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Abstract 
Police legitimacy is fundamental to the relationship between the state, citizens and their police, 
and this is nowhere more challenging than in public order policing contexts. Procedural Justice 
(PJ) and the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) have gained dominance in UK policing 
as the means of establishing greater perceptions of police legitimacy and public compliance 
and cooperation with the police and the law. Much of the theorising and empirical research in 
this field has been conducted with regard to police reform, complaint handling, crime reduction 
and sporting event policing. However, there are limitations to both PJ and the ESIM 
approaches within public order contexts. PJ and the ESIM assume that violence and disorder 
stem from a failure of policing to create perceptions of police legitimacy. However, this is 
problematic for the policing of protest and public order for three interrelated reasons. Firstly, 
there are occasions when violence occurs despite the police use of PJ and ESIM approaches. 
Secondly, ignoring or underplaying this detail serves to demoralise the police and undermines 
their trust in using PJ and the ESIM. Thirdly, an insistence on police use of PJ and ESIM as 
the exclusively legitimate means of dealing with violence and disorder, ignores different 
approaches to police legitimacy that are not found within the PJ or ESIM literature. The 
findings presented in the thesis suggest that PJ and the ESIM do not necessarily work in 
protest contexts, because protesters’ self-policing, a key claim of the ESIM, does not 
necessarily equate to compliance with the law and authority. Personal values and moral 
legitimacy are important aspects of protest contexts that feature less prominently than required 
within the PJ and ESIM research. The thesis argues that police legitimacy, defined empirically, 
needs to be understood with regard to the policing context. It is in this respect that the thesis 
claims an original contribution by identifying and explaining contextually based influences 
associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and 
their attitudes to compliance and cooperation. The thesis uses a mixed method approach to 
examine the claim of PJ and the ESIM that fair and respectful treatment garners increased 
perceptions of police legitimacy and creates compliance and cooperation with the law and the 
police. The empirical research comprises an exploratory quantitative survey (n=40), qualitative 
interviews (n=79) and non-participant observations at thirteen protest events in London 
between 2010 and 2015. The findings establish that while the general claims of PJ hold and 
that social identity forms part of perceived police legitimacy, protesters’ perceptions need to 
be understood contextually. A contextually driven model of police legitimacy (CDM) developed 
from empirical data is presented, it suggests that additional influences other than fair and 
respectful policing play a determining role in constructing and shaping protester perceptions 
of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation. The theoretical 
implications are considered and professional practice recommendations for the policing of 
protest are presented. 
 
 
Key words: police legitimacy, procedural justice, protest, ESIM, compliance and 
cooperation. 
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Glossary 
ACPO The Association of Chief Police Officers was a not-for-profit private limited 
company that led the development of policing practices in the UK. It was 
established in 1948 as a forum for chief officers to share ideas and 
coordinate their strategic operational responses. It was replaced in 2015 by 
the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC). 
Antifa A term originally used to describe the Anti-Faschistische Aktion group (a 
German anti-fascist organisation), often used as an umbrella term to denote 
a protest network opposed to fascism. 
BF Britain First are a far-right British political organisation formed in 2011 by 
former members of the British National Party. 
Bitcoin A cryptocurrency and worldwide payment system. It is the first decentralized 
digital currency without a central bank or single administrator. 
Black Bloc A Black Bloc is the name given to a protest tactic usually carried out by 
protesters who wear black clothing. It involves direct action and sometimes 
the use of violence at protests. The term refers to the activity and is not an 
identifiable movement or protest group. 
BNP The British National Party is a far-right political party formed in 1982 by 
former members of the National Front in the United Kingdom. 
CIA The community impact assessment is used by the police to identify issues 
that may affect a community’s confidence in the ability of the police to 
respond effectively to their needs, thereby enhancing the police response. 
Climate 
Camp 
A protest camp organised by the Campaign against Climate Change. They 
bring people together to push for action to prevent the destabilisation of 
global climate. 
Containment A police tactic for controlling crowds. It involves the formation of cordons 
(lines) of police officers who then move to contain a crowd within a limited 
area. It is sometimes referred to as “kettling” outside of the police service. 
CoP 
 
The College of Policing is a professional body for the police in England and 
Wales. It was established in 2012 to take over a number of training and 
development roles that were previously the responsibility of the National 
Policing Improvement Agency. 
EDL English Defence League is a far-right movement which focuses on 
opposition to immigration, Islamism and Sharia in the United Kingdom. 
EG Evidence Gatherer – a uniformed police officer with the remit to record audio-
visual evidence during the policing of protest and disorder. Usually deployed 
in pairs as an EG team. 
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ESIM The Elaborated Social Identity model proposes that conflict in crowds 
emerges directly from social identity processes and inter-group dynamics, 
usually between the police and crowd members. 
FIT Forward Intelligence Team consisting of two or more uniformed police 
officers who are deployed to gather intelligence during protests. 
G20 The Group of Twenty is an international forum founded in 1999 for the 
governments and central bank governors of selected countries. It discusses 
policy relating to international financial matters. 
HMIC Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary was the body responsible for 
assessing and reporting on the performance and effectiveness of the police 
service in England and Wales until 2017. 
HMICFRS Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Service. In 
2017 HMIC also took over the inspections of England’s fire & rescue 
services, assessing and reporting on their efficiency, effectiveness and 
leadership. The name changed from HMIC to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Service (HMICFRS). 
IPP Imprisonment for Public Protection were sentences created by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 and used from April 2005, they were designed to protect 
the public from serious offenders whose crimes did not merit a life sentence. 
They were abolished for new sentences from 2012. 
Kettling See Containment. 
NCTT  
 
The National Community Tension Team is a strategic body under the 
National Police Chiefs’ Council responsible for community intelligence 
doctrine and briefing to UK police forces. 
NPCC The National Police Chiefs’ Council coordinates the operational response 
across the service to terrorism, organised crime and national emergencies. 
The NPCC brings together and is funded by police forces in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland as well as the armed services and some overseas UK 
territories. 
NPIA 
 
The National Policing Improvement Agency was a non-departmental public 
body in the UK that was established to support the police by providing 
training, guidance and expertise. It closed in 2012 with many functions 
passing to the College of Policing (CoP). 
Occupy Occupy is an international socio-political movement that protests against 
social and economic inequality. 
PACE The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is an Act of Parliament which 
instituted a legislative framework for the powers of police officers in England 
and Wales and provided codes of practice for the exercise of those powers. 
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PEEL An acronym for the Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy 
inspection process carried out by HMIC/HMICFRS. 
PERF The Police Executive Research Forum is a national organisation of police 
executives in the United States. Its aim is to improve policing and advance 
professionalism through research and public policy debate. 
PJ Procedural Justice is a psychologically-based compliance theory with 
Durkheimian and Weberian foundations. It emphasises the primary role of 
fair processes and respectful treatment at the hands of authority in 
establishing public perceptions of legitimacy with compliance and 
cooperation as its corollary. 
PLO/PLT Protest Liaison Officer/Protest Liaison Team - specially trained police 
officers (or teams of such) who are deployed to work with protest organisers 
and protesters before, during and after an event. The purpose being to 
facilitate lawful, peaceful protest by dialogue between the two. 
PSU A Police Support Unit is a body of police officers trained in specialist public 
order policing tactics. Sometimes deployed with helmets, overalls and 
shields it consists of 1 inspector, 3 sergeants and 18 constables. 
SAC  
 
Students against Cuts also known as the National Campaign Against Fees 
and Cuts is an organisation of activist students and education workers who 
campaign against tuition fees, education cuts and privatisation in the UK.  
Searchlight A British magazine founded in 1975 which publishes exposés about racism, 
antisemitism and fascism. 
Snatch 
squad 
A team of police officers deployed into a crowd to arrest and remove an 
identified person suspected of an offence. Also known as an arrest team. 
SPR The Strategic Policing Requirement sets out the threats, police response and 
resources required for defined crime types and policing situations in the UK. 
Threat 
assessment 
A threat assessment is based on facts, information and intelligence and 
forms the basis for the police response to a situation. 
TPA The Peoples’ Assembly is a UK political protest and pressure group that was 
launched in 2013 to oppose austerity and cuts to public services. 
TUC The Trades’ Union Congress is a national federation of trade unions in 
England and Wales, representing the majority of trade unions. 
UAF Unite against Fascism is an anti-fascist pressure group in the UK formed 
around 2003. 
UKIP The UK Independence Party is a Eurosceptic and right-wing political party in 
the United Kingdom. It emerged from the Anti-Federalist League and was 
renamed in 1993. 
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Introduction 
“You have to challenge authority to change things, this is the way to a better system, we the 
few, doing it for the many. I am not here to do what the police want, they’re part of the 
problem. Resist. Rebel. Revolt.” (Interviewee TPA3, The Peoples’ Assembly)  
Police legitimacy lies at the heart of the relationship between the state, citizens and their 
police. The primary focus of this thesis is on the construction and shaping of protester 
perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to cooperation and compliance. It is both 
theoretically and empirically-based. The empirical research uses an approach that Jefferson 
(1990, p. 16) has called “bottom up - the vantage point of the policed”, one that privileges the 
protester’s point of view. Additionally, it draws upon theoretical perspectives of police 
legitimacy and uses non-participant observation informed by many years of professional 
expertise and competence. It seeks to make sense of protester perceptions of police 
legitimacy, provide contextual analysis and a more nuanced understanding of their sources. 
The thesis argues that police legitimacy, defined empirically, needs to be understood with 
regard to the policing context. 
 The policing of protest is an activity that places police legitimacy under intense pressure 
and scrutiny. It has received much public, academic and professional attention in recent years, 
specifically within the Procedural Justice (PJ) (Jackson et al, 2011, Tyler, 1990) and the 
Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) (Stott, 1998, 2009) literature. PJ has gained status 
as orthodoxy in UK policing as the means to establish greater police legitimacy and foster 
compliance and cooperation with the police and the law. The ESIM is instated as the dominant 
model for understanding crowd dynamics (Stott, 2009) and it informs policing strategy and 
tactics in the UK aimed at enhancing police legitimacy and reducing conflict (HMIC, 2009a, 
2009b). A positive contribution of both approaches has been to significantly raise the level of 
interest and debate about police legitimacy. However, neither PJ or the ESIM address the 
presence and influence of antecedents and contingencies on the construction and shaping of 
protester perceptions of police legitimacy. These antecedents and contingencies appear to 
derive from three main sources: 
• The asymmetry of policing (Skogan, 2004, 2006, 2012);  
• Social distancing and motivational posturing (Braithwaite, 2009, 2010, 2011); 
• The dialogic nature of police legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013).  
These sources are expanded upon in chapter one. Ultimately, they demonstrate complexities 
that are currently missing from our understanding of the nuances of police legitimacy in the 
policing of protest.  
 Protest is an area of policing in which it can be difficult to be reflective, yet arguably where 
it is most important to do so. The thesis investigates theoretically and empirically, the 
influences associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police 
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legitimacy and their attitudes to cooperation and compliance with the police and the law. 
Through the empirical data it presents a contextually driven model1 of police legitimacy (CDM) 
consisting of four factors. The four factors underpinning the model are: 1) protester 
constructions of policing which concern views about the perceived role and function of the 
police and the narratives that are created and communicated by protesters; 2) power and 
identity relationships between protesters, and protesters and the police; 3) levels of protester 
engagement and distancing concerning their positions on cooperation or defiance with the law 
and the police; and 4), pre-existing protester ideology concerning their political or dogmatic 
positions that may serve to frame the context of protest and its policing. A full account of the 
CDM, together with a narrative detailing its development from the empirical data is provided 
in chapter six. However, a preliminary outline is shown here in order to set the scene for the 
reader (figure 0.1). 
 
 
Figure 0.1 The contextually driven model of police legitimacy. 
 
                                                          
1 The term “model” is used to denote an explanatory framework that is constructed from the empirical 
data and informed by related theories. The research process, coding and analysis of the data was 
informed by grounded theory method, but the thesis does not claim a grounded theory. 
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 The introductory chapter will outline how the concept of legitimacy can be interpreted and 
understood in different ways, it introduces the tenets of PJ and the ESIM highlighting their 
contributions to policing and articulates the link between them. It orientates the thesis 
theoretically and sets out the research questions. Through a mixed method study, the 
empirical research investigates the claim of PJ and the ESIM that fair and respectful treatment 
by the police increases perceptions of police legitimacy and engenders compliance and 
cooperation. It also identifies additional influences that are associated with the construction 
and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy.  
 The empirical research was conducted across 13 protest events in London over a five-
year period between 2010 and 2015. It comprises an exploratory, quantitative survey (n=40) 
and qualitative interviews (n=79) with protesters, and non-participant observations by the 
researcher. The thesis engages with the burgeoning body of theorising and empirical research 
literature within the fields of PJ and the ESIM as they relate to police legitimacy, both generally 
but more specifically to protest. It critically examines the influence that they weigh in policing 
practice, policy and training and makes recommendations for future research and professional 
practice. PJ and the ESIM are examined in more detail as the thesis unfolds, but a very short 
explanation of each is provided here to assist the reader in understanding the terms being 
applied. 
What is PJ? 
PJ is a psychologically-based compliance theory with Durkheimian and Weberian foundations 
(Hough et al, 2010; Tyler, 1990). It emphasises the primary role of fair processes and 
respectful treatment at the hands of authority (such as the police) in establishing public 
perceptions of legitimacy, with compliance and cooperation as its corollary (Tyler, 1990, 2006). 
PJ focuses on the way that police and other legal authorities interact with the public, and how 
the characteristics of those interactions shape views of the police and public willingness to 
obey the law.  
 PJ is based on four main principles, 1) treating people with dignity and respect, 2) 
giving people a 'voice' during encounters with authority, 3) neutrality in decision making, and 
4) conveying trustworthiness (Tyler, 2006). PJ approaches in the criminal justice system are 
process-based rather than outcome focused, that is to say that they emphasise quality of 
contact and fairness over results and effectiveness. The corresponding effect of perceptions 
of legitimacy are held to occur because the experience of fairness and respectful treatment 
fosters feelings of trust and shared identity between people and authority. 
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What is the ESIM? 
The ESIM is derived from social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and it proposes that 
conflict in crowds emerges directly from social identity processes and inter-group dynamics, 
usually between the police and the crowd (Reicher, 1996a; Stott, 2009). The ESIM posits that 
individual identity in a crowd context transforms from a personal to a predominantly social 
(group) identity. This transformation provides people with a frame of reference for judging 
whether they are able to act in particular ways, such as opposition to the police or another 
group who are present. The ESIM argues that the quality of contact with the police informs 
these identities and behaviours, such that a negatively perceived police action is likely to 
evoke hostile group reactions directed at the police (Stott, 1998, 2009). In contrast, positive, 
facilitative measures carried out by the police encourage cooperation and “self-policing” within 
groups (Reicher, 1996a; Stott, 2009, 2011). 
 The theoretical framework of the thesis is drawn from these two approaches. From PJ 
with regard to the concept of empirical legitimacy and its corollary of compliance and 
cooperation (Tyler, 1990, 2006). From the ESIM (Stott, 1998, 2009) as it relates to a reliance 
on emerging perceptions of police illegitimacy in understanding protester behaviour and 
cooperation with the police and the law. The constituents of PJ have been cultivated through 
an expanding body of work across Europe, Australia and the US (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003a; 
Tyler, 1990, 2006; Jackson et al, 2011). In the UK the ESIM is currently pre-eminent in the 
policing of sporting events and protest crowds (Stott, 2009, 2011). Together, these two 
perspectives inform the theoretical setting for my investigation into the construction and 
shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and 
cooperation with the law and police at protest events. 
The concept of legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a core concept in PJ and ESIM. Before discussing the version of legitimacy upon 
which they rely, I will outline some broader observations related to the notion of legitimacy. 
While the thesis specifically engages with the version of legitimacy that PJ and the ESIM 
assume, we should acknowledge other theoretical considerations regarding the concept of 
legitimacy and how it can be interpreted.  
 In most areas of policing, the existence and authority of the police is assumed, 
meaning that legitimacy becomes questions about fairness, respect and police conduct, rather 
than the existence of the police per se. However, in conflictual situations such as protest and 
disorder, such order cannot be so readily assumed. Protest contexts are fluid and dynamic, in 
such a way that the very authority of the police is at times drawn into question. Arguably, 
protest is aimed at challenging such order and authority. 
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 The simplicity offered by PJ makes it an attractive proposition as a means to generate 
greater police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance. However, such simplicity 
complicates its application to explaining police legitimacy in complex policing contexts such 
as protest since PJ relies upon a particular version of legitimacy that is Rawlsian in nature 
which assumes established order in society as a given (Rawls, 1971). The work of Hobbes, 
Locke and Kant focused on the need to justify the existence of authority and that order could 
not just be assumed. Hobbes, in part saw crime and disorder as a norm, rather than 
pathological, in the sense that authorities needed to bring about order. However, later 
interpretations of legitimacy have assumed the existence of order and the discussion becomes 
one about how police authority should be exercised. PJ relies on an assumption of established 
order. However, whilst relying on the concept of empirical legitimacy it perhaps fails to grapple 
some fundamental challenges associated with it, for instance, what if people eschew the 
established order or fail to recognise the authority of the police or the law? 
 The legitimacy of the state (and by association its agents) is often framed in 
Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian terms (Simmons, 2001). However, with their social scientific 
focus PJ and the ESIM appear less concerned with the moral and political philosophical 
dimensions of legitimacy. Moral and political philosophy have wrestled with the notions of the 
legitimacy of the state and citizens’ obligations and rights for centuries before the inception of 
the social sciences. The Lockean tradition identifies the need to account for the nature and 
justification of political obligation and state legitimacy, seeing the two as distinct (Simmons, 
2001). PJ and the ESIM do not rely upon a distinction. Why should this matter we may ask? It 
matters, since in philosophical terms their interpretation of legitimacy outcomes, such as 
compliance and cooperation arising from a person’s felt obligation, ignores the idea that 
compliance with the state and its agents can be an obligation quite independent from how they 
“feel” about it. Reliance on the notion that there is no overriding need for obligation to the state, 
risks plunging us into the realms of philosophical anarchism that ranges from a repudiation of 
the existence of the state or its functionaries with a call to replace it with a more subjectively 
acceptable version based on a “balance of reasons” (Simmons, 2001, p.108). That is to say, 
by applying degrees of weight to the obligations being placed upon us. Our decision making 
in this way becomes highly contextualised. Simmons explains in the following terms: 
The finality or imperatives of rights or obligations is, on the balance of reasons, 
very much a function of the context within which they are exercised. (Simmons, 
2001, p.108) 
 The notion of legitimacy applied in PJ is one more reliant on a Weberian tradition, 
which sees legitimacy as gifted to the state by its subjects through levels of acceptance or 
denial of its authority (Beetham, 1991, 2013). However, a reliance on beliefs, personal 
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attitudes and public perceptions as defining legitimacy is not without significant argument. 
Simmons (2001) draws a distinction between their presence and that of what constitutes 
legitimacy as follows: 
The attitudes of a state’s subjects can at best be part of what argues for its 
legitimacy, not that in which its legitimacy consists (emphasis added). 
(Simmons, 2001, p.133) 
This differs from an analysis basing legitimacy solely on empirical perceptions and subjectivity 
alone. The latter ultimately reduces legitimacy to nothing more than the ability of the state (or 
its agents) to produce feelings of acceptance and allegiance. Defining legitimacy in these 
terms is merely the capacity of the authority to engender certain beliefs in its subjects. 
Simmons (2001) elaborates on this further by noting that no state can theoretically claim a 
right to impose and enforce a binding duty on its subjects purely on feelings of loyalty or some 
innate or contrived ability to create them. In reality, it can be argued that there are simply 
situations where much to their chagrin people will not like what is done to or required of them 
or others as members of society. In philosophical terms, we may contend that we cannot solely 
rely upon legitimacy based on attitudinal aspects, instead accepting the idea “that a state is 
legitimate and will, typically we hope (emphasis added) result in feelings, beliefs or attitudes 
but this is not necessarily the case” (Simmons, 2001, p.134). 
 In policing, a further problem with basing legitimacy on public consensus alone is that 
there are limits as to how far the police can respond to popular views. This is highlighted in an 
example provided by Wood (2017): 
…the police will not always be able to gain consensual support for protecting a known 
paedophile or allowing a racist organization to march through the town centre. (Wood, 
2017, p.42) 
The point here is that the police do do such things, because whilst they might not be supported 
by the majority, it remains the “right” thing to do. This is the nature of moral rather than 
consensual legitimacy arising from public opinion (Wood, 2017). The concept of legitimacy 
then can be interpreted differently to that based on consensual perceptions.  
 In the Lockean sense legitimacy is the state’s right to impose on us through legally 
binding directives. This differs from a Kantian view in which, although born with an innate right 
to freedom, people obligate themselves to civil society for rights to be realised and protected. 
The notion that the state somehow deserves our obligation features in Rawls’ account of 
legitimacy, but in such a way that justifying the state is unimportant (Rawls, 1971, 1995; 
Simmons, 2001). Rawls (1971) appears to rely on an acceptance of the state in some form 
and of its use of coercion. In Simmons’ analysis of Rawls’ work, it appears the question 
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becomes one of “what sort of state” (2001, p.143) not whether there should be one. We might 
conclude that in a Rawlsian sense we need only demonstrate that a state is legitimate because 
“reasonable members of a society can accept it as the best conception of the good” (Rawls, 
1995, p.144). Moreover, that it can be assessed by external, validating criteria. How then might 
we understand legitimacy in these objective terms? 
Objective legitimacy  
Objective legitimacy is defined by morally justifiable objective criteria (Beetham, 2013). Thus, 
authority can be viewed as legitimate not simply because of a subjective assessment by those 
subject to it, but because it meets external universal requirements, those of “rationally, 
defensible, normative principles” (Beetham, 2013, p. 5). Therefore, any normative conception 
of legitimacy has to describe why meeting these criteria confers authority on norms, institutions 
or persons. It can be argued for on a rational basis, such as why the criteria generate morally 
binding rules. Whereas empirical legitimacy means stating that people believe an arrangement 
to be right and just, normative legitimacy means substantive recognition that the truth (or 
validity) of these arrangements is right and just. For evidence of objective criteria, we might 
look to the example of universal human rights2 such as those of the right to life, freedom from 
slavery and freedom from torture (Simmons, 2001) or the protection of the rights of others 
(Wood, 2017). These can be argued for on a rational basis, independent of public consensus.  
 According to Beetham (2013, p.6) the definition of legitimacy commonly applied in the 
social sciences is distinguishable from that in political philosophy on the basis that it is 
“concerned with legitimacy in particular historical societies rather than universally; with 
legitimacy in given social contexts (emphasis added) rather that independent of any particular 
context: with social relations rather than ideal ones”. With PJ and the ESIM focusing on 
perceptions of legitimacy and attitudes about cooperation and compliance in a given context, 
how might we better understand the term empirical legitimacy and the subjective basis behind 
it? 
Empirical legitimacy 
Empirical legitimacy as commonly applied in the social sciences is Weberian in nature (Hinsch, 
2008). Specifically, this interpretation of legitimacy is concerned with public recognition or 
approval of authority, values or norms. Where this notion is applied to the law, it is deemed 
                                                          
2 Irrespective of whether we believe human rights can be established objectively, it is beyond question 
that their efficacy and meaning can only be established if they are accepted and assumed to be 
objective moral criteria. In this respect, human rights are distinct from, and more than legal rights. 
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legitimate when people perceive it as a norm that should be complied with (Jackson and 
Bradford, 2010a). Hinsch (2008, p.40) explains that “the empirical understanding of legitimacy 
naturally occupies a central place in explanatory theories of social order”. This is interpreted 
by Jackson and Bradford (2010a) in the following way: 
An observer sitting outside the system might find a particular arrangement unjust 
and unacceptable, but they must nevertheless conclude that it is legitimate when 
those governed believe (emphasis added) it to be so. To say something is 
legitimate is to make a claim about the subjective (emphasis added) state of mind 
of particular individuals. (Jackson and Bradford, 2010a, p.2) 
Consequently, according to the notion of empirical legitimacy we could say that the police are 
legitimate when citizens feel obligated and inclined towards them. However, as one of the 
most renowned authorities on legitimacy in the social sciences, Beetham (1991, 2013) notes 
that this is only part of empirical legitimacy and he presents us with something of a hybrid 
model. Beetham (1991) draws on both objective and empirical notions of legitimacy, in which 
he attends to how power is legitimised by authority. There are three dimensions to this, 1) 
conformation to established rules, 2) justification of the rules and 3) evidence of consent by 
sub-ordinates to authority. Beetham (2013, p.16) explains that “the first is that of rules, the 
second is that of belief, and the third is that of actions (emphasis added)”.  
 There are five important observations arising from Beetham’s multi-dimensional 
account of legitimacy which differs from a purely normative or empirical stance. Firstly, that 
power can be legitimate when the rules relating to its acquisition and maintenance are formal 
(such as the law) or informal (such as custom and convention). Secondly, that the power 
creating such rules has a justifiably valid source of authority. Thirdly, that rules alone are 
insufficient to secure legitimacy unless they have justification derived from beliefs shared by 
both the authority and its sub-ordinates. Fourthly, what suffices as justification may go beyond 
what is legally defined yet must still be based on logic and rational justification. Fifthly, 
expressed consent, seen through the actions of sub-ordinates, introduces a moral and 
normative commitment on their part: its public expression gives rise to the legitimation of 
power (Beetham, 1991, 2013). Thus, according to Beetham any consideration of legitimacy 
must involve both normative and empirically-based elements. 
 The discussion above demonstrates a distinction between different interpretations of 
legitimacy, how then is police legitimacy to be understood in PJ? The framework applied in PJ 
is an empirical one focused on public mandate and opinion (Jackson et al, 2011). PJ theorists 
tend to apply three criteria to assessing whether police authority is appropriate, proper and 
just, that is to say, the criteria which underpin the public mandate of police legitimacy. First, a 
criterion termed the obligation to “obey” (or what Beetham (1991) calls expressed consent). 
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Here, the perceived legitimacy of the police is concerned with whether people would obey the 
instructions of the police, even if they disagreed with the reasons. Secondly, a criterion termed 
moral alignment, where the legitimacy of the police is concerned with whether their decisions 
reflect the personal values of people and their social group(s). Thirdly, a criterion based on 
perceptions of legality, wherein legitimate authority is believed to be following its own rules 
and regulations. This is an empirical framework, wherein no single criterion is prioritised, but 
all must co-exist in the relationship between the police and policed for the police to be deemed 
legitimate (Jackson et al, 2011). Thus, police legitimacy is actualised or instantiated by specific 
acts of deference, compliance or cooperation by the public. It is consensual. Arguably, 
legitimacy seen in this way is highly context specific since according to Mawby (2002) “[the] 
legitimacy of the public police [is] potentially held up for scrutiny when any policing activity is 
engaged in” (2002, p.53). 
 Tyler’s (1990, 2006) original PJ model identifies trust and confidence as a mediating 
link between peoples’ experiences of policing and their perceptions of police legitimacy. In 
other words, perceived legitimacy may be damaged by low public confidence in police 
effectiveness, fairness and engagement with communities. Tyler (2006) defines legitimacy as 
being the psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads 
those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just. According to Bradford 
and Jackson (2011) the premise is one in which procedurally just and fair treatment at the 
hands of the police is linked not only to public satisfaction, but also with an inclination to offer 
support and assistance in the future and personal compliance with the law (Tyler and Huo, 
2002). The work of Tyler and other PJ theorists suggests that the conduct of police officers, 
especially during moments of contact with the public is pivotal in constructing and shaping 
perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. However, this seems a 
rather clinical and unilateral approach devoid of any recognition of the various contextual 
complexities of policing and public attitudes, especially those of protest and public order 
situations. 
 In general terms, PJ theorists see the police as representatives of society and the 
legitimacy of the police as an institution as bound up with the dominant social order (Jackson 
and Bradford, 2009). They see challenges to these assumptions by society as rare, citing that 
the police in England and Wales retain a relatively high level of support among the public 
which speaks to “a continued recognition and justification for the police” (Jackson and 
Bradford, 2009, p.3). However, they recognise that on the other hand, legitimacy is more 
contested at the level of personal interaction between the police and the public. Individuals 
appear readier to challenge police authority at this level (Jackson and Bradford, 2009; Loader 
and Mulcahy, 2003; Reiner, 2010). We might consider that given their dynamic and 
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contentious nature protest situations provide ideal circumstances for police legitimacy to be 
challenged, rendering it ‘tentative and brittle…to be renegotiated case-by-case’ (Reiner, 2010, 
p.162). This demonstrates that the underlying assumptions of PJ about the presence of order 
and authority are not ubiquitous in every policing situation, they are context relevant. 
Legitimacy, procedural justice and policing 
Policing represents a wide variety of circumstances that have the potential for contention 
between the police and citizens, challenging the nature of the relationship between citizens, 
the police and the state. The police find themselves thrust to the forefront of maintaining social 
order and come to represent the very public and at times coercive face of state authority, as 
such, these occasions always bring the issue of police legitimacy sharply into focus (Reiner, 
2010; Wright, 2002). Waddington (2003) highlights the problematic nature of policing 
contention in the following terms: 
The legitimacy of law enforcement may at any time become problematic but is 
not intrinsically so. Criminals are ipso facto beyond the moral community and 
police can readily don the mantle of moral superiority. This is quite different 
when those whom the police seek to restrain or suppress are motivated by 
ideals. In these circumstances any police action (even mere presence) may be 
interpreted as illegitimate. In other words, policing contention is unavoidably 
‘political’. (Waddington, 2003, p.395) 
In a liberal democracy, the police find themselves between a proverbial rock and a hard place 
in balancing expectations that they will facilitate the right to free speech, assembly and 
association with concerns about public safety and the maintenance of law and order. 
 Contextually, in protest situations the police tread a fine path between perceived 
legitimacy and illegitimacy, with the prospect of what pleases one being met with displeasure 
from others, in building trust and cooperation with some while eroding it in others. However, 
there are clearly occasions where the police must act to prevent injury, damage to property 
and by objective criteria behave with decorum to no avail. In this sense police legitimacy 
understood empirically (as PJ does) is always conditional, never absolute and highly context 
specific (Waddington, 1994a, 1999). What is clear from my empirical data (see chapter six) is 
that protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy have deep and far reaching antecedents and 
contingencies, with outcomes for both the police and protesters. I argue and demonstrate 
through the data that the contextual aspects of protest exercise significant influence on the 
construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to 
cooperation and compliance with the police and the law. 
 The behaviour and activities of police officers during encounters with the public can be 
essential to the way in which perceptions of the police are formed. It has been suggested that 
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direct and specific contact with the police often results in lower levels of overall confidence, 
however this is not conclusively the case (Myhill and Quinton, 2011). In the UK, public 
confidence in the police together with perceptions of police fairness have remained largely 
stable. It may be the case that on occasions some improvement can be gained by positive 
encounters, which is what PJ and the ESIM approaches to policing propose, but it appears 
that the best case may be to hope for a maintenance of existing trust and confidence levels 
(Myhill and Beak, 2008; Myhill and Quinton, 2011). Since protest situations often involve 
police-initiated contact with the public, police responses are likely to cause neutral or lowered 
satisfaction levels if this general observation holds true in those contexts (Myhill and Beak, 
2008). Indeed, my empirical data suggest that protesters see protest policing as being 
distinctly different from day-to-day general police duties and public interaction. Improved 
service, measured in confidence terms may not always follow with greater gain for police 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The relationship between treatment and confidence in the 
police according to Skogan (2006, p.100) may be “asymmetrical rather than balanced. Good 
days may not balance out bad days. At its worst the police may get essentially no credit for 
doing a good job while a bad experience deeply influences peoples view of performance and 
legitimacy”. Therefore, the asymmetrical nature of policing arises as a potential contingent to 
PJ and the ESIM accounts of police legitimacy. 
 However diverse the definitions of legitimacy are, a common feature of that relied upon 
in PJ research is that it confers both the right to command and promotes the (felt) duty to 
comply and cooperate (Tyler, 1990; Weber, 1978). This duty may be one imposed through an 
external driver, such as that derived from fear of sanction or punishment or from an 
internalised one which sees the obligation felt as a personal and moral one, because it is the 
‘right thing to do’. The former condition may be termed instrumental compliance and the latter 
as normative (Bradford and Jackson, 2010, Tyler, 1990). In normative compliance citizens 
defer and comply with legitimate authorities because they have a belief that it is right to do so 
(Sunshine and Tyler, 2003a, 2003b). In simple terms, the conception sees the law as 
legitimate because citizens view the system and its agents as providing a suitable standard 
that can be followed, the implication here is that people are influenced not by sheer power 
alone but because they feel and believe the rules and decisions to be fair, proper and worthy 
of ‘obedience’. The description highlights again the deeply affective and contextual features 
of empirical legitimacy.  
 The law is one means by which the state creates or maintains social control. PJ views 
compliance with it, forced by the exercise of instrumental means alone as costly, largely 
ineffective and ultimately inefficient, it being more short-term because it is not internalised by 
the public. Indeed, in PJ’s analysis of policing and crime control, the threat of sanction or 
punishment is never enough to secure widespread compliance and cooperation in society 
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(Tyler, 1990, 2006). Fundamentally, due to the nature of protest, it is a context where empirical 
legitimacy is more fluid, dynamic and precarious; being defined or redefined accordingly as a 
result of contact with the police (Jackson and Bradford, 2010a, 2010b; Stott, 2009). This 
observation, I suggest, is problematic for wholesale reliance on PJ and empirical legitimacy 
as a general and ubiquitous approach to policing. Moreover, a note of caution should be 
applied since such a notion infers that experience of police contact is the sole means by which 
legitimacy is made or broken. I will demonstrate through the empirical data that protester 
evaluations of contact with the police are not the only means by which they construct and 
shape their perceptions of police legitimacy. Nor does positive contact with the police 
necessarily result in protesters expressing views of compliance and cooperation with the law 
or the police. Arguably, such inferences by PJ and the ESIM are too simplistic as far as 
understanding the complexity of police legitimacy in the context of protest. I contend that there 
are additional factors at work that impact upon the routes to perceived police legitimacy and 
public cooperation and compliance. 
 In the study of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation with the law, PJ 
(Tyler, 1990, 2004) has undoubtedly emerged as one of the most influential theoretical 
perspectives in recent times. A plethora of commentaries, analyses and research studies have 
emerged demonstrating its application across the world (Bradford et al, 2009; Jackson et al, 
2011; Mazerolle et al, 2013; Myhill and Quinton, 2011; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003a, 2003b). In 
a sense, PJ is presented as a panacea for the problem of crime and disorder and improving 
police-public relations. How then might we understand its contribution to policing? 
The contribution of procedural justice to policing 
The general contribution of PJ to policing can be summarised from Jackson and Bradford’s 
work (2010a, 2010b) in that how the police treat people matters not just on legal or ethical 
grounds, but in terms of influencing generally how society interacts with the police. Specifically, 
whether the public will cooperate in all aspects of crime control and crime prevention, by 
engaging in formal and informal crime prevention, such as making reports of crime and 
incidents to the police and generally supporting the public police in its activities (Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003a; Murphy et al, 2009; Tyler, 2004). Jackson and Bradford (2010a) explain the PJ 
contribution to policing in the following terms: 
 
Fair and decent treatment fosters satisfaction with the authority involved, 
enhances legitimacy and increases cooperation. If that authority is the police this 
enhanced legitimacy is further held to boost compliance with the law and 
encourage self-regulation. In contrast, if the police are perceived to be 
illegitimate not only will cooperation decline but people will be less likely to obey 
the law, encouraging or forcing authorities to take a more punitive and/or 
aggressive stance. (2010a: p.6)  
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Thus, the widespread contribution to policing claimed by PJ is that improving or increasing 
public perceptions of police legitimacy will universally augment compliance with the law 
without the need for police intervention or coercion, fostering generalised cooperation and 
compliance as a felt, public duty to do so. However, most commonly PJ is applied and 
researched in certain policing contexts such as beat duties (such as traffic stops), community-
based engagement initiatives, stop and search operations and complaint handling (Mazerolle 
et al, 2013). We may question then whether its general claim carries to each and every quarter 
of policing practice and more pertinently that of protest and public order. In short, whether it 
really is a case of what worked, specifically, not what works universally.  
The contribution of the elaborated social identity model to policing 
Whilst PJ has established broad appeal and application in policing and crime control, the ESIM 
is aimed more specifically at crowd management and protest policing. Significantly, ESIM-
based policing and best practice currently provide the driving force from both police and 
academic directions in these areas (Stott, 2009). The revised manual of guidance for public 
order policing Keeping the Peace (ACPO, 2010) and recommendations contained in a variety 
of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) reports, rely heavily upon the work and 
influence of the main protagonists in this field of study (HMIC, 2009a; 2009b; Stott, 2009). 
These recommendations are endorsed as being able to “shape the future of national public 
order policing and drive changes in [police] preparation for protest and our relationships with 
those involved” (HMIC, 2009b, p.2). The discipline of social psychology offers a significant 
amount of empirical research that accounts for the dynamics at work in crowds and the 
reasons for the development of collective disorder. The ESIM is most relevant to the policing 
of protest given its emphasis on the interactional level and its dominance and primacy appear 
as yet unchallenged. Accordingly, in a submission to HMIC, Stott (2009) declared the ESIM 
as: 
The leading scientific theory of crowd psychology. It provides a theoretical basis 
for accurately explaining and predicting the nature of crowd behaviour, particularly 
as this relates to the emergence of collective disorder. (Stott, 2009, p.2) 
On this basis, the ESIM has gained considerable momentum within the policing of sporting 
events and protest crowds.  
 The ESIM is based on the social identity theory developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) 
which was originally formulated to explain intergroup prejudice and discrimination. It posits 
that a person has not one, but several identities that correspond to different group 
memberships or affiliations into which a person enters through a process of self-categorization 
(Reicher, 2003; Stott and Reicher,1998a). An individual is deemed to have multiple social 
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identities derived from perceived membership of various social groups. In general terms, those 
who perceive that they share the same social identity behave in ways that act against 
outsiders, but for their confederates. Thus, creating a “them” and “us” situation, this is typically 
referred to as an in-group and out-group dynamic (Stott, 2009). The ESIM explains how crowd 
disorder develops due to changes in crowd member’s social identities, as a direct result of 
their perceptions of police legitimacy (Stott, 1998; Stott and Pearson, 2007). Stott et al (2001) 
explain the basis for this change in the following way: 
Social identity processes involve the dynamics of intergroup relationships. 
Therefore, rather than context being seen as something external to identity, the 
context in which one group acts is formed by the actions of the other. (Stott et al, 
2001, p.363) 
The immediate context then appears significant in the ESIM, but it gives little significance to 
antecedents and factors outside of it. Stott (2009, 2011) proposes that emergent perceptions 
of police illegitimacy are the central drivers of conflict, quite beyond prior intentions. Therefore, 
the ESIM relies on the idea of emerging notions of legitimacy and takes little or no account of 
any antecedents or contingencies to police legitimacy. Ostensibly, it relies upon an acceptance 
that these notions emerge during the protest event itself based predominantly on contact with 
the police. The ESIM, which focuses on explaining the development of crowd conflict appears 
to provide a feasible, but perhaps limited explanation for the emergence of violence and 
disorder during dynamic encounters with the police. Furthermore, it does not account for the 
range of sources from which perceptions of police legitimacy are constructed and shaped.  
 What the ESIM does provide is a framework for protest policing based on four 
elements. Firstly, an understanding of the role of social identities in the crowd, gleaned from 
operational knowledge about the psychological groups that are present. Reicher (2011) 
summarises the importance of understanding the group culture for the following reason: 
...if public order policing put as much emphasis on cultural intelligence as on 
criminal intelligence it would be in a better position to pre-empt conflict. (Reicher, 
2011, p.18)  
Secondly, a differentiation between psychological groups, through an awareness of the 
different values and norms that may be present. Essentially, this is in order that group 
members are not treated homogenously and subjected to “catch all” police tactics. Thirdly, 
recognition of the role of facilitating the legitimate goals of the crowd, which is viewed as the 
buttress to the ESIM framework (Reicher, 2011). Fourthly, establishment of a clear 
communication strategy concerning police actions which starts before the event or protest and 
continues throughout. The use of policing approaches based on the ESIM, aimed at garnering 
perceptions of legitimacy, encouraging benevolent social identities and reducing collective 
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conflict are currently forefront in the theoretical orientation and best practice for dealing with 
protest in the U.K. (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, ACPO, 2010, Stott, 2011, Reicher, 2011). If PJ and 
the ESIM both lay claim to providing the means for establishing greater police legitimacy and 
compliance and cooperation, how might they be linked and related to the context of protest 
policing? 
Articulating the links between procedural justice and the elaborated social identity 
model 
Having outlined the contributions of PJ and the ESIM to policing, we can now identify how the 
two have become increasingly theoretically linked. The proponents of PJ articulate a clear 
linkage between it and the ESIM (Bradford, 2010, 2012). Notably, that the principles of ESIM-
based policing correspond with those advocated in PJ, specifically, in that fair and respectful 
treatment by the police influences group values and identity that increases perceptions of 
police legitimacy with cooperation as a corollary (Bradford, 2010, 2012). With the ESIM’s 
reliance on social identity as its theoretical basis there is every reason for it to be incorporated 
within the relationship between the two. According to PJ, individual perceptions of the police 
are implicated with the formation of collective identity in groups. It suggests that judgements 
about the fairness of the police will be the most important factor in such formative processes 
(Tyler and Blader, 2000). Thus, it is proposed that fair treatment promotes a sense of inclusion 
and value within the group. Consequently, positive social identities are therefore formed in 
relation to the police, with them being seen as relevant to and representative of the group, 
thus promoting compliance and cooperation with the police (Bradford, 2012; Stott, 2009). 
 The link between perceptions of police legitimacy and collective conflict is well 
documented within the ESIM approach to policing (Reicher, 1996a, 1996b; Stott, 1998) and 
that of perceptions of legitimacy in increasing compliance and cooperation with authority and 
the law in PJ (ESS, 2011; Jackson et al, 2011; Tyler, 1990, 2006). PJ appropriates the ESIM 
conceptually as the means of establishing a causal relationship between fair treatment by the 
police and compliance and cooperation as its corollary. The PJ claim is that procedurally just 
policing influences peoples’ behaviour and their social identity, correspondingly social identity 
influences changes in behaviour, notwithstanding the circular nature of this assertion, it is one 
that resonates absolutely with the ESIM interpretation of the dynamics of crowds and their 
policing (Bradford, 2012; Hough et al, 2010; Reicher, 1996a, 1996b; Stott, 2009; Stott et al; 
2001; Stott and Reicher, 1998a). 
 Hough et al (2010, p.1) note that the police are “the most visible and accessible face 
not only of the criminal justice system but also, arguably, of the state itself”. The joint claim of 
PJ and the ESIM is that procedurally fair policing, characterised by neutrality, transparency 
and equitable, respectful treatment creates alignment between people and the police as state 
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representatives. A claim offered by PJ is that this perception of shared group membership has 
greater trust, legitimacy and cooperation as its corollaries. Central to these claims is that the 
level of people’s identification is shaped, in no small part and in certain contexts by the quality 
of their interactions with police officers which again is consistent with the ESIM (Hough et al, 
2010). Yet, we might note that these interactions do not occur in a vacuum devoid of any 
history, ideology, attitudes and beliefs. The ESIM is expressed as the means of explaining the 
mechanism for shifts in identity arising from emerging notions of police illegitimacy (Stott, 
2009). In practical terms, the ESIM provides guidelines for the policing of crowds and protest 
based on the police educating themselves about crowd identities, facilitating legitimate group 
aims, communicating police intentions and avoiding the indiscriminate use of force. We can 
see that PJ and the ESIM are theoretically and practically conflated as complementary 
approaches to enhance perceptions of police legitimacy and secure cooperation and 
compliance.  
 However, PJ and the ESIM appear to assume that violence and disorder at protests 
flow from a failure of policing to create perceptions of police legitimacy. This is problematic for 
the policing of protest for three reasons. Firstly, violence and disorder may not be solely due 
to a failure of policing because there are occasions when violence occurs despite the police 
use of PJ and ESIM approaches. Secondly, this assumption serves to demoralise the police 
and undermines their trust in using PJ and the ESIM when they do not work. Thirdly, an 
insistence on using them denies the legitimacy of other ways of dealing with violence and 
disorder. Moreover, PJ and the ESIM appear to underplay the significance of pre-existing 
perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation, that are rooted 
in a number of antecedents and contingents. 
 In summary, PJ and the ESIM approaches rely upon the concept of empirical 
legitimacy, both theoretically and for the purposes of empirical research. The key measures 
that relate to researching empirical legitimacy are identified as trust and confidence, moral 
alignment with the public, perceived legality of police actions and the corresponding 
willingness to comply and cooperate as a “felt” public duty (Hough and Sato, 2011; Jackson 
et al, 2011; Jackson and Bradford, 2010a, 2010b). These measures are applied in my 
exploratory survey of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to 
compliance and cooperation with the police and are then further investigated by the qualitative 
interviews and non-participant observation phase of the empirical research. In order to engage 
on a similar footing with PJ and the ESIM, the thesis employs their version of legitimacy yet 
acknowledges its limitations and the criticisms that can be levelled at it. This is not to make a 
judgement that any particular concept of legitimacy is preferable to another, it is more about 
highlighting the limitations and nuances that arise from a reliance on empirical legitimacy. 
Orientation of the thesis sits within the police legitimacy debate by engaging aspects of PJ 
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and the ESIM with regard to how protesters’ perceptions of legitimacy are formed and acted 
upon. To this end the thesis examines two key questions in the context of protest: 
• To what extent do the broad claims of PJ and the correlates of police legitimacy and 
compliance and cooperation hold? 
• What additional influences can be associated with the construction and shaping of 
perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation? 
The scope of the second question goes beyond that addressed by PJ and ESIM research. 
Specific to the context of protest and public order policing it acts as the stimulus to add to our 
understanding of the contextually-based influences that are associated with perceptions of 
police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation with the law and police. 
The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter one traces the origin of PJ from Tyler’s 
original work (Tyler, 1990) and charts its rapid development as orthodoxy in UK policing. It 
examines the contribution of PJ to policing, specifically its spread into protest and public order 
policing and how it has informed assessments of police performance. The chapter concludes 
by identifying important antecedents and contingencies to perceptions of police legitimacy and 
its corollary of cooperation and cooperation with the law and the police. 
Chapter two details the changing political and social aspects of protest and public order 
policing and reactions to it throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It also examines 
how crowds have been understood from classical psychological reductionism, that is the idea 
of the “mob”, to modern day social psychological models of crowd dynamics. The trends in the 
way that protest has been managed are examined and the chapter deals with the debate about 
the paramilitarisation of the policing of protest. 
Chapter three covers four main topics. First, it draws together ideas about what constitutes 
protest and the role of social movements in how peoples’ intentions and actions are framed, 
organised, communicated and acted upon. In a review of academic literature, the discussion 
seeks defining criteria for protest that informs the contextual framework for the empirical 
research. Secondly, the chapter examines the role of social media in the framing of protest 
events, the establishment of communication networks and as a means of mobilising 
resources. Thirdly, it critiques explanatory theories and models of public disorder, specifically 
those referred to as “tinder and spark” explanations of riot and disorder (Waddington, 2007). 
The origin and development of the ESIM is examined, together with a critical look at the role 
of emerging perceptions of police illegitimacy in the escalation of collective violence (Reicher, 
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2011; Stott, 2009, Stott, 2011). The chapter concludes by identifying links between protester 
attitudes and behaviour, highlighting the importance of context and the conditions under which 
protester attitudes influence their behaviour.  
Chapter four analyses more recent attempts to legitimize the policing of protest and public 
order in the UK since London G20, 2009. It draws on academic and “grey” literature sources 
in a critique of the recommendations and changes to police training and policy, intelligence 
gathering, tactical flexibility and the police use of force. 
Chapter five describes and evaluates the research strategy, methodology and processes 
employed for the two stages of empirical research. It also provides a commentary about the 
researcher’s reflections on the research process and ethical considerations.  
Chapter six provides the analysis, results and discussion of both phases of the study, 
highlighting the key themes that were taken from the phase 1 survey for development in phase 
2. It provides a narrative about the construction of the CDM of police legitimacy from the 
empirical data. 
Chapter seven provides the conclusion and recommendations. It sets out the theoretical, 
policy and professional practice recommendations that arise from the literature reviews and 
empirical research. The limitations of the research are discussed and opportunities for further 
research identified. It concludes by proposing that perceptions of police legitimacy and 
attitudes to compliance and cooperation need to be understood in light of the policing context, 
there being a number of additional influences acting on their construction and shaping beyond 
PJ and the ESIM explanations.  
About the researcher 
During the five-year period of the empirical research and writing of the thesis I was a serving 
police officer, having served for 29 years in a number of roles in different police services and 
geographical settings. I left the police service in 2016. While serving I was fortunate to have 
been involved in the planning and policing of large-scale public events, sporting crowds, 
protest and public order operations at a number of strategic and tactical levels in the UK and 
Germany. Professionally, the most notable of these was as a police support unit (abbreviated 
as PSU) commander at the London G20, 2009, involvement in its aftermath following the death 
of Ian Tomlinson and the subsequent HMIC reviews of public order policing (HMIC, 2009a, 
2009b).  
 I had always been somewhat uncomfortable with the rather predictable and formulaic 
approach to the policing of crowds and the lack of innovation in the way that the police are 
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expected to, and often do, respond to protest. I became intrigued with the reasons as to why 
crowds behave in certain ways, particularly when in most scenarios by sheer numbers alone 
they overwhelm the police presence and yet most often do not take advantage of a potential 
vulnerability. In contrast, I was interested in why protesters did not always respond to well-
intentioned or facilitative styles of policing that were being lauded as best practice. Why in the 
presence of identical policing practices should one police cordon face violent opposition and 
another stoic or good-natured cooperation? I found the political and social psychological 
processes highly interesting and the way in which they influenced peoples’ compliance and 
cooperation (or not) with the police in a diverse range of protest contexts. Latterly, I began to 
feel uncomfortable with a growing emphasis on police tactics as wholly and unilaterally 
responsible for the initiation of collective violence and conflict. I felt that, whilst no defence of 
oppressive policing should be made (and certainly the police can be inappropriately heavy-
handed at times), this emphasis could not be generally applied or a universal interpretation. I 
had been in numerous protest situations where the police behaved impeccably to no avail, 
where their very presence or existence as a state agent acquired opprobrium from the 
protesters. Similarly, I had been in other protest situations where one might have expected 
collective conflict, yet it did not occur. The construction and shaping of protester perceptions 
of police legitimacy appeared to be an unpredictable, multifarious affair. One in which the 
singular premise of PJ and the ESIM that unilateral, fair and respectful treatment by the police 
fosters cooperation and compliance and self-regulation did not seem to be borne out by the 
experience of professional practice. As a result, I suspected that there may be other 
contextually based influences at work that impacted upon the construction and shaping of 
protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation 
with the law and the police. The experience led me to begin and sustain an intense interest 
and research focus.  
 As a serving police officer at the time and a researcher, significant challenges were 
faced in carrying out empirical research in the context of protest and my reflection on the 
experience is discussed in detail later. For the avoidance of doubt, the thesis is not a defence 
of repressive, inappropriate policing of protest and public order. However, it does note that 
perceptions of police behaviour and the use of force are only one element in an arrangement 
of contextual influences represented by the CDM. After all is said and done, in the history of 
protest and public order policing there are examples of police repression wherein 
conflagrations of violence and disorder have not occurred, some where heavy-handed policing 
was utterly responsible, yet others where seemingly fair and proportionate policing garnered 
no greater legitimacy or cooperation from the public (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, 2011b; Scarman, 
1974, 1981; Waddington, 2007; Waddington, 1991, 1993). 
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 In conclusion, this introductory chapter has introduced the reader to PJ and the ESIM 
approaches to policing. It has discussed the concept of legitimacy and highlighted that upon 
which PJ and the ESIM rely, namely empirical legitimacy. The limitations of this were 
highlighted by examples where the police are morally or duty bound to act against the wishes 
of the majority. The analysis identified that legitimacy can be established objectively through 
moral argument. Human rights, and the obligation of the state to protect peoples’ rights 
highlighting this point. However, we saw that legitimacy can be based on empirical and 
objective criteria such as in Beetham’s (1991, 2013) multi-dimensional model of legitimacy.  
 The chapter also outlined the contributions of PJ and the ESIM to policing and 
demonstrated the theoretical link between them, one based on a shared assumption of fair 
and respectful treatment and processes as the means to enhance police legitimacy and 
compliance and cooperation. Taking this link into account PJ and the ESIM appear to infer 
that violence and disorder stem from a failure of policing to create perceptions of police 
legitimacy. This inference is challenged by the antecedents and contingencies to police 
legitimacy that are discussed in the next chapter as it charts the rise and establishment of PJ 
as orthodoxy in UK policing. 
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Chapter 1 
The establishment of procedural justice as orthodoxy in UK policing 
“The police support the system and I want to change it, they did a good job today, but it’s not 
for me to agree with them”. (Interviewee 1, Occupy London Stock Exchange protest) 
“It’s not my duty to support the police at a protest”. (Interviewee 36, TUC March) 
This chapter traces the origin of PJ from Tyler’s original work and “Chicago” study (Tyler, 1990) 
and charts its rapid rise as orthodoxy in UK policing. It examines the contribution of PJ to 
policing practice, how it has informed management practices and internal assessments of 
police performance. The chapter concludes by identifying important antecedents and 
contingencies to perceptions of police legitimacy and its corollary of cooperation and 
cooperation with the law and the police. 
 PJ has come to exert significant influence in policing and criminal justice. It was not 
that long ago that one of the major reviews of policing in England and Wales (Flanagan, 2008) 
made no direct reference to PJ as the means to develop policing for the 21st century. However, 
in recent times it has become common parlance. Whilst a very positive move in terms of 
attempting to enhance police legitimacy, the danger is that we stop thinking about the 
subtleties and nuances of different policing contexts. It is apparent that within a relatively short 
timeframe PJ has gained a position as orthodoxy in UK policing and it is now recommended 
as a generic approach to crime control and in managing police-community relations (Tyler, 
1990, 2006, 2011a; Quinton et al, 2015). Furthermore, it has been used to underpin the so-
called revised Peelian principles and the social justice model of policing contained in the 
Independent Police Commission review of policing (2013). 
The emergence and rise of procedural justice 
 It is in the US that we see the emergence of PJ in policing and police management, 
first and foremost. Tyler (2006) describes the professionalisation of policing in the US from the 
early 1990s onwards, a situation that has been mirrored to some extent here in the UK. Such 
professionalism it is claimed can be demonstrated by the growing academic interest and 
research in policing policy and practices, the development of professional qualifications at 
most levels of policing and greater emphasis on police leadership development. Indeed, there 
is now a requirement for all UK police officers to have academic qualifications as a pre-
requisite to joining or in gaining in-service ones through police and HEI partnerships (COP, 
2016). The speed with which PJ has taken hold is worth consideration since it has significantly 
influenced developments in policing on several levels here in the UK. 
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 Tyler’s (1990) original work based on his Chicago study was published in 1990. But it 
was not until 2006 and thereafter that PJ is consistently referred to as a substantial canon of 
work to be applied in criminal justice (Myhill and Beak, 2008; Myhill and Quinton, 2011; 
Quinton et al, 2015). Since then the mantra of it being “a growing body of research” appears 
ubiquitously in the relevant literature (Mazerolle et al, 2013). However, Sir Ronnie Flanagan 
(2008) in one of the most significant examinations of modern day policing in the UK makes no 
reference to PJ and appears to avoid its vocabulary, therefore we might consider it a 
newcomer to our policing world. Flanagan’s (2008) Review of Policing avoided reference to 
developments in PJ or seemed unaware of them yet noted that British policing was at a 
crossroads arising from the challenges that it faced in the wake of austerity in the late 2000s. 
He spelt out the position in the following terms: 
Serious decisions must be taken, not simply by the police service itself but by 
everyone involved in policing, about how we can best succeed over the next 
decade and beyond. One option would be to match the growing complexity of 
modern policing by seeking to specify every outcome and control and 
bureaucratise every aspect and process, from the centre to the force and within 
the force from the chief constable to the constable, in an attempt to cover every 
risk and meet every demand. To me, however, such a response would fail to 
acknowledge that a fundamentally different, more dynamic model is 
essential…an alternative vision of what successful 21st century policing should 
look like. (Flanagan, 2008, p.6) 
The success of which Flanagan spoke was identified as being based upon a risk-based 
approach, in part on policing ethics and problem solving, development of frontline skills, 
principled approaches to risk management and streamlining doctrine and policy. A veiled 
reference to PJ might loosely be found in Flanagan’s (2008) report that the police should: 
Develop clear lines of accountability for bringing clarity to who is responsible for 
what and hold them to account. Adopt a problem-solving approach, looking at 
the whole system, measure and value what matters, not what is easy to count, 
understand what works by identifying successful outcomes and sharing good 
practice. Clearly define policing purpose to better reflect ‘real local demand’; do 
what is right for the victim, right for the community, is in the public interest and 
fair. (Flanagan, 2008, p.8) 
These measures were intended as the means by which successful policing would be 
delivered, with success being measured by the protection and gaining of trust and confidence 
of the public. In tandem with developments in the US, Flanagan (2008) recognised the 
significance of public perceptions of police accountability, practically this appeared to be 
assessed by perceptions of how the streets were being policed and how the local police 
treated the community. While Flanagan’s review may have had reducing bureaucracy as its 
key theme, due more perhaps to its terms of reference from the Home Secretary than much 
else, police accountability and the means by which it was experienced by the public appeared 
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central to its aim. Local accountability as experienced by the public was key, less important it 
seemed were the formal and structured mechanisms for public engagement and police 
accountability.   
 What Flanagan highlighted was that since the late 1980s to the early 1990s in the UK, 
public sector reform aimed to meet public expectations of community safety and public 
protection. In Flanagan’s terms (2008, p.12) the police became sole guardians of protection 
from all manner of risk and harms in a society where authority figures were in decline and the 
police came to fill the “authority vacuum”. At the time much of the public felt little ability to 
influence the police or their decisions. However, we should note that community justice and 
law enforcement have arguably been diverted away from the public police to local authorities 
and private policing over a number of years (McLaughlin, 2007; Reiner, 2010; Shearing and 
Stenning, 1983). The public experience of fair decision making and personal treatment, so 
necessary for assessments of legitimacy ala the PJ thesis may not always be at the hands of 
the public police, but rather other less equable mechanisms of law enforcement and social 
control. What we can derive from Flanagan’s analysis is that structural accountability of the 
police appeared as less important to the public than it did to government, inspection bodies 
such as HMIC and the police themselves. What mattered was that people were most 
interested in “issues at the very local (their own street) level and in how they are treated” 
(Flanagan, 2008, p.14).  
 In addition, Flanagan observed that police cultural change was most likely to make the 
biggest difference to public confidence and satisfaction, not PJ per se but echoing similar 
sentiments that can be found in the Tyler’s work (1990, 2006). Thus, the cultural change 
referred to focused on what Flanagan (2008, pp.39-41) called the “treatment of individuals 
during the processes that exist”, one that would “wage influence on public confidence and by 
association improve perceptions of trust and credibility of the police”. Trust and confidence in 
the police according to Flanagan (2008) is driven by contact, another similarity with PJ. A note 
of caution is advised here in light of the contingencies to various aspects of police legitimacy 
that are shown to undermine perceptions of trust and confidence in the police and the law 
itself (Braithwaite, 2009; Murphy and Cherney; 2011; Skogan, 2006, 2012). Flanagan (2008) 
appears to unwittingly drift into the trap of asymmetry in police-public relations, with an over 
reliance on the simplicity of unilateral cultural change in the police engendering widespread 
confidence and satisfaction. However, what he established was a seed bed for the emergence 
of PJ in UK policing, one that would extend and be nurtured in a subsequent green paper on 
policing in 2009. Police legitimacy and PJ as they are currently promulgated do not appear in 
any explicit sense in Flanagan’s 2008 review or indeed the government response to it. Instead 
the focus is on building trust and confidence in the context of controlling crime through local 
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cooperation and partnership and on reducing bureaucracy within the police service. We cannot 
look to this review of policing for any significant recognition of PJ in UK policing. However, the 
Independent Police Commission review of Policing under Lord Stevens (2013) largely relies 
on the tenets of procedural justice to the extent that it underpins its recommendations for 
revised Peelian principles and a new social justice model of policing. 
 Behind the political machinations in UK policing, academic interest in PJ abounded 
from the mid to late 2000s with a significant amount of empirical research published and a 
major Europe wide survey of Trust in Justice being carried out within the European Social 
Survey (ESS, 2011; Mazerolle et al, 2013). The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) 
and London School of Economics (LSE) produced a widely read summary of PJ theory and 
research concerning what works in crime reduction as police forces sought to meet the 
challenge of doing more for less, discharging what the government saw as their main function 
to “prevent crime and disorder” in times of austerity (Home Office, 2010, p.5). In assisting this 
venture Myhill and Quinton (2011) produced a detailed summary of academic research and 
the links between police legitimacy, public cooperation and crime reduction in order to 
demonstrate how this could be done. In a single, police-focused document we see stated for 
the first time the idea of a causal relationship between PJ, police legitimacy and crime control: 
an indication of the trajectory to come. Myhill and Quinton (2011) cited the US development 
of PJ and a further analysis by Mazerolle et al (2013) provided evidence that community-based 
policing and specific initiatives, such as scripted road traffic stops encourages legitimacy and 
compliance with the law. We might consider whether such interventions are desirable or 
indeed possible in many other dynamic policing situations (such as protest and public order). 
 Nonetheless, Myhill and Quinton (2011) did single out protest and public order policing 
by linking PJ to the social identity theories of crowd control such as the ESIM, one of the first 
times that such a link can be found in the literature. They summarise this as follows: 
There are implications for the policing of protest and public disorder (emphasis 
added). Overall, fair and respectful treatment by the police in a general sense, 
might enhance social bonds that make disorder less likely. Furthermore, it is 
possible that the legitimacy of the specific tactics used by the police to deal with 
a public disorder incident – in the eyes of particular elements of the crowd – 
could make the situation better or worse. Social psychologists have for example 
argued for a graded tactical response in these situations… if the police are seen 
to act fairly and treat people with respect, it can encourage crowd members who 
have law abiding intentions to align with the police and to self-police other crowd 
members. (Myhill and Quinton, 2011, p.10) 
PJ is placed firmly front and centre through this analysis as the new way to control crime, 
enhance perceptions of police legitimacy and public cooperation. Significantly, it proposes that 
PJ can be used as the basis for protest and public order policing. However, it failed to occur 
to the proponents that no published empirical research applying PJ specifically to protest was 
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available to support the assertion. As an initial foray into the application of PJ in policing it 
suffices, however, it fundamentally misses the internal aspects of cultural change and the 
behavioural standards identified earlier by Flanagan (2008). However, the PJ drive continued 
through a supplemental paper (Quinton et al, 2015) provided in the wake of the police Code 
of Ethics (CoP, 2014). Prior to its publication ethical standards in policing were subject of 
review by the College of Policing through the Integrity programme which was precursory to 
the introduction of the police Code of Ethics in 2014 (CoP, 2014). Superficially, the Code of 
Ethics appears entirely unrelated to the development of PJ in UK policing. However, when PJ 
is seen in its original US context with emphasis on officer behaviour and quality of contact 
between police and the public, the significance of PJ in the Code of Ethics becomes apparent. 
Indeed, developments in PJ research now claim that there is a direct, causal relationship 
between police organisational behaviour and the treatment of its’ staff with how they relate to 
the public (CoP, 2014; Quinton et al, 2015). This is usually referred to as organisational justice 
(Quinton et al, 2015).  
 The Integrity programme (ACPO, 2012) proposed that police integrity was necessary 
to maintain public trust and confidence in the police. Further, that the quality of daily interaction 
with the police was central to it and seeing police actions as legitimate encouraged public 
compliance. Thus, the Integrity programme shared much in common with the PJ agenda. The 
introduction of the Code of Ethics drove the principles of PJ further into the fabric of UK policing 
and the psyche of senior police leadership. The College of Policing commissioned research 
related to the Integrity programme in an effort to further demonstrate the link between 
organisational justice, PJ and police legitimacy (Quinton et al, 2015). In studies limited to 
Durham Constabulary, evidence is adduced to indicate that officers who perceive being poorly 
treated are more likely to disengage, see less value in providing high quality service to the 
public and are less committed to ethical policing (Bradford and Jackson, 2011; Quinton et al, 
2015). It concludes with a recommendation for effective leadership in driving the Code of 
Ethics by “being firm in setting and enforcing standards” (CoP, 2014, p.3). While the authors 
make no claims for wider generalisation and the response rates for the two surveys might be 
considered methodologically poor (at a third in each case), the findings significantly influenced 
the substance and pace of the Integrity programme in the UK, further raising the profile of PJ. 
 Quinton et al (2015) contributed a further commentary aimed at examining and setting 
out the evidence about fairness in policing. Its aim, to establish the ways in which police 
officers should act; fairly, ethically and with respect (again linking these in a causal manner to 
public perceptions of police legitimacy and crime control). Furthermore, it included an 
examination of how organisational behaviour might be used to shape officers’ personal values 
and cooperation with force practices. The key argument established is that organisational 
justice has a positive impact on officer behaviour towards the public (Colquitt et al, 2001; 
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Colquitt, 2008; Greenberg, 2007; Tyler, 2011a). The inference is that this would engender 
wider public cooperation with the police and reduce crime (Quinton et al, 2015). How then 
might PJ be integrated into police culture and management to achieve this? 
 PJ can be seen in the police Code of Ethics (CoP, 2014) under the rubric of fairness 
and respect, partly on the basis that it is linked to fair treatment of the public. The value placed 
on PJ in police organisational structures and its intended impact on the public is summarised 
by Quinton et al (2015) in the following terms: 
Bringing together internal justice models and external PJ it is possible to see 
how fairness and respect within a Force could open up important feedback loops 
in policing at relatively low cost. The evidence suggests that when officers feel 
they have been treated fairly and with respect they are more likely to say that 
they value the public and support ethical policing, assuming that these translate 
into action and the public are treated with greater fairness and respect police 
legitimacy is likely to be enhanced and people more likely to offer voluntary 
support. This public support could help to close the loop in as far as the research 
suggests that perceived public support and cooperation are important factors. 
(Quinton et al, 2015, p.12) 
On the basis of the strategic significance given to the relationship between internal and 
external PJ outcomes the course seems set for its rise in police administration and leadership 
for many years to come. How then are procedural and organisational justice linked with police 
performance and assessments of police effectiveness? Previously, HM Government sought 
to reduce central targets, pushing accountability to a more local level and reduce bureaucracy. 
However, it should be noted that the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 
strengthened the mandate of HMIC (now the HMICFRS) to centrally drive compliance with 
national initiatives. It is to this body that we turn our attention to see how the PJ agenda is 
driven, monitored and reported through the Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy 
(abbreviated as PEEL) assessment process. 
The procedural justice drive through assessments of policing by HMIC 
The PEEL assessment process is the annual programme of inspection for police forces in 
England and Wales and replaced the thematic type of inspection used until 2013 (HMIC, 
2014a). The evidence gained is used to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of 
the police with the intention that the public will be able to judge the performance of their local 
force and policing as a whole through the published findings (HMIC, 2014a). The effectiveness 
of a police force is assessed according to how well it carries out its responsibilities including 
preventing crime, protecting those considered vulnerable, tackling anti-social behaviour and 
dealing with emergencies and calls for service. Its efficiency is assessed in relation to how it 
provides value for money. A police force’s legitimacy is assessed according to whether it 
operates fairly, ethically and within the law (HMIC, 2014a).  
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 How legitimacy is defined within PEEL provides us with a clue about its reliance on the 
components of PJ, as both an assessment tool and the mechanism by which policing is 
expected to be delivered. The PEEL legitimacy criterion relies upon a rather narrow 
interpretation that a police force is considered legitimate where it has the consent of the public 
and that the force consistently behaves in a way that is fair, reasonable, effective and lawful 
(HMIC, 2014a). Conceptual and methodological challenges arise from the manner in which 
PEEL operationalizes the notion of legitimacy and gathers its evidence. Fundamentally, it is 
clear from the headline and core assessment questions used by HMIC that it synonymises 
police legitimacy with operational effectiveness (HMIC, 2014a, 2016). No direct reference is 
made to the theoretical concept or constituents of police legitimacy that are applied in PJ 
research, however, a critical look at the definition reveals its basis as that of empirical 
legitimacy. Thus, we have evidence of a somewhat restrictive and subjectively-based notion, 
borrowed partially from PJ of what it means for the police to be legitimate. 
 Three sources of information about police performance appear to be used for the PEEL 
assessment, arguably each with its own methodological challenges namely, 1) the Crime 
Survey of England and Wales, 2) victim satisfaction surveys and 3) police self-reported 
datasets (HMIC, 2014a). Notably, questions are asked relating to organisational justice and 
force compliance with the Code of Ethics and it is clear that HMIC view PEEL assessments 
as hand in glove with the Integrity and Leadership programmes inspired by PJ (HMIC, 2016). 
HMIC (2014a) make clear they will use PEEL assessments in line with the College of Policing 
activity: 
HMIC will give fuller and more specific consideration to leadership in future 
PEEL assessments. This will allow us to take account of the College of Policing 
review of leadership. (HMIC, 2014a, p.3) 
We can only surmise that this entails inspection based on the ten recommendations contained 
in the Leadership Review (HMIC, 2016), although we should acknowledge that the PEEL 
inspection criteria are currently under review (HMICFRS, 2017).   
 The theme of organisational culture reflected in the review of policing by Flanagan 
(2008) is revisited in PEEL assessments with an emphasis on leadership delivering and 
maintaining an ethical culture. Critically, a reliance is made apparent on the certainty of a 
direct, causal relationship between organisational justice, PJ and police legitimacy with public 
compliance. Arguably, the PEEL programme has less to do with PJ and police legitimacy as 
we might know them in their academic guise and it appears a highly confused inspection 
regime that reflects neither academic precision or thorough examinations of police efficiency 
and effectiveness. This assertion is made on the basis that methodologically PEEL shares 
little in common with the research methods available and commonly applied in the field of PJ 
and it is limited as an effective measurement of a police forces operational performance. 
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Cynically, there appear to be elements of PEEL assessment aimed at nationally driving 
compliance with organisational justice and the Code of Ethics agenda, with HMIC providing 
central governance. Whether the general public share the same desire and translate this into 
greater perceptions of police legitimacy remains to be seen and tested. 
 In summary, from its US origins PJ has rapidly been woven into the fabric of UK 
policing and is being pursued as the means to deliver cost effective, normatively-based crime 
control and social order. Whilst not appearing overtly in previous reports on police reform, PJ 
fell rather gracefully into a role as the means to drive cultural and practice changes in the 
police service. In so doing it has been merged with organisational justice and police integrity 
under the Code of Ethics and Leadership programmes. At a strategic level, progress of the PJ 
agenda continues to be driven through the PEEL inspection programme and College of 
Policing oversight.  
 Principally, this type of policing rests on the assertion that fair processes and respectful 
treatment at the hands of the police engender perceptions of legitimacy, and compliance and 
cooperation. The assumption is made by PJ that this mechanism operates against a 
background of social order and stability. However, not all policing contexts might reflect this 
assumption. PJ, in tandem with the ESIM is recommended as best practice for the policing of 
protest and public order with little specific empirical evidence to support it. However, there are 
a number of antecedents and contingencies to PJ theory, perceptions of police legitimacy and 
attitudes to compliance and cooperation that can be identified. 
The antecedents and contingencies of procedural justice and the elaborated social 
identity model 
Thus far, I have demonstrated the dominant positions that PJ and the ESIM have attained in 
policing. However, there are antecedents and contingencies to the claims made by PJ and the 
ESIM about police legitimacy and compliance in specific policing contexts such as protest. 
Can it be a simple case that fair processes and respectful treatment engender perceptions of 
police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation? Might there be additional factors to take 
into account that potentially undermine this assumption? Factors that serve to moderate the 
impact of PJ and ESIM-based approaches? Have these received limited attention in this area 
of research thus far?  The discussion below provides clarity about the sources of antecedents 
and contingencies and their influence on perceptions of legitimacy. There are at least three 
main sources of antecedents and contingencies that can be summarised as:  the asymmetrical 
nature of the relationship between the police and public (Skogan, 2006, 2012); the dialogic 
nature of police legitimacy that is not reflected in PJ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Cherney 
and Murphy, 2011; Tankebe, 2013); and the phenomena of motivational posturing and social 
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distancing (Braithwaite, 2009). These all resonate with my own finding of additional factors 
involved in the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their 
attitudes to compliance and cooperation (see chapter six). 
The asymmetry of policing 
The notion of an asymmetric relationship between police and public engages the present 
debate since it relates to the claims of PJ and the ESIM that quality of contact with the police 
creates trust and confidence and perceptions of police legitimacy. Social identity-based 
approaches to policing crowds such as the ESIM rely upon the idea of emerging notions of 
police illegitimacy in crowd contexts, without addressing the existence and impact of the 
asymmetry issue. Skogan (1989, 1994, 2004, 2006, 2012) has identified that the relationship 
between how people perceive their treatment at the hands of the police and their levels of trust 
and confidence in the police may be asymmetric in nature. The impact of negative experiences 
of police contact is many-fold more than that of positive ones. There are factors that can 
influence these public perceptions such as, personal background, previous experience and 
neighbourhood conditions. Personal background often relates to characteristics such as 
colour, ethnicity, age and socio-economic status and there are longstanding examples of 
contention between the police and citizens based on race and perceived social inequality. 
Citizens who perceive themselves as being greater stakeholders in society often have a 
greater inclination to support the police (Correia, 2000; Skogan, 2006). The experience of 
police contact can be subject to what Skogan (2006, p.104) refers to as a “bedside manner” 
relating to the empathy, helpfulness and fairness of the police. However, positive assessments 
of police conduct are mitigated in those people who have had previous contact that was 
perceived as punitive (such as prior arrests, stop search and contentious situations). The 
context of protest and public order policing can bring this asymmetry sharply into focus, 
magnifying its effect.  
 The idea that the effects of negatively and positively rated contact with the police are 
asymmetrical is a longstanding one (Jacob, 1971; Nicholas and Walker, 2004; Skogan, 2006). 
The explanation advanced for this is that people may simply view good experiences of the 
police as atypical or that they anticipate good experience and only take notice when they do 
not receive it (Weitzer and Tuch, 2004). Skogan (2006, 2012) elaborates on this explanation 
by proposing that positive attitudes do not carry the same psychological power as negative 
ones, perceived negative experiences shaping attitudes and behaviour more than positive 
ones. In his own research of public encounters with the police, Skogan (2006) identifies a very 
strong asymmetry in the impact of perceived positive and negative contact. He explains that 
human beings are more risk adverse than logically rational and that they pay excessive 
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attention to bad news. While acknowledging this as less the case in a UK context he 
demonstrates it to be present nonetheless. Skogan (2006) summarises the implications of 
asymmetry for policing in the following terms: 
By inference the large asymmetry we observe in many places could be 
interpreted as implying that the quality of service rendered does not matter very 
much (emphasis added)… the answer seems quite clear: democracies are 
committed to both equality of treatment and an objectively fair level of treatment 
through every aspect of law and constitutions, yet the one-sided interpretation 
(emphasis added) of those efforts remains a huge stumbling block…The 
empirical message is “You can’t win, you can just cut your losses”. No matter 
what you do, it only counts when it goes against you. (Skogan, 2006, p.119) 
Normatively, the police in a liberal democracy should strive to gain consensus, yet the enigma 
comes in deconstructing and navigating the size, composition and manifestations of the 
stumbling block.  
 PJ may lay claim to providing the means of closing the gap on the positions elaborated 
in the asymmetry debate, indeed much empirical work has been undertaken in demonstrating 
the efficacy of respectful treatment and procedural fairness in securing legitimacy and 
compliance (Jackson et al, 2011; Mazerolle et al, 2013). Yet there are at least three reasons 
to cast doubt on this assertion. First, there is evidence that the influence of PJ varies across 
groups and more significantly across contexts (Cherney and Murphy, 2011; Tankebe, 2009a). 
Second, research in this area relies on common measures and commonalities in the PJ 
concepts applied to police legitimacy, however, authors have identified deficiencies in the 
variables being applied (Jackson et al, 2011; Reisig et al, 2007; Tankebe, 2009a). Moreover, 
Cherney and Murphy (2011) draw upon Tankebe’s (2009a) work on the instrumental 
dimensions of PJ to demonstrate that research attention should be directed at the variance in 
PJ outcomes across different policing contexts. Specifically, variance occurs according to 
peoples’ personal and vicarious experience of encounters with authority, cultural differences 
and where the legitimacy of the law itself is questioned (Braithwaite, 2009; Cherney and 
Murphy, 2011; Weitzer and Brunson, 2009). Thirdly, and highly pertinent to my thesis is the 
observation that PJ research in the specific context of protest policing is lacking (Mazerolle et 
al, 2013). In short, these reasons raise the question of whether PJ “works all the time, 
depending on the context and groups being engaged” (Cherney and Murphy, 2011, p. 229). 
My contention is that it does not. The policing of protest and public order, for the police and 
protesters is highly context specific, rather than generalised and routine. There is every reason 
to consider that other influences are at work in the construction and shaping of protester 
perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation. 
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The dialogic nature of police legitimacy 
According to Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) legitimacy consists of a dialogue between power-
holders and their audiences, wherein power-holders such as the police make a claim to 
legitimacy and the audience responds (positively or negatively) to that claim. The police in turn 
observe the audience’s response to their claim to legitimacy and may or may not alter it as a 
result. However, PJ deals only with audience legitimacy, not power-holder claims in the route 
to perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. Bottoms and Tankebe 
(2012) make the observation that with the rapid increase of empirical research in PJ, it has 
over-extended its early theoretical basis. In an effort to advance the conceptual understanding 
of legitimacy, Tankebe (2009a, 2013) argues that power-holder legitimacy is of equal 
importance and needs to be accounted for. Tankebe’s argument engages certain aspects of 
Tyler’s original work, and that which follows it. Tyler (1990, 2006) began his original work by 
contrasting instrumental and normative modes of compliance and cooperation, he divided the 
normative mode into “personal morality” (that is, general beliefs as to how people should act) 
and “legitimacy” (that is, perceptions as to whether the police rightly have authority over them). 
Surveys were conducted, asking questions about peoples contact with the police, their 
reaction to such contacts, and their corresponding behaviour. Tyler (1990) concluded that 
people comply with the law not so much because they fear punishment, but because they feel 
that legal authorities are legitimate and that their actions are generally fair. Therefore, with an 
emphasis on legitimacy, he placed normative compliance above instrumental compliance. A 
further dimension of Tyler’s work (1990, 2006) was the perceived procedural fairness of the 
police as being particularly important in shaping perceptions of legitimacy and compliance as 
its corollary. Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) note that the concept of a felt obligation to obey the 
law cannot be so straightforwardly equated to legitimacy, because there may be several 
reasons why people feel obliged to obey the law or cooperate. These include apathy, 
pragmatic acquiescence (what they call a dull compulsion) and calculations about risks and 
benefits. We cannot understand what creates, sustains or undermines legitimacy, if we only 
focus on audience legitimacy based on peoples’ perceptions (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; 
Tankebe, 2013).  
 Two additional aspects to audience legitimacy are perceptions of legality and shared 
values (what Jackson et al (2011) call moral alignment with the police). Despite an obvious 
link between police illegality and a lack of legitimacy, it is paradoxically the case that the proper 
enforcement of the law can sometimes fail to enhance legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 
2012), for example in cases where the police exercise the letter of the law without fear or 
favour, much to the chagrin of those subjected to it.  
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 The PJ concept of shared values (or moral alignment) between the public and police 
becomes problematic, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) explain: 
Suppose that a given society has a set of strongly and consensually held values, 
but that because of political disturbances or economic crises in nearby countries, 
it experiences a relatively sudden influx of several separate sets of migrants, each 
with core values different from one another and from the host country. What is now 
a “shared value” within that society? Issues of this kind can present real dilemmas 
for law enforcement agencies. (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012, p. 25) 
The notion of shared values between the police and the policed tends to assume that laws 
arise from the shared norms of society, yet this does not universally follow. The relationship 
between laws and values is by no means always so straightforward (Bottoms and Tankebe, 
2012, p. 25). Therefore, to understand the nuances of police legitimacy properly, these points 
must be accounted for. However, most PJ studies do not pay sufficient attention to them 
relying upon narrow, constrained variables that are only measured quantitatively. 
In summary, the police must seek to understand the construction and shaping of police 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public through a “legitimacy dialogue”, that is, one based on 
listening, observing and reflecting in action. I suggest that this “legitimacy dialogue” can be 
informed by the police attending to protester constructions of policing, pre-existing ideology, 
levels of protester engagement and distancing and power and identity relationships that are 
contained in the CDM (see chapter six). 
Motivational postures and social distancing 
Braithwaite (2003, 2009, 2010) has written on the positions that people take in relation to the 
law, state authorities and the manner in which they are manifested. The positions can be seen 
as motivational postures taken in order to engage with or disengage from authority or the law. 
Motivational postures are described as sets of beliefs and attitudes that encapsulate peoples’ 
orientation to another social entity (Braithwaite, 2010). Social distancing is the position that 
people adopt in relation to state authority, systems and laws. It is posited that there are 
degrees in the positions that people adopt to authority and/or the laws they represent, both 
within and outwith formal structures. Essentially, where legitimacy is contested, be it of the law 
or authority itself, a position of defiance may be adopted (Braithwaite, 2010). Defiance can be 
seen as dismissive or resistant with neither cast as definitive stances being subject to personal 
and group revision throughout contact with agents of authority. The characteristics of 
dismissive and resistant defiance are described below. 
 Dismissive defiance is characterised by people asserting what they deem to be their 
absolute right of freedom to the authority, this is less about taking a position against it but is 
more concerned with making statements about their position in relation to the authority, an 
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individual statement of their personal liberty (Braithwaite, 2010). Of course, if we follow the 
logic of the ESIM pathway, from the individual to the group identity, then this potentially 
becomes a statement of the group based on a shared social identity of opposition. Dismissive 
defiance in this respect potentially brings people into direct conflict with the state and its 
instruments of governance, in either a passive or active manner. Passively, it is manifested by 
ignoring the agents’ efforts to take control of a situation. Actively, by open and direct challenge 
to authority and seeking to grapple that control and place it into their own hands. In short, a 
political struggle for power and control (Braithwaite, 2010). In a policing context, both are 
potentially problematic, making it difficult for the police to engage with those who ignore or 
won’t recognise their authority and likely to result in the use of coercion in the latter case. 
 Elsewhere, defiance has been characterised as the idea that the authority has no right 
to control or interfere with personal freedoms (Brehm and Brehm, 1981). In essence the aim 
is not merely to alter or ameliorate the situation, but to offer a direct challenge to those in 
authority who have created it, Braithwaite (2010, p.1) summarises it as meaning that “you 
have no right to expect subservience of me”. 
 Resistant defiance has as its focus, not the authority itself, but the rules and 
mechanisms that they administer. The objective in these circumstances is aimed at influencing 
and changing the practices or inclination of the authority in order to steer a different course of 
action. Resistant people are assumed capable of remaining engaged and moved to a position 
of greater cooperation with the law or authority. In short, dismissive defiance signals rebellion 
and freedom, and a desire to reject constraints such as laws and rules, whilst resistant 
defiance signals a desire to change the rules or the manner in which the authority applies 
them. Dismissive defiance gives rise to greater conflict and confrontation between citizens and 
state authority, it representing an existential threat to the authority itself. By contrast, resistant 
defiance is open to dialogue and discussion through the existing political and social structures 
(Braithwaite, 2010). It is further proposed that there are those who will be committed to 
deference and compliance with the law and authority by virtue of their own personal values 
and less likely to place social distance between them (Braithwaite, 2003). All of these positions 
are reflected in my empirical data and the factors of the CDM (see chapter 6). 
 However, these positions should not be seen as definitive stances, they are capable 
of change and can be escalated or de-escalated one from another. The origins of these 
positions can be based on a multitude of personal, social, environmental, ideological and 
political influences (Braithwaite, 2009, 2010). Yet, it is noticeable that the development of 
defiance relies upon the construction of narratives, that become pivotal in creating and 
maintaining these positions. Braithwaite (2009) observes that people create narratives about 
themselves or their group, or of the state and its agents in order that they are not seen as the 
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“villains”. She elaborates that these narratives have institutional, environmental and personal 
facets that are designed to justify levels of disengagement and distancing. In this construction, 
moral agency is utilised to establish standards of behaviour and ways of thinking that are 
acceptable to the individual and group identity (Bandura, 1989; Braithwaite, 2011). There are 
parallels with the ESIM here, it reflects this agency insofar as, in group-based defiance people 
draw on shared norms and values which may be explicitly stated or assumed. In so doing, the 
narratives that are created are made understandable and acceptable to the group (Zerlditch 
Jr., 2001). This occurs in any protest campaign or activity, where the acceptability and 
rightness of the cause is important for fostering public acceptance and to create social 
identities. The ways in which people make sense of rules, the laws and state authority are 
contained in these narratives. Commonly, the theme of injustice as a rubric is invoked by those 
wishing to justify levels of defiance and to secure their credibility (Braithwaite, 2010).The 
empirical research and conclusions from the present study support the notion that, in the 
context of protest, personal values and beliefs about the law, the creation and communication 
of narratives about the police, power and identity relationships and pre-existing ideology are 
significant influences in the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy, 
attitudes to cooperation and compliance, and in justifying protesters’ positions to authority. 
 The presence of defiance as a position can become problematic for the state and its 
agents, once socially widespread or highly visible it can precipitate social disorder. Under a 
state of resistant defiance people may still submit to the authority of the law and its agents, 
even if begrudgingly through deference or fear. However, under conditions of dismissive 
defiance, where authority itself is seen as irrelevant or oppositional, people may disengage 
and withdraw from the state and its agents, rendering them obsolete in their own minds and 
signalling the end of any hope of cooperation or compliance (Braithwaite, 2010). Braithwaite 
(2003) describes the idea of complete withdrawal as disengagement, which is a position 
extending beyond mere resistance and involves people operating outside of the system and 
its agents and receding from any interaction at all. Disengagement is described by Murphy 
and Cherney (2010) in the following terms: 
Disengaged people are unlikely to want to challenge an authority and are 
unlikely to interact at all with authority or its system of rules…are particularly 
difficult to win over even when PJ is deployed in an attempt to engage such 
groups. One reason being that PJ is seen as an insincere attempt to win 
cooperation. (Murphy and Cherney, 2010, p. 6) 
 
The idea of insincerity and even suspicion is one highlighted in my own empirical research 
when protesters identified doubt about the motives of the police and their actions, whether 
factually based or not (see chapter six). Understandably, the state and its agents may utilise 
PJ approaches to foster engagement, but not without creating potential for it to be seen merely 
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as a “ploy”. The impression that PJ can be nothing more than an insincere attempt to gain 
cooperation and engagement is repeated elsewhere (Braithwaite, 2003, 2010; Tankebe, 
2009b).  
 Much PJ theorising and research deals with peoples’ perceptions of the authority itself, 
in the context of the present work, the police. However, it can be argued that this is a flaw in 
PJ by failing to take account of how the legitimacy of the law itself is perceived (Murphy et al, 
2009). Murphy and Cherney (2010, p.6) refer to this as “authority legitimacy versus law 
legitimacy”, whereby those who question the legitimacy of the law itself may be less inclined 
to engage with authority and adopt positions of disengagement. Attention to the antecedent 
nature of the relationship between legal legitimacy and perceptions of police legitimacy is 
scarce in the literature, generally and specific to protest policing (Mazerolle et al, 2013). 
Significant gaps appear in the research on the role of perceptions about the legitimacy of the 
law and the legal system. However, it is apparent that not only are the police required to be 
perceived as fair and just, but the rules and laws enforced by them need to be seen as such 
(Mazerolle et al, 2013; Murphy and Cherney, 2012). Therefore, perception of legal legitimacy 
is a vital antecedent to attitudes of compliance and cooperation with the police. Whilst the 
police as an entity may be viewed as a legitimate authority, the laws, policies and regulations 
that they enforce can be perceived as illegitimate. Conversely, others propose that the manner 
in which the police conduct themselves and discharge their duties influences peoples’ 
perceptions of the law (Tyler and Huo, 2002). These observations point to a less than linear 
relationship between a complex array of factors, it being a more comminuted route to 
perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. Thus, it appears 
that not everyone pays heed to PJ-based approaches in every policing context. 
 Evidence indicates that groups with shared identities who feel distinctly different from 
the police are less likely to respond to PJ approaches because officers’ presence, as far as 
what they represent, are not “identity relevant” to them (Bradford, 2012, p. 23). PJ has greater 
efficacy in establishing a link between police legitimacy and compliance when people perceive 
authority, such as the police as an in-group (Bradford, 2012; Smith, 1983, 2007). This has 
contextual relevance to it, since police activities based on procedural fairness that are 
perceived as irrelevant to a group’s prevailing identity may achieve very little. Procedural 
fairness is a constituent of PJ and yet has nuances within it, there is a wide spectrum of what 
is perceived as procedurally fair ranging from that occurring at the individual level of interaction 
to societal inclusion in policy and decision-making (Murphy and Cherney, 2010). The latter 
has no direct individual input from the point of view of the public apart from engagement in the 
political processes (such a voting and lobbying), whilst the former engages people at the 
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personal level. Policing relies heavily on the interactional level and assessments of what is fair 
can be highly subjective.  
 The dynamic between authority and social groups depends on the inter-group status 
and relevancy. PJ outcomes will vary according to the group context and the salience of social 
identities, where multiple and conflicting identities occur in social settings such as protest the 
relevance of the police and what they represent may be questioned and fragmented. Bradford 
(2012) identifies that: 
The weight of current evidence serves to complicate the potential link between 
police fairness and social identity. (Bradford, 2012, p. 24) 
According to PJ and the ESIM, perceived representativeness of the police to the social group 
and the setting is an agent in establishing perceptions of legitimacy and compliance. 
Perceptions of the police as representative in this way can be influenced by tradition and 
symbolism relating to the police role in social order. Mazerolle et al (2013) explain this aspect 
in the following terms: 
Tradition carries with it historical elements and cultural beliefs and practices. 
Traditional responses and held beliefs relating to police legitimacy may 
characterise community held beliefs in the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a police 
service over many years or generations. These beliefs are not necessarily 
based in fact but are handed down from one generation to the next as a set of 
expectations and responses. Moreover, people are part of communities and are 
influenced by the attitudes of those with whom they interact. (Mazerolle et al, 
2013, p.1) 
PJ approaches can be problematic for the contexts of protest policing given the focus on 
delivering procedural fairness without taking into account the full range of antecedents and 
contingencies in the complicated connections between police activity, social identity, 
perceptions of legitimacy and attitudes to compliance. The CDM of police legitimacy proposes 
that these can be more fully accounted for by the four factors of, 1) protester constructions of 
policing, 2) power and identity relationships, 3) levels of protester engagement and distancing 
and 4) pre-existing ideology. These occur across three dimensions at the personal, social and 
protest cause levels. 
 If we accept for the moment the proposition that PJ might not work all of the time in 
every context, the argument can be taken further to ponder if PJ approaches can, in certain 
contexts be counter-productive? There is variance in peoples’ attitudes toward the very laws 
that the police are expected to enforce and this is not specifically addressed in PJ research 
as a contingent (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Braithwaite, 2009; Cherney and Murphy, 2011). 
Furthermore, people may perceive the police as being a legitimate authority (or not) and 
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question the justification and legitimacy of the law itself both generally and specifically. Thus, 
it is clear from the contingency debate that police approaches aimed at demonstrating 
procedural fairness may be impeded or induce a counter effect. It is quite possible that 
oppositional views to state authority, the police and/or the law itself can co-exist 
simultaneously. People may adopt positions that are opposed to the law and the police, 
support the law in principle but not the police, support the police but not the law itself (Murphy 
and Cherney, 2011). Empirical research has identified that perceptions of legal legitimacy do 
influence levels of compliance with authority, a notable aspect to this research is that PJ 
approaches may be counter-productive relating to compliance with authority where the 
legitimacy of the law itself is questioned or challenged (Murphy and Cherney, 2011). Indeed, 
I will demonstrate through my empirical research that personal values related to the law are 
influential in the way that people construct perceptions of police legitimacy and come to view 
compliance and cooperation with the police and the law, regardless of benign or positive 
evaluations of protest event policing. 
 In summary, this chapter has charted the development and explosive rise of PJ from 
its original US origins into British policing. In particular, identifying how it has informed the 
police Code of Ethics, PEEL inspection regime and police reform. In so doing, it has 
highlighted the establishment of PJ as orthodoxy in UK policing. Evidence has been presented 
for the existence of a number of antecedents and contingencies to both PJ and the ESIM 
approaches to the policing. The weight of influence of positive contact with the police is not 
entirely equivalent to that given to negative encounters, providing the basis for an asymmetric 
dimension to protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy. Impressions or experiences of 
negative contact may be viewed as the norm, with positive encounters balanced against the 
proviso that they are the exception to the rule, indicating a filtering process through which 
evaluations of policing can be made.  
 However, the influence of PJ in attempting to secure perceptions of police legitimacy 
and compliance can be confounded by the context, circumstances and social processes within 
and outwith the protest event itself. The dialogic nature of police legitimacy demonstrates that 
the PJ empirical research has over-stretched its theoretical basis, causing us to question the 
variables that are applied and how we understand the complexities of police legitimacy and 
pathways to compliance. The phenomena of social distancing and motivational postures 
based on protester beliefs and attitudes can and does influence people’s degrees of 
engagement with authority, the police and the law and informs their social identity. The net 
effect of these antecedents and contingencies can cause what might be described as a 
contextual “gap”, one in which police claims to legitimacy lie on one side and protester 
perceptions at the other. It appears that we have reason to believe that these antecedents and 
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contingencies serve to influence the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of 
police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation beyond PJ and the ESIM 
explanations. Due to its meteoric rise, few would doubt that PJ has become common parlance 
in policing and criminal justice in the UK. However, it raises the question of what did we do 
before? Are we to consider that issues of trust and confidence, police legality, alignment of 
values between the police and public, police and legal legitimacy were not priorities on the 
professional practice and academic agendas? Clearly not. The danger is that with the new 
nomenclature that comes with PJ we begin to rely on simplicity without reflective practice and 
critical thinking. Without reflection, we cannot develop learning and come to rely on 
generalisations that overlook the nuances of different policing contexts. PJ is a positive 
contribution to policing, but it has its limitations. 
 The chapter that follows examines the foundations of the policing of protest and 
disorder. The historical background to policing in England and Wales under the old watch 
arrangements to the birth of the new police in 1829 is discussed. It documents some pivotal 
moments in the policing of protest and public order that led to reform, with a move away from 
the use of the military to the civil police. It also details how crowds have been construed from 
classical psychological reductionism, that is the idea of the “mob”, to modern day social 
psychological models of crowd dynamics. Trends in the way that protest has been managed 
are also identified and examined. 
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Chapter 2 
Foundations and trends in the policing of protest and public order 
“The police incite violence, arrest people at random and use disproportionate violence 
against protesters”. (Interviewee 22, TUC March) 
“On protest days like this they get the Met TSG out. Thugs, psycho-goons”. (Interviewee 5, 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson protest) 
 The policing of protest and public order is at times a fraught venture, arguably one of 
the most challenging policing situations for the public and the police, with a long political and 
social history in the UK. In order to contextualize it, the following chapter begins by setting the 
historical background to policing since the thirteenth century under the old watch 
arrangements, to the birth of the new police in 1829 and beyond. It documents some pivotal 
moments in the policing of protest and public order that led to reform, with a move away from 
the use of the military to the civil police. The chapter details the changing political and social 
landscape, how it relates to protest and public order policing, and reactions to it throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It also details how crowds have been construed, from 
classical psychological reductionism, that is the idea of the “mob”, to modern day social 
psychological models of crowd dynamics. Trends in the way that protest has been managed 
are critically examined and the chapter concludes with a detailed discussion about the 
paramilitarisation of the policing of protest. 
Policing before the new police 
 The maintenance of order, as far back in English history as Saxon times was based 
on collective responsibility under the watch of appointed people. According to Emsley (1996, 
pg. 9) the medieval constable was “a man appointed from within his community and charged 
with carrying out the duties of the office [and] increasingly became the executive agent of the 
manor or parish for which he was appointed and it was his task to make reports about felons, 
miscreants and nuisances”. The longstanding tradition survived into Norman times where the 
constable gained royal authority under the remit of maintaining the King’s peace and policing 
arrangements became governed by statute. In order to maintain law and order, towns were 
required by the Statute of Winchester in 1285 (13 Edw. I, St. 2) to establish a watch and 
householders were obliged to perform this duty to assist the locally appointed constables 
charged with being the spokesperson for the community and responsible for community 
oversight (Cowley, 2011). The watchman guarded the entrances to the town at night, patrolled 
the streets and maintained order by arresting drunks and prostitutes (Bunyan, 1976, p. 59). A 
second legislative change contained in the Justice of the Peace Act 1361 (34 Edw. 3, c.1), 
established aristocrats chosen by the Crown, as Justices of the Peace (JPs) and the role of 
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constable became subordinate to crown authority vested in them. The constable was 
accountable to the JPs, who passed down orders and instructions via the constables to the 
community (Cowley, 2011). These arrangements survived for many centuries until the social 
landscape and expanding economy of the eighteenth century changed the nature and 
expectations of the watch. The expectation became one of protecting those whose legitimate 
business or pleasure took them onto the streets at night (Beattie, 2001, p.169). However, there 
is some evidence that watch duty was unpopular among the citizens required to perform it 
(Rosenheim, 1991). Yet, relatively few refusals were officially recorded, although it is difficult 
to know whether this was because people grudgingly undertook the duty, hired a substitute or 
because enforcement action was only taken at times of crisis. A pivotal moment for the watch 
arrangements came when certain London parishes obtained legislation in 1735, under which 
citizens exchanged their duty to serve by paying a watch rate (Rawlings, 2002). Other parishes 
followed suit.  
 Eventually, by the late eighteenth century few people in London were choosing to 
serve, leading to the appointment of paid deputies. Many parishes had established or 
improved watch schemes. Reform did not necessarily stop once a new watch scheme was in 
place. Many parish watch committees continued to seek further improvements so that by the 
nineteenth century some had regulations about the qualifications, pay, working methods and 
discipline of the watchmen, and had even extended their cover by the appointment of patrol 
officers with greater discretion to operate (Harris, 2004). Across the country, with growing 
urbanisation, the local ruling elite often wanted their towns to acquire the trappings of civic 
status. This included a professional watch system. Reform of the watch in one town, led 
neighbouring communities to introduce changes, due in part because of the fear that potential 
criminals would simply migrate from better, to less well policed areas (Emsley, 2009).  
 Reform proposals were not without difficulties, citizens who were unwilling to serve or 
critical of the professional watch were also unenthusiastic about contributing to its cost. The 
complex structure of the government in many boroughs could also obstruct reform, and there 
were power struggles between local political and interest groups over control of the watch 
forces (Rawlings, 2002). The question remains as to whether these reforms made any real 
difference. The records of trials at the Old Bailey indicate that after the mid-eighteenth century, 
victims, who had previously called for assistance from their neighbours, were more likely to 
call for the watch (Shoemaker, 2004; Williams, 2011). This suggests that they had some 
confidence in the new professional forces, although it might merely indicate that, having paid 
for this service, they no longer expected neighbours to respond or there was a belief that 
calling for the watch would in some sense reinforce their testimony against an offender 
(Williams, 2011). Certainly, criticism of the watchmen arose and persisted throughout the 
51 
 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, although it is not easy to judge whether this was 
because they were inept and/or corrupt (as is often reported) or because public expectations 
of them had increased (Emsley, 2009; Hurl-Eamon, 2005; Rawlings, 2002). 
Specifically, the ability and efficiency of the watch arrangements to cope with public 
disorder and disturbances was considered questionable before the new police were formed, 
a situation epitomised by the Gordon Riots in 1780. Lasting for five days, no magistrate could 
be found who would face the ‘mob’ to read the Riot Act 1714 (1 Geo.1 St.2 c.5), causing the 
royal prerogative to be exercised in deploying the army onto the streets (Emsley, 2009; 
Rawlings, 2002). Deploying military might against the civilian population raised a number of 
problems. Mistrust of the government meant that there was widespread opposition to the 
existence of a standing army for use against civilians. Moreover, magistrates who had the 
power to request assistance from the army, had a number of concerns about doing so: the 
nearest barracks might be some distance away which meant the soldiers might arrive too late 
to deal with outbreaks of disorder; there was uncertainty about the authority to use force and 
what level of force might be exerted; there were fears that the presence of soldiers might 
further inflame public resentment that otherwise would have dissipated (Rawlings, 2002; 
Williams, 2011). This created a dilemma, since the authorities had been criticised for failing to 
request the army early enough to quell the Gordon Riots. However, there were also concerns 
that parts of the military had been sympathetic to the rioters (in that case, if not others). It 
appears that fears concerning the use of force were not altogether unfounded. In 1761, an 
imported militia from North Yorkshire gained notoriety after hacking at least forty people to 
death at a protest in Hexham, Northumberland (Emsley, 1996, 2009). Could the authorities 
run the risk of similar events becoming more common place? Efforts were made to reduce the 
dependence on soldiers by establishing paramilitary forces composed of part-time volunteers. 
Yet, these also proved difficult to control, when in 1819 a charge by one such force turned a 
peaceful meeting in Manchester into the Peterloo massacre. Perhaps in consequence, the 
government and civil authorities continued to rely on the army to some extent in dealing with 
protest and disorder. Indeed, to improve the availability of troops, a large number of barracks 
were built around the country (Rawlings, 2002). The use of troops in support of the new police 
continued sporadically beyond 1829, yet with a growing acceptance and desire that the civilian 
population should be policed by a civil force without resort to military power (Emsley, 2009). 
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Policing and the new police 
It is inconclusive whether there had been an actual rise in public disorders during the early 
nineteenth century or a growing intolerance of public gatherings (Harris, 2003). The situation 
did not escape the attention of Sir Robert Peel, adding momentum to his argument for reform. 
Even if he did consider a civil force that might take on the mantle of riot control, the issue 
remained politically sensitive and did not appear to be writ large in his pronouncements for 
policing in London in 1829. However, historic events and reactions to them provided the 
background to the development of the new police, Rawlings (2002) explains that “from the 
outset it was intended that by creating a single force the new police would be able to deal with 
public disorder” (2002, p.118). Sir Robert Peel himself declared that:  
The whole of the police force will be gradually placed under such a degree of 
discipline as may enable it to act with effect, should any occasion arise for its 
services, as an (sic) united corps – for instance, the late riots in Spitalfields, and 
tumultuous mobs of any kind”. (The Times, 11th August, 1829) 
 
Thus, it appears that the policing of protest and disorder was always considered to be part of 
the remit. 
A significant difference between the new police and the previous watch system was 
the “severing of the connection with the community police, the parish authority and ratepayers” 
(Rawlings, 2002, p. 118). The public were to be policed and expected to co-operate with it. 
Notwithstanding the introduction of the Metropolitan Police in London, most counties however, 
retained the office of parish constable. The borough councils (in 1835) were permitted to 
organise a police force, yet few of them seemed eager to implement this (Williams, 2011). 
Accordingly, by 1837, just over half of the boroughs had an established police force. Legal 
arrangements in 1839 allowed any of the English counties to raise and equip a salaried police 
force, JPs were permitted to appoint Chief Constables, for the direction of the police in their 
areas and allowed one officer per 1,000 population (Emsley, 2009). Whilst discretionary, the 
arrangements saw the development of the first police constabularies. In the 1840s, there was 
still a great disparity between different parts of the country with no single style of policing 
having been adopted (Emsley, 2009). With concerns about rising political unrest associated 
with the Chartist movement, attempts were made to establish greater standardisation and 
control of policing to meet the challenge (Rawlings, 2002; Redekop and Pare, 2011).  
The system of policing that developed throughout the nineteenth century appears to 
have changed little into the early part of the twentieth century, it was a format based on foot 
patrol, delivered by a disciplined (often along military-type lines) and bureaucratically-
controlled force (Williams, 2011). Against this background, protest and disorder appeared to 
occupy two types. The first relates to community disorder and unrest, often between different 
sections of the community, into which the police became drawn (Waddington, 1992). The 
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second, from the 1970s onwards, occurred directly between the police and ethnic minorities, 
and the police and protesters at industrial disputes. Anti-globalisation and political protest 
being a much more recent addition to the protest landscape (della Porta et al, 2006a). Dunning 
et al (1987) mapped British community disorders occurring from 1900 to 1970, and found that 
apart from in 1910, that saw a very sharp rise, there was a significant decline in large-scale 
disorder until the 1960s. 
The 1950s occupy a special place in the nostalgic tradition of the British police, 
epitomised by the fictional character of Dixon of Dock Green (McLaughlin, 2007). In this, a 
consensual police officer upheld the law and was an integral part of the community which they 
served. The constable knew the people and they him. Petty criminals deferred and assisted 
in investigating serious crime (Emsley, 2009; McLaughlin, 2007). Policing as a symbol of the 
consensual society is important because it feeds into a broader, imagined social history of 
Britain (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Williams, 2011). However, whilst conceptually the 1950s 
are understood to have been a period with an absence of conflict and disorder, policing was 
not perhaps the halcyon days that they are portrayed to be. The so-called 'golden age' of 
policing still suffered riots and witnessed a spiralling crime problem (Reiner, 2010; 
Waddington, 1991). Reported crime rose, there were fears for the erosion of respect in society 
and a young generation out of control. Some of this was the perennial fear of crime and 
disorder, but some of it was new with a youthful population who had little direct experience of 
the World War years, more opportunity and income (Reiner, 2010; Brogden, 1991). 
In 1962, a Royal Commission on the Police was formed, to look at the relationship 
between the police, the public and means of ensuring proper accountability. This was a chance 
to confront the dilemma facing a police service working on the basis of 'the law on the streets', 
and a public which increasingly was demanding that they stick consistently to the methods of 
'the law in books' (Williams, 2011, p. 58). What stands out from a study of its history, though, 
is the way that this opportunity was missed. The members of the Royal Commission, and the 
crucial posts of chair and deputy, were vetted to make sure they were “reliable” (Rawlings, 
2002). The outcome of the Commission was a report about administration and structures of 
accountability and the 1964 Police Act (1964, c.48) was drawn up. Significantly, it removed 
elected watch committees, consolidated a national institution of ‘senior’ police officers, 
increased the power of the Home Secretary and reduced the Police Authorities to the role of 
“quartermaster” (Williams, 2011). It allowed the Home Office to amalgamate boroughs and 
counties, a process that eventually produced 43 police forces. Greater centralization 
accompanied close attention to central control of police training and accreditation. 
Consequently, the system of British police organization moved further from institutional 
accountability to the public, towards a more centralized, performance and target focused 
system with the aim of greater “professionalization” (Williams, 2011). Arguably, this created 
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opportunity for greater command and control and mutual support between police forces to 
deal with disorder. 
However, the Royal Commission could not transform relations between the police and 
the public, they continued to be problematic with claims of police repression and racism 
against sections of communities. According to Williams (2011) the immediate catalyst for most 
controversy in the 1970s and 1980s was the role of racism in both policing and wider society. 
When substantial numbers of West Indian immigrants arrived in the U.K. after the Second 
World War, they congregated in certain areas, which made them susceptible to discrimination 
and harassment. They felt that the police were of little help to them. Relations deteriorated, 
until by the 1970s a young generation, which had seen their parents discriminated against 
came of age in an era of high employment and a policing style which was perceived as 
harassment (Whitfield, 2004; Williams, 2011). Consequently, a number of disorders occurred 
between predominantly black youths and the police. Confrontations were often sparked by 
police raids and heavy-handedness at events such as the Notting Hill carnival (where disorder 
had occurred in1976 and 1977) (Waddington, 1992). However, such disorders were not limited 
to London, with riots breaking out in many inner cities across the country during the 1980s 
(Bristol, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham to name just four). Indeed, it appears that many 
community disorders of the time went under-reported (Benyon and Solomos, 1987). With 
rising crime rates, the minority who turned to crime drew police responses aimed at the whole 
community, which further soured relationships. Lea and Young (1984) described the situation 
in some areas as 'military policing' characterized by: 
…policing without the consent of, and with the hostility, active or otherwise, of the 
community. The community do not support the police because they see them as 
a socially or politically oppressive force in no way fulfilling any protective 
functions… the police force under such circumstances will not be in a position to 
receive the type of information from the community which would enable its 
activities to be characterised by the principle 'certainty of detection'. The crucial 
consequence of this situation is that an important part of police activity will come 
to constitute the random harassment of the community at large irrespective of 
involvement in crime. (Lea and Young, 1984, pp.172-173) 
 
 It was against this stark backdrop that police operations such as 'Swamp '81' in Brixton 
1981 occurred. A police operation aimed at street crime, using stop and search and 
widespread arrests of suspected persons, it triggered three days of anti-police rioting in the 
area. Many were shocked at the breakdown in police-community relations. Lord Scarman's 
(1981) Inquiry concluded that although the riots could not be condoned, the police needed to 
make significant changes to the way that they went about their duties (Williams, 2011). 
However, whilst some improvements were initiated, the breakdown in consensual policing, 
rising unemployment, deprivation and social unrest unleashed a political imperative from the 
1980s onwards to re-create and maintain order and control. In part this could be manifestly 
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seen in the policing of community disorders and industrial disputes of the 1980s, particularly 
the miners’ strikes. Reiner (2010) observes that since that time police responses to public 
disorder developed a tougher edge, taking on a more professionalised, paramilitary face 
characterised by weapons, technology and specialist equipment. He summarises the situation 
as one in which “Darth Vader displaced Dixon in riot control tactics” (Reiner, 2010, p. 87). 
Arguably, most public order policing tactics, training and equipment in the UK have gone 
largely unchanged since. 
Historical perspectives on crowds and protest 
In examining the foundations and trends in protest and public order policing, it is useful to 
survey some of the historical and social origins of crowds, how they have been understood 
and policed over time. One of the first wholesale analyses of crowds in the UK occurred as a 
study of the food and labour riots of the eighteenth century. Thompson (1970) describes how 
reactions of the masses to soaring food prices and unemployment up and down England in 
the eighteenth century led to an interest in group behaviour by historians and politicians of the 
time. While Thompson recognised the social and political context of disturbances, Beloff 
(1938, p.75) earlier proposed that these activities were seen as nothing more than 
“degenerations into mere excuses for crime”. Although historical evidence is scant to support 
such accusations the idea appeared widespread across western Europe and to some extent 
still endure today. Stott (2009) provides a detailed and thorough examination of the classical 
approaches to crowd psychology which have influenced the policing of crowds and public 
order.  
 In producing a detailed social history of France, Taine (1876) was among the first to 
conceive crowds as being irrational and mob-like. Significantly, he proposed that crowds 
consisted of those of lower intellect who lacked any rationality. At the time he provided a 
framework for the understanding of crowds that rapidly spread and the idea was given 
significant momentum through the work of Gustave Le Bon (1895), who proposed a tripartite 
arrangement to the pathology of crowd psychology. The three themes identified are those of 
submergence, contagion and suggestibility. Submergence proposes a loss of personal identity 
in crowd members when they are immersed in a group, Le Bon (1895) asserted that this occurs 
principally because of the anonymity given to an individual within the context of a large crowd. 
For Le Bon, this signaled a shift from mere personal psychology to a crowd one, which was 
homogenous, shared and which lacked individuality. The contagion aspect refers to the 
unfettered spread of ideas or emotional states within the crowd, similar to how we might 
understand that an organic disease does, inferring that disorder could somehow be infectious 
and transmitted. Suggestibility refers to a trance-like state induced by anonymity, which is the 
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conduit for the contagion to occur. Le Bon suggested that through the dynamic of these three 
components, homogeneity enables the crowd to act and be influenced as one, particularly by 
leaders. The inference is that by merely being part of a crowd, individuals lose all sense of self 
and any personal responsibility. This view of crowds of course includes a de-civilisation 
concept that see’s individuals in a crowd context as somehow degenerative and innately 
barbaric (Reicher et al, 2004). Le Bon (1895, p.32) pointed to this when he observed “they 
possess the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity of primitive beings”. Ideas of social 
degeneration were certainly fashionable during this period, which may account for its appeal. 
 Le Bon’s work has since been shown to be decontextualized (particularly by 
proponents of social identity-based approaches to crowds) in terms of it being isolated from 
the social and cultural conflicts occurring at the time. Myopically, he failed to detail the real 
grievances of the people and the potential effect of state authority or police upon the crowd. 
Reicher et al (2004) state that such a shallow analysis of the contextual elements of group 
behaviour ultimately leads to an unnecessary pathologisation of crowds. In essence, this 
means that classical reductionist psychology is unsighted and nonchalant to the prevailing 
social, ideological and interactional contexts of crowd behaviour. Reicher (2004) considers 
that policing strategies today still miss opportunities to fully engage and understand the 
complexity of social identities in crowds, although arguably developments are being made in 
dialogue-based approaches to the policing of crowds and protest (HMIC, 2009a, HMIC, 2009b, 
Stott, 2009). These developments are important, and Reicher (2003) explains that failing to 
engage with social, ideological and interactional levels of crowds excuses the need for police 
to communicate with the crowd in anything other than unilaterally, if at all. Less communicative 
policing styles may be differentiated from broadly European ones today that tend to rely on 
police negotiation and communication with individuals and the crowd (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, 
2011b). Waddington (2007, p.59) asserts that “pacificatory gestures” by the police can 
promote positive police-public relations, however this is not perhaps without contingencies. 
An over-reliance on widespread coercive activity can lead the police to deny any responsibility 
for crowd behaviour, since they come to believe that violence is in the very nature of the group 
itself. Denial of this nature only serves to validate police repression and the use of escalated 
force in order to control crowds. In the modern context of protest policing, this adds justification 
for the use of coercive tactics which in turn can result in creating or heightening perceptions 
of illegitimacy toward the police (Stott, 2009). 
 Festinger et al (1952) attempted to establish support for classical psychological 
reductionism through the theory of deindividuation. It proposes that the level of anonymity 
given to a person in a crowd works to reduce their self-awareness and decreases their 
threshold for displaying anti-social behaviour. It follows that this influences their ability to use 
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or engage in violence. Deindividuation is however derived from a study of adolescent male 
youths in which anonymity, given in the guise of group membership, increased expressions of 
anti-social and anti-normative behaviour (Festinger, 1957; Festinger et al, 1952). Originally, it 
was argued that deindividuation takes place when individuals within a crowd are not 
scrutinized, thus feeling unaccountable for their actions. The psychological consequence 
being to lessen internal restraint and increase behaviours that would normally be inhibited. 
The concept was developed further to include a sense of anonymity induced by heightened 
arousal, sensory overload, drugs and alcohol use (Zimbardo 1969, Diener et al, 1976). 
However, analysis of the outcomes of several deindividuation studies indicates that it is 
erroneous and lacks broad empirical support (Diener, 1980; Postmes and Spears, 1998). The 
notion that people lose self-awareness cannot be relied upon theoretically or pragmatically in 
formulating policing approaches to crowds or in understanding protest events. On the contrary, 
it seems to be the case that individuals retain personal awareness and individual responsibility 
for their actions (Mcphail,1991; Madensen and Knuttson, 2011).  
 Classical reductionist views undermine the significance of the situational and 
interactional levels of crowd behaviour by failing to take account of the influence of the police, 
other protesters or antecedent attitudes within crowd members. What we see is an inference 
that crowd members are always potentially violent and dangerous, whether they are cognisant 
of it or not. Moreover, this putation has influenced the policing of crowds for a long time. The 
view is, that to some extent it endures in the UK today, despite a desire within the police 
service to facilitate peaceful protest and adopt less coercive tactics (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b; 
Stott, 2009). There are signs of change with efforts to increase engagement, facilitate peaceful 
protest and mitigate the consequences of the use of perceived repressive interventions such 
as containment (or “kettling”). By no means can sea change be anticipated in the near future, 
with this would come an entirely different way of configuring crowds and the ways of policing 
them (Reicher, 2011; Stott, 2011; Stott et al, 2010). The enduring influence of history may be 
harder to eliminate than by simply discarding old textbooks or vade-mecum. The situation is 
compounded when the police are faced with contradictory assessments of their ability and 
performance, such as the perceived failures of the police to deal with the UK student riots 
2010 and the August 2011 disorders that led to a dampening effect on earlier G20, 2009 
recommendations. Arguably, this has created something of an identity crisis for protest and 
public order policing in the UK. 
Trends in the management of protest 
Thus far the chapter has discussed some of historical context of the policing of protest and 
disorder and how crowds have been understood. I will examine in more detail later the 
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contribution of alternative theoretical approaches to understanding crowds and disorder, but 
before doing so I will examine observable trends in the management and policing of protest 
and public order. A close examination of protest and public order policing in the UK since the 
1960s reveals certain patterns in policing styles that have emerged. These are in part reflected 
in global trends and developments that began to gain more detailed academic attention during 
the 1980s (della porta et al, 2006). Observations of a number of protests in many countries 
reveal an initial position of repressive policing with a more generalised move toward the 
concept and practice of negotiated management, that is to say, one based on dialogue with 
protesters and facilitation of their aims. Latterly, this was to become displaced with a 
regression to more repressive styles of policing (della Porta and Fillieure, 2004; della Porta 
and Reiter, 2006b; HMIC, 2009a, 2009b).  
 The negotiated management policing style saw the police implement regimes based 
on dialogue with protesters before and during events, which indicated a departure from a 
reliance of the use of force and coercion, even where acts of civil disobedience might be 
present. In latter day parlance, this might be described as peaceful, but not necessarily lawful 
protest activity, the type often seen on the streets and public places of the UK (HMIC, 2009a, 
2009b, HMIC, 2011b). It is claimed that negotiated management marked a shift in the 
dominance of western policing styles that were present during the late 1960s and 1980s which 
tended to be generally less tolerant and altogether more repressive (della Porta et al, 2006; 
della Porta, and Reiter, 2006; Waddington, 2007). In a British context, the negotiated 
management style has been identified in many studies of urban community disorders where 
a measured policing approach aimed at restoring confidence in the police and re-establishing 
legitimacy has been commended as the way forward for the policing of protest and disorder 
(Field, 1982; Hoggett and Stott, 2008: HMIC, 2009a, 2009b; Waddington, 2007). Negotiated 
management as a policing style can be said to be characterised by respect for the right to 
protest, a more liberal attitude towards short-term community disruption, reduced tendency to 
make mass arrests and reluctance by the police to resort to high levels of force to control 
situations (della Porta et al, 2006; Mcphail et al, 1998). Such descriptors have similarity with 
previous recommendations and police directives going back to the 1980s and in this sense 
are nothing new (Waddington, 1994a). Whether negotiated management of protest truly 
occurs in the literal sense of an equable relationship between police and protesters is 
debatable, since as Waddington (1994b, p.79) points out “negotiation is not a neutral process” 
with protest often being managed to a large degree on police terms. 
 Some commentators note that there has been a consistent move in the past decade 
or so for police in the West to return to approaches in line with a more punitive and actuarial 
penology, perhaps reflective of wider practices in the criminal justice sphere of the time 
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(Hough, 2007; Noakes et al, 2005; Noakes and Gillham, 2006). The policing intervention of 
containment (“kettling”) and associated tactics such as cordons (static or moving lines of police 
officers) have been interpreted as sharing more in common with the escalated force and 
coercive strategies of previous decades. The evidence for this observation is cited from 
studies of a series of protests in which political and anti-globalization demonstrations have 
attracted greater repressive policing (Noakes et al, 2005; Noakes and Gillham, 2006). Further 
evidence can be found in the policing of G20, 2009 in London and the London Student protests 
2010, where a heavy reliance on these tactics appeared to prevail (HMIC, 2011a). In the UK, 
the development and use of perceived coercive tactics such as containment coincides with 
this chronology, although the use of containment as a formalised police tactic in the UK is a 
relative newcomer in the history of public order tactics (ACPO, 2010).  
 While much of the research cited was conducted in a US context, similar conclusions 
in support of it can be found in studies of European protests (della Porta and Reiter, 2006b; 
Waddington and King, 2005). Repressive policing styles are often linked with strategies aimed 
at nullifying protesters’ objectives and the activities of a minority within protest crowds. 
However, in consequence they can indiscriminately be directed at larger, homogenous groups 
who become affected by their mere physical presence alone. Policing interventions forming 
part of such strategies are characterised by: disruption of the right of assembly; use of 
intelligence gathering and surveillance methods; removal or arrest of suspected ringleaders; 
establishment of no protest zones; and the mass detention or containment of protesters 
without criminal charge (della Porta and Reiter, 2006b; Noakes et al 2005). Policing based on 
escalated force is commonly underpinned by the notion that large crowds are in some way 
inherently irrational, dangerous and in need of control (Le Bon, 1895; Reicher, 2003; 
Schweingruber, 2000; Stott, 2009). This is evident since it gives little, if any priority to the right 
to peaceful protest, communication between police and protesters is poor and there is frequent 
illegitimate use of coercive force against what is perceived to be an homogenous horde of 
protesters (della Porta and Fillieule, 2004; HMIC,2009b; Mcphail et al, 1998; Stott et al, 2010). 
Repressive policing manifests in three main types of police strategies: coercive using force to 
control, contain or disperse protest; persuasive using contacts and communication with protest 
groups or activists to influence or control; and information strategies using criminal intelligence 
and information gathering as a preventive measure to identify offenders (della Porta and 
Reiter, 1998, 2006b).  
 Coercive and preventive strategies predictably involve large numbers of highly visible, 
paramilitarised and riot-equipped officers. In a domestic context, this has been evident in 
disorders of the late 1990s, May Day 2001 demonstrations in London, G8 2005, G20 2009 
and Student protests 2010 (HMIC, 2009b; Stott et al, 2010; Waddington, 2007). Notably, in 
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tactical terms Police Support Units (PSU) in the U.K are highly structured, heavily equipped 
and controlled by a rigid command structure (ACPO, 2010). A militarily-organised police force 
can be considered to be more prone to brutality since it implies a hierarchical organisation with 
‘blind’ obedience to orders (della Porta and Reiter, 2006a, 2006b). However, perhaps more 
importantly is the way in which they can be perceived by protesters as heavy-handed and 
antagonistic serving to shape attitudes of police legitimacy. The significance of the presence 
and appearance of this type of police resource cannot be underestimated in terms of public 
perceptions and the presence of feelings of mistrust, fear and trepidation amongst protesters. 
The danger in light of more recent reviews of disorders in the UK is that it becomes more 
commonplace (HMIC, 2011a, 2011b). Yet, according to my own empirical research we might 
recognise that protesters are capable of drawing a distinction between the types of police and 
tactics used in protest and general police duties and that even benign police tactics such as 
traffic safety measures aimed at facilitating protest can be misinterpreted. 
 The wider political setting of protest can exert significant influence over the policing 
style adopted, this is characterised in the way that power is held by the state and the political 
imperatives or agenda placed on the police in particular protest scenarios (della Porta and 
Reiter, 1998; Reiner, 2012; Waddington, 1994b; Waddington, 2007). Latterly, there has been 
much more emphasis placed on the role of the police as protectors and facilitators of citizens’ 
rights. Certainly, the zeal with which human rights legislation is driven would indicate so and 
the way in which it permeates every quarter of policing, not just the public order sphere 
(Flanagan, 2008). In a liberal democracy we may expect this to be the case and aspire to it 
normatively, yet the spectre that comes in the shape of the police as the coercive arm of the 
state is perhaps less openly acknowledged at times (Waddington, 1991, 1994b). In 
consideration of the political nature of the policing of protest the strategies employed can of 
course be influenced by the views of government and parliamentary committees, protest 
groups, news and social media and the prevailing social sensitivities: making the policing of 
protest “unavoidably political” (Waddington; 2007, p.395) and at times highly contentious. 
Policing, and in particular the policing of protest and public order is a political activity, Brewer 
et al (1988, p. 4) emphasise that “nowhere are the police political innocents: to claim otherwise 
is disingenuous. By focusing on public order, policing is clearly revealed as a political activity”. 
 All of the above factors may conspire together to influence the policing strategy and 
protester perceptions of police legitimacy. However, policing practice based solely on 
persuasive strategies can perhaps be the author of their own demise. Consider, what happens 
when dialogue and communication between police and protesters cannot or does not occur 
despite the best efforts of those involved, particularly in cases of those who are disengaged 
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from the state or its agents? Orde (2011) highlights this type of dilemma in general terms 
following the 2010 Student Protests in London when he stated: 
There are lots of people to talk to, but they need to stand up and lead their 
people too. If they don’t we must be clear that the people who wish to 
demonstrate won’t engage, communicate or share what they intend to do with 
us and so our policing tactics will have to be different…more extreme. (Orde, 
2011, p. 30) 
The problem here are the assumptions that people want to engage and that without 
communication the police are somehow obliged to police events to the ‘worst case’ scenario, 
which by a process of reciprocity can actually serve to heighten tension and the potential for 
disorder. This can lead to perceptions of police illegitimacy and the withdrawal of cooperation 
and compliance. However, as I have previously highlighted there are antecedents and 
contingencies which underpin the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy. 
Indeed, it could be argued that those who do choose to engage with the police are a self-
selecting group, who in PJ parlance already possess a degree of moral alignment with the 
police. In the management of protest, they are less problematic for the police since they are 
likely to hold greater perceptions of legitimacy and be inclined to cooperate. 
 della Porta and Reiter (1998, p. 20) have previously argued that the very restriction 
and prohibition of protest is often a factor in “encouraging violent dynamics”. We know that 
feelings of anger and frustration can be provoked within groups when individuals feel 
threatened or have their aims blocked by others (Myers et al, 2010; Reicher, 2003). Thus, 
where the policing strategy involves an over reliance on coercive tactics, with large numbers 
of police officers present, and is seen as preventing what protesters perceive as their 
legitimate activity, conflict is viewed as more acceptable and lamentably, all the more likely 
(della Porta and Reiter,1998; Reicher, 2003; Stott, 2009).  
 The type of changes seen in police or crowd behaviour during policing interventions 
have been described as “reciprocal adaptations” that can be caused by memories of ‘atrocities’ 
committed in the past on both sides (della Porta, 1995, p.40). This demonstrates the distal 
and proximal nature of the influences that are at work in shaping perceptions of police 
legitimacy. A combination of these can form a body of protester and police knowledge that 
directly influences the style of policing and the way that protesters perceive it. Protester 
perceptions of policing style may inform the framing of protest that can represent existential 
challenges to the police, acceptance of their tactics and contributes to a reciprocal dynamic 
between the police and protesters. This body of knowledge exists on three levels, 1) in the 
immediate context of events where protesters respond to the prevailing policing style at the 
time, 2) in the preconceived notions brought by both parties, that impact on views about each 
62 
 
other, and 3) in perceptions of police legitimacy that are likely to influence future events and 
views of policing more broadly. These notions of police legitimacy can endure long after 
protest events themselves and affect future encounters. A striking example of this was 
provided by Climate Camp organisers soon after the London, G20 2009 (at which a man died) 
in an open letter published to the Metropolitan Police: 
On August 17th, you wrote to the Camp for Climate Action requesting further 
information on the location of our next camp…you say that this is to help with 
“community liaison” and for you to put a “preplanned and proportionate” policing 
operation in place. The location is a secret… there’s a simple reason for this: 
I’m afraid we just don’t trust the Police. Why? Because it seems as though every 
time we have a protest the police turn up and start hitting people. Look at what 
happened at G20 that’s not a good way to win people over. (Climate Camp, 
20/08/09) 
 In summary, a view emerges from the literature that the policing of protest across the 
western world has undergone something of an annular evolution. Whilst certainly not a 
unanimous one, there is a reliance on the idea that heavy-handed and disproportionate 
policing contributes to crowd violence and disorder (Waddington and King, 2005; Stott, 2011). 
In general terms, the 1960s to 1980s were dominated by forms of policing that were 
considered to be more repressive and based on escalated force. In contrast, it is claimed that 
from the late 1980s into 1990s there was a desire (with limited success) to move towards the 
negotiated management of protest, with the period post-1999 being characterised by a return 
to escalated force and repression, particularly related to political protests. There is a significant 
body of evidence to commend the above analysis as a broad picture of recent history in the 
style of protest and public order policing in the UK. A style that can and does influence the 
construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to 
cooperation and compliance with the police. Understanding how these are constructed and 
shaped is key to how the police make policy, are trained, plan for and operate in protest and 
public order situations. 
 
The paramilitarisation of policing  
A significant debate related to the trends in protest and public order policing is one of 
paramilitarisation (Jefferson, 1987; Waddington, 1987, 1991; Waddington, 2007). Whilst I do 
not intend to replay the twists and turns of the arguments in detail here, it is useful to recognise 
and precis the main points about the paramilitarisation of policing. We should perhaps start 
with how paramilitary policing might be defined, Jefferson (1990) describes it in the following 
terms: 
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…the application of (quasi-) military training, equipment, philosophy and 
organization to questions of policing (whether under centralised control or not) and 
a concretely grounded sense of the history and sociology of paramilitarism. (1990, 
p. 16)  
This is differentiated from a more traditional form of policing that is described as: 
…lines of bobbies, with arms linked, pushing and shoving against lines of 
demonstrators…this dominant image neatly captures the essence of the traditional 
approach to public order policing, namely the bringing together of a number of 
conventionally uniformed officers to form a relatively static and defensive human 
shield. (Jefferson,1990, p. 1) 
Whilst some might see this as a quaint and romantic image of the policing of 1960s 
demonstrations, it serves in highlighting the distinctions between the types of policing in 
question. Waddington (1987, 1991, 1994) places emphasis on paramilitary policing as having 
utility in protest and public order situations, in tandem with greater command and control, it 
being less prone to officers acting as “loose cannons” outside of strategic objectives. He 
explains that “…it is essential that officers engaged in public order situations are carefully 
supervised and controlled, for internal controls on behaviour are unlikely to prove reliable” 
(Waddington, 1991, p. 137). For Waddington (1991), more traditional and less paramilitary 
policing (without the conditions contained in the definition above) allows individual police 
officers too much discretion and the ability to run amok in already highly charged situations. 
Significantly, this might involve indiscriminate use of force and coercion against innocent and 
guilty alike (Waddington, 2007, p. 28), provoking crowd reactions and diminishing police 
legitimacy. On this basis, Waddington makes the case for specially trained, equipped, and 
closely supervised units of officers, operating to strategic aims. The type of tactics particularly 
related to achieving these aims involve co-ordinated arrest teams (or “snatch squads”), 
evidence gatherers (EGs) and intelligence operatives (Jefferson, 1990, Waddington, 2007). 
 However, the paramilitarisation of policing is not without controversy. Jefferson (1990) 
sets out the case against it, noting that whilst it might appear to professionalise policing, it has 
an “inherent capacity to make matters worse” by amplifying the prospect of disorder (1990, 
p.16). Jefferson (1990) notes that there are typically four distinct phases that occur where 
paramilitary policing is applied; preparation, controlling space, controlling the crowd and 
clearance.  
 In the preparation phase (sometimes referred to as standby or waiting time) specialist 
officers trained and equipped, sit, waiting for action, often “cooped up in vans or police 
canteens” (Jefferson, 1990, p.84). This standby time serves to be stressful and frustrating 
while boosting officers’ morale and readiness for action. From the protester point of view such 
preparation can be interpreted as provocative. 
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 The next phase is concerned with controlling space, dominating areas that the 
protesters may or may not use, sometimes involving moving people from one area to another. 
This activity understandably causes resentment, which if misinterpreted by the police only 
confirms the trouble they were expecting (Waddington, 2007). Having demarcated the use 
and availability of space, the police become involved in controlling the crowd. If, and often it 
does, this involves containment (sometimes with the use of force), crowd anger and 
resentment is said to grow. Jefferson describes this as:  
In this situation, with tempers becoming frayed and frustrations mounting, the 
paramilitary nature of the response – horses, dogs, riot shields and so on – only 
serves to make matters worse, by seeming to invite the stone-thrower. (Jefferson, 
1990, p. 85) 
Consequently, a spiral of reciprocal violence is triggered, creating action and reaction in a self-
fulfilling prophecy, often aimed at restoring order, relying on highly repressive policing. 
Following the conflagration of violence and the restoration of some order comes the clearance 
phase. Most protesters may comply and move on, some feeling resentment and indolence, 
yet eventually the police will clear an area, only for both to return more determined and better 
prepared, on subsequent occasions (Jefferson,1990). The extent to which paramilitary 
policing contributes to these effects may have dependency on a number of antecedents and 
contingencies described elsewhere.  
 Apart from the type of tactics, training, use of equipment and the stages applied in 
paramilitary policing Jefferson takes issue with the idea of impartial law enforcement, and 
police discretion. He asserts that the police appeal to the idea that they uphold the law without 
fear or favour as servants only of the law itself (Jefferson, 1990), whilst a laudable idea this is 
seen as unrealistic in the following way: 
Either way, impartial law enforcement constitutes an impossible mandate…for 
constables under his [the chief constable’s] command because the necessary 
prerequisite for impartial law enforcement - clear law activated by a particular 
complaint – is often simply not applicable to the area of law being enforced. 
(Jefferson, 1990, p. 47) 
Nowhere perhaps is this seen more readily than in the context of a tumultuous crowd in a 
protest situation, some of whom may be committing a variety of offences among a majority 
who are not. In the absence of complaint, a lack of evidence or proper identification of suspects 
the police tendency is to arbitrarily apply their discretion. 
 One reason why the paramilitarisation of policing is so appealing relates to police 
concerns about safety and Jefferson (1990) highlights an amusing anecdote about the actual 
risks of policing as follows “…a police researcher inquiring about police sick days in the Met. 
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discovered that more working days were lost from falling down ladders while decorating than 
that it has negative undertones about policing whilst ignoring the key point that it provides for 
from injuries in the line of duty” (Jefferson, 1990, p. 144). 
 However, Waddington (1987, 1993) takes issue with a number of the observations and 
conclusions that Jefferson (1987, 1990) makes about the paramilitarisation of policing. 
Fundamentally, he disagrees with the terms of the definition applied to paramilitarism, noting 
“co-ordination through superior command and control. Instead of leaving individual officers to 
take uncoordinated action...” (Waddington,1987, p. 38). This approach allows for a more 
disciplined response to disorderly and violent situations than is possible by traditional policing 
methods. Further, Jefferson (1987) synonymises paramilitarisation with public order policing 
per se, when in fact most officers engaged in public order policing tend to be general beat 
officers with additional training, not members of full-time specialist units. It could be argued 
that most provincial police forces in the current climate can least afford the luxury of specialist 
squads, which is one reason that the national Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) requires 
minimum numbers of regular, trained officers in each force area and recommends mutual 
support across areas (HMIC, 2011b, 2014b). Waddington (1987, 1993) notes that by 
necessity, with such training comes particular equipment, whilst unwelcome it is “…merely 
defensive [because] police officers are also employees, and it is no more acceptable to expose 
them to a hazardous working environment without adequate protection” (Waddington, 1993, 
p. 354).  
 Whilst acknowledging that there are valid criticisms to be made of specialist squads, 
Waddington (1993) argues that specialisation, even in the use of force is not necessarily 
militaristic or a feature of modern day policing. He questions whether it be preferable to have 
officers deployed in protest and public order situations without the specialist training that might 
be required (whether it is used or not)? To do so might attract claims of less professionalism. 
Waddington (1993) concludes that just because officers are trained in the use of force, it does 
not follow that they will use it. 
As to Jefferson’s account of the inevitability and amplification of violence deriving from 
his four-phased approach. Waddington (1993) draws on his own extensive empirical data to 
demonstrate that the conditions for amplification, as described by Jefferson (1987, 1990) are 
normally present in protest situations. However, confrontation, disorder, and violence are quite 
the exception in reality. Whilst it may be true that the police seek to control space, with planning 
and preparation it is often achieved by using barriers and “cordoning” off. Waddington (1987) 
notes that even when space and the crowd are controlled more overtly by a police presence, 
disorder does not habitually follow. Thus, to claim that “crowd anger will almost certainly 
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(emphasis added) follow such containment” (Jefferson, 1990, p. 87) is erroneous and 
misleading. In clearing the street, officers often do so with little or no violence by “simply 
ushering people along” and even when officers are dressed in overalls, helmets and carrying 
shields, violence is not a necessary corollary (Waddington, 1993, p. 356). Waddington 
challenges the assertion that there is a strong correlation (as claimed by Jefferson) between 
so-called paramilitary police and violent disorder, noting that to claim so requires not only that 
violence should occur when paramilitary deployments are present, but that it should be 
avoided when such deployments are absent. 
 The use of the view from below (that is from the perspective of protesters) in Jefferson’s 
(1990) examination of protests can be interpreted methodologically as a very selective 
perspective (Waddington, 1987,1993). This may be a valid point, I certainly acknowledge the 
limitations in my own research, yet contend that when dealing with protesters’ perceptions of 
police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation, it is a necessary and 
useful heuristic. One that can be supplemented by informed non-participant observation.  
 The paramilitary debate is one that more broadly continues and while not settled, it 
none the less offers a useful description of the contribution of policing styles and use of police 
power in the development of violence during protest. Furthermore, of the influence of 
judgements about protest policing on perceptions of police legitimacy. Perhaps it is a case of 
the lesser of two evils since as Waddington (1993, 1995) notes, militarism has always existed, 
given the ability of state authority to call upon the military for support to its civil powers 
(Waddington, 1991, p. 155).  If we wish to avoid calling upon military support in the policing of 
disorder and civil disturbance, the police must be adequately trained, equipped and able to 
deploy at least with a degree of “paramilitarism”. 
 In summary, this chapter has discussed some of the historical context of policing, 
examining the policing of protest and order under the watch arrangements and the reforms 
that came with the new police in 1829. It has highlighted the political and social aspects leading 
to a move from the use of the military to the civil police in the policing of protest and disorder. 
The theoretical approaches to crowds and their psychology have been highlighted, together 
with the tracing of trends and developments in policing styles that have occurred across 
Europe. A trend that has seen a return, according to some commentators, to repressive 
paramilitarised policing. The paramilitarisation of policing has been examined in detail and the 
key points for and against it presented. The following chapter will provide a discussion of the 
characteristics of protest, how we can understand it contextually and how it is organised. It 
sets out an operational definition, in order to frame the empirical research and concludes with 
a critique of specific theories and models that deal with violence and disorder. 
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Chapter 3 
Understanding protest and public disorder 
“What is a rebel? A man who says no: but whose refusal does not imply a 
renunciation…Rebellion cannot exist without the feeling that somewhere, in some 
way, you are justified”. (Camus, 1953, p.19) 
“Protest and resistance give you a feeling that you’re not on your own…like you 
are part of something”. (Interviewee 4, Students Against Cuts protest) 
At the heart of protest lies the belief that something, somewhere is fundamentally wrong, that 
someone should do something. The protester, whether they view themselves as a “rebel” or 
not protests not simply to be contrary, that is, just for the sake of saying “no” but has reasons 
and motivations as diverse as protest events themselves. Seeking to understand how the act 
of protest is conceived, its manifestations, levels of organisation and coordination is an 
important, yet often neglected aspect of the theory and practice of protest and public order 
policing. However, typologising and categorising protesters and protest carries with it 
limitations. The purpose of this chapter is to establish recognition for a more nuanced 
understanding of the influences associated with the construction and shaping of protester 
perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation, by demonstrating the 
complexities of protest and its policing  
 The chapter covers four main topics. First, it draws together ideas about what 
constitutes protest and social movements, how peoples’ intentions and actions are framed, 
organised, communicated and acted upon. The discussion explores several types of protest 
activity and how levels of organisation and coordination can be interpreted. From an array of 
academic literature, the discussion seeks some defining criteria for protest, that informs the 
contextual framework for the later empirical research. Secondly, the chapter examines the role 
of social media in framing protest events, establishing communication networks, and as a 
means of sharing and mobilising resources. Thirdly, it summarises and critiques explanatory 
theories and models of public disorder, specifically those broadly called “tinder and spark” 
explanations of riot and disorder (Waddington, 2007). The origin and development of the ESIM 
is examined, together with a critical look at its claim about the influence of emerging 
perceptions of police illegitimacy in the escalation of collective violence (Reicher, 2011; Stott, 
2009, Stott, 2011). The chapter concludes by demonstrating the theoretical link between 
protester attitudes and behaviour, highlighting the importance of context and the conditions 
under which attitudes can influence behaviour.  
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Protest and social movements 
Protest can be defined as a form of expression of an extraordinary nature, which is intended 
to accrue some benefit from a political or economic system, such activity is said to occur within 
the existing political structures (Lipsky, 1968). Opposition is expressly directed at policies or 
social conditions. However, three observations can be made about Lipsky’s (1968) 
conception. First, it implies that the political structure facilitates or at least tolerates protest, 
not so perhaps in oppressive regimes across the world. Secondly, it implies that protest is 
somehow not a part of everyday activity or the social context, and thirdly that protesters 
recognise and validate the existing political system. The extraordinary nature to which Lipsky 
(1968) refers implies that the social and political setting is stable, well-established and features 
a certain status quo. This echoes the assumption in PJ of the acceptance of authority and a 
backdrop of social order.  
 Alternatively, we may view protest nowadays as an ordinary feature of late modern 
society. That is to say, protest has become part and parcel of contentious politics and a much 
more common form of citizens expressing support or dissent for the issues that matter to them 
(Johnston, 2011; Goldstone, 2003). In this sense, protest has perhaps become much more 
normalised as a social and political activity and not extraordinary at all. Johnston (2011) 
interprets Lipsky’s (1968) view as being: 
…a time when researchers saw protest as extraordinary phenomena. Only 
occasionally usually under conditions of dissatisfaction, destabilising social 
change and social psychological influences…would people come together to 
voice grievances. Unhappy, isolated citizens would gather around a shared 
grievance or demand and if conditions were right, a social movement would form 
which could variously be aimed at reform, revolution or personal transformation. 
(Johnston, 2011, p.65) 
This is typically identified as a collective behaviour approach to protest, which sees the means 
by which protest is made as something out of the ordinary. In many instances, given the 
frequency with which protest occurs across such a diverse range of issues today, we might 
consider it as merely the routine exercise of politics by another means. This is particularly the 
case in democratic states where the public can seek to influence the policies and direction of 
international, national and local government mid-term, beyond the rigid timetable of the ballot 
box (Johnson, 2011).  
 However, protest can be viewed as a special form of policing context and protesters 
as “extraordinary” citizens. Any engagement in protest is made on a self-selecting basis, in 
that protesters choose to participate in it. This is in contrast to many other policing contexts 
where people do not exercise such choice, such as road traffic stops, stop and search, as a 
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victim or witness of crime. Protesters thus choose to place themselves in (potential) contact 
with the police at protest events in ways that are extraordinary to everyday public life. 
Undoubtedly, there may be a minority of people who are dedicated and frequent activists in 
protest causes and in one sense we might consider these to be “extraordinary” people, on the 
basis that they are different from the majority of citizens who do not engage in protests with 
such frequency (if at all).  
 Protesters can view the policing of protest as somehow distinct from general day-to 
day-policing too, in the way that they perceive police officers and police tactics at protest 
events. In understanding the nuances associated with the construction and shaping of 
protester perceptions of police legitimacy, the context and type of policing situation is highly 
pertinent. Protest engages people (protesters and police alike) doing extraordinary things and 
ignoring this subtlety leads to generalisation and complacency in our understanding of it. It is 
a policing context in which the general claims of PJ (Tyler, 1990, 2006) about the route to 
perceived police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation may carry less efficacy. One 
where the impact of antecedents and contingencies such as asymmetry (Skogan, 2006, 2012), 
social distancing and motivational posturing (Braithwaite, 2009, 2010, 2011) and the dialogic 
nature of police legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013) can be magnified. 
In short, the conditions for perceptions of police legitimacy are not equal in every policing 
context.  
 Increasingly, the term social movement society has been applied to the political scene 
in liberal democracies, in which participation by the masses in protests and demonstrations 
has become more common place (Johnston, 2011; Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Opp, 2009). In 
contrast to societies where protest was the recourse of underprivileged and excluded groups, 
the argument is that it is now the means to promote various political agendas. Moreover, that 
because of the diffusion and acceptance of protest as a legitimate activity, many organisations 
and pressure groups readily resort to using it (Johnston, 2011, p. 66). Indeed, social 
movements are formed for all sorts of issues, not necessarily political ones. A situation 
described by Melucci (1989) as the “movementisation” of society. Evidence in support of this 
in the U.K. is drawn from the considerable increase in the number of protests over recent 
years, the way in which they have become institutionalised and the increasingly moderate 
response from state authorities to protest activity (HMIC, 2010a, 2010b, 2012; Johnston, 
2011). However, the latter point may be debatable given examples of punitive policing and 
what some commentators report as a return to more repressive policing styles across 
democratic countries in western Europe (della Porta et al, 2006; Redekop and Pare, 2011). 
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 The institutionalisation of protest can be viewed as a means by the state to manage 
political contention, particularly where it originates from groups who are apt to engage in 
unconventional types of direct action and lack well defined organisation (Peterson, 2006). 
Institutionalisation in this form is described by Meyer and Tarrow (1998) as: 
The routinisation of collective action, such that the challengers and authorities 
can adhere to a common ‘script’, recognising familiar patterns as well as 
potentially dangerous deviations; inclusion and marginalisation, whereby 
challengers willing to adhere to established routines will be granted access to 
political exchanges in mainstream institutions, while those who refuse can be 
shut out of conversations through repression or neglect; co-optation, which 
means that challengers alter their claims and tactics to ones that can be pursued 
without disrupting the normal practice of politics. (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998, 
p.21) 
This relationship permits protesters to present and pursue their agendas, simultaneously 
giving the police the opportunity to manage them without direct challenge or confrontation. 
Examples of this include police negotiation on times, locations, limits on physical numbers, 
zones for protest, police protection in the face of counter-protest and a certain degree of 
tolerance to civil disobedience (such as blockades, sit-ins, traffic disruption and occupations) 
(Meyer and Tarrow, 1998). However, concessions such as these indicate a “scripted” type of 
encounter between police and protesters, but do little to describe the dynamic, spontaneous 
situations which often become highly contentious, with a potential for violence and disorder 
because they depart from the routinisation script.  
 Protest constitutes certain acts or conditions consisting of: the expression of 
grievance(s); an inability to ameliorate the situation personally and directly; an objective to 
highlight said grievance(s); and to bring about some change (Opp, 2009; Turner, 1969). 
Implicit in this description is the existence of some form of a collective, which is perhaps why 
many commentaries on protest synonymise it with social movements (abbreviated as SMs) 
(Opp, 2009). Since this is the case I will summarise below some of the main points concerning 
SMs and how they are often conceived.  
 A social movement in broad terms can be described as a collectivity of individuals, 
however, this would clearly include any social collection of individuals. There appears to be 
specific criteria that define SMs in terms of their level of organisation, intention and group size 
(Opp, 2009). Certain authors focus on the organisational aspect of SMs, in terms of the pursuit 
of common goals or objectives as a defining characteristic of the collective (Opp, 2009; 
McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977), others have appeared to downplay the significance of this 
aspect and highlight physical numbers of participants as the key feature (Olson, 1965). 
However, Olson (1965) proposed that the larger a group becomes, the less common good is 
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achieved, suggesting that there is an optimal, critical mass. It can occur that in very large 
groups competing agendas arise, with some sub-groups becoming antagonistic to each other. 
We may argue that the numbers of persons involved is arbitrary, since what difference might 
five, ten, fifteen or twenty etc. make to a movement as a whole and emphasis on sheer 
physical numbers does not appear to be widespread in the literature on this topic. Although, 
interestingly, the British police have used physical numbers to define a protest by referring to 
the presence of two or more persons (ACPO, 2010). Moreover, British public order legislation 
applies numerics to certain group activities such as riot, violent disorder and affray (under the 
Public Order Act 1986). 
 What appears to unite many explanations of protest is the existence of specific goals 
and objectives as a defining characteristic of the group(s), whether pre-existing or emergent 
through a shared social identity, in order to mobilise support or to highlight a particular issue. 
In commenting on the social psychological features of SM’s, Snow and Oliver (1995) extract 
the following as their defining characteristics: 
Change-oriented goals; some degree of organisation; some degree of temporal 
continuity; and some extra-institutional and institutional activity. (Snow and 
Oliver, 1995, p.571) 
Street demonstrations have been explicitly identified as an example of extra-institutional 
activity (Opp, 2009; Snow and Oliver, 1995). Arguably, individuals are usually unable to 
influence the target of their protest alone, hence they form or join a SM, utilising it as a vehicle 
to do so. The reason for this is that most definitions of SMs in the literature imply joint action 
as a key ingredient, whether or not individual membership has any longevity beyond the 
parameters of the protest event itself. There is tacit acceptance and the implication that joint 
action occurs through the physical presence of individuals rather than more abstract forms of 
activity (Opp, 2009). However, virtual and e-protest using the internet and social media are 
complex nascent phenomena, for this reason their use is discussed in more detail below. 
Whether all SMs use protest is outside the scope of the present study, but certainly, individual 
protesters use SMs as a means to an end, inasmuch as their activity can be coordinated and 
collective towards pursuing common goals. The collective nature of such activity is common 
in much of the literature (Jenkins and Form, 2005; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Toch, 1965; Zald 
and Ash, 1966). However, collective action may not be and frequently is not as well organised 
and coordinated as this implies. 
Types of protest 
What then specifically qualifies collective behaviour as “protest”? Returning to the earlier 
criteria set out by Lipsky (1968) and Turner (1969) we can discern four key points, that protest 
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is 1) an action or behaviour, 2) intended to support or demonstrate dissent for a target or 
cause, 3) intended to bring about change or exert influence, and 4) that protesters cannot or 
will not achieve it individually. Protest activity can be said to be regular where it appears to 
have rules and conventionality, in that it is formalised and often repeated, examples include 
party political activities, meetings and lobbying (Lipsky, 1968; Turner, 1969). In contrast, 
marches, picketing, blockades, sit-ins and alike may depict more irregular activity (Opp, 2009). 
However, this appears to be too simplistic, because some of these activities are de facto, 
highly organised and often sponsored by political parties and trades union groups, in this 
sense they already exist within a regulated framework defined by those organisations and thus 
by definition are ‘regular’. 
 Unofficial and disorganised protest can occur spontaneously, yet still be aimed at a 
target, intended to shame, influence or support a wider political agenda. Protest then can be 
viewed as “more or less organised, legal or illegal, more or less legitimate, violent and non-
violent and so on” (Opp, 2009, p. 38). This description provides a broad dichotomy, but in 
many instances, protesters do not categorise themselves in a well-defined and polarised 
fashion. The reality may be much more diffuse and consist of many sub-groups within the 
wider collective. An awareness of this is critical to understanding the nuances of protests and 
their policing, based on the motives, intent, attitudes and beliefs of the crowd (Reicher et al, 
2004, 2007). This is why it is important to account for the range of factors upon which 
perceptions of police legitimacy are constructed and shaped.  
 A coalition approach to protest provides for coordinated activity, by a network 
arrangement that mobilises protesters and takes in a wide range of interest groups who would 
not normally organise together (Peterson, 2006). A particular feature of the coalition approach 
is its temporary nature, protesters often only coming together for a defined event or objective 
and dissolving just as quickly (Peterson, 2006). This resonates with Snow and Oliver’s (1995) 
observations of the temporal nature of social movements. The lack of formal organisation is 
explained further by Peterson (2006) as being one in which: 
…rainbow coalitions join together, a temporary and loosely knit array of 
organisations and action groups within particular countries, as well as like-
minded groups and organisations across borders in a communication network 
coordinated through internet channels...what distinguishes this [coalition] is the 
lack of controlling elements. (Peterson, 2006, p.46) 
 However, let us not confuse less organisation with a lack of coordination. While the 
coalition approach might not have defined overall leadership and a distinct, single leader is 
rarely identified, it brings together a number of key players through coordinated 
communication. Indeed, my own empirical data suggest the coordination of protest activities 
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or assumptions of support between what might appear prima facie to be disparate groups. 
Such communication often occurs in dynamic protest situations through the use of social 
media. For more recent examples of how protest events can be coordinated we may look to 
the use of social media before, during and after the UK August riots 2011 (House of Commons, 
2011; Roberts et al, 2011). However, to conclude that social media is in some way to “blame” 
for causing public disorder is not borne out by the evidence (RCVP, 2012).  
 The fluid nature of this type of coordination can be problematic for the police who often 
only differentiate two groups, nonviolent or violent, preferring defined leadership and 
organised groups with whom they can readily engage, who play to the script of institutionalised 
protest. The ESIM approach to crowds posits that perceived group membership and 
perceptions of the police are highly significant factors in this circumstance that will influence 
how protest events unfold (Stott, 2009). According to this analysis the extent to which 
individuals relate to groups or sub-groups can be dictated by the course of events and the 
manner in which protesters and the police categorise themselves and each other. This 
emphasises the ESIM’s reliance on the proximal aspects of police/protester contact, rather 
than on the existence of pre-existing notions of police legitimacy. 
Organised and disorganised protest 
A simple dichotomy has been suggested elsewhere which provides for two types of protest, 
organised and disorganised (Hylander and Granström, 2011). These terms are not 
synonymous with regular and irregular, the organised type appears to capture elements of the 
coalition approach set out above. The disorganised type is not always construed as protest at 
all, but rather more criminal, opportunistic behaviour and is discussed below. Four types of 
organised protest have been identified from observation and analysis of several nationalist 
demonstrations: leader-governed, rule-governed, goal-governed, and idea-governed 
(Hylander and Granström, 2011).  
 Leader-governed protest is typically characterised by the presence of a defined leader, 
often identified prior to the event(s), their leadership may be self-declared or group assigned. 
Commonly, the leader will deal with any legal and procedural aspects of the protest such as 
negotiating and gaining authorisation from the police or state authority. This does not 
necessarily imply or guarantee any control over the participants and their behaviour, but the 
police might anticipate being able to exercise a degree of vicarious control over the event and 
participants via the leader. However, it is worth noting that this may have more to do with how 
the protesters perceive the legitimacy of their own leadership rather than perceptions of the 
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authority of the police. Notwithstanding, less conflict appears to occur where there is both 
leader-focus and participant assent for it (Hylander and Granström, 2011). 
 Rule-governed protest denotes an organised event insofar as it has structure and 
systems in place, such as defined protester roles and responsibilities for the event or its 
issues. It has leadership (singular or shared) and boundaries created by the participants or 
the leadership on their behalf. Hylander and Granström (2011) note that often those involved 
in this type of protest have previous protest experience, and tacit or explicit frameworks define 
what is deemed as acceptable or unacceptable behaviour. The presence of stewards, and 
shared, expected group norms that may be published or communicated are also features of 
this type of protest.  
 Goal-governed protest is generally less well defined by organisation and coherent 
groups, instead tending to consist of small sub-groups formed for a particular purpose or 
objective and it typically lacks prior notification to the authorities. Examples of goal-governed 
protest groups are described as: 
…project organisations, the group exists for as long as the project…typically it 
has a clear goal, for example to perform a sit-in, demonstration or trainstopping. 
(Hylander and Granström, 2011, p.78) 
The detail and means of the action may not be widely communicated to the participants, even 
before the event. Notably, the protest may rely on a degree of civil disobedience, but not overt 
or unilateral violence. This is in contrast to the coalition approach described above, that relies 
on widespread communication for disparate leaders and participants to be coordinated for the 
protest to achieve its goals (Peterson, 2006). Significantly, the conduct and outcome of goal-
governed protest can be influenced by how the police react to it or are perceived as doing so 
by protesters, whether they can or do facilitate the goals of the protesters, police categorisation 
of protesters and their intentions and vice versa. This can be described as follows: 
The police can overlook offences like an unannounced sit in but not the 
destruction of tools or buildings. The protesters expect the police to do their job 
and move the protesters or block them from entering and they expect to take 
their punishment. The police may trust the protesters to be non-violent. 
(Hylander and Granström, 2011, p.79) 
Such a reciprocal relationship echoes the more scripted approach to routinised protest that 
we have discussed above. However, where each party goes beyond the tacit script, goal-
governed protest is likely to develop into conflict and disorder. 
 Idea-governed protest refers to sub-groups with no defined structure or leadership. A 
key feature of this type is self-determination in terms of its activities, goals and meaning. The 
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act of protest is usually spontaneous and dynamic with an anarchic undercurrent or one 
explicitly stated as such. Individual freedom of expression and rejection of any structure, 
leadership and authority is actively promoted that can be described as: 
Participants have a more or less anarchist ideology. They agree on a common 
set of principles but each and every individual speaks for themselves and not 
on behalf of any group. Even if most would wish to demonstrate peacefully they 
do not take responsibility for what other protesters do. [The] attitudes toward 
violence are leaving it to each individual to decide what violence is necessary. 
(Hylander and Granström, 2011, p.79) 
The type of ideology espoused here means that there is a variety of individual attitudes ranging 
from those who would never resort to the use of violence, those who would do so to protect 
themselves, to those who believe that either the protest cause itself justifies violent struggle 
or in order to subvert the existence of the state and its authority. These authors highlight that 
idea-governed protest is often accompanied by music, use of vehicles, dancing, drama, 
community food provisions and street “partying” in the face of authorities (Hylander and 
Granström, 2011). This spontaneous and potentially chaotic scene is difficult for the police in 
terms of how they categorise and manage the group(s), is it a bona fide gathering or a serious 
public disturbance? Furthermore, how the police and protesters ‘read’ the script of protest, 
categorise and react to each other influences the outcome. However, problems arise with the 
term “anarchist” where it is used to categorise types of protest or protester because there are 
many forms of anarchism and anarchist protesters, making the terminology and what it tries 
to portray misleading (Dupuis-Deri, 2014). 
 It is arguable whether goal-oriented and idea-governed protest can be classified as 
typically organised. The key features are identified as a lack of coordination, less 
communication with authorities, and the encouragement of autonomous sometimes anarchic 
behaviour that implies de facto, less formal organisation. The coalition approach to protest 
iterates the coordination associated with different interest groups, who come together for a 
common purpose. This demonstrates that a lack of organisation does not always equate to 
less coordination in protest.  
 Disorganised protest has been described by Hylander and Granström (2011, pp.80-
81) as consisting of “provocateurs and thrill seekers” who represent a small group of relatively 
hardcore individuals, bystanders and opportunists who do not share the objectives of the wider 
group or protest movement. Police and protesters often agree that this group does exist and 
yet they may not define themselves as such. The presence of this group is stereotypically 
credited with the emergence of violence and criminal activity. Certainly, the police and 
protesters appear to anticipate their presence and where violence erupts usually assign 
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responsibility to them. Conversely, where events pass peacefully and without incident the 
police may conclude that this group were either not present or “policed” out (Granström et al, 
2005). However, violence and conflict may occur as a direct result of police actions and 
categorisation of protesters in those terms (Granström, 2008; Hylander and Granström, 2011). 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that some protesters do see the presence of provocateurs as 
disruptive and shifting attention away from the objectives of protest itself. Meyer and Tarrow 
(1998) explain: 
Putting half a million people on the streets for an orderly demonstration may 
push policies in activists’ directions more than the dramatic and disruptive efforts 
of a few militants who firebomb or turn over cars. (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998, 
p.24) 
 In policing terms this seems encouraging, since it implies that the police can act 
specifically against a small element and accrue legitimacy in the eyes of the wider group who 
distance themselves from them. However, others might propose that the activities of 
provocateurs are not protest at all, inasmuch as they are merely opportunities or excuses for 
criminal behaviour unrelated to the true purpose of the protest. Evidence in support of this can 
be drawn from the multitude of offences and actions displayed in the UK August riots and 
looting, 2011 (RCVP, 2012). While many were viewed and expressed as legitimate, objective 
and goal-oriented, some were reported as little more than gratuitous criminality (RCVP, 2012). 
The report produced by the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel (2012) provided profiles of 
protesters. Many who engaged in these events were found to be organised criminals, violent 
aggressors, opportunists and spectators who looted and committed acts of violence against 
the public, police and property unrelated to any social and political grievances. While certain 
commentators interpreted these actions differently, as being made on social identity bases 
(Reicher and Stott, 2011), the evidence lends more credence to the idea that many were 
motivated by criminality (HMIC, 2011b). However, this raises the point about whether violence 
can ever be viewed as an act of protest? 
Violence as protest  
There is a view that frames the use of violence as an act of protest. For many its use is seen 
merely as criminal behaviour, yet others describe it as part and parcel of contentious politics 
expressed across a spectrum of protest activity (Tilly, 2003, 2006; Waddington, 1994b). Tilly 
(2003) highlights that often this occurs in relation to the power dynamic that exists between 
protesters and those in authority, where a distinction is made between violence and force. Tilly 
explains this as follows: 
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Rulers, police, philosophers, and historians often distinguish between force and 
violence. Force might include legitimate self-defense but not unprovoked 
aggression. Violence refers to damage that does not enjoy legal protection…a 
large share of the collective violence in the episodes that people call riots, 
rebellions, or revolutions directly involves governmental agents as purveyors or 
objects of damage. (Tilly, 2003, pp. 27-28) 
In the usual course of protest events, the police often lay claim to the use of force, usually with 
legal protection or justification. However, protesters find it much harder, if not impossible to do 
so. There are clearly circumstances where state endorsed use of force is violence, and 
protester violence is force used in the face of provocation (Bunyan, 1976; Tilly, 2003; 
Waddington, 2007). It is not so easy to dismiss protesters use of violence as ipso facto criminal 
activity. In addition, protester use of violence is usually directed at targets of symbolic value. 
What Tilly (2003) highlights is that the variable nature of force and violence, depending on the 
contexts in which they occur, are deserving of a more sophisticated level of analysis. 
 In the extreme, as a means of overthrowing an oppressive regime, it seems unlikely 
that change would come about without resort to forceful, violent means. In more liberal 
democracies we might expect violence to achieve much less and play into the hands of critics 
and conservative commentators (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Opp, 2009). However, the threat 
of violence is a different matter. Indeed, the inference or possibility that violence might be 
resorted to, can sometimes mobilise wider support and attract attention for protest causes 
(Waddington, 1994a, 1994b). Arguably, some protesters identify that the use of violence or its 
threat can be a powerful tool of expression and posturing, with a recognition that a minority of 
protester(s) will use or support violence. For the police this is problematic since dealing with 
outbreaks of violence requires careful consideration. At stake is public opinion if the police do 
not intervene and public safety where passers-by or counter-protesters are affected. Police 
intervention brings its own challenges, such as inappropriate handling of protesters or an 
inability to deal with violence (due to numbers). Both carry a risk of exacerbating the situation 
or of injury to police, public and protesters alike with the wider consequences signalling a 
breakdown of social order.  
 In summary, protest defies a unanimous and homogeneous definition. The presence 
of terms such as SM and protest group occlude the picture further. Opp (2009) summarises 
certain defining criteria from the literature: 
We define protest as joint action of individuals aimed at achieving their goal by 
influencing decisions of a target. A protest group is defined as a collectivity of 
actors who want to achieve their shared goal by influencing the decisions of a 
target. A social movement is a type of protest group with several distinguishing 
characteristics such as size and the degree of organisation. (Opp, 2009, p. 44) 
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As descriptive and critical as many accounts of the policing of protest are, few if any provide 
reflection on what protest actually means in the research context. Taking a more parsimonious 
approach to the literature, I rely on a definition of protest to apply to my empirical research as 
follows:  
A protest is a regular or irregular event comprising collective behaviour created by the actions 
of individuals, intended to achieve shared or personal objective(s) by influencing a target or 
targets.  
As an operational definition it allows for actions to be wide-ranging as long as they are driven 
by the objectives of a collective. They may be legal or illegal, violent or peaceful, regular or 
irregular (in whether they are formally organised or spontaneously coordinated) and part of a 
wider SM or not. In this definition, the target may be an individual, the state or something less 
tangible (in terms of a policy, opposing ideology or social situation). It does not include violence 
which is not in support or pursuance of the stated goals or intentions of the collective, 
considering these to be individual acts of offending unrelated to the protest itself. However, it 
is accepted that the ethical considerations for the present work, arising from the researcher’s 
occupation as a police officer, influence the extent to which inquiry can take all of these 
situations into account.  
 Thus far, the chapter has outlined and discussed the notion of protest and some key 
features of social movements as they relate to protest activity. Levels of organisation and 
coordination have been identified and the way in which protest activity is categorised. We have 
seen that while the breadth and depth vary in many conceptions of the term ‘protest’, little if 
any consensus exists about its meaning. Instead, we are provided with something of a general 
rubric under which common characteristics emerge. What can we learn from reflecting on 
types of protest and social movements? In short, it serves to demonstrate the sheer 
complexities of protest contexts and their policing, underlining precisely why we need to 
understand the nuances associated with the construction and shaping of perceptions of police 
legitimacy.  
 The policing of protest is especially challenging, due to the very nature of protest itself, 
sometimes designed to disrupt, at times violent, carrying the element of surprise and with the 
risk of the police being de-legitimised (Waddington,1991,1994b). Therefore, we might 
consider that the policing of protest is sufficiently qualitatively different from other forms of 
general policing activity. 
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The use of social media in protest 
Internet-based and social media phenomena are much more recent, yet highly influential 
additions to the world of protest. They are discussed here because it is apparent that they are 
used extensively in the framing of protest and for communicating narratives about the police 
and policing of protests. The use of social media by protest groups was made clear during the 
empirical research (see chapter six). 
 During the mid to late 2000s social media technology and its use erupted due in part 
to the technological advances in hardware and broadband internet. The contribution of social 
and economic factors such as affordable technology, the fashionable status of social media to 
a younger, technically “savvy” generation and the development of software has cemented 
social media use on a worldwide level (Howard et al, 2011). In terms of policing, protesters’ 
use of social media to promote narratives and potentially mobilise people to action is less 
problematic than the actual physical existence and actions of the group once and if the virtual 
becomes realised as protest behaviour. The reasons for this come from a situation where the 
police can just as equally access, monitor and contribute to social media, and that there is 
insufficient evidence that an online community will manifest as protest in the real world. Thus, 
the questions for policing become those of what constitutes social media, what contribution 
does it actually make to protest and how should policing make use of it?  
 Social media are broadly defined as social instruments of communication that utilise 
public communication networks, most notably the internet (Dewing, 2010). The introduction of 
Web 2.0 technology enabled not just the publication of information, but interaction and the 
ability to contribute directly to it in real time (Dewing, 2010). In using social media, protest 
organisers and protesters can publish and exchange photographs, moving images, news 
stories, share opinions and participate in discussion about protest activity and policing 
responses. Hosted via a number of websites and mobile applications, commonly used social 
media are, web logs (otherwise termed “blogs”), collective websites that can be modified by 
participants (often referred to as a wiki), social network sites which allow people to publish a 
profile, adopt lists of other users and interact with them. Micro-blogging services such as 
Twitter allow the publishing and sharing of updates, and media sharing sites enable the 
distribution of video footage and photographs (such as YouTube, Pinterest and Instagram) 
(Dewing, 2010). 
 Protests across the world, involving the mobilisation of vast amounts of people have 
relied significantly on the use of social media to communicate messages and organise 
activities (Shirky, 2011). The coordinating power of social media is clearly demonstrated in a 
number of accounts of protest activities such as anti-religion protests in India, education 
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protests in Chile, South Korean food protests and the wave of Arab Spring uprisings from 2009 
onwards (Baker, 2012; Howard and Hussain, 2011; Khamis and Vaughn, 2011; Segerberg 
and Bennett, 2011; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012). The concurrent expansion in the availability 
and use of social media and levels of protest activity across the world lends weight to the idea 
that the two may be related (Valenzuela, 2013). Valenzuela (2013) claims that various 
research contexts support the notion that people engaging in protests commonly use social 
media. So far, research suggests multiform ways in which social media impact on activism 
(Chadwick and Howard, 2008; Valenzuela, 2013). The main influences range from the 
provision of information to enable mobilisation, coordination of activities such as 
demonstrations and the exchange of news or narratives about political causes and events. 
Whether certain social media serve to influence particular types of protest groups or activities 
is less well known. However, the use of a particular form of social media may be influenced 
by ideological preferences of the group. As an example, some anarchist and anti-
establishment groups eschew the mainstream press and most commonly use the Indymedia 
platform as a means to report on protest events and activity (HMIC, 2011b).  
 Information and its communication is key to mobilising participation in protest events 
on a number of levels. Logistical information needs to be spread concerning locations, times 
and potential contact information and tactically, organisers may wish to share the types of 
protest activity that will be engaged in, tolerated and supported (Lemert, 1981). It is highly 
unlikely that this type of information will be made available through mainstream media outlets. 
Social media enable group collaboration and mobilisation through the formation of activist 
networks and support the creation and maintenance of collective identities. The latter point 
underlines the pivotal function of social networks in constructing social identities supportive of 
protest action and behaviours (Breur, 2012). This is relevant when considering the ESIM 
approach to protest policing since it relies on the assumption of an emerging identity as a 
consequence of treatment at the hands of the police. However, such identities are clearly 
capable of forming outside of the immediate policing context. My own empirical research 
highlights that narratives about policing and protest issues are created, communicated, and 
play a role in constructing and shaping protester perceptions of police legitimacy (see chapter 
six). 
 Specific studies relating to individual participation report a positive association 
between the use of social media and protest activity (Papacharissi, 2010). One explanation 
for this relates to the formation and expression of social identity. According to Valenzuela 
(2013) group identity in political activism is promoted by intra-group feedback, peer 
acceptance and reinforcement of group norms which are enabled through social media. 
Interactive, information hubs commonly seen in the form of newsfeeds allow the rapid and 
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sustained dissemination of narratives about protest activities and causes, which are accessed 
on a self-selecting basis. However, the reasons behind the association between social media 
use and actual physical participation in protest are not entirely clear and the possibility of a 
causal relationship is “underwhelming” (Breur, 2012, p.1).  
 What can be extrapolated is that social media certainly informs participation in protest 
on at least three levels. First, in creating a virtual space for the association of ideas and 
expression with like-minded or related individuals. Secondly, by acting as a mechanism for 
disseminating information to mobilise and share resources. Thirdly, in becoming a source of 
pre and within event news, narratives and information. These levels inform the construction 
and shaping of protester perceptions of policing and are reinforced by research that indicates 
the strength of psychological and attitudinal factors in feeding social media content and how 
people use it (Breur, 2012; Shirky, 2011). Factors such as anger, fear, sense of grievance or 
outrage can motivate participation and are capable of being communicated and informed by 
social media.  
 Politically motivated protest groups rely heavily on social media as the means to 
promote ideology and narratives as a coordinating tool for protest activity (Shirky, 2011). The 
development of narratives about the protest cause is essential to establishing broad support, 
particularly where protest is aimed at state authority or its agents, and where political positions 
are being adopted. Crucially, the mainstream press or media may not always reflect what 
organisers or participants consider to be a desirable representation of events or facts 
(McLeod, 2010). There can be exceptions to this, since research following the English riots of 
August 2011 highlighted that mainstream news media were a significant point of reference for 
rioters and bystanders, above and beyond social media (RCVP, 2012). Nevertheless, a broad 
evidence base demonstrates that narratives are constructed and communicated via social 
media to provide participants with knowledge and information prior to events or as they unfold 
(Breur, 2012; Norris, 2000; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012; Segerberg and Bennett, 2011; Shah et 
al, 2005).  
 However, it is worth acknowledging that even the public digital space in which social 
media exist can be occupied or dominated by a “digital elite” capable of shaping the origin and 
direction of the information being communicated (Breur, 2012, p.1). It appears to be something 
of a myth that social media content related to protest and mobilisation is a socially created 
smorgasbord of thoughts, opinions, facts, images and news. Poell and Van Dijck (2015) 
demonstrate that digital leadership plays a role in creating and shaping the content held on 
social media platforms. In a digital sense these act as “connective leaders” who steer the 
content, discussion and sharing of information as page administrators, or through the process 
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of re-tweeting and trending discussion threads (Poell and Borra, 2011; Poell and Van Dijck, 
2015). It would appear that many users are less well informed about this technocratic aspect 
to social media. 
 In summary, there are reasons to conclude that people involved in protest do use social 
media to a considerable extent, but not necessarily that social media predicts or increases 
protest behaviour in the physical world. While some evidence suggests the use of social media 
can be predictive of self-reported attendance levels at demonstrations, this is by no means 
ubiquitously reported. Valenzuela (2013, p. 935) interprets social media more as “a tool for, 
rather than a cause of action”. The three roles of social media in protest appear to be 
networking, a mobilising agent, and as the means to construct and communicate narratives. 
Whilst social media and their role in protest is a phenomenon that changes with advances in 
the technology available, there are a number of theories and models that seek to explain 
protest behaviour and disorder. A selection of these are discussed below. 
Theories and models of protest and public disorder 
A number of theories and models attempt to explain the development of violence and disorder 
at protests. We have seen in the earlier discussion that PJ and the ESIM assume that violence 
and disorder stem from a failure of policing to create perceptions of police legitimacy. Whilst 
not intended as an exhaustive compendium, the following discussion focuses on those that 
appear particularly relevant to my field of inquiry. However, it is worth emphasising that the 
thesis is primarily concerned with police legitimacy and not with explaining the causes and 
development of violence and disorder. The aim of critically analysing specific theories here is 
to highlight that the CDM (see chapter six) is distinctly different from models that rely on the 
“tinder and spark” thesis. The discussion covers five, related theories and explanations of 
disorder and riots, 1) the theory of collective behaviour (Smelser, 1962), 2) the model of riot 
dynamics (Hundley, 1968), 3) the stage theory of riot process (Spiegel, 1969), 4) the “tinder 
and spark” explanation of riot causality (Benyon, 1987) and 5) the Flashpoints model of 
disorder (Waddington et al, 1987). The Flashpoints model draws upon the other four 
approaches and is therefore discussed in greater detail. 
The theory of collective behaviour 
In a US context, Smelser (1962) made an ambitious, sociologically-based attempt to explain 
all forms of collective behaviour covering cultural fashions, religious revivals, political and 
economic movements, mob lynchings, protest and race riots. The theory highlights structural 
and contextual elements together with a precipitating (or “spark”) factor in collective behaviour. 
According to Waddington (2007) it is based on the notion that hostile behaviour tends to 
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involve groups that are deviant (often the young, unemployed or migrant). In the context of 
disorder, a series of six determining factors are identified, 1) structural conduciveness, 2), 
structural strain, 3) the growth and spread of generalised hostile beliefs, 4) a precipitating 
factor, 5) mobilisation of actors and 6) social control.  
 Smelser (1962) posited that all of these factors need to converge, yet according to 
Waddington (2007) the combined effect of two are seen as sufficient to trigger an outburst of 
disorder. The first, the precipitating factor, is defined as “incidents, rumours, sudden threats 
or deprivations which amplify an existing, widespread belief” (Waddington, 2007, p. 41). The 
second, the mobilisation of actors to action requires leadership and communication. The 
extent to which disorder spreads is dependent on the social control asserted by the police 
(Smelser, 1962). Smelser (1962, p. 267) proposes that to deal with disorder the police should: 
interrupt communication and the spread of beliefs; disrupt leadership to confound mobilisation; 
and take an unconditional attitude in dealing with violence. The efficacy of the theory in 
adequately explaining public disorder is challenged by Waddington (2007) on a number of 
levels including: that it is wrong to view rioters as deviant and disorder as irrational; the theory 
takes little if any account of cultural differences and historical relations between rioters and 
the police; that the police interventions suggested may escalate disorder rather than reduce it 
(Waddington, 1992; Waddington, 2007; Waddington et al, 1989). Smelser’s model might be 
better seen in its cultural and historical setting to understand its appeal and significance at the 
time. 
The model of riot dynamics 
Hundley (1968) may be viewed as building on Smelser’s theory with his explanatory account 
of the dynamics of riots in the US, relying on data from a study of witnesses to urban riots he 
identifies three elements to disorder and rioting. First, the preceding conditions such as 
inequality or deprivation, a lack of avenues to address grievances and shared views that rioting 
is necessary. Secondly, immediate conditions such as communication of grievance and 
rumour together with a triggering event that epitomises the grievance(s). Thirdly, internal 
dynamics such as the rioters gathering together, mobilisation and leadership (Hundley, 1968). 
The presence or absence of police activity when these three elements converge is seen as 
pivotal together with rioter views of police legitimacy to the development of disorder. In short, 
where police actions are viewed as legitimate (note that no defining criteria are given for what 
legitimacy means in this context) then violence is unlikely, even where police numbers are 
few. There are two scenarios according to this model wherein disorder occurs. First, where 
acts of incivility are encountered by potential rioters, regardless of police numbers (Hundley, 
1968, Waddington, 2007), the point here is that it is the perception that the police are asserting 
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dominance in the situation that triggers the disorder. Second, where the police are seen as 
ineffective, lacking appropriate control of the situation and allow “deviant behaviour to go 
unpunished” (Waddington, 2007, p.43). Hundley (1968) claims that at this stage, even if the 
police decide to withdraw, disorder will continue and the only way to resolve it is by force of 
numbers. Given its particular focus on specific “ghetto riots”, Hundley’s model of the dynamics 
of disorder receives little consensus today, yet it carries the notion of a triggering event often 
shared by other approaches. 
The stage theory of riot process 
This explanation for the development of riots is based on Spiegel’s (1969) study of race riots 
in the US. The premise is that riots occur due to an underlying and antecedent belief system 
that one section of society is being treated or “valued” less (Spiegel, 1969, p. 120; Waddington, 
2007). In Spiegel’s analysis this is principally along racial lines with black residents feeling that 
they and their grievances are less valued by the authorities than white ones. However, 
disparity occurs within black communities with so-called moderate members being valued 
more than dissenting or militant ones (Waddington, 2007). According to Spiegel (1969) a riot 
occurs as rumour of particular injustice circulates, comprising four stages. The first is a trigger 
or precipitating incident by which the rioter’s underlying belief system is substantiated. Spiegel 
(1969, p. 120) describes it as “a concrete illustration of the beliefs”. An example of a trigger 
might be a police shooting or an act of police brutality. 
The second stage is a confrontation between the police and potential rioters usually based in 
the street, where specific individuals verbalise community resentments and attempt to rally 
support behind them. According to Waddington (2007) this stage relies on the notion of 
contagion for the resentment and hostilities to spread. The response of authority to the 
demands of the crowd are said to give ebb and flow to the hostility, where a “genuine readiness 
to listen and resolve complaints” (Spiegel, 1969, p. 123) is likely to result in it subsiding. 
However, should this fail, disorder enters a third stage, the roman holiday where disorder 
spreads outwards, in isolated pockets away from the original confrontation. Usually involving 
younger males, violence is directed at specific targets (often along racial divides) with what 
Spiegel refers to as “angry intoxication indistinguishable from glee” (1969, p. 123). Police 
activity at this stage dictates whether the riot enters the fourth state of siege. Whilst not 
qualifying precisely what under or over-policing is, Spiegel notes that, too little allows rioters 
licence to literally “run riot”, while too much brutality at the wrong time exacerbates the 
situation. Spiegel (1969) summarises the position as one in which: 
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…the police must endeavour to strike an effective balance: they should strive to 
be firm but discriminating in their actions from the outset, making arrests 
selectively and without unnecessary use of force. (Spiegel,1969, p. 122) 
The particular context of the research underpinning this model and its content shares much in 
common with Hundley (1968). While some parallels can be drawn to 21st century events in the 
US and UK concerning police shootings and brutality (particularly involving black and minority 
ethnic people), the model’s reliance on principles founded by Le Bon’s (1895) study of crowds 
and classical psychological reductionism render it anachronistic. 
The “tinder and spark” explanation of riot causality 
While the “tinder and spark” explanation encompasses more of a collection of ways to interpret 
British urban riots in the 1980s, it uses the idea of background conditions that are somehow 
ignited to become disorder (Waddington, 2007). Since it bears much in common with those 
discussed previously, I devote less space to it here. Benyon (1987, p. 34) summarises specific, 
related background conditions (the tinder) to riots consisting of: race discrimination and 
disadvantage, material deprivation, unemployment, exclusion and powerlessness, and 
hostility to and mistrust of the police. The latter condition appears specifically related to 
repressive stop-and-search and perceived police harassment. In any case, a trigger event (the 
spark) is necessary to ignite disorder, usually involving an encounter between the police and 
black people (Benyon,1987). Waddington (2007) acknowledges that these background 
conditions provide a useful framework for understanding riots, but he adds that additional 
variables can be identified, specific to a British context. Waddington (2007) notes that: 
British studies also highlight the importance of cultural differences between the 
police and African-Caribbean youths, an ideological climate encouraging hostility, 
and the particular dynamics and locations of daily interactions acting as precursors 
to the [British] riots. (Waddington, 2007, p. 46) 
These additional variables, Benyon’s (1987) background conditions and the paramilitary 
policing of the 1980s are deemed responsible by some authors for the British urban riots of 
the time (Lea and Young, 1993). 
The Flashpoints model of disorder 
Waddington et al (1989) took inspiration from the earlier work of those theorists outlined above 
to develop the Flashpoints model of disorder. Waddington (2007) explains the purpose in 
doing so as being:  
The main objective of the [Flashpoints] model was to incorporate relevant 
variables into a general framework for explaining the circumstances in which 
disorder (emphasis added) is likely to break out or, alternatively fail to ignite. 
(Waddington, 2007, p. 49) 
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The model provides a multi-levelled analytic framework for explaining the causes and triggers 
of public disorder, as such it does not examine or model the construction and shaping of police 
legitimacy. The Flashpoints model is predominantly a sociologically-based one originally 
consisting of six interdependent levels: structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual, 
situational, and interactional (Waddington, 2007, p.49). Each level is discussed below. 
 The structural level accounts for factors such as material deprivation, social and 
political exclusion and lack of opportunity and the extent to which they can be changed through 
the prevailing social and political structures. These are seen as “underlying [the] collective 
grievances and resentment in society” (Waddington, 2007, p. 49). Accordingly, conflict is said 
to occur if groups are not able to improve their situation (Waddington et al, 1989), two 
observations can be made concerning this level. First, the material inequalities relate to 
specific notions of “class, gender and ethnicity” (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 158). Secondly, it 
involves what Waddington identifies as “ideological alienation from the state” (Waddington, 
2007, p. 49). Thus, according to Waddington et al (1989) groups need not be personally 
affected by material inequality to have an ideological alienation from the state. Waddington et 
al (1989) explain that: 
Groups whose material situation is not disadvantaged may feel and ideological 
alienation (emphasis in original) from the state. Students and nuclear disarmers 
who are not personally victims of inequality may feel that the state is committed to 
activities that they find morally repugnant. Thus, whether the initial grievance is 
material or ideological, what is crucial is the group’s perception of its relationship 
to the state (emphasis in original) and its front-line representatives, the police 
force. (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 160) 
The structural level appears then to encompass different elements within it, those of moral 
values, alignment with the state and authority and political views occurring at personal and 
group levels. 
 The political/ideological level deals with the way that the groups demands are seen 
and dealt with by key institutions. The terms political and ideological are being applied here 
by reference to “key political and ideological institutions” (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 160), 
such as politicians, the police, media and judiciary. Waddington et al (1989) emphasise that 
the degree of political power that a group feels it has, impacts on whether it will be likely to 
resort to using violence in furthering its claims: 
The experience of protestors of political marginalization and ideological vilification 
may lessen their resistance to violence. One consideration is whether violence is 
culturally endorsed [by the group]. (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 161) 
An additional consequence of vilification by the authorities is posited as not only fueling 
protester resentments, but somehow encourages police repression (Waddington, 2007). 
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However, the process of how and why police repression follows is unclear in the Flashpoints 
model. 
 The cultural level deals with protesters definitions of themselves and others, usually 
informed by culture and sub-culture. The term “cultural” is defined by Waddington et al (1989) 
as being: 
…all the ways in which groups of people understand the social world and their 
place within it, their definitions of the rules which do or should govern behaviour 
and how they define themselves and other social groups. (Waddington et al, 1989, 
p. 162) 
This level appears to share similarity with the ESIM approach to crowds (Stott, 2009), 
inasmuch as it highlights the creation of in and out-groups: implying rules, norms and 
stereotypes based on the situation and interpretations of it. However, the focus of Flashpoints 
is on the relationship between culture and violence. Waddington et al (1989) emphasise this 
in the following terms: 
Participants in a potentially conflictual situation can still come to a compromise 
and accommodate each other’s objectives. It is possible for the police and pickets 
to evolve a set of agreed norms about what is acceptable on a picket line, a good 
clean shove being permissible whereas throwing bricks is not. (Waddington et al, 
1989, p. 163) 
However, we should note that whether such agreement occurs is contingent on the other 
interdependent levels of the flashpoints model. 
 The contextual level captures the potential for disorder that derives from 
communication processes occurring in the lead up to a protest event. Principally, according to 
Waddington (2007, p. 50) these are viewed as potentially preparing both police and protesters 
for a worst-case scenario. The communication processes involved appear as rumour and 
gossip, history or recent incidents between the parties, media exposure and potentially 
inflammatory statements being made. The contextual level is considered as predefining the 
response of the police or protesters to conflict (Waddington et al, 1989). Waddington et al 
(1989) note that the police are likely to nurture grievances just as much as protesters do (citing 
events at Orgreave, South Yorkshire during the 1984 miners’ strike, as being in part, revenge 
for those at Saltley, West Midlands in 1972 (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 168)). However, it 
appears that pre-event communication and liaison between the parties may avert the worst-
case being realized. This level is concerned with the relations between the police and protest 
group(s). 
 The situational level addresses certain spatial determinants of disorder, such as the 
symbolic nature of certain places, buildings and locations. Some of which may be the object 
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of the protesters attention. Furthermore, it can relate to notions of access and availability of 
locations, whether access to an area is contested or the protesters “turf” is encroached upon 
by the police (Waddington, 2007, p. 50). Waddington (2007) proposes that organization and 
tactics applied by both police and protesters may be relevant in whether disorder breaks out. 
He claims that violence is less likely where protesters self-manage by having stewards and 
the organisers espouse peaceful protest. Similarly, disorder is less likely where the police 
adopt a less paramilitary approach, such as all the trappings of “riot-clad reinforcement, dogs 
and horses” (Waddington, 2007, pp. 50-51). 
 The interactional level seeks to explain the influence of face-to-face contact between 
the police and protesters on disorder. It is suggested that at this level a flashpoint or flashpoints 
may occur that act as the spark to the tinder existing in the other levels of the model. This is 
explained by Waddington and Critcher (2000) in the following terms: 
In highly charged situations, a particular incident (the throwing of a brick, an arrest 
or police charge) may spark off disorder. Such ‘flashpoints’ are interpreted 
symbolically as indicating the underlying attitude of the other side. (2000, p. 106) 
A criticism levelled at the model is whether a single flashpoint is responsible for triggering 
disorder and that riots can happen without any such flashpoint or long after one occurs (Keith, 
1993; Otten et al, 2001; Waddington, 1991, 1994b). It should be noted that many riots and 
disorders occur without any perceptible flashpoint at all (Waddington, 1991, 1994b). However, 
this objection is countered by Waddington (2007): 
It is important to assume that there is a need for the model to allow for variations 
in the nature of precipitating incidents…Likewise it is also important to assume 
that there may be several flashpoints in the course of one particular event, some 
of which do not ignite, others of which may initially ignite only to then die down, 
and one or more of which explode so intensely as to consume the whole event. 
(Waddington, 2007, p. 52) 
Critically, there appears to be a certain contradiction in calling something a flashpoint that 
does not ignite and the reasons as to why it does not seem unclear. 
 The original version of the Flashpoints model contains little reference to police 
traditions, culture or doctrines specifically related to public order. In response to criticisms, 
Waddington (2010) added a further level, that of structuration to take these into account. He 
suggests that this enhances the original model by focusing on the influences of police conduct 
that derive from traditions in policing, systems of accountability and the ‘missions’ or operating 
procedures governing police strategy and tactics in public order situations (Waddington D, 
2010, p. 346). Inclusion of this additional level apparently bolsters the interactional level of the 
model by providing better “contextual understanding of police agency” (Jordan, 2015, p. 28).  
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 However, the Flashpoints model is still not widely regarded as the best framework for 
the analysis of disorder in every circumstance (Bagguley and Hussain, 2003; Hussain and 
Bagguley, 2005). Hussain and Bagguley (2005) highlight issues about how to quantify the 
actual levels of economic inequality needed for disorder to erupt and the power imbalances 
between the police and the crowd. In addition, they echo P.A.J. Waddington’s (1991, 1994b) 
concern about the agency of a single flashpoint (or not) in sparking disorder. Indeed, we might 
note that if quantifying the critical levels required for disorder is problematic, it would be difficult 
to apply the model predictively. In short, criticisms of the Flashpoints model seem to relate to 
the necessity for any of the conditions being present before disorder breaks out. That said, 
Flashpoints does provide a detailed explanation of the many factors that can be found after 
disorder occurs, having been applied to the analyses of a number of protest events (King and 
Waddington, 2005; Lo Shiu-hing, 2006; Waddington, 1992, 2007). Therefore, its efficacy is as 
a tool for post hoc analysis. 
 The Flashpoints model is clearly one of disorder. This is made explicit by its original 
purpose and claim to be “an explanatory framework which is flexible enough to encompass a 
variety of [disorder] types” (Waddington et al, 1987, p. 159). As such, it has more utility as an 
analytic tool post-event about why disorder broke out or not. A detailed examination of the 
Flashpoints model shows that it is not an explanatory model of police legitimacy and protester 
attitudes to cooperation and compliance with the law and/or the police. The critical analysis of 
“tinder and spark” inspired theories such as the Flashpoints model specifically demonstrates 
that the CDM of police legitimacy is not synonymous with it. Unsurprisingly, given the similar 
context of the research the CDM shares similarity in its empirical data with Flashpoints. This 
is no different from the similarities that Flashpoints might share with the “tinder and spark” 
theories. However, the CDM significantly differs from the Flashpoints model of disorder in its 
focus and explanatory power.  
As we have seen, the Flashpoints model is primarily concerned with explaining the initiation 
of disorder (or absence), the CDM is concerned with perceptions of police legitimacy. 
Flashpoints is a sociologically-based model, the CDM rests heavily on a social psychological 
and philosophical base. The levels in the Flashpoints model provide little, if any explanation 
of the factors associated with the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy. 
Legitimacy in Flashpoints is a term reserved for “the ways in which the group’s declared ends 
and the means proposed are subject to ideological processes” (Waddington et al, 1989, 
p.161). Indeed, in the original publication of the Flashpoints model Waddington et al (1989, p. 
157) make clear that in so doing they are attempting to theorize the factors found to be “the 
crucial determinants of order and disorder”. Furthermore, the use of the term “contextual” by 
the CDM is entirely different from that intended by the Flashpoints model. The CDM uses the 
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term to depict the policing situation(s) in and by which protesters’ perceptions are formed and 
constructed, whilst Flashpoints uses it to denote “a set of existing relations between the police 
and dissenting groups” (Waddington et al, 1989, p. 163). The Flashpoints model of disorder 
does not deal with police legitimacy in any way similar to that of the thesis.   
 The complexity and many fold levels of the Flashpoints model (now seven) might 
indicate one reason why it has not gained widespread appeal in policing practice as a tool for 
managing protest. However, one model that has done so is the ESIM, which we will discuss 
in detail below. 
The ESIM approach to policing protest and public order 
The most prominent and current influence on the policing of protest and crowds in the UK is 
based on the ESIM (derived from the social identity and self-categorization theories from the 
field of social psychology). In the Introduction to the thesis, the link between PJ and the ESIM 
was demonstrated, explaining how the thesis engages them both in its investigation of the 
construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy. For this reason, the 
ESIM is given more detailed examination here.  
 The ESIM is primarily a model of crowd dynamics and as such lays claim to explaining 
how policing contributes to perceptions of police legitimacy and the development of collective 
violence (Reicher et al, 2004; Stott, 2009). Notwithstanding the significance of the other 
frameworks and models outlined above, ESIM-derived best practice currently provides the 
driving force behind protest policing and crowd management in the UK Indeed, the revised 
manual of guidance Keeping the Peace (ACPO, 2010) and the recommendations contained 
in a variety of HMIC reports post G20, London, 2009, rely heavily upon the work and influence 
of the main protagonists in this field of study (HMIC, 2009a; 2009b). These recommendations 
are exalted as the means to: 
…shape the future of national public order policing and drive changes in our 
preparation for protest and our relationships with those involved. (HMIC, 2009b, 
p.2) 
The discipline of social psychology offers a significant amount of empirical research that seeks 
to account for the development of collective disorder. Research in the field of social identity is 
most relevant to the policing of protest given its emphasis on the situational and interactional 
dynamics and its dominance in policing appears as yet unchallenged. In a submission to 
HMIC, Stott (2009) declared the ESIM approach as: 
…the leading scientific theory of crowd psychology. It provides a theoretical 
basis for accurately explaining and predicting the nature of crowd behaviour, 
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particularly as this relates to the emergence of collective ‘disorder’. (Stott, 2009, 
p. 2)  
On this basis, it has built considerable influence within protest, public order policing and crowd 
management in the UK. However, in light of the antecedents and contingents to perceptions 
of police legitimacy and attitudes to cooperation and compliance, we have reason to question 
the claim. I will outline below the key tenets of the ESIM and how it has developed (Reicher, 
1984, 1987, 2003; Stott and Reicher,1998a).  
 The ESIM is based on the social identity theory developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) 
which was originally formulated to explain intergroup prejudice and discrimination. Social 
identity theory posits that a person has not one, but several identities that correspond to 
perceived group memberships or affiliations into which a person enters through a process of 
self-categorization. An individual is deemed to have multiple social identities derived from 
perceived membership of various social groups. These social groups can be existing ones or 
formed during a social encounter, such as protest or crowd situations. In general terms, those 
who perceive that they share the same social identity behave in ways that act against 
outsiders, but for their confederates. Thus, creating a “them” and “us” situation, this is typically 
referred to as an in-group and out-group dynamic (Reicher, 2003).  
 A precursor to the ESIM, the social identity model (SIM) used social identity theory as 
a basis to explain how people in crowd events shift from behaving singularly to behaving in 
terms of a contextually specific and common social identity (Reicher, 1984,1987). The SIM 
defines psychologically what behaviours are viewed as acceptable and valid for the crowd 
members and who or what has influence within it. Reicher (1984) asserts that it is this common 
shared identity which counts as normative behaviour in a crowd context, which accounts for 
peaceful or violent norms being formed and expressed during contact with the police. Whilst 
it is acknowledged to provide a rebuttal to the traditions of classical psychological 
reductionism, the original SIM model demonstrates one key flaw, in that it explains what 
people do in a riot or disorder but does not fully explain how the psychological processes 
influence the emergence and escalation of violence and disorder. The anomaly is reportedly 
addressed with the development of the ESIM (Stott, 1998; Stott and Pearson, 2007: Stott et 
al, 2001).  
 In a study of the Poll Tax riots of 1990, Stott (1998) examined how a riot develops due 
to changes in crowd members social identities as a direct result of their perceptions of police 
legitimacy. The protesters in this case perceived that they were acting legitimately, whereas 
the police defined them as illegitimate and potentially violent. The police had the power and 
instrumental authority to impose itself upon the crowd, leading to a context in which 
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participants’ social identity changed and led to a cycle of disorder and escalated police use of 
force (Stott, 1998; Stott and Drury, 2000). Notably, by presenting this as a change, Stott (1998) 
implies that crowd members initially held different notions of police legitimacy prior to contact 
with the police. The role of antecedent attitudes to police legitimacy and cooperation seems 
less relevant to the ESIM and the interpretation of the concept of legitimacy are not made 
explicit or systematically examined in the research. While PJ and the ESIM are demonstrably 
linked it is unclear if they share identical conceptions of the terminology they use.  
 Stott (2009) elaborates on the precise effect of a social identity that perceives the 
police as illegitimate in the following way: 
The central point is that perceptions of police illegitimacy within the crowd can 
be the central driver for an escalation of conflict. In such circumstances even 
participants harbouring no prior intention of engaging in confrontation may 
become hostile toward the police as a means of reasserting perceived rights. 
(Stott, 2009, p.10) 
In the Poll Tax riot example, the result was that protesters came to see violent conflict as 
increasingly legitimate and therefore united together in opposing the police. This is described 
by ESIM proponents as a cycle wherein the police escalate their response to conflict with the 
crowd in a reciprocal manner which drives a cycle of behaviours (Stott et al, 2001; Stott and 
Drury, 2000). The relationship between the policing of protest and crowd behaviour is reflected 
in the observations of della Porta and Reiter (1998). These concern the causes and effects of 
police conduct, policing strategy within the crowd and the influence exerted on the quality of 
interaction.  
 We can draw two points from this, 1) that police behaviour and tactics are considered 
to be a direct influence upon the emerging social identities of crowd members and their 
corresponding perceptions of police legitimacy, and 2) that these add to what is deemed as 
acceptable behaviour by the crowd. However, it should be noted that the ESIM places great 
emphasis on the emergence of protester notions of police illegitimacy. In so doing it gives little 
weight if any, to nuances arising from pre-existing attitudes and orientations toward police 
legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. Ostensibly, the ESIM relies upon an acceptance 
that these emerge dynamically during the event, based upon experiences of contact with the 
police. Therefore, the ESIM, in explaining the development of crowd conflict appears to 
provide a feasible, but arguably limited explanation of the full range and subtlety of factors 
involved in the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to 
compliance and cooperation. This represents a significant point of difference between the 
ESIM and the CDM, since the latter seeks to capture sources of such influences, emergent or 
otherwise.  
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 In the ESIM group identity is associated with the perceived presence of another group, 
either within the crowd or outside of it. Protest events usually involve face to face encounters 
between groups and counter-protest groups or between groups and the police. In protest 
events, it is often the police who epitomize the idea of the “outgroup” identified in the ESIM 
(Reicher, 2003; Reicher et al, 2004; Stott, 2009). Reicher et al (2007) argue that the outcome 
of such encounters is dependent on the way that the crowd and the “other” interact. However, 
the events which stimulate violence will vary from crowd to crowd as a function of different 
notions of legitimacy or a crowd’s history with groups such as the police or counter-protesters 
(Adang and Standaar, 1993), this serves to highlight again the importance of policing context.  
 In contrast to the ESIM, protester perceptions of legitimacy can exist as a distal factor 
and independent of any real-time encounter with the police (Adang and Standaar, 1993). What 
this means is that attitudes and beliefs concerning the police and the protest context may be 
present in individuals or as part of a shared social identity, quite outwith police actions at the 
time. The presence of these alone may contribute to the emergence of conflict and serve as 
a perceptual filter through which the police are viewed, which influences protester willingness 
to cooperate and comply.  
 We might ponder that at least some attending protests will have negative views about 
the police already and be unlikely to be persuaded otherwise through legitimate contact. That 
said, the most influential in social identity terms, may well be those who come to protests with 
benevolent or neutral perceptions of police legitimacy since the theoretical premise of the 
ESIM is that they can be harnessed to influence other protesters during the course of events. 
I present empirical evidence that highlights two key points relevant to this discussion. First, 
protesters exhibit self-regulation based upon their personal and shared values, also 
recognising the potential futility of attempting ‘self-policing’ in certain protest contexts. 
Secondly, protesters may consider their experience of contact with the police in a neutral or 
benevolent way, yet not express any inclination to cooperate with the police or the law.  
 According to PJ, personal attitudes inform peoples’ perceptions of police legitimacy 
and correspond with self-reported levels of cooperation and compliance (Jackson and 
Bradford, 2010b; Tyler, 1990, 2006). In developing an explanatory framework for the nuances 
associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and 
their attitudes to cooperation and compliance, my empirical research measures and explores 
peoples’ attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, it is important to examine whether and to what extent 
protesters’ attitudes can be linked to their behaviour. 
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The link between protester attitudes and behaviour 
Having examined the ESIM, which is a social psychologicalIy-based model, I discuss here the 
place of the individual within the crowd and identify where responsibility for personal and 
collective behaviour lies. While the emphasis has been a discussion of crowds in general, the 
starting point is at the individual and personal level. This is where perceptions of legitimacy 
lie, attitudes to the police are (re)formed and behaviours potentially ensue. The seat of 
attitudes and decisions to engage, support or confront the police patently resides at the 
individual level, albeit sometimes expressed through a group identity. People make individual 
choices, notwithstanding that they are social beings with social identities and that personal 
decision-making may be informed or influenced by the social context (Adang, 2011; Madenson 
and Knutsson, 2011; Mcphail, 1991). Whilst it is outside the remit of the thesis, it should be 
noted that any link between attitudes and behaviour applies just as well to police officers 
engaged in the policing of protests, as it does protesters. 
 An elementary study of the literature on social identity might lead to a premature 
conclusion that people act in a crowd based on either a shared identity or retain a singular, 
individual one in which case they would be part of a group by mere geography and presence 
alone. Jetten and Postmes (2006, p.4) summarise this as social identity sometimes being 
“treated as an on/off switch” as if a person sits at one pole or the other. In fact, this is far from 
the case and was recognized from its inception as erroneous (Tajfel,1978; Jetten and 
Postmes, 2006). A person’s behaviour can be described as existing along: 
A continuum with purely interpersonal behavior at one extreme and purely 
intergroup behavior at the other...but does not treat the individual self and the 
group as fundamentally opposed or antagonistic. Indeed, in social identity 
theory both individual and group behavior is perceived as equally valid forms of 
self-expression. Nonetheless, by putting interpersonal and intergroup at 
opposite ends of a continuum, they have become each other’s opposites. 
(Jetten and Postmes, 2006, p.4) 
However, collective behaviour does not occur in an homogenous fashion based purely on the 
prevailing social identity. It is simply not a case of group ‘A’ locked in a reciprocal encounter 
with group ‘B’. Instead, it is a more fluid and dynamic affair in which individual, intragroup and 
intergroup processes are at work. Where many sub-groups are present within a larger one, 
some psychologically bound, sharing ideological influences and others by mere physical 
presence alone. The dimensions in which such influences operate can be a combination of 
the personal, social or causal (related to group aims or protest causes). 
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 Observations of several large-scale protests and crowd events demonstrate that the 
majority of participants do not engage in violence purely by their physical presence, and 
crowds do not become dangerous merely because of a numerical mass (Adang, 2011; 
Mcphail,1991; Waddington, 1994b). In a psychologically bound group the role of the personal, 
cognitive processes at work can often be adumbrated, there are two factors that need to be 
taken into account. First, personal attitudes that accompany intergroup conflict are 
“determined by a continuing process of self-definition” (Tajfel, 1974, p.67). However, such self-
definition to maintain ingroup/outgroup dynamics is a cognitive and deliberate one, in which 
“people do not lose control of their actions simply because they participate in a large gathering” 
(Madenson and Knutsson, 2011, p.3). Secondly, individuals seek to establish a social identity 
in order to construct meaning for the context in which they find themselves. What these two 
factors mean in practice is that individuals in crowds are able to “influence the course of action 
through communication, negotiation, strategic and autonomous behaviours” (Jetten and 
Postmes, 2006, p.5). In policing terms this is reassuring, since it suggests the presence of 
individuals able and willing to engage and be engaged through communication and capable 
of interpreting police contact within a personal frame of reference, which may influence 
perceptions of legitimacy. Conversely, a frame of reference might exist that is oppositional to 
policing and remain so.  
 However, individual perceptions of police legitimacy remain key in all aspects and at 
all junctures along the continuum outlined above. Indeed, social identity evolved to articulate 
the links between individual perceptions and group identity and behaviours. This being the 
case, there is adequate reason to examine the role of individual attitudes to the police and the 
agency that they have in police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. In an abstract 
model, it may seem probable for groups to be influenced, however groups don’t hold 
perceptions. To rely on this, risks applying some notion of “groupthink” and a prevailing group 
mind that in essence is classical, psychological reductionism. Rather, any police action aimed 
at influencing the wider group must be aimed at individuals or focused on understanding why 
they may not be so influenced. Individuals may define themselves in personal and collective 
terms and move along a continuum in either direction depending upon the prevailing 
influences. Turner et al (2006) summarise this: 
There is no Chinese wall between the individuality and groupness of people. 
One cannot be reduced to or subsumed by the other but neither should any 
false dichotomy be invented to deny the living reality of people in which being 
an individual and being a group member function collaboratively. (Turner et al, 
2006, p. 264) 
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 Based upon observations of crowd events, Adang (2011, p.62) implies that individual 
choice in behaviour is both rational and deliberate, where people “prepare themselves, pursue 
goals and clearly take the risks into account”. Collective behaviour, however complex it may 
look at times, comprises sequences alternating between individual and social activity with 
variance in the mode and form of behaviours (Mcphail, 1991). Notably, individual choice 
guides behaviour, insofar as people control and self-regulate in pursuit of their own goals and 
aims (Mcphail,1991).  
 Where might this leave us in terms of the ESIM’s analysis of the impact of police 
contact in protest and perceptions of police legitimacy? Firstly, people will unite with others 
where their individual views and experiences coalesce with a collective one, particularly where 
they share a common fate at the hands of the police, such is the essence of ESIM. Secondly, 
those who previously held negative views about the police or state will be vindicated in that 
view, which serves to galvanize their position. Disconcertingly, a number of those who may 
have seen the police previously as legitimate might be swayed according to the ESIM 
approach. Reicher (2003) explains it thus:  
In a number of studies involving crowd events, including football matches, 
student demos, tax protests and environmental protest a common dynamic has 
been found to underlie processes of change. Each of these events had different 
psychological crowds, with different identities and different intentions co-existing 
within the physical crowd. Such change as occurred was among “moderate” 
elements of the crowd who understood those policing them as neutral 
guarantors of social order. As a consequence of being impeded in carrying out 
legitimate activities and in response to being treated as dangerous and 
oppositional by police, moderate crowd members in turn came to see police as 
illegitimate opposition. (Reicher, 2003, p.201) 
The ESIM account seeks to demonstrate the significance of the impact of police contact on 
empirical legitimacy. Notwithstanding that the basis on which Reicher (2003, p. 201) 
categorises people as “moderate” is unclear, it does underline the importance of the police 
understanding this as a potential agent in the initiation and escalation of violence and disorder. 
However, it should be recognised that there are limits to this proposition because the 
asymmetry of policing (Skogan, 2006, 2012) means that there may well be those for whom no 
amount of positive or benevolent police contact will engender legitimacy. In addition, 
Braithwaite (2009) identifies that in some instances the measures taken by the police to induce 
perceptions of legitimacy can be interpreted as cynical attempts and actually prove 
counterproductive. 
 The ESIM implies that protester attitudes and behaviours are driven by their 
experience of contact with the police. However, there is reason to consider that individuals do 
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not attend protests as blank canvasses upon which attitudes and behaviours are drawn by 
other protesters or the police. Haslam et al (2010) explain this in the following way: 
Individuals do not come to social encounters with a mind that is ‘tabula rasa’ 
and then proceed to mechanically process information in a dispassionate, 
uninvolved manner in order to decide whether or not a particular person should 
be seen as a member of a particular group. Rather, (it) categorization depends 
on the perceivers prior expectations, many of which derive from existing group 
memberships and prior encounters. (Haslam et al, 2010, p.349) 
Therefore, it is by no means conclusive that emerging notions of police legitimacy in time and 
space, guarantees a shift in social identity as claimed by the ESIM. Prior expectations referred 
to here may serve as filters in the minds of protesters, through which their experiences of 
policing pass (Haslam et al, 2010). My empirical research suggests that perceptions of the 
policing of protest events may indeed be viewed through a combination of filters derived from 
personal and group-inspired constructions of policing, levels of engagement and distancing, 
power and identity relationships and pre-existing ideology. I will explore in detail below some 
of the specific conditions under which personal attitudes can configure behaviour and highlight 
the opportunity that they have to shape cooperation and compliance with the law and police. 
 The rational nature of crowd behaviour and the proposition that individuals do not lose 
a sense of self-control in the crowd leads us to consider the reference points upon which crowd 
members rely. An answer to this is that their public behaviour is significantly influenced by 
external social influences or ones that they have internalized as a form of self-regulatory 
mechanism (Myers et al, 2010). These influences may come from others prototypical 
behaviour or exist in the prevailing context as group norms or group ideology. Whilst a reliance 
on the idea that attitudes generally determine behaviour may be spurious (Batson et al,1997; 
Batson and Thomson, 2001; Wicker,1969), this may have more to do with attempting to 
correspond a general attitude with very specific behaviour (Bohner and Schwarz, 2003). As 
an example, a general dislike of the government would be a poor indicator that a person would 
in fact set fire to a government building. Thus, in general terms, it may appear to be the case 
that attitudes do not beget behaviour or prove to be a reliable predictor of such.  
 However, it has been demonstrated that there is a strong correlation between attitude 
and behaviour under certain specific conditions (Myers et al, 2010; Sigull and Page,1971). In 
circumstances where external restraining influences are minimal, people will declare certain 
attitudes if they perceive that others are more likely to be accepting of them. This indicates 
that where the prevailing social influences and context support the expression and acting out 
of attitudes, the behaviour is much more likely to occur (Sigull and Page,1971; Hofmann et al, 
2005). Furthermore, the closer the alignment of a specific attitude to a specific behaviour, then 
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the greater likelihood exists for it to be acted upon. This is otherwise known as the 
“correspondence principle”, where both are said to be alike in their “degree of specification” 
(Bohner and Schwarz, 2003, p.425).  
 If we apply this in protest situations, those with an ideological opposition to the authority 
of the police, the law or state may be more inclined to act in a way that demonstrates and 
supports it. In situations where there are attitudes that specific direct action and violence are 
acceptable, it might be more likely to occur. Such a position can be adopted despite exemplary 
conduct by the police. Research elsewhere has identified that measures taken by criminal 
justice agents that are aimed at securing legitimacy can prove counter-productive for people 
who are diametrically opposed to the police or the law (Braithwaite, 2009; Cherney and 
Murphy, 2011).  
 The correspondence principle is one supported by the theory of reasoned action (TRA) 
(Ajzan and Fishbein,1977, 2005). The TRA posits that certain dependents operate to influence 
our conscious behaviour. Namely, the expectations of others and the value placed on them, 
the congruency of the attitude with the behaviour and the potency of the attitude in terms of 
its contextual saliency. This can occur in situations where people share context, experience 
greater self-awareness or feel provocation (Myers et al, 2010). A type of awareness process 
can be demonstrated in the framing of protest events and the priming of attitudes prior to 
events, this occurs in social movement organizations, pre-event communications, publicity 
and the wider media (Klandermans,1997; Opp, 2009). What is pertinent to the thesis is that 
engagement in or support for protest activities have both attitudinal and behavioural aspects 
(Klandermans,1997). Therefore, generating and harnessing these is often key to the success 
of the protest, its objectives and progress, which may compete with police measures aimed at 
increasing perceptions of legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. Together, the points 
discussed highlight the importance of understanding the nuances of context of the policing 
situation. 
 In summary, what can we learn about the effect of attitudes on behaviour in protest 
events? Where influence from other individuals can be found within the context of the protest, 
and they support individual attitudes, corresponding behaviour is more likely to be seen as 
normative and prototypical (Myers et al, 2010). Arguably, where attitudes about police 
illegitimacy already exist and are perceived as shared or supported by others, behaviour is 
more likely to follow. Group norms and values play a role in aligning peoples’ attitudes with 
their behaviour. While this pathway from attitudes to behaviour is often a fragile one, the 
relationship can be argued to be stronger in the group context where attitudes are seen as 
normative and prototypical. Indeed, people may act out behaviours in order to “validate their 
99 
 
group membership to themselves…[and] publicly performed behaviour can lead to more 
enduring internal attitudinal and self-representational change” (Terry and Hogg, 1996, p.776). 
Although not overtly stated in the ESIM, we might conclude given its basis in social identity 
ala Reicher (1984) that prototypical members of a group are a significant source of information 
and feedback upon which attitudes and behaviour are formed. Behaviours in protest events 
may be defined with reference to assumed group norms that set the parameters for individuals 
by: 
Pay[ing] close attention to identity consistent behaviour of fellow ingroup 
members, particularly those who are highly prototypical, in order to learn precise 
situation-specific and identity consistent behaviours to engage in. (Hogg, 2001, 
p. 63) 
What this tells us is that there are complex dynamics at work that inform protesters’ attitudes, 
their relationships with other protesters and the police, and define the limit and extent of their 
behaviours. This is a highly pertinent point contained within the social identity tradition that I 
would argue is germane to perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance. It is not 
inconceivable that perceptions of and behaviours in relation to the police can be underpinned 
by these dynamics. We know that during dynamic and spontaneous situations, individuals 
refer to their personal mechanisms in making judgements about what constitutes normative 
behaviour and how others (like the police or fellow protesters) might be categorised (Haslam 
et al, 2010). The link between attitudes and behaviour can be seen to be highly contextually 
specific and needs to be understood as contextually-driven. 
 In conclusion, this chapter set out to demonstrate the need for a more nuanced 
understanding of the contextually based influences associated with protester perceptions of 
police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation. It highlighted the complexities of protest 
contexts and their policing. It has examined what protest means, exploring levels of its 
organization and coordination. In so doing, it identified an operational definition that frames 
the empirical research. The chapter also investigated the impact of social media in protest, 
highlighting their use for networking, mobilising protest, and as the means to construct and 
communicate narratives about the police and protest causes. A selection of theories and 
models of disorder, have been outlined and critically examined. Specifically, those derived 
from the “tinder and spark” perspective. A more detailed examination of the Flashpoints model 
has been made to identify its contribution to our understanding of the causes of disorder. This 
identified that it is not a model of police legitimacy, with explanatory power about the 
construction and shaping of protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to 
cooperation and compliance.  
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 With its current dominance in British policing, the origin and development of the ESIM 
has been examined, highlighting its reliance on the notion of emerging perceptions of police 
illegitimacy arising from police contact as the basis for collective violence. Limitations relating 
to its failure in acknowledging antecedent attitudes about the police and pre-existing ideology 
have been raised. Finally, the chapter has demonstrated the theoretical link between 
protesters’ attitudes and their behaviour, and the circumstances in which this can occur.  
 Scholars, policy makers and police leaders often seek typologies and categories to 
apply to protest and policing, as we have seen from the discussion above. However, these 
can prove less useful, since the dialogic nature of police legitimacy requires greater reflection 
in action than they allow. The danger is that typologies and categories tend to over simplify 
and generalize about protesters, protest and policing to such an extent that it misses the 
nuances. To do so provides us with only a partial understanding of the processes and 
mechanisms at work in the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy. 
Ultimately, the review of related theories and models highlights a straightforward, but important 
observation, that any one model has limited explanatory power, since the contexts of protest 
are fluid, dynamic and have great complexity. Therefore, a contextually driven approach to 
police legitimacy is required. 
 The following chapter will critically analyse key developments and attempts to 
legitimize the policing of protest and public order in the UK, since the London G20, 2009 
protests. 
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Chapter 4 
Developments in the legitimisation of protest and public order policing 
“I was at G20 and the Climate camp, I’ve seen what the police can do and people should 
know about police brutality. It is state endorsed violence aimed at destroying protest”. 
(Interviewee 6, March for Jobs protest)  
“We set up a campaign after Ian’s death, we didn’t think we’d get far. Statistically, you are 
more likely to die at the hands of the police than in the general population…There are more 
murderers in the police force than in any other section of the population”.  
(Interviewee 1, Justice for Ian Tomlinson protest) 
 
 This chapter analyses some of the attempts to legitimize the policing of protest and 
public order in the UK since London G20, 2009. It draws on academic and “grey” literature 
sources in a critique of recommendations and changes to police training and policy, 
intelligence gathering, tactical flexibility and the police use of force. In examining several HMIC 
reports and reviews from the London G20, 2009 onwards, I highlight their impact, and the 
consequences for protesters and the police. In fact, these now represent four major reviews 
and sets of recommendations between 2009 and 2011, that set the landscape we currently 
see. However, I will demonstrate that these should not be considered free of controversy and 
have contributed to confusion in resolving many of the issues facing the perceived legitimacy 
of the policing of protest and public order in the UK. 
 Whilst certainly not the first time in the history of British policing that a death can be 
associated with protest and public order, arguably the London, G20, 2009 initiated a period 
that has accelerated in advance of all expectations. It provided something of a watershed for 
the policing of protest and public order in the UK. HMIC (2011a) highlight the significance of it 
in the following terms: 
The character of protest is evolving in terms of: the numbers involved; spread 
across the country; associated sporadic violence; disruption caused; short 
notice or no-notice events, and swift changes in protest tactics. After a few, 
relatively quiet years, this is a new period of public order policing (emphasis 
added) one which is faster moving and more unpredictable. Foreseeing the 
character of events will prove more difficult and, in some cases, their nature and 
mood will only become apparent on the day. What seems evident is a 
willingness to disrupt the public and test police. Police tactics have to be as 
adaptable as possible to the circumstances to keep the peace for all of us. The 
fine judgement required to strike the right balance between competing rights 
and needs is getting harder. (HMIC, 2011a, p.2) 
Reviews and recommendations for protest and public order policing 
It is clear that public order policing required more than window dressing in the aftermath of Ian 
Tomlinson’s death at the London G20, 2009. According to HMIC (2011a, 2011b) in order to 
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succeed it required greater public consent and support, informed by debate about the nature 
of policing priorities, the role and responsibilities of the police and public expectations of 
policing in such circumstances. 
 The mandate under which HMIC most recently operated can be summed up in the 
wake of the August, 2011 English riots and the so termed Rules of Engagement (HMIC, 
2011b). Central to these rules is the development of a national framework aimed at providing 
greater certainty for the public and the police on the approach to dealing with protest and 
public disorder. This framework includes clear objectives for the early resolution of disorder 
and sets out rules of engagement between the police and public. It provides guidance on pre-
emptive action and the police use of force, public order tactics, and training. Considering that 
this was in light of criticisms of the slow police response to the 2011 riots, it is unsurprising 
that HMIC (2011b) called for: 
Go forward tactics, training to nationally consistent standards and including the 
capability to use a range of levels of force (given different scenarios) to save 
lives, protect the public and disrupt criminality. These tactics should be informed 
by the law on public order and the use of force to enable officers and 
commanders to be both professionally confident and competent in the use of 
their powers to keep the peace. (HMIC, 2011b, p.8) 
The inference is that in some way the police had unilaterally adopted a “hands off” approach 
and an unwillingness to engage with public disorder. I will examine the main themes contained 
in these rules of engagement in the discussion below and argue that in competition with earlier 
HMIC recommendations after London, G20, 2009 (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b), they contribute to 
something of an identity crisis for the policing of protest and public order. 
The use of force 
The use of force has been mired in controversy since the use of the military under the “old” 
policing arrangements and since the new police were formed in 1829 (Emsley, 2009; 
Rawlings, 2002). The police use of coercion and force understandably raises human rights 
considerations, and its improper or excessive use potentially undermines police claims to 
legitimacy. This can be structural in terms of the rules and procedures followed by the police 
or empirical, that is, as experienced and perceived by the public. The use of force is linked 
directly to levels of public trust and confidence in the police (HMIC, 2011a, 2011b).  
 The current rules of engagement explain that it is critical for the police to be clear with 
the public concerning the circumstances in which force will be used, and they provide 
contextual examples of the type of police tactics that are recommended in specific protest 
scenarios. However, these are not always supported by the weight of public opinion it would 
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appear. Ipsos MORI (2009) were commissioned by HMIC to undertake a survey in the wake 
of London G20, 2009 (based on 1,726 face-to-face interviews) with a nationally representative 
sample of respondents aged 15 years or more in England and Wales. The purpose was 
primarily to understand public attitudes toward the police and opinions on police performance 
at the G20 protests, but it also examined the level of public tolerance for the use of force and 
police tactics. Respondents were found to be twice as likely to opt for a situation that gives 
police the freedom to use force against protesters, necessary to keep public order, as opt for 
a situation where the police should never use force (Ipsos MORI, 2009).  
 When presented with a list of protest behaviours that commonly occur during large-
scale protest, respondents were asked to evaluate whether the police use of force was 
justifiable. The use of force was defined as a police officer using their baton to strike a 
protester. The results indicated that as protester behaviour escalates, more people consider 
the use of force to be justified. The use of force was most strongly supported when police were 
faced with acts of physical violence from a protester (82% of respondents) (Ipsos MORI, 
2009).  
 Similar findings can be found in a public opinion survey commissioned by HMIC 
(2011b) after the August 2011 urban riots (based on 2000 respondents). People felt very 
strongly about actions that should have been taken by the police to deal with the crowds. All 
police methods including containment (kettling), use of batons, water cannon and attenuated 
energy projectiles (rubber “bullets”) for crowd control were strongly supported by more than 
three-quarters of respondents. A third of people thought that firearms should be used by the 
police in public disorder (HMIC, 2011a). 
 When it comes to perceptions of police tactics it is interesting to note assumptions that 
the public can make without any reference to media or factual information, since in the same 
survey people believed that the police had used more forceful tactics than they actually had. 
A number (23%) believed that the police were already using water cannons in mainland Britain 
to deal with such events (HMIC, 2011b). This is the background to the finding that almost half 
(49%) of respondents believed that the police used too little force to deal with events during 
the August 2011 disorders. Notably, those in Haringey and Croydon, perhaps the foci of the 
most serious disorder, were more likely to think this at 56% and 57% respectively (HMIC, 
2011b). These examples perhaps highlight the perversity associated with an insistence on 
using public consensus as the basis for police legitimacy. 
 Where the restriction of movement and use of containment or “kettling” was examined 
there was a perception that such tactics may be justifiable to deal with incidents of disruption 
to the general public’s day-to-day activities. In fact, 76% believed that holding protesters in a 
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controlled area was acceptable, with the number increasing to 82% where protesters 
threatened public or private property (HMIC, 2011b). Notwithstanding the political aspects of 
dealing with the aftermath of a man’s death, we might question why with evidence of greater 
public support for the use of force, the police had shied away from the use of containment and 
punitive tactics after G20 (2009), adopting a more hands off, ‘no surprises’ approach to the 
policing of protest and public order situations. Certainly, HMIC sought to bring about such a 
policing model and placed great emphasis on the ESIM-based approaches to policing crowds 
and dialogue-based policing tactics through protest liaison teams (PLTs) (HMIC, 2009a, 
2009b, 2011a, 2011b; Stott, 2009). The main characteristics of the “new” policing model from 
G20, 2009, based on a ‘no surprises’ approach, assumes peaceful protest as a starting point. 
It is a model aimed at dealing with the question of how best the police should adapt to the 
modern day demands of public order policing, while retaining the core values of the British 
model of policing epitomised by principles associated with Sir Robert Peel and the enduring 
notion of policing by consent.  
 To answer that question HMIC (2009a, 2009b) made recommendations on how 
protests should be policed in England and Wales. The areas covered in the recommendations 
reiterated the police use of force, the use of stop and search and overt photography, 
consistency of practices around public order training standards and additional training for 
officers. The police service (certainly the Metropolitan Police, who were to some degree the 
main focus of HMIC observations post G20, 2009) began in earnest to execute the new model 
of policing public order (HMIC, 2009b, 2011a, 2011b). However, this was to be short lived in 
practice and the consequences of the review arguably led to a degree of reticence and 
paralysis on the part of the police service to respond more robustly to later disorders. For 
instance, after the student-led protests at cuts to education funding in 2010 where the offices 
of the Conservative party HQ were overrun, questions were asked about how the police could 
possibly have let it happen and why a more punitive approach was not used. Greater numbers 
gathered than had been anticipated by the police and following an HMIC review, the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner at the time Sir Paul Stephenson (HMIC, 2011a) stated that: 
The game has changed. The nature of protest is evolving in terms of: the 
numbers involved; spread across the country; associated sporadic violence; 
disruption being caused; short notice or no-notice events and swift changes in 
protest tactics. After a few, relatively quiet years, this is a new period of public 
order policing, one which is faster moving and more unpredictable. (HMIC, 
2011a, p.3) 
 How then might this new period of public order policing be addressed? HMIC produced 
yet another review and more recommendations that would cement the previous ones in a 
definitive document “Policing Public Order” (HMIC, 2011a).  
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The sense was that the police service had delivered on the majority of earlier 
recommendations made in the post G20, 2009 review. However, progress was slow and 
nationally fragmented relating to tactics, flexibility, leadership, and clarity on the use of force. 
Continuing to respond to the whole spectrum of protest would require finessing of existing 
police tactics, adapting them to handle the risks and spiralling costs of instrumental policing 
approaches. The police were exhorted that they must prevail in all circumstances to keep the 
peace, but within confined budgets (HMIC, 2011a). 
 What then was presented as a new template to finesse the policing of protest and 
public order? With an acceptance that delivering national change would take up to two years 
for a new training curriculum and national standards to be put in place, achieving national 
consensus contributed to its delay. Even were consensus to be reached, issues of local 
interpretation remain. HMIC (2011a) aspired to have national consensus on training and 
tactics yet promoted local flexibility as essential to delivering effective solutions for the policing 
of public order. Critically, on the one hand we have measures aimed at a “one size fits all” and 
on the other a call for more local flexibility at the point where the “boots hit the ground”. 
However, local interpretation of national guidance often results in different working practices 
which may be “visible and problematic when officers from other places operate together” 
(HMIC, 2011a, p.17). This situation creates something of a post code lottery in the treatment 
of protesters.  
 HMIC (2011a) examined the mechanism for developing new guidance and training in 
order to implement their recommended changes, by reviewing a number of protests and public 
order policing operations. What they observed was a demonstrable change in the police 
planning processes for events, greater acknowledgment of the legal requirements, increased 
attempts at dialogue with protest groups, and reaching out to potential protesters and 
communities. HMIC (2011a) recognised that: 
The investment made by forces in community engagement before, during and 
after events has been impressive and undoubtedly assisted in achieving 
operational objectives and maintaining the peace, as well as enhancing 
community and public confidence. (HMIC, 2011a, p.34) 
Finally, subject to the national perspective held by the National Policing Improvement Agency 
(at the time), police forces appeared to be getting it right and were applauded for implementing 
the recommendations from the London, G20, 2009 review.  
 However, the momentum and emphasis on this type of policing model contributed to 
the police suffering something of a setback in the August riots of 2011. Renewed vigour and 
emphasis by the police on assuming a starting position of peaceful protest, facilitating lawful 
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protest and avoiding the use of force for fear of reprisals, have been cited as having a direct 
impact on police decision making. Notwithstanding that HMIC (2011a) had issued guidance 
on the use of force that was intended to provide clarity on its application in certain protest 
scenarios, all of these considerations created a perfect storm for the events of 6-11th August 
2011.  
 Speculation and analyses about the causes and extent of the 2011 riots abound from 
various perspectives, but a common denominator appears to be that the policing style was in 
some degree to blame for their inception and proliferation. Some commentators report that 
the riots were borne out of a sense of injustice and a symptom of deeper community 
resentments towards the police (HMIC, 2011b; RCVP, 2012; Stott and Reicher, 2011), others 
dispute that interpretation and claim them as nothing more than criminal activity by mindless 
individuals aside from any genuine social grievances (Lammy, 2011; Winlow and Hall, 2012). 
Others decried the feeble police responses to quell disorder and their failure to maintain peace 
and order. The police faced criticisms for standing by, not intervening sooner and being 
reluctant to engage with protesters and rioters (HMIC, 2011b). Inevitably, HMIC (2011b) 
conducted another review with the remit to ensure that in future: 
The public order policing response is as effective as it can be and that HMIC 
conduct work to support clearer guidance to forces on the size of deployments, 
the need for mutual aid, pre-emptive action, public order tactics, the number of 
officers (including commanders) trained in public order policing and an 
appropriate arrests policy. (HMIC, 2011b, p.38) 
However, considering the substantial influence of previous HMIC reviews of protest and public 
order policing and the frenetic activity within the police service to address perceived 
shortcomings (2009a, 2009b), it is perhaps remarkable that a further re-think was being 
contemplated so soon. A re-think premised on the basis that police forces up and down the 
country had been forced to adapt tactics to address the challenges of the riots. Arguably, 
tactics that had come from the earlier HMIC recommendations and the newly revised manual 
of guidance “Keeping the Peace” (ACPO, 2010).  
 HMIC (2011b) ultimately conceded that there was a need to reconsider the efficacy of 
previous approaches to protest and public order. The recommendation was made that a range 
of tactics, not requiring massive resource implications be developed “to ensure the peace is 
not lost from the streets” (HMIC, 2011b, p.2). Notably, the revised manual of guidance laid out 
a menu of police tactics. Bearing in mind that the revisions took place in part due to the London 
G20, 2009 review recommendations, it was now implied that they did not meet the needs of 
public order policing for spontaneous protest, rioting and disorder. Following analysis of the 
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August 2011 riots and disorders, HMIC (2011b) concluded that the manual was no longer fit 
for purpose: 
[The manual] needs to be reassessed so that it can usefully take account of the 
dangers presented by the swift co-ordination and spread of disorder. (HMIC, 
2011b, p.2) 
Previous emphasis on using the principles of the ESIM in underpinning protest and public 
order policing strategy, command and tactics was overshadowed. An over reliance on the 
ESIM, developed from and used principally in managing football and sporting event crowds, 
was now assessed as being less useful in managing protest and public order (HMIC, 2011a, 
2011b). This caused something of a riposte from proponents of the ESIM and dialogue-based 
policing who highlighted concerns that now was not the time to revert to more repressive and 
regressive policing (Hoggett and Stott, 2012; Stott and Reicher, 2011). 
 Additional considerations in the wake of the August 2011 riots that differed from 
previous HMIC diktats came with a recognition that police command needed to be more 
flexible and adaptable in delegating command. We might note that the rigid command and 
control structure used in protest and public order policing, does not lend itself to flexibility and 
reflection in action. Ground commanders are usually reluctant to self-deploy, go outside the 
chain of command or make unilateral decisions, with preference given to communicating 
upwards and responding to instructions.  
 HMIC (2011b) stated that officers need to be trained to think innovatively and be 
flexible to ensure that life and property remain protected. Some commanders considered that 
there were opportunities to make early arrests and interventions that were not taken in the 
2011 riots because in traditional public order tactics the common resource unit is a Police 
Support Unit (PSU), and they were reluctant to sub-divide their resources (HMIC, 2011a). 
Whether the command models in current use are sufficient is not a novel question, indeed 
they lack responsiveness in pacey and complex situations. HMIC have questioned whether a 
more devolved approach to command would allow officers to act more rapidly (HMIC, 2011b). 
However, if police commanders are to develop reflective practice in action, they need to be 
trained and willing to understand the nuances of the construction and shaping of perceptions 
of police legitimacy and be empowered to act accordingly.  
 What the HMIC review (2011b) contributed was a number of reiterated 
recommendations and calls for the development of yet another framework for the policing of 
protest and public disorder. A framework for resolving situations relying on three key elements, 
1) improved intelligence functions, 2) greater tactical flexibility, and 3) more guidance on the 
police use of force. Each is examined below. 
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Improving intelligence functions in public order policing 
There is recognition that after the event(s), intelligence can be viewed as the missing link in 
police responses to public disorder arising from large scale events such as protests (HMIC, 
2011b). Police intelligence requirements can be viewed in two ways through national tension 
monitoring, and at local community levels. National tension monitoring has historically been 
conducted by the National Community Tension Team (NCTT) coordinating the national 
delivery of monitoring activity by collating information from local police forces, local authorities 
and various government agencies. This is aimed at building a profile of emerging issues and 
tensions within communities that assists in developing policing interventions such as 
community engagement and public reassurance patrolling. However, in the wake of the 2011 
disorders HMIC (2011b) called for a national hub of information to be established, with the 
mission to aggregate the collection, management and dissemination of public order 
intelligence and information. It is claimed that such a mechanism would act as: 
…a radar for the Police Service and put them on the front foot by scanning the 
wider environment to look for precursor signs and signals, from both open 
source material and police databases. (HMIC, 2011b, p. 85)  
Furthermore, this new function would serve as the police repository for data required to 
complete a national public order threat and risk assessment. However, I contend that this new 
approach runs the risk of repeating the mistakes of the past unless it utilises a fresh and 
nuanced approach to what information and intelligence is gathered and how it is framed. I 
make this point on the basis that after the August 2011 riots, HMIC discovered that in order to 
manage the sheer volume available to the police, the collection, analysis and dissemination 
of intelligence tended to be directed at known problems and people, rather than a flexible and 
holistic perspective (HMIC, 2011b). According to HMIC (2011b) this anomaly is at both 
national and neighbourhood levels, the importance of developing an informed intelligence 
picture is acknowledged, but presently there is not the capacity to do so in a meaningful and 
structured way at the different levels of policing.  
 Intelligence requirements are focused requests for information relating to a particular 
person or issue. However, this does not go far enough in establishing the range of influences 
that inform protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and 
cooperation. Both the structure of intelligence gathering and its content often lacks format and 
detail. HMIC (2011b) highlight that such information and intelligence is widely submitted on 
the basis of what staff believe to be important, rather than responding to specific and relevant 
requirements. Thus, HMIC (2011b, p.86) highlight that there “is a strong possibility the current 
focus is inducing a situation where the police are unsighted in respect of a range of risks”. This 
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means that the nuances associated with police legitimacy in the protest context are less well 
known. I argue that the CDM of police legitimacy represents a framework by which focused 
information and intelligence gathering can occur about protester constructions of policing, pre-
existing ideologies, protester levels of engagement and distancing, and power and identity 
relationships. Information about these could improve the management of protest and its 
outcomes. 
 Dialogue-based policing has emerged as a police tactic aimed at legitimising the 
management of protest and public order over a relatively short period of time (explicitly defined 
as a tactic) (HMIC, 2009b, HMIC, 2011a, 2011b). Dialogue-based policing approaches 
emerged in part as a result of the Swedish police experience of protests at EU summits in 
Gothenburg, 2001 (Holgersson and Knutsson, 2009; Peterson and Oskarsson, 2006). The 
Swedish authorities called for the development of a new policing tactic that would rely on the 
social psychological basis of the ESIM (HMIC, 2009b; Holgersson and Knutsson, 2009). 
Criticisms highlighted in the Swedish report were reflected in those of HMIC (2009a) with 
regard to disproportionate measures adopted by the police, negative stereotyping of 
protesters, indiscriminate use of coercion and the lack of planning for protest policing 
(Holgersson and Knutsson, 2009; HMIC, 2009a). 
 The principles of the dialogue-based tactic can be summarised under the headings of: 
facilitation, dialogue, counter-part perspective, differentiation, signal value and state (SOU, 
2002). It is the dialogue element that we will examine in detail since it related specifically to 
perceived deficiencies in UK policing previously (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b). By applying an ESIM-
based approach the objective of dialogue policing is to achieve a degree of self-policing by 
the crowd (notwithstanding that the term is contested) and to explain, discuss or negotiate the 
conditions for the protest. In practice this means that specialist dialogue police officers working 
in pairs mingle and engage with the crowd before, during and after the event. However, whilst 
dialogue is presented as the means to negotiated management of protest, we might also heed 
opposing views that operational aims sometimes render dialogue as nothing but subtle forms 
of police coercion (Stott et al, 2013; Waddington, 1994b; Wahlstrom, 2007).  
 In a UK context the use of protest liaison officers or teams (PLO/PLTs) has proliferated 
since G20, 2009 with a recorded number in 2013 of 296 trained PLOs across England and 
Wales (CoP, 2013). PLO/PLTs are also listed as a tactical option to be encouraged before, 
during and after protest and public order events (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, 2011b). Yet, we might 
observe that they are perhaps not empowered with the degree of autonomy and operational 
independence that they have in the Swedish policing context (SOU, 2002). Consequently, 
PLO/PLTs can be viewed with suspicion, being engaged by protesters on a highly self-
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selecting basis and have limited efficacy in communicating and managing protest in the U.K. 
in a meaningful way (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, 2011b).  
 The dialogue tactic itself comprises the elements: negotiation, mediation, suggestion, 
communication and monitoring (Reicher, 2011). Negotiation involves facilitating compromises 
and agreements between the police commander and protesters. Mediation is intended to 
explain the police perception to the crowd and vice versa in order to assist a mutual 
understanding of the situation and reduce negative stereotypes of each other. Suggestion is 
intended to provide options and solutions to each side in order to negate the risk of conflict 
and violence. Communication concerns the exchange of information between the police and 
protesters. Monitoring provides an assessment of the mood of the crowd members, 
preparedness for conflict and information to commanders about the effects of police actions. 
Proponents of the ESIM clearly view the effective use of the tactic as creating and sustaining 
perceptions of police legitimacy and reducing conflict and violence (Reicher, 2011). In practice, 
PLO/PLTs can sometimes be viewed as nothing more than intelligence gatherers.  
 Police reports highlight that it is often unclear how PLO/PLTs feedback the 
intelligence/information that they obtain and that there should be a clear distinction between 
protester liaison and operational policing of protest. Stott et al (2013, p.55) propose that PLTs 
can make a positive contribution where there are “transparent operational and structural 
divisions between PLTs and the criminal intelligence resources applied by the police to 
protests”.  
 Notwithstanding any controversy about whether PLO/PLTs are communicators, 
intelligence gatherers or both, police knowledge of the cultures, identities and ideologies are 
pivotal to the success of any dialogue-based approach (Reicher, 2011; Stott et al, 2013). I do 
not concern myself here with the debate as to whether they should or should not be gathering 
intelligence. Arguably, they are police officers first and foremost, separating roles and 
requirements in Stott’s terms can in practice prove highly difficult or be notional at best. 
However, if the key characteristic of the liaison role according to Stott et al (2013, p.14) is to 
“identify ‘influential’ people in crowds in order to work with them in the interests of promoting 
‘self-regulation’ and therefore peaceful protest”, there exists an argument for dialogue to be 
conducted by non-police officers. This is because in its purist form what is being required of 
them does not require a warranted status or the execution of any police powers. After all is 
said and done, policing functions are increasingly provided by non-police officers and there 
are many examples of police staff engaged in intelligence roles. 
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Tactical flexibility 
The second element of the proposed framework for public order policing relates to tactical 
flexibility (HMIC, 2011b). One of the roles of police leaders is to reflect upon police responses 
to protests and identify the lessons learned, whether the tactics employed to facilitate lawful 
protest, manage civil disobedience and disorder are appropriate or require development. 
HMIC (2011b) have suggested a number of questions to aid reflection in the wake of the 2011 
riots, covering a range of topics such as use of social media and communication, target 
hardening, use of physical barriers instead of police presence, focused containment of 
protesters, devolved command levels, information gathering and sharing, limitations and 
protections of the rights to protest and recognition by those organising and taking part in 
protests that it is unacceptable for the police to be used as a target for violence or to vent their 
frustrations. The latter might be seen as a laudable yet unrealistic proposition. However, what 
we notice here is again a focus on reflection after the event, the idea of the “debrief”. Arguably, 
this might help with planning for future events, but rather misses the importance of reflection 
in action.  
 Tactical flexibility means that police responses must be appropriately robust and 
effective, yet within the tradition of the British policing model of community engagement and 
consent, acting decisively whilst using the minimum force necessary to safeguard life and 
property (HMIC, 2011b). However, whilst policing by consent may be true in a wider sense, 
acknowledgement should be made that this is subjective and has contextual limitations, since 
policing is a particularly “conflict ridden enterprise” (Reiner, 2010, p. 69).  
 These assertions by HMIC are simplistic in light of the wide array of factors that appear 
to influence protester perceptions of the law, police and their legitimacy. An over reliance on 
the HMIC approach to change the face of public order policing risks repeating past mistakes 
and creating confusion for public and police alike. However, the two key objectives of 
embedding common national learning standards for public order and communicating new 
tactics and practice to senior command teams and officers remains their mission for 
developing police tactical flexibility (HMIC, 2011b).  
 There is recognition by HMIC that public consent can only be achieved through a public 
debate about policing priorities and by establishing realistic public expectations of what can 
be achieved in public order policing (subject to legal constraints). If the contingencies of PJ 
and the ESIM in the shape of asymmetry, the dialogic nature of police legitimacy and social 
distancing and motivational postures are applied to this analysis, we might conclude that only 
those who are aligned and engaged with the police and the authorities are likely to contribute 
to any debate. Yet to what extent might we rely on the notion of policing by consent in protest 
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and public order policing tactics? The British way of policing relies heavily on the idea of 
policing by consent none more so perhaps than in public order policing (HMIC, 2009a, 2009b, 
2011a, 2011b). However, the term carries something of a paradox about it.  
 Policing by its operational nature is discriminatory, whether through the application of 
discretion in exercising the law, the targeting of particular individuals or groups or in terms of 
a power dynamic (Waddington, 1994b, 1999). To truly police with the consent of some 
sections of the community, the police would, in certain contexts and encounters be paralysed 
into inactivity. Ultimately, people who do not wish to receive police attention will have it whether 
they approve of it or not (Waddington, 1994a, 1999). In the contexts of protest the term is 
ubiquitously applied under the rubric “no surprises” and facilitative, negotiated management 
styles of policing. Yet, can the policing of protest ever be entirely consensual? To what degree 
do the police always retain control of the parameters and terms upon which protest takes 
place? Restriction and restraint, not necessarily overt, can be tacitly applied through the 
acceptance of police terms and conditions by protesters and event organisers (Waddington, 
1994b). In this way, protesters concede because they know that there is a cost for not doing 
so, and in any negotiations the police ultimately hold the power (Waddington, 1994b).  
 However, this is not the same for those who place themselves outside of the formal 
mechanisms, what we might call the disengaged, dismissive and defiant who fall outside of 
this consensual contract. These situations signal the potential that for protesters and police 
alike, “the gloves are off” and that policing by consent is suspended. As Waddington (1994b) 
points out the problem is that policing by consent is: 
…still policing and policing entails the potential ultimately to use coercive power. 
‘Consent’ cannot mean genuinely informed and unconstrained agreement for 
that would imply the abrogation of police authority itself. (Waddington, 1994b, 
p.200) 
 A reliance on the idea that the police can always align themselves with the values of 
certain groups and be representative of them (as per the concepts of moral alignment and 
personal values in PJ) is doubtful, since consent can be considered to be highly context 
specific. 
 The revised framework for the policing of protest and public order revisits the use of 
force and aims to inform public discussion about it (HMIC, 2011a, 2011b). However, as I have 
alluded to earlier in the chapter the debate needs to go wider since at least as far back as 
G20, London 2009 and thereafter, public opinion appears to infer a more robust stance on the 
use of force than the police service takes. HMIC (2011b) caveat this by noting that: 
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Policing is not just about public support. By definition not everyone they arrest 
is supportive. Officers constantly have to work to win public confidence, but in 
their use of force they are accountable to the courts and the rule of law. 
Perceptions apart, they must act lawfully (emphasis added). (HMIC, 2011b, 
p.85) 
 On the one hand, we have the importance of public consensus, on the other, objective 
criteria (by law) about how force will be used and judged by the courts. In order to use force 
appropriately officers need to know that they are acting lawfully and that they are likely to have 
support from most people in the communities they police. HMIC (2011a, 2011b) identified that 
improved officer training in the law is necessary, but this will be insufficient alone. There is 
also a need to develop a shared understanding between the police and the public of the tactics 
that might be used in different scenarios. My own empirical research highlights protesters’ 
assessments of poor legal knowledge in police officers and their perceptions about police 
tactics. In the latter case, even relatively benign activities such as traffic control during 
marches can be viewed with suspicion and misinterpreted by protesters. There must be an 
acceptance in any debate of the significance of protester perceptions of police activity and a 
recognition that public consensus is unlikely.  
 In summary, where might this leave the attempts to legitimise protest and public order 
policing in Britain today? The recommended national framework continues to be pursued and 
sets out three expectations: the early resolution of disorder; mobilisation planning to ensure 
police forces are prepared for disorder; and the circumstances in which a range of police 
tactics (including the use of vehicles, water cannon and attenuating energy projectiles) can be 
considered (HMIC, 2011b). Ultimately this framework is intended to serve as the rules of 
engagement for protest and public order policing now. However, what is the impact and 
consequences of the somewhat contradictory recommendations and changes that have 
occurred since London G20, 2009? 
 
The impact and consequences of HMIC recommendations for the policing of protest 
and public order. 
What are the consequences of the convoluted and meandering course being steered through 
the world of protest and public order policing? Realistically, we can expect further reviews and 
recommendations to come post hoc, reflecting the increasing nature of protest, disorder and 
critiques of police involvement. For now, it will suffice to summarise the impact and 
consequences to date, I suggest that there is something of an identity crisis for the policing of 
protest and public order in the UK, created in part by the melange of reviews and contradictory 
guidance on offer. This observation can be made on five bases.  
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 First, the police service lacks confidence in its ability to police protest and disorder 
effectively. Following very positive activity to meet the original recommendations in Adapting 
to Protest (HMIC, 2009a) and Adapting to Protest 2: Nurturing the British model of policing 
(HMIC, 2009b) the police had two major surprises in the form of the Student protests, 2010 
and the August riots, 2011. Surprising, because in attempting to implement the en vogue 
policing model (derived from the ESIM and the policing of football and sporting event crowds) 
based on facilitating protester rights, taking a no surprises approach and using dialogue to 
establish greater legitimacy, they failed. That is not to say that the model per se is a failure or 
that heavy handed indiscriminate policing is desirable. However, the contingents and 
antecedents of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance 
remain unaccounted for. The perceived failures of protest and public order policing have 
served to erode both public and police confidence and the view that the police will not be 
supported endures in such terms as “if we [the police] use force, we are not confident we will 
be supported with all the media attention and the threat of legal action” (HMIC, 2011b, p.14). 
 Secondly, confusion arises from the training and guidance that officers at all levels 
receive. One minute being told go “soft” on protesters and now going hard on “rioters” (HMIC, 
2011b). It can be difficult in the heat of disorder to establish who exactly is exercising a 
legitimate right to protest, who is a passer-by, who is intent on criminality and at what point 
one becomes the other or vice versa, such is the nature of the policing context. HMIC (2011a, 
2011b) recognised that both officers and commanders experience frustration and degrees of 
cynicism about the strength of political and public desire for a robust policing response, while 
being trained and exhorted to operate in a more circumspect manner. The belief is that, were 
something untoward to happen, that same political and public support would rapidly evaporate. 
 Thirdly, following the G20, London 2009 and the incident leading to the tragic death of 
Ian Tomlinson, officers’ fear of accusations of heavy handedness impact negatively on their 
decision-making. Observers and commentators would do well to consider that Adapting to 
Protest 1 (HMIC, 2009a) and its follow-up reviews have exerted considerable pressure on 
changes to the policing of protest, changes that HMIC now imply are erroneous (HMIC, 
2011b). Consequently, if HMIC believed them to be inadequate, having recommended them 
previously then what is the police service and the public to make of it?  
 Fourthly, the issue of apparent clarity on the police use of force, which arguably is a 
defining feature of the public police with its state mandate and ability to use force on citizens 
(Bittner, 1970; Reiner, 2012; Waddington, 1994b, 1999), remains unresolved. HMIC and the 
College of Policing (CoP, 2015, HMIC, 2011a, 2011b) have considered and published legal 
advice on what constitutes the appropriate police use of force. However, I would argue that it 
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provides no greater clarity than the existing legal position in England and Wales, namely that 
officers are accountable and responsible for their individual use of force and must be able to 
justify their actions in law. This is a longstanding situation covered under Common law 
principles, the Criminal Law Act 1967 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Instead, 
officers’ accountability and responsibility are simply restated among the ten key principles for 
the use of force in public order issued by HMIC (2011a, 2011b) and the College of Policing 
(CoP, 2015). As such, this neuters any claim that new guidance provides more clarity about 
the circumstances and criteria surrounding the proportionate use of force in protest and public 
order policing.  
 On a positive note, HMIC have consistently lobbied for a codification of public order 
policing since G20, 2009 (under S39a of the Police Act, 1996). This is similar to other Codes 
of Practice that are in force, for example PACE Code A for Stop and Search and the 
established PACE Code C for custody and detention. However, there appears to be no senior 
police and government appetite for its introduction. Arguably, a code of practice for public 
order policing would provide transparency, clarity and something of a yardstick for the police 
and public alike, in short everyone knows where they stand in terms of compliance and 
accountability. Structurally, a code of practice for public order would provide clear, internal 
rules that underpin the notion of police legality, which is a component of perceived legitimacy 
(Beetham, 1991). 
 Finally, there is inconsistency and contradiction with approaches used across other 
areas of policing activity. Specifically, this relates to the use of stop and search powers in 
protest. The police use of stop and search generally, has been a highly contentious issue for 
many years and arguments concerning the consequences of its disproportionate use and how 
it is perceived by the public are well rehearsed and documented (HMIC, 2013, 2015). 
However, stop and search as a preventative, early intervention tactic in public order is singled 
out by HMIC as a tool for managing protest and disorder (HMIC, 2009b, 2011b). Together with 
a call for its use in conjunction with a “proactive, deterrent [officer] presence” (HMIC, 2011b, 
p.7) it raises real challenges for officers and commanders seeking to secure consensual 
legitimacy. Protest contexts are those where such actions can so often be counterproductive 
and provocative to the community. Notably, the use of stop and search was cited as a causal 
factor for the August, 2011 riots across the UK, with its “inappropriate use having a corrosive 
effect on community relations” (RCVP, 2012, p.13). Oddly, HMIC (2011b, p.16) observe that 
when those determined on violence organise themselves at short notice to “attack the 
community, early decisive [stop and search] intervention through effective local mobilisation 
offers the best opportunity of stopping the spread of rioting”, this rather misses the point that 
often these are people of that community, as rioter profiles indicate (RCVP, 2012). The 
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benefits of stop and search tactics should be weighed against the potential negative impact 
on public confidence in the police. Patently, there is a distinct fracture between the HMIC 
recommendation for greater use of stop and search in protest and public order policing and 
other reviews and empirical evidence on its use and negative consequences (EHRC, 2010; 
HMIC, 2013, 2015; HMICFRS, 2016; RCVP, 2012). 
 This chapter has critically discussed attempts to legitimise the policing of protest and 
public order in the UK. It documented calls for a shift from repressive policing tactics to ones 
based on facilitation of peaceful protest on a “no surprises” basis. The chapter highlighted how 
this was short-lived following HMIC reviews of the August, 2011 riots and calls for more robust 
policing interventions. The net effect of these reviews has been demonstrated as contributing 
to more confusion than clarity for the police and public alike, calling into question the utility of 
approaches based on PJ and the ESIM. They also highlight the diversity of public opinion 
about how the police should respond to protest and disorder, and the validity of their tactics. 
 The events and aftermath of G20, London 2009 provided something of a watershed 
for the policing of protest and public order, one in which genuine attempts have been made to 
further legitimise it. Out of a concentrated period of protests and disorders in the UK, reviews 
and recommendations have abounded. However, they are not without contradictions that 
prove problematic for police legitimacy. What is clear is that the police need to acknowledge 
and understand the unique context of protest and its policing and develop the means to 
understand the nuances associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions 
of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. 
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Chapter 5 
The research strategy, methodology and processes 
This chapter sets out in detail the research strategy, methodology and processes employed 
for the two stages of empirical research and the construction of the CDM. The strategy 
consists of a mixed method design, employing an exploratory, quantitative survey intended to 
examine the initial research questions, followed by a detailed qualitative exploration of the 
findings and investigation of factors associated with the construction and shaping of protester 
perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to cooperation and compliance.  
 The strategy is informed by aspects of the grounded theory method (GTM) insofar as 
the coding and analytic methods used, but does not claim a grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006; 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Urquhart, 2011). It is not uncommon for researchers to use the 
tools of grounded theorists without developing what would be described as a substantive 
grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006; Urquhart, 2011). While the sequencing of the research is 
not intended to imply distinctly separate stages and should be seen holistically, for ease of 
discussion, thesis structure and clarity I do refer to the exploratory quantitative survey as 
Phase 1 and the qualitative interviews and observations as Phase 2.  
The mixed method approach 
The research design can broadly be described as a sequential research study (Creswell, 2003; 
Robson, 2011) that investigates the influences associated with protesters’ perceptions of 
police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance. The approach is two-fold. First, to provide 
a preliminary quantitative exercise in establishing if the commonly held claims of PJ are to be 
found in the specific context of protest. Second, to identify and investigate themes for further 
qualitative investigation. I have relied upon a comparative and reflective process between the 
two phases of inquiry and link the findings, observations and themes from the exploratory 
survey with the later qualitative data collection and analytic developments of phase 2.  
 The study is informed by specific aspects of GTM, insofar as taking emerging findings 
back into the field to engage participants through structured and semi-structured interviews, 
non-participant observation, and analysis of video footage of protest events gathered by the 
researcher. In phase 2, I adopt the following process from GTM to develop the preliminary 
findings from the survey,1) data collection based on the established and emerging themes 
and relationships, 2) initial (line-by- line) coding, 3) focused coding and category identification 
(Charmaz, 2006). I have relied upon note-taking to capture the conceptual developments 
aimed at constructing the categories and factors that eventually form the CDM of police 
legitimacy (see chapter six). As stated it is not intended that the work be seen as two distinct 
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and exclusively separate entities, the phased distinction in this chapter is made in order to 
provide transparency, clarity in the discussion and ease of critique of my work. It is also 
provided in the event that others may wish to replicate the research in the future.  
 I am aware that this may be uncomfortable since the terminology used might imply a 
pre-disposed theory that is being pursued in a positivist fashion. However, it is entirely 
consistent according to some authors for a GTM to be used in order to develop initial findings, 
and to investigate results that have been established elsewhere (Charmaz, 2006; Robson, 
2011). It is both an overall strategy in conducting mixed method research and a means of 
coding and analysing data. Whilst commonly seen as suitable for qualitatively-based data 
collection there appears no requirement that this is exclusively so (Robson, 2011).  
 The research focuses on a “real-life” context and the dynamic social situation of protest 
and public order policing. This poses a problem for the researcher in that there is a 
requirement, following previous similar research to have a quantitative element aimed at 
testing the validity and reliability of the constructs associated with empirical police legitimacy, 
and focused qualitative research to explore their meaning and interpretation (Jansen, 2010). 
The first phase seeks to provide a confirmatory baseline. However, in keeping with the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions set out below (see p. 120) this is not to imply an 
external, objective social reality capable of singular, independent observation and 
measurement. Protest is a complex social, political and interactional activity that is highly 
contextualised. Survey research can and is often used in a precursory manner with the 
advantage that the meaning of the responses can be developed and interpreted beyond the 
initial quantitative statistical analysis through subsequent investigation (della Porta and 
Keating, 2008). Both are important if I am to be able to engage my own thesis with the 
assumptions and conclusions drawn from similar PJ research whilst maintaining a degree of 
flexibility for other explanations to emerge. The approach provides the framework for 
examining how perceptions of police legitimacy are constructed and shaped. I seek to interpret 
and explain the social situation through what Phillips and Burbules (2000, p.43) call a “rational 
activity based on evidence and a social activity based on power, politics and ideology”. 
However, this must be seen in light of the difficulties in claiming absolute knowledge about 
human behaviour and activity.  
 Whilst a positivist view seeks to define a priori variables, establish measurement, 
propose hypotheses and causal relationships, a constructivist view introduces the notion that 
people seek to make sense of their own experience and reality (Creswell, 2003). In social 
constructionism this hinges on the processes of personal interaction with others, and the 
environment rather than a concrete, independent social reality. Crotty (1998) elaborates on 
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the social aspects of this worldview in terms of meaning being personally created through 
engagement with the world and by interaction with others in historical, social and cultural ways. 
For the researcher, data collection and analysis need to take account of the setting and context 
of the activity. When applied in an interpretivist dimension to social activity an approach 
informed by GTM appears to offer significant benefits because of the close relationship 
between the stages of coding, categorising of data and the way in which meaning and 
interpretation are constructed and represented (Creswell, 2003; Urquhart, 2011).  
 A research strategy informed by GTM is not exclusively qualitative or quantitative and 
it appears to be entirely consistent as a research approach that combines the strengths, 
rigours and richness of both interpretations of the term “paradigm” (Urquhart, 2011). Moreover, 
we should remain cognisant that the qualitative “paradigm” has many within it (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000; Pitman and Maxwell, 1992).  
 Any research strategy is not entirely value free, something of which I am aware. Just 
as other researchers do, I acknowledge that I carry assumptions about the social reality and 
the topic area and I have needed to choose a method that provides “best fit” with similar 
research and to my own research questions (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). I echo that no one 
comes to engage in research as tabula rasa when seeking any explanation of the social world. 
It would be naïve to approach my research without acknowledging these assumptions and 
taking necessary measures through the application of appropriate means to mitigate bias.  
 The benefit of the approach taken in Phase 1 is that it allows my study to use existing 
constructs from similar research elsewhere to examine the relationships associated with 
perceived police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation with the law. The focus of the 
exploratory survey is to provide a form of ‘signposting’ to themes that can be further 
investigated and engaged with in an iterative process. In short, phase 1 provides self-reported 
information about what people perceive, while phase 2 investigates the processes and 
influences involved with how these perceptions are shaped in order to construct a much richer 
explanation (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2003). The qualitative components of both phases 
enable me to focus on the context of participants’ experiences and perceptions and tentatively 
examine the outcomes of the initial survey, while establishing a richer explanatory narrative. 
The strength of a phased approach lies in gaining more detailed information than a purely 
quantitative survey would ever provide (della Porta and Keating, 2008). This strength is useful 
where there appear to be unknown or additional processes at work that have not yet or cannot 
be operationalized for measurement as variables (Pasick et al, 2009). Since part of my 
research problem implies that there are gaps in our knowledge currently, and it seeks to 
understand the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy, it is appropriate 
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to include this approach in my research strategy. I contend that thinking about and 
approaching research into protester perceptions of police legitimacy in a different way to that 
undertaken elsewhere, provides my study with originality and establishes opportunity to further 
our understanding in this area of research.  
 One of the challenges of a mixed method approach is how to integrate the data 
collected and how data produced from seemingly different world views and research 
approaches can provide coherent explanations? Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) provide 
explanations for how this can be achieved whereby the data are merged. Two data types can 
be connected when the analysis of one type of data leads to the requirement for the other to 
be collected. According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) this can occur in one of two ways. 
Firstly, a researcher may establish quantitative results that in turn lead to the subsequent 
collection and analysis of qualitative data. Secondly, the connecting of data can occur in 
different ways, such as in clarifying the research questions, identifying relevant participants 
and sampling requirements. My own approach uses these ideas about connecting and 
merging. The quantitative element provides information and value-based outcomes to inform 
later qualitative data collection, and develops theoretical sensitivity (Charmaz, 2006).  
 One of the most appropriate ways to use this combination is in a sequential design 
where the results of one dataset builds on or informs the other (Creswell, 2003). Utilising 
segments of qualitative data in the form of comments made by participants during the phase 
1 survey, helps to identify aspects of police legitimacy beyond the commonly defined 
constructs in the PJ research elsewhere. This approach assists in linking the phase 1 analysis 
and findings to the themes of phase 2. In applying GTM I have taken this further by allowing 
for iterations backward and forward in a constant comparative manner (Charmaz, 2006). 
A note on epistemology and ontology 
For the sake of clarity and in claiming a scientific endeavour, I rely upon certain interpretations 
of ontology and epistemology that have informed the pursuit of the initial research questions 
and the emerging themes. I refer to ontology as the position being adopted regarding the 
nature of the social world. The assumption applied to the present work is that protesters’ 
realities are constructed by them, through the interplay of internal and external processes and 
influences. I refer to epistemology as the way in which knowledge of the social world is made 
possible. The assumption applied herein is that knowledge of the protester’s world is 
developed through social interaction and interpretation, thus rendering mine a constructivist, 
interpretivist position (Charmaz, 2006, 2014; Weed, 2009).  
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 The present work focuses on perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to 
compliance and cooperation with the police which are somewhat abstract notions. For this 
reason, I do not rely upon a single, objective social reality existing beyond the participants. 
Instead, I rely on the idea that individuals in the research context construct their own social 
reality. Thus, an epistemology that direct knowledge can be gained purely through direct 
observation and measurement cannot be relied upon. My underlying assumption here is one 
of seeing observations and measurement as providing indirect indications of phenomena. The 
moment that I apply a survey question based on what is deemed a readily held PJ concept, I 
am aware that it may be limited and inadequate as a means of capturing a person’s internal 
world and their perception of reality. To that end it only provides a fallible and partial 
knowledge. I accept that I am in a sense forcing an expectation on them that implies their 
reality can be measured in the finite terms of the question(s). Indeed, the very words used in 
a survey may in fact be interpreted variously by different people in differing contexts. Thus, I 
have no expectation in using a survey based on operationalised constructs that I am 
measuring anything other than a person’s constructed social reality, and that such may be 
influenced by the choice and application of questions and participants’ interpretations. These 
observations indicate a social constructivist position (Charmaz, 2006; Weed, 2009).  
 As a researcher I engage with constructed realities in an interpretive manner and my 
research develops interactionally. I come to the research process with prior knowledge and 
expertise related to the policing of protest and public order, thus I acknowledge that my own 
values play a role and potentially influence the research process, even where mitigation is in 
place to reduce the effect of any bias (Charmaz, 2006). I respond to the method and my 
analysis in a flexible way and aim to gather data intended to seek out how “participants 
construct their lives and worlds” (Charmaz, 2006, p.403). Charmaz (2006) defines this 
approach in the following terms: 
…social constructionists combine their attention to context, action and 
interpretation…and in using strategy informed by GT methods as producing 
dense analyses with explanatory power as well as conceptual understanding. 
(Charmaz, 2006, p.408) 
 The type of scientific reasoning applied in GTM is subject of considerable debate 
concerning whether it can claim to be inductive, deductive or abductive. Both Glaser and 
Strauss in their body of publications have claimed that GTM is an inductive method (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 2002; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Whether this is in part an effort 
to distinguish it from other sociological research methods that rely on deduction is subject of 
speculation by others (Anderson, 2004; Andersen & Kaspersen, 2000; Bryant & Charmaz, 
2007). Induction has its own perceived shortcomings, one relating to recognising the existence 
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of exceptional cases and the other the subjective influence of the researcher mediating the 
observations (Birks et al, 2009; Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). However, the limitations of inductive 
thinking in GTM are recognised and some authors advocate use of the abductive method 
(Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Charmaz, 2014; Reichertz, 2012).  
 In general terms, abduction is a circular process involving raising a hypothesis based 
on pre-existing knowledge or evidence and afterwards ‘creatively’ testing that hypothesis 
(Creswell, 2003). The process may result in new knowledge that is then tested again, 
influencing the hypothesis with the study ending when the researcher has the best explanation 
to fit the research problem (Birks et al, 2009). Abduction then makes no claim to reach any 
universal truth rather an inference to the best explanation. As a means of approaching social 
research from a constructivist perspective it has certain commending features relevant to 
grounded theory methods as Reichertz (2012) observes: 
The great success of abduction may be traced back to two particular features, 
first to its indefiniteness and second to the misjudgement of the achievements 
of abduction that derive from this. For abduction is no longer treated as a 
traditional, classical means of drawing conclusions but as a new method not yet 
incorporated into formal logic. However, it is in every sense a means of 
inferencing. It is precisely in this quality of being a means of inferencing that we 
find the secret charm of abduction: it is a logical inference (and thereby 
reasonable and scientific), however it extends into the realm of profound insight 
and therefore generates new knowledge. (Reichertz, 2012, p.216) 
Strengths and weaknesses of the research design 
Clearly, in any research design there are strengths and weaknesses, indeed none can be free 
from defect. Acknowledging them and having a strategy for mitigation during the research 
process is required for robust and defensible science. I will discuss the relative strengths and 
weaknesses below and explain how they are mitigated. In general terms a mixed method 
approach can be highly resource intensive given the stages and the time taken to do so 
(Robson, 2011), sampling issues can arise and there is a need for adequate sample sizes 
across the qualitative and quantitative stages. Data collection, analysis and interpretation are 
all potential issues (Bryman, 2006; Teddlic and Yu, 2007).  
 Sample size is certainly an issue for the exploratory phase 1 survey given the small 
number gathered. It would be entirely untenable to seek any claim of generalisation from a 
sample of forty participants when the population from whence they came consists of potentially 
tens of thousands. However, in taking a social constructivist approach I acknowledge that 
generalisations can be partial, conditional, and situated in time and space in any case 
(Charmaz, 2006). Arguably, one of the limitations of PJ research are that its claims lie in 
generalisation of the means to create perceptions of legitimacy and foster compliance across 
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a realm of policing situations, without seeing the variance that comes from specific policing 
contexts. In social constructivism generalisation is seen as problematic and perceived as 
partial and conditional (Charmaz, 2006). 
 I only rely on the exploratory survey results and conclusions as a preliminary exercise 
to link my research with similar in the field of PJ. More specific challenges for my own study 
are perhaps two- fold. Firstly, there is the decision about which results from phase 1 are to be 
followed up in phase 2. Secondly, how might any differences that emerge in phase 2 be 
accounted for? There is an acceptance in PJ research that certain competing (confounding) 
variables can impact the constructs used for measuring police legitimacy, while they are often 
quantitatively accounted for, these competing variables are not exhaustive. In effect this 
means that not everything is accounted for in the quantitative measures. Thus, I contend that 
a research design should be capable of capturing and dealing with others that have not been 
operationalised as variables. The solution here lies in the flexibility provided by a GTM 
approach which allows for iteration between data and does not confine collection to 
predetermined variables. Since any approach seeking to provide explanation must be planted 
in the data, GTM allows for data collection that is reflective as new themes emerge and for 
iteration between data, the codes and categories identified during the ongoing analysis 
(Charmaz, 2014). It also mitigates the perceived shortfalls that I have highlighted above.  
 In the context of the thesis, providing representativeness is not the main focus in terms 
of randomisation to establish statistical generalisation to the wider population. The sampling 
applied to the phase 2 research is aimed at gathering data to establish categories that relate 
to the emerging codes and development of the CDM (Daniel, 2012; Robson, 2011). 
 To summarise, in phase 2 the protest events observed and the persons interviewed 
are selected on the basis of established themes being examined in further detail, construction 
of others and those emerging from the ongoing analysis. It should be noted that this is not a 
licence to merely exclude inconvenient exceptions or outlying data. Information obtained 
during data collection must be compared and contrasted throughout the analysis in a constant 
comparative fashion (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Robson, 2011; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), 
using an iterative process (Charmaz, 2006; Weed, 2009). Theoretical sampling is considered 
suitable as a sampling method aimed at theory development and modelling processes. It 
utilises a confirmatory and dis-confirmatory approach since the researcher selects cases on 
their merit in advancing or demonstrating explanation. As Daniel (2012) explains: 
Data are interpreted in terms of a theory and generalised to a theory, rather than 
to a population. Glaser (1978) indicated that in using theoretical sampling the 
analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his data and decides what to collect 
next and where, in order to develop theory as it emerges. (Daniel, 2012, p.91) 
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On this basis, sample elements that give high level support or indeed critique can be selected. 
Elsewhere this is sometimes referred to as critical case sampling (Morse, 2009). My sampling 
approach will allow for the results and themes from the survey to be further examined and 
interpreted in light of emerging data and identified categories (Creswell et al, 2011; Daniel, 
2012). Utilising theoretical sampling to stimulate further data collection around constructed 
categories and relationships can be done where tentative themes are developed. Charmaz 
(2014, p.205) describes this as the ability to “check, qualify and elaborate the body of 
categories and to specify the relationships”. While there are many advantages in using a 
certain approach informed by GTM in that it sets out processes for sampling, data collection, 
coding and analysis in a systematic and structured fashion, it is not without criticism. Aside 
from the well documented philosophical and structural schism between its original founders 
there are other perceived problems associated with using GTM (Charmaz, 2006; Urquhart, 
2011). 
 The first criticism relates to the place given to existing literature and theory in the 
research process. In many academic traditions it is the norm to engage in a form of literature 
review at the outset and certainly in a deductively based approach to test hypotheses from the 
theory. GTM appears to downplay the significance of the literature review and its application, 
seeing it as in some way contaminating the researcher’s open-mindedness. However, 
Urquhart (2011) states that this is a common misconception. She advises that while the dictum 
may be that there is no need to review the previous literature this is not to say that the 
researcher should not. Reviewing literature might be delayed or postponed in order to prevent 
the researcher preconceiving categories from the data collected. However, I argue that this 
should be balanced against the observation that there is a difference between “an open mind 
and an empty head” (Dey, 1993, p.63). The researcher needs to have developed a theoretical 
sensitivity to the research topic that provides the ability to recognise and extract from data 
those elements that have significance and relevance to the research problem (Birks and Mills, 
2011).  
 Typically, the theoretical sensitivity of a researcher has three features, 1) professional 
competence and experience, 2) techniques, tools and strategies and 3) development during 
the research process (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). How else would we obtain the elements 
of theoretical sensitivity without reading and reviewing relevant literature? Urquhart (2011) 
answers this question with the assertion that an initial literature review does provide benefits 
when using a GTM approach because it investigates what theory already exists and how 
others might have approached the research problem. The role of the literature review and the 
debate within GTM on its significance is in some degree unimportant to my own approach 
since I am not claiming a grounded theory. However, since my methodology leverages aspects 
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of it, it could be interpreted that I have relied upon a form of literature review in the preceding 
chapters to develop an acute theoretical sensitivity. The literature review also helps to situate 
my own research within a theoretical framework and to meaningfully engage with the 
prevailing debate on PJ and ESIM as they relate to police legitimacy and protest policing. 
 The second criticism of using GTM relates to perceived inflexibility which stems from 
its systematic approach to coding data and categorising. However, this may well relate to a 
specific variant of the approach (Charmaz, 2006; Urquhart, 2011). Whether this is the case 
may be a matter of personal preference and experience, others have commented on the 
inflexible aspect of the Straussian paradigm (Kendall, 1999; Urquhart, 2011). However, the 
coding process that I have applied draws on that developed by Charmaz (2006, 2014) and 
provides best fit with the social constructionism underlying the present work. I draw upon the 
following coding process: initial coding (line by line), focused coding (comparing and coding 
the initial codes), identification of categories, theoretical sampling for categories and the 
development of factors from the categories. Notes and memo writing are utilised throughout 
the process to establish relationships and test and develop theoretical thinking. The coding 
process is elaborated in further detail in the phase 2 analysis section. 
 A third criticism of using GTM relates to the level of theory generated from its use. It 
appears this stems from the micro-level at which data is analysed, sometimes resulting in “rich 
and detailed” data that is not scaled up (Urquhart, 2011, p.30). This would not appear to be 
an inherent characteristic of GTM itself but more related to the researcher failing to scale up 
the theory generated through the procedures into a wider formal theory (Charmaz, 2006; 
Strauss, 1987). Previously, I commented on the distinction between using aspects of GTM in 
my own research and producing a grounded theory per se. I stress that my own research 
utilises an analytic approach informed by GTM and is not aimed at formulating a grounded 
theory in its pure sense (Charmaz, 2006, Urquhart, 2011). The process being applied 
produces an arrangement of factors that can be expressed as an explanatory model. 
 A fourth criticism comes in attaching epistemology to an approach informed by GTM. 
Is it positivist or interpretivist? I have already set out my own philosophical position for the 
present study. However, the attachment of a definitive label may limit its use and or scientific 
validity depending in which stable the reader resides. However, it appears in practice, given 
the range and diversity of research areas where GTM has been applied that this is not the 
case. Urquhart and Fernandez (2006) propose that it is in line with, rather than oblique to 
many data types and the diverse epistemological assumptions of researchers that appear to 
use it. Charmaz (2006) notes that GTM as an approach is epistemologically neutral and 
Urquhart (2011) elaborates on this statement as follows: 
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…the most helpful position is simply to concentrate on GT’s undoubted 
strengths for coding and theory building rather than seek an inherent 
philosophical bias that may or may not be present. (Urquhart, 2011, p.32) 
Indeed, it is the strength of the detailed coding processes and category formation that 
commended GTM to the present work, and its ability to build explanatory understanding in the 
form of a model.  
 Doubtless there will be many for whom there exist more shortcomings of this type of 
approach, it is not within my scope or persuasion to seek to address them all. I merely seek 
to explain and apply a rationale for the method which ultimately best informs the pursuit of my 
own research questions and which I contend provides best fit. Whatever the criticisms and 
shortcomings of using aspects of GTM, as others have noted elsewhere the choice of a 
research method and its tradition provide some defensibility for the considered researcher. In 
short it provides a degree of: 
Shelter and support from criticism – providing that the ways of the tribe are 
followed. And, less cynically the fact that previously a group of researchers and 
methodologists have worked away at the approach over a number of years 
making it likely that solutions to problems and difficulties have been found. 
(Robson, 2011, p.150) 
To conclude, I have set out the overall research strategy and methodology for the empirical 
research in general terms. The ontological and epistemological aspects of the thesis have 
been discussed and made prominent together with a justification of the strategy and methods 
being applied. I have identified and acknowledged strengths and perceived weaknesses. I will 
now explain in more detail the Phase 1 survey methodology and consider some specific issues 
related to the survey design and its implementation. 
Phase 1 exploratory survey method 
In this section I will set out the specific methodology for the survey questionnaire used in phase 
1. The discussion includes reference to the scales used, the use of forced responses, the 
limitations and issues specific to Likert scales such as the level of data collected, and how 
they can be analysed appropriately. I explain the development of the survey, means of 
administration and sampling procedures together with the ethical challenges that I faced as a 
serving police officer and researcher, and mitigation measures applied. The phase 1 
exploratory survey utilises a structured quantitative survey intended to collect data about the 
defined variables associated with perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation and 
compliance with the police. Opportunity is also provided for qualitative data to be captured by 
way of comments made by the participants to certain questions as is the norm in this type of 
survey (Moser and Kalton, 1971; Punch, 2005). The research questions addressed by the 
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survey aim to establish the extent to which the claims of PJ and its correlates hold in the 
specific context of protest in the following ways: 
• What is the relationship between protester perceptions of police legitimacy and 
cooperation and compliance during protest?  
• What association is there between protester moral alignment with the police and 
cooperation in protest?  
• What association is there between protester personal values about the law and 
cooperation and compliance in protest?  
• What is the relationship between moral alignment with the police and how protesters 
perceive events and event treatment?  
• What association is there between protester perceptions of event treatment by the 
police and cooperation and compliance? 
The survey questionnaire gathers data about the commonly applied constructs for the concept 
of police legitimacy as defined in the PJ literature, and the dependent variable of cooperation 
and compliance with the police as a stated outcome by the participants. It also seeks to record 
what might be foreseen as competing (or confounding) variables. According to Jackson et al 
(2011) the competing variables commonly encountered and measured in this area of research 
are: 
• Previous police contact and personal experiences of the police;  
• General attitudes about the law;  
• Individual values of morality. 
These have been accounted for and documented in the body of research on PJ and during 
the development of the European Social Survey (Round 5, Trust in Police and Courts) (ESS, 
2011). It is acknowledged that further competing variables exist in the study of trust in criminal 
justice and policing and given the complexity of the notion of police legitimacy the methods 
that I have applied allow for these to be captured and investigated in phase 2. Indeed, in the 
final analysis I argue that the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police 
legitimacy and attitudes to cooperation and compliance are subject to a much wider set of 
influences, antecedents and contingencies than PJ allows for. Moreover, I argue that the 
outcomes of greater police legitimacy and cooperation and compliance are moderated by 
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factors not fully accounted for by PJ. The variables commonly identified and measured in the 
PJ literature are: 
Dependent (or outcome) variables 
• Compliance and cooperation with the police, expressed by participants as a public 
duty to comply with the police; 
• Perceptions of event treatment by the police. 
Independent (or predictor) variables 
• Trust and confidence in the police; 
• Moral alignment of the police with the participant(s); 
• Perceived legality of police actions; 
• Treatment by the police. 
 The empirical work utilises a type of investigation that is widely used in this area of 
research, the retrospective post-event enquiry (Punch, 2005). In practice this is because the 
questions were asked after participants had taken part in a protest. The quantitative survey 
method is commonly used where a number of variables are identified and can be 
operationalised in the form of survey questions that can be administered in a naturally 
occurring situation (in this case at protest events). The approach has the advantages of ease 
of application, user friendliness, reduced response fatigue, consistency in both application and 
recording by the interviewer and timeliness in challenging environments such as protest 
events. It must be noted that due to the small sample size (n=40) statistical significance would 
be confounded. Therefore, the survey is descriptive only. Notwithstanding the statistical test 
limitations with Likert scales, seeking correlations and generalising to a wider population is not 
possible or desirable with a sample of 40 participants. However, the findings of the survey 
serve as a confirmatory exercise and to inform themes for later investigation and data 
collection in phase 2. This is entirely consistent with interpretations of a mixed method 
research design (Creswell, 2003; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011; della Porta and Keating, 
2008; Robson, 2011). 
Survey scales and related issues 
The scale applied to the survey questions is a Likert, 5-point scale (Likert, 1932) with the 
exception of certain introductory questions (for example, categories such as demographics 
and previous police contact). For the constructs operationalisation and in order to cover the 
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variables, each has a suite of three questions in the survey (twenty-one questions in total). It 
is acknowledged that there is a trend in quantitative social research for the use of 11-point 
scales. While the ESS (2011) (from which my survey partially draws questions) uses 11-points, 
I have relied upon a reduced scale. There are two key reasons for this, a theoretical and a 
practical one. 
 The case for 11-point scales providing optimum results has not been made beyond all 
doubt (Uslaner, 2002, 2010) while 5 to 7-points appear to reach a compromise. The 
compromise arrives in giving too little choice to participants or too much choice so as to 
confound them (Johns, 2010). An 11-point scale may imply a greater discrimination between 
response options than actually exists or participants cannot place themselves along it. 
Conversely, too few points, less than 5, may fail to provide enough intensity particularly in the 
case of attitude and opinion measurement. Evidence suggests that data collected using less 
than 5-points or more than 7 may become less accurate (Carifo and Perla, 2007; DeVellis, 
2003). That said there are no substantial compelling grounds for lauding 5-point scales in 
preference to 7. Long scales, those in excess of 7 may mean that labelling the response 
options in a meaningful way becomes confusing and difficult for participants. This is highly 
pertinent given evidence that suggests detailed and discriminant labelling captures better 
quality data (Carifo and Perla, 2007; Devellis, 2003). 
 The European social survey (ESS, 2011) upon which many of my own survey 
questions are based, relies upon the 11-point scale presumably intending that it provides 
better results and advantages over 5 or 7-point scales. However, the template for the ESS 
does not discuss the rationale associated with 11-point scales (ESS, 2011). I have chosen not 
to use these in my own survey and have reduced the scales in the questions taken from the 
ESS. Partly this is a pragmatic approach, in order to lessen response fatigue, speed up 
completion in the field and to reduce confusion amongst participants. However, there is also 
a methodological reason elaborated in detail by others concerning the real value of 11-point 
scales (Uslaner, 2010).  
 Two key issues arise with such scales that are worthy of consideration. First, the 
problem of “clumping”, the tendency for participants to give responses in the mid-range of item 
response options. Although in fairness this can also be the case in lesser scales too. However, 
there is evidence to indicate that clumping is a particular issue with 11-point scales particular 
to measuring trust and related concepts (Uslaner, 2010). The second issue relates to the 
implication that an 11-point scale has more discrimination than may be felt and subsequently 
confuses the respondent whilst seeking improved precision. The provision of too many options 
can confuse participants and precipitate what is described as sub optimal choices (Schwartz, 
2003). Whilst there has been a move toward 11-point scales, can they offer significant benefit 
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over and above others and on that basis render all others redundant? An 11-point scale may 
quite simply demand too much of participants. Evidence exists of reliability in 11-point scales 
elsewhere (Hoogne and Reeskens, 2007; Scherpenzeel and Saris, 1993; Zmerli and Newton 
2008;). However, if people are confused with the amount of options provided by an 11-point 
scale they might be expected to cluster around the centre options, a phenomenon 
demonstrated in several analyses of surveys used in measuring trust. Clumping around the 
midpoint has been shown to be systematic across a range of questions and surveys on trust 
(Uslaner, 2010). The available reference points in 11-point scales may be so extreme as to 
require more precision than people can realistically make. On balance the case for keeping 
an 11-point scale in my own survey questions is not conclusively made, therefore I have 
adapted them accordingly to provide a measurement tool that is both practical for use in the 
field and methodologically sound. 
Forcing responses on participants 
It is often the practice to provide odd numbers of response options in a survey in order to 
provide opportunity for a neutral midpoint, usually, in the guise of “don’t know” or “neither” 
options. Likert (1932) actually applied the term “undecided” originally but convention has 
evolved since then. However, there are circumstances where it may be appropriate and 
desirable to force responses from participants and avoid the so-called “fence-sitters” (Johns, 
2005), since participants may use this option as a means to avoid reporting a choice which 
they see as less acceptable to the researcher or to avoid making a committed choice at all. 
Where there is likely to be an intense strength of attitude or feeling or its presence is key to 
the variables being measured, forcing a choice may be desirable and appropriate from the 
researcher’s perspective (Johns, 2005, 2010). For this reason, my survey uses question 
response options that tend to avoid those of “don’t know” (with a notable exception elaborated 
below). The option to record a “neither” response is provided where appropriate. There are 
specific questions that utilise a semantic differential scale (Osgood, 1952), which due to the 
numerical values of the response options, do provide a “don’t know” option, since there is no 
“neutral” position provided in the item response labels in verbal form. These are highlighted 
later in the detailed discussion of the survey questions. 
 In practical terms, conducting fieldwork in the challenging environment of a crowd 
situation or protest means that extended time for the completion of a barrage of questions and 
response options is not viable. Any scale applied to a survey in these dynamic situations needs 
to be clearly explained, easily understood by participants and delivered in such a manner as 
to maximise data quality, lessen bureaucracy and reduce response fatigue. It is acknowledged 
that the use of telephone surveys, panel studies and market research campaigns are afforded 
the luxury of somewhat more lengthy interviews, however, this is not the reality of fieldwork in 
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my area of study. Guidance on constructing and using surveys commends the researcher to 
adopt as straightforward approach as possible, therein lies the tension between convenience 
and the quality of data. Johns (2010) summarises the dilemma facing the researcher thus: 
…quite often in survey design, then, there is a trade-off between convenience- 
for both researcher and respondent- and data quality. In that case, it is all the 
more important to follow simple rules both for individual items and for composite 
scales. (Johns, 2010, p.11) 
Balancing the challenges of the fieldwork environment, the needs of the participant and 
collecting quality data has been the driving force in my own survey design whilst securing 
evidence in support of the method, scales and response options applied. 
Issues relating to Likert scales 
While popular and ubiquitous the Likert scale has specific challenges inherent with its 
application. There are three main criticisms relating to Likert scales, the error of central 
tendency, acquiescence bias and issues around the level of quantitative data that they gather. 
The error of central tendency relates to the general phenomenon that responses centre around 
a particular value or characteristic. In terms of Likert scales this is evident because participants 
can tend to avoid selecting the extreme points on a scale and gather at the centre, this has 
been discussed in detail above in the section on scale size, item response values and 
clumping. 
 Acquiescence bias relates to the tendency for participants to agree with an item value 
regardless of content (Garland,1991; Winkler et al, 1982). This is often the case where 
attitudes are being measured and the attitude structure is not well known. However, arguably 
in the context of the present work this attitude structure has been demonstrated in previous 
empirical research (ESS, 2011). The impact of acquiescence is that measurement accuracy 
can be reduced on sensitive issues and associations between similarly worded items that are 
not conceptually linked can be higher (Winkler et al, 1982). It has been identified that higher 
levels of positive responses occur in interviews relating to acquiescence bias. Acquiescence 
in that context is defined by Holbrook et al (2003, p.286) as “a culturally based tendency to 
agree because it is easier than to disagree”. However, a review of literature on this topic 
indicates that this most commonly occurs in health-related research, sexuality issues and drug 
and alcohol research (Tourangeau and Yau, 2007). Additionally, the effect is seen less in self-
administered questionnaires and is more of a problem in non-face-to-face interviews, for 
example telephone surveys (Holbrook et al, 2003). 
 Improved accuracy in response rates has been demonstrated where face-to-face 
interviews with clear instructions occur and control of completion of the survey by the 
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researcher occurs with anonymity in completion (Tourangeau et al, 2000). Overall, research 
is inconsistent and inconclusive in this area, although it appears that there are steps the 
researcher can take to minimise the acquiescence effect both by design and in manipulating 
the data in analysis. The effect can be minimised by careful attention to the variables being 
captured and the connections between them. This is particularly the case where concepts that 
are operationalized have little or no provenance or the survey items have not been piloted, 
such attention relates to wording, format, content and context (Podsakoff et al, 2003). Wording 
relates to question construction and syntax which can be tested in a pilot stage and by using 
items with a peer reviewed provenance. Both are the case in respect of the present work. In 
terms of format, different response labels can diminish acquiescence bias where verbal labels 
are used and the use of negative or positive number values is avoided (Podsakoff et al, 2003; 
Tourangeau et al, 2000).  
 It has been suggested that the use of negatively worded labels mitigate the bias 
(Barnette, 2000). While this might be the case the practice has been shown to be damaging 
to internal consistency, which as a disadvantage weighs against doing so. The present work 
relies on existing protocol that avoids negatively worded labels on the Likert scale items within 
the questionnaire. By creating logical breaks in the survey layout, the researcher can lessen 
the acquiescence effect. This makes previous responses less salient and relevant and creates 
a gap in the survey chronology and interpretation, the result has a positive impact on 
participant cognition. Examples of such gaps are section breaks, introductory comments, 
chronology of themes and explanatory notes being provided (Podsakoff et al, 2003). 
 The discussion of the survey questionnaire and question provenance below highlights 
that most if not all of the measures aimed at reducing the impact of acquiescence bias have 
been attempted in the phase 1 survey. 
The nominal versus ordinal data debate 
I will discuss here the specific issue of data type commonly associated with Likert scales. This 
is because it is contested and incorrectly applied at times. An understanding of what level of 
data are collected informs the statistical tests to be applied in my later analysis and what 
conclusions can validly be drawn. As we shall see there are debates concerning the levels of 
measurement and whether data obtained by Likert scales can or should be analysed using 
parametric or non-parametric tests.  
 Likert scales are ubiquitous in the measurement of attitudes and are undoubtedly 
useful in giving a range of responses to value statements or specific questions. The response 
options in Likert scales have a rank order, but the intervals between these values are not equal 
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(Jamieson, 2004). Traditionally, Likert scales are assumed to offer a level of measurement 
providing ordinal data. However, it has become common practice for researchers to treat the 
data as if the intervals are equal. Ordinal data can be described as “data in which an ordering 
or ranking of responses is possible but no measure of distance is possible” (Allen and 
Seaman, 2007, p.1). Jamieson (2004) identifies that the legitimacy of assuming an interval 
scale for Likert type categories is of fundamental concern to a research study since descriptive 
and inferential statistical tests differ for ordinal and interval variables. She contends that if the 
wrong statistical technique is used, the researcher runs the risk of drawing incorrect 
conclusions, misrepresenting their findings or misleading others. Specifically, the mean (and 
standard deviation) are unsuitable for ordinal data. Most sources on the matter iterate that for 
ordinal data the median or mode should be used as the measure of central tendency (Field, 
2009). The mathematics applied to calculate the former are inappropriate for ordinal data since 
the numbers generally represent what are verbal responses. Most parametric analyses are 
based on normal distribution (Allen and Seaman, 2007). Ordinal data may be described using 
frequencies and percentages (Jamieson, 2004). Researchers are generally advised that 
ordinal data should be dealt with by using non-parametric tests. There is continuing debate 
over whether ordinal scales can be treated as interval. It appears to have become common 
practice to treat Likert scales as if they somehow yield interval data and to apply parametric 
testing improperly (Blaikie, 2003; Jamieson, 2004; Knapp, 1990; Kuzon et al, 1996). Some 
authors allude to treating Likert scale data as if they are greater than ordinal but somehow 
less than interval, this is somewhat confusing and lacks scientific consensus (Sani and 
Todman, 2006). Clearly, an informed and evidence-based method must be selected from the 
outset before data are coded and entered into any database for analysis.  
 Issues concerning levels of measurement, the appropriateness of mean, standard 
deviation and parametric statistics and the purpose of the analysis need to be resolved in the 
design stage of any research study (Jamieson, 2004; McCrum-Gardner, 2007). Non-
parametric tests should be deployed if the data are obviously ordinal in nature. Where the data 
can be demonstrated to be classed as interval the sample size and normal distribution should 
be taken into account. Jamieson (2004, p.2) summarises the controversy and the weight that 
we should give to it as follows: 
The average of fair and good is not fair-and-a half this is true even when one 
assigns integers to represent fair and good. (Jamieson, 2004, p.2) 
In order to comply with long held and well supported convention I treat the phase 1 quantitative 
data as ordinal in nature and do not make parametric assumptions concerning their treatment. 
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The use of non-parametric statistics 
Non-parametric test methods are generally less powerful than parametric ones (Field, 2009; 
Rowntree, 1981). Mean and standard deviation are not considered valid parameters for 
descriptive statistics when data is ordinal. Non-parametrics that are based on measures such 
as range, rank and median are more appropriate. Further non-parametric tests based on 
distribution free assumptions such as tabulations, frequencies, contingency tables and 
Pearson’s Chi square can be employed with ordinal data (Allen and Seaman, 2007). Non-
parametric methods that can be applied to Likert scale data are Mann-Whitney U test, Chi-
square test, Fisher’s exact correlation coefficient and Wilcoxon signed rank test provided that 
the test assumptions are met. The statistical tests applied to the phase 1 data will be 
elaborated further in the analysis and results section of my thesis. In summary, data obtained 
by Likert scales should not involve parametric statistics because it is ordinal in nature as 
discussed above. Some researchers advocate doing so as a pilot analysis only. In keeping 
with tradition and the mainstream arguments concerning such matters, I will employ non-
parametric methods to provide the descriptive analysis and tests for association. 
 
Developing and testing of the phase 1 survey questionnaire 
I will now discuss how the survey questionnaire was developed, tested in the pilot stage, the 
method of administration, sampling frame and ethical considerations. I conclude with an 
annotated explanation of the survey items (a copy of the questionnaire is shown at Appendix 
4).  
 The constructs associated with police legitimacy have been operationalised in a series 
of questions and related scales elsewhere. Most notably this occurred in Tyler’s seminal work 
on PJ in his “Chicago Study” (Tyler, 1990, 2006) and latterly as part of the European Social 
Survey (ESS) for which Jackson et al (2011) published a suite of measures for trust in criminal 
justice and police legitimacy. These measures have undergone extensive panel development 
and a validation process. Permission was obtained from the authors above for the use of 
certain questions from both studies. Due to the unique nature of the phase 1 survey and the 
challenges of conducting fieldwork in a dynamic protest environment some questions have 
been adapted. Specifically, such adaptation occurs around the size of the scalars used and 
the number of questions used to measure each construct in order to balance quality of 
information gained without making completion onerous on the participant. This allows for a 
more ‘user friendly’ questionnaire for participants that can be used in the field, reducing 
response fatigue and encouraging completion of the survey questions by participants. 
Arguably, there is a fine balance to be achieved between a rigorous, extended questionnaire 
regime and pragmatic parsimony. I have attempted to strike a balance between them. 
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Focus group and pilot stages 
A pilot stage in the development of any survey is usually recommended to establish the 
adequacy of the questionnaire, the non- response rate to be anticipated and variability within 
the population being surveyed (Creswell, 2003; Moser and Kalton, 1971; Punch, 2005). Non-
response rates become more critical to the investigation where the means of administration is 
online surveys, remote completion (such as handed out to respondents to be returned later) 
and telephone surveys. These are key reasons, other than cost and lack of control in who is 
actually completing the survey that the present work relies upon face-to-face interviews by the 
author. A further reason relates to the intention to capture qualitative data segments from 
participants for analysis. There is a specific consideration on the means of administration of 
my survey that is discussed later in terms of confidentiality and ethics. 
 Pilot studies usually produce too small a number to be useful statistically. However, 
they do provide valuable supporting evidence where issues later arise. It is perhaps in the 
area of adequacy that pre-testing and pilot studies yield useful information to the researcher. 
This stage of development enables evidence to be gained of the use-ability of the survey, 
clarity and meaning of the questions, instructions and its efficiency (Moser and Kalton, 1971; 
Robson, 2011). The use of dialogue with participants during and following completion is 
essential in identifying how they interpret the questions and response options, whether they 
need qualification (which identifies a poorly worded question or response option) and whether 
the questions “flow” properly. In summary, pre-testing and piloting the survey questionnaire 
results in design improvement and increased efficiency. This was achieved in the present work 
by conducting a street focus group and initial pilot which is described below. It should be noted 
that in GTM fashion I have used all of the data obtained, including that from the pilot stage in 
my subsequent analysis. 
Street focus group and pilot of the survey 
The initial draft of the survey questionnaire was drawn from existing sources as outlined above 
and then developed through a ‘street’ focus group. In these situations, convenience sampling 
on a self-selecting basis was applied in order to gather a small group of participants to discuss 
the content and the experience of completing the structured questionnaire. In the focus group 
a total of five participants at the Occupy London Stock exchange (Occupy LSX) protest, 2011 
were approached by the researcher and asked to take part in a spontaneous focus group. The 
group comprised three males and two females, with five other people agreeing to verbal 
discussion with the researcher but not wishing to complete a written questionnaire. The 
participants were selected on the basis that they were taking part in an organised protest that 
was subject of police contact over a number of days. They were invited to take part and the 
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process explained and documented (consent forms and information sheets given) as would 
be the case in all future interviews. Following individual completion of the questionnaires all 
participants, including the two who had not recorded written responses but agreed to read and 
review the questionnaire were asked about the format and structure of the questionnaire, the 
clarity of the questions and response options and any other related feedback that they wished 
to give about the survey and the policing of the event. Due to the issues of trust and 
confidentiality this was not audio recorded but researcher notes were made 
contemporaneously. The discussion revealed three issues as described below.  
1. The need to record ethnicity? 
Both female participants questioned the requirement to record ethnicity on the form and asked 
about the relevance of it. I explained that the purpose was to capture demographic information 
in order to establish any bias or observations about ethnic background of those taking part in 
protest events. I explained that it was self-defined by the participant and not imposed by the 
researcher. The explanation appeared to alleviate any concerns and it should be noted that 
this issue has never occurred since. 
2. Whether a “Don’t know” option is required on questions that have “Neither” as 
a response option? 
Two male participants questioned the inclusion of both categories on the question response 
options. The view centred around the observation that “...if I don’t know then I can select the 
neither can’t I? “(Interview SQ1), and “Yeah the neither box seems ok as one option to me” 
(Interview SQ3). 
3. Self-completion as opposed to researcher administered 
The procedure adopted was for the researcher to explain the process, seek consent and hand 
out the information sheets and then invite the participant to self-complete the survey 
questionnaire. The question posed by the researcher was whether this was preferable or if 
they would prefer to have the researcher administer it. The consensus was that they preferred 
doing it themselves and handing it back once completed. The point was made that it was 
useful having the researcher at hand in case they had any questions or needed clarification, 
in the following examples:  
 “[…] doing it [the survey] myself rather than feeling like it’s a test or something” 
(Interviewee SQ3), and “I’ve done these before and it’s a bit weird replying with someone 
standing there asking questions and writing it down, it’s on the street and all?” (Interviewee 
SQ2). 
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These views were taken into account and the survey questionnaire adapted in respect of the 
response options and the method of administration to enable participants to self-complete the 
questionnaires. Following the focus group, a revised version of the questionnaire was then 
applied in future interviews. 
The survey questionnaire 
Here I provide a description of the measures contained in each question or suite of questions 
that relate to the constructs of PJ. Where any adaptations have been made to the original 
sources these are highlighted and explained. Regardless of any demonstrable provenance, in 
keeping with convention the scales covering the variables under examination have been 
subject to reliability testing using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (α) (Cronbach, 1951). Where 
this has been the case the α value is reported below. The survey questionnaire is organised 
into the following sections with twenty-five questions in total: 
• Demographic questions on age, gender and self-defined ethnicity; 
• Previous contact and experience of the police; 
• General trust and confidence in the police; 
• Moral alignment with the police; 
• Perceptions of police legality and integrity; 
• Personal morality and attitude to the rule of law; 
• Event specific perceptions of police activity and behaviour; 
• Perceptions of cooperation and compliance expressed as a public duty during protest. 
The survey begins with an introductory statement explaining the purpose of the first six 
questions, as asking about the protester and their general views about the UK police before 
they took part in the protest event.  
Questions 1-3 relate to demographic information about the participants age, sex and self-
defined ethnicity, which are generic crime survey type questions in common usage (BCS, 2008; 
ESS, 2011). The age ranges are recorded in multiples of 5 years with two exceptions, the 16-
19 year age group and the over 80 years. In the former case this is because of the ethical issues 
related to interviewing children under the age of 16 years without a parent or guardian present. 
It was considered by the author to be unrealistic to expect that such would be available during 
and after a protest event and that even if they were it would prove problematic in the field to 
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carry out an extended consent process that such interviewing would require. Therefore, 16 
years was the lowest age. Also, this is because during the literature review stage of the work, 
it was clear that this age group is rarely represented in the demographic of persons attending 
protest events and it mirrored the data collection methods applied in similar studies.  
 It is acknowledged that the use of age ranges in this manner has inherent limitations as 
to statistical analysis, given that they do not provide exact number values for the purposes of 
descriptive statistics such as the mean. That said, it is identical to the approach used in other 
like studies (ESS, 2011). Whilst it appears to be a given that research studies collect gender 
information, it is interesting to note that during the initial pilot stage of the survey development 
its use was questioned. When the questionnaire was piloted at the Occupy London Stock 
Exchange (Occupy LSX) event 2011, two of the respondents asked the author why this was 
necessary. While to the researcher, it may appear obvious that we should collect demographic 
details such as gender to ensure that our research is not gender biased this may not be so for 
the respondents. 
Question 3 records participant’s ethnicity using the 16-point self-defined coding system (ESS, 
2011; Home Office, 2011). This system is widely used in policing research and census studies 
and is copied in this present work from the Policing Families and Communities survey questions 
and British Crime survey questionnaire (Home Office, 2001, 2011, BCS, 2008). 
Questions 4-5 are designed to gather data about previous contact and overall trust and 
confidence in the police by asking: 
Q4 In the past two years did the police approach you, stop you or make contact with you for any 
reason? If Yes, go to Q5. If No (or Don’t know), go to Q6. 
Yes- No- (Don’t Know) 
 
Explanatory notes are provided for the researcher and participant in order to explain the context 
and meaning of the term ‘police contact’ these are intended to ensure consistency each time 
that the question is delivered. The definitions of police contact being applied are as follows: 
“Approach” as in to ask you for information or because they suspect you of a crime or to ask 
you to do or stop doing something; 
“Contact” as in public or police initiated, for example, you approached the police or they you in 
a formal way. This is intended to cover circumstances such as being a victim or suspect of an 
offence or incident, not trivial matters such as asking for directions. 
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Q5 How dissatisfied or satisfied were you with the way the police treated you the last time that 
this happened? 
Very dissatisfied Dissatisfied Neither satisfied 
or dissatisfied 
Satisfied Very 
Satisfied 
(α=.821) 
Question 5 is also provided with an explanatory note to enable consistency of interpretation. 
“Treated” is explained as being how the police responded to or dealt with the participant.  
Jackson et al (2011) suggest that contact and satisfaction levels are important to collect 
information about in order to maximize predictions of trust. The ESS (2011) uses four questions 
under this heading but is reduced to three in the present work, a pattern that is repeated 
throughout in order to make the survey more manageable in the field and to reduce participants’ 
response fatigue. The questions are drawn from the ESS Round 5 questionnaire on Trust in 
Police and Courts (ESS, 2011). However, the questions used differ slightly in that they have the 
“don’t know” response option removed with the exception of Q4 which caters for the occasion 
where a participant cannot remember. There are two reasons for this, first, in attempt to reduce 
the overall time taken for the questionnaire to be administered in a crowded protest situation. 
Second, where a participant cannot recall or does not express a view this is captured under the 
“neither” response category. The latter point was highlighted in the Street Focus group stage of 
questionnaire development. 
Questions 6 and 7 record information about overall confidence in the police. The type of 
question is referred to elsewhere as a base or top line indicator of trust and confidence (BCS, 
2008; Scribbins, 2010) or a single indicator measure of overall confidence in the police (Jackson 
et al, 2011). The present work includes a short comment section where participants can 
elaborate or explain further about why they have responded to these questions in this way. The 
researcher allows the participant to write a response, this is not intended to be a probed 
discussion merely an opportunity to clarify any of the responses to the questions above by virtue 
of a written cue. It should be noted that there is a subtle difference in these two questions, in 
that Q6 relates to how the police perform in terms of overall effectiveness. Whilst Q7 relates to 
a feeling of confidence derived from taking everything into account concerning the police. Trust 
in police fairness appears to have a greater impact on perceptions of legitimacy than does police 
effectiveness (ESS, 2011). 
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Q6 Taking everything you know about the police into account do they do a good job or a bad 
job? 
Very good job Good job Neither good or 
bad job 
Bad job Very bad job 
(α= .759) 
Q7 Taking everything I know about the police into account I have confidence in the police. 
Very good job Good job Neither good or 
bad job 
Bad job Very bad job 
(α=.672) 
The next suite of questions provided by questions 8-11 relate to participant views about the UK 
police in general terms not related to the specific protest event itself which are covered in a later 
section of the questionnaire. The concept being operationalized in these questions is moral 
alignment with the police. Moral alignment implies that the participant perceives that the police 
have a justifiable right to exist, that they represent the views and shared values of the public or 
community that they serve in the sense that the police “represent and enact the appropriate 
social and moral values that shape behavior” (Jackson et al, 2011, p.23).  
Q8 The police generally treat people fairly 
Q9 I generally support how the police usually act. 
Q10 The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as I do. 
Q11 The police stand for values that are important to me. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
(α Q8 .814, Q9-.767, Q10-.789, Q11-.823 overall scale reliability α= .854)  
The response options for these questions have been reduced to five, in contrast to the ESS. 
The ESS provides for a “don’t know” option, this has been excluded in my survey for the reasons 
explained above. Explanatory notes are provided for researcher and participant to enable 
consistency and clarity, these are defined as: 
“Fairly” in the sense of being unbiased and without prejudice; 
“A sense of right and wrong” is described in terms of feeling morally right or wrong; 
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“Standing for values” means in the sense of the police upholding, defending or promoting rights. 
It is posited that moral alignment with the police predicts or shapes compliance, otherwise called 
the obligation to obey (ESS, 2011).  
 While questions 12-14 also relate to the UK police in general terms, they are specifically 
intended to collect data on protester perceptions of police legality and alleged wrongdoing. The 
concept operationalized here relates to the way that the police are perceived to follow the rules 
in respect of having integrity and lawfully exercising their authority. In short that the police are 
bound by and follow the same laws and rules that they apply to others. The response options 
differ from the previous questions in that they are set out along a semantic differential scale. 
This is done for two main reasons. First, to avoid responses where the participant repeats 
previous positions on the scale, since it requires the question to be read and responded to in a 
different way to the questions above it. Second, it reflects the style used and contained in the 
ESS, retaining the integrity of the development of those questions as indicators of police legality. 
However, the scale is reduced from the original 11-point to 6, including the “don’t know” option. 
The latter is included on this item since the semantic scale cannot provide a verbal, neutral 
position of “neither”. The previous discussion on the merits of scale sizes describes the rationale 
behind the adoption in the present work. 
Q12 How often would you say that the police take bribes? 
Q13 How often would you say that the police deliberately give false evidence to the courts? 
Q14 How often would you say the police use more force than is legally allowed when 
making arrests? 
Never    Always (Don’t Know) 
0 1 2 3 4  
(α Q12-.718, Q13- .717, Q14-.716 overall scale reliability α= .719) 
Explanatory notes are provided for these questions and defined in the following terms: 
“Bribes” as in money or any other inducement to influence them; 
“Evidence” as in witness testimony or other materials provided to a court as part of a 
prosecution. 
Questions 15-17 are designed to capture participants’ personal views about the law in general. 
This is referred to in the present work as personal values in keeping with Tyler (2006). The 
reason that it is being captured comes from the notion that personal values about the law in 
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general have been identified as competing variables to take into account (Jackson et al, 2011; 
Tyler, 2006). The questions are taken (with permission) from the original survey conducted by 
Tyler in his Chicago Study (Tyler, 1990, 2006). The full suite of questions in Tyler’s study 
contained four questions. Again, in order to reduce response fatigue and maximize data 
collection in the field environment the author has chosen to use three questions and remove 
the “don’t know” response option. 
Q15 I always try to follow the law even if I think it is wrong. 
Q16 Disobeying the law is hardly ever justified. 
Q17 It is hard to blame someone for breaking the law if they can get away with it. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
or disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
(α Q15- .403, Q16-.601, Q17- .714, overall scale reliability α=.687) 
Whilst questions 6-8 covered general views about trust and confidence in the police, in order to 
provide a contextual assessment, specific questions concerning trust and confidence in the 
policing of the protest event itself are included in questions 18-22 inclusive (the scale shown 
applies to all five questions). This is done in order to capture competing factors that may 
manifest as co-variables in the analysis. Question 18 includes a short section where participants 
can elaborate or explain further about why they have responded to the question in that way. 
The researcher allows the participant to write, this is not intended to be a structured discussion 
merely an opportunity to clarify the response and the data segments were coded later using the 
GTM. 
Q18 Overall, did the police do a bad job or a good job in policing the event? 
Very bad job Bad job Neither good 
or bad job 
Good job Very good job 
Q19 I had confidence in the way that the police dealt with the event. 
Q20 How dissatisfied or satisfied were you with the way that you were treated by the police 
during the event? 
Q21 The police treated people fairly at the event. 
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Q22 I would support how the police acted during the event. 
(α Q18-.906,Q19-.894, Q20-.922, Q21-.895, Q22-.878, overall scale reliability α =.919.) 
Explanatory notes are provided and defined in the following terms: 
“Treated” (Q20) in the sense of how the police responded and dealt with people, note that this 
also includes others and not just the individual for the reason that perceptions of the police may 
be mediated and gained vicariously; 
“Fairly” (Q21) as in they were unbiased and without prejudice; 
“Support” (Q22) in terms of backing the police actions during the policing of the event. 
Questions 23-25 inclusive capture the dependent variable of compliance and cooperation. The 
concept is operationalized in terms of the felt obligation of a public duty to cooperate with the 
police in the following ways: support for police decisions, even where they disagree with them; 
doing what the police say even when they didn’t understand the reason; doing what the police 
say even where they didn’t like the way they were being treated. 
At their core these questions rely on the perceived legitimacy of the police specifically in terms 
of protest events as a psychological property (ala Tyler’s (2006) model of PJ) and expressed 
consent as defined by Beetham (1991, 2013) otherwise known as a perceived “obligation to 
obey” (ESS, 2011, p.21). This notion is derived from other research findings that the self-
reported obligation to follow police directives is a predictor of compliance and cooperation. 
Jackson et al (2011) summarise this idea as follows: 
…people justify the existence of legal authorities when they feel they have an 
obligation to obey the rules set forth by the legal system and enforced by the 
authorities, such as the police. (Jackson et al, 2011, p.22) 
Q23 To what extent is it your duty to support the decisions made by the police even if you 
disagree with them? 
Q24 To what extent is it your duty to do what the police tell you even if you didn’t understand 
or agree with the reason(s)? 
Q25 To what extent is it your duty to do what the police tell you to do even if you didn’t like 
how they were treating you? 
Not at all my duty    Completely my duty  
0 1 2 3 4  
(α Q23-.839, Q24-.891, Q25-.802, scale reliability overall α = .896) 
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The item response values adopt a semantic differential type, as in the original survey by Tyler 
(2006) with the exclusion of the “don’t know” option, this is done in order to restrict so called 
“fence sitters” and evoke a forced response of one intensity or another. 
An explanatory note is applied to the term “duty” in these questions and is clarified as being a 
public, moral duty as a citizen to the state. This raises a dilemma in that it assumes that the 
individual recognizes the state and sees themselves as a “citizen”. However, the same rationale 
has been applied in the ESS (2011) and other research into crowds, protest and PJ. On that 
basis it is included here. The questionnaire concludes with a general opportunity for participants 
to add to any of their responses and the questions within the survey and a salutation for taking 
part. Any qualitative data recorded here were coded using the GTM and contributed to the 
content of categories constructed in phase 2. 
 In summary, the phase 1 survey was conducted using a twenty-five question structured 
and themed questionnaire that draws on existing research measures used in this field. It relies 
on what are considered to be reliable indicators of the relevant concepts related to measuring 
public trust, confidence and police legitimacy (ESS, 2011; Tyler, 2006).  
Phase 1 sampling frame 
In general terms the sampling frame applied to the phase 1 survey is based on probability 
sampling (Daniel, 2012). Probability sampling is intended to give each member of the 
population a “known and non-zero probability” of being selected (Daniel, 2012, p.66). Put 
simply, that each member had a chance of being selected. However, one of the difficulties 
experienced with this approach is that groups in protest events do not gather in any linear 
fashion to make using such a sampling frame achievable and realistic. In these circumstances, 
it is recognised that an element of convenience sampling applies, for example where a 
particular group or section of the crowd present themselves or the interviewer with the 
opportunity to engage. This does not invalidate the approach. Much research carried out in 
this area has made significant use of convenience sampling (see Adang, 2011; Hoggett and 
Stott, 2008; Stott and Drury, 2000). However, the strengths of probability sampling are that it 
provides opportunity for representative samples from the population, statistical inferences can 
be drawn from the sample and it reduces bias. However, it is acknowledged that 
representativeness and power of inference are not viable in the present work given the small 
sample size, and the latter point is not entirely removed on the basis that the researcher 
approached the group in a particular time and place (given the size of the crowds and physical 
environment) to decide a starting point for engaging with respondents. The thesis does not 
stand upon statistical inference or associations between the defined variables in Phase 1. 
However, in keeping with tradition systematic, random selection was attempted by using a 
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system in which every fifth participant was approached by the researcher to be interviewed. 
This was abandoned when it was clear that people congregated in groups and moved around, 
making such a linear approach impossible. 
Survey Administration 
I will describe here the process used to administer the phase 1 survey. Protest events were 
selected based on the definitional criteria of protest set out previously in the thesis. I attempted 
to establish beforehand the starting or muster point for an event. This may have been 
advertised in pre- event media releases or on open source social media sites. I then attended 
the start point at an early stage to acquaint myself with the surroundings and contextualise the 
event, whilst not scientific I found it helped to get a “feel” for an event in the build up to it by 
having a physical presence. I recorded observations of the event throughout by using a 
selection of hand written field notes which were later transcribed, video and still photography. 
It also provided opportunity for gathering video footage for later analysis in phase 2, the 
method of interviewing and non-participant observations applied in phase 2 deserves singular 
treatment and is discussed in detail later. 
 I followed the route of the event, usually at the front, most often where the Press and 
Media can be found and often a police presence. This has the added benefit of monitoring 
police response and activities and crowd reactions to it. Where spontaneous protests, sit 
downs or break away groups occurred I found it useful to “shadow” police as to the route and 
direction of the protest in a non-participant manner but close enough to see and hear events 
taking place. Most organised events had a predetermined end point where participants loitered 
at the conclusion of the protest or one emerged after a period of time where it had not been 
established beforehand. In staying with the crowd, I was in the best position to gauge the 
appropriate time to begin engagement with participants. The events attended here in phase 1 
all had predetermined finish places in Trafalgar Square, Embankment and Hyde Park 
respectively. I selected a starting point to apply the sampling frame and approached a 
participant. The initial approach to a participant followed a certain pattern. I would begin by 
engaging the person in conversation around the event and whether they had attended it since 
the start. Usually this was in terms of a question such as “Have you taken part in the event 
today?”, “What did you think of the event today?”, “Did you meet at the starting point?” This 
was done in order to clearly establish that the person met the criteria for taking part in the 
survey and to assist with rapport building prior to the interview process. I then explained that 
I was conducting research into people’s perceptions of the police and the policing of the event 
and whether they would agree to take part by filling in a short survey questionnaire. Once this 
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had been explained I highlighted that the survey was anonymous and that it could in no way 
personally identify them.  
 At this stage I was ethically obliged to explain that I was a serving police officer but 
that the research was in no way connected to my work. During the fieldwork I had only two 
persons decline to take part in a survey when my position of employment became known. In 
order to maximise cooperation and reduce hostility I made the decision that it would not be 
appropriate to disclose my employment at the very start of the conversation but to do so prior 
to gaining consent and issuing the study information sheet. I provided the participant with 
opportunity for a study information sheet to explain the background, what they are required to 
do, the process and confidentiality measures. The opportunity existed for them to sign the 
consent form and have a copy. I then clarified any questions before proceeding.  
 The survey was administered in each and every case according to the defined 
structure and wording on the questionnaire. At the conclusion of the participant completing the 
questionnaire, I checked through each question to ensure completion and for any missing or 
corrupted data. (The study information and consent sheets can be found at Appendices 2 and 
3. These are produced in accordance with Canterbury Christ Church University’s Ethics 
compliance policy). 
Phase 2 method and process 
I have discussed the research strategy and phase 1 survey methodology above. Here I will 
set out specific considerations for the phase 2 methodology and outline the reasoning behind 
its application. The purpose of phase 2 of the study was to take the findings of the phase 1 
survey back into the field to qualitatively address the question of what additional factors 
influence the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and 
attitudes to compliance and cooperation. The aim being to synthesise the findings of the 
survey, develop new themes based on non-participant observations and qualitative interviews 
with protesters and develop an explanatory model for the construction and shaping of protester 
perceptions of police legitimacy. 
 Clearly, by taking an established body of theoretical knowledge and empirical findings 
from PJ, testing it through phase 1, establishing outcomes and themes to take back into the 
field using an iterative process, and producing an explanatory model I rely on abductive 
thinking. I chose the GTM approach since it provides a particular way to learn about this type 
of social situation and is a means to develop greater understanding of the influences at work 
in protest contexts.  
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 The challenge I faced was in planning a research study in an under- researched area 
of PJ such as this. Such questions arise about who should be interviewed, what should be 
observed, what should I inquire of participants and situations? However, as Charmaz (2006, 
p.178) notes GTMs analysis “shapes the conceptual content and direction of the research 
study, the emerging analysis may lead to adopting multiple methods of data collection and to 
pursuing inquiry in several sites”. In ontological and epistemological terms, a method built in 
this way serves the thesis well. I claim that a method based on constructivism provides a 
research process capable of focusing on the many social processes and influences at work in 
protest, one that sees “…human beings as active agents in their lives and in their worlds rather 
than as passive recipients of larger social forces” (Charmaz, 2006, p.7). The constructivist 
aspect to my method is demonstrated in the data collection process with a focus on interaction 
with the data and ultimately recognition of my role in shaping interpretations of them. The 
discussion as to whether grounded theory per se should incorporate a constructivist approach 
is an ongoing debate beyond the remit of the thesis. 
 In the main I have utilised a research process in a Charmazian way and much of the 
language and terms applied are those from that variant of GTM (Charmaz, 2006, 2014). 
However, cognisant that I am not claiming a grounded theory it is highlighted that I fall short 
of applying the term “theoretical concept” at the highest level of analysis, preferring the less 
grandiose term explanatory “factor”. In this conception the phrase “factor” is intended to mean 
a definable set of influences, that impact on the construction and shaping of protesters’ 
perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation. They are 
defined by having properties and characteristics derived from the empirical data. The CDM 
identifies four factors that are used to conceptualise it as an explanatory framework. The main 
stages of the phase 2 research process are as follows: 
• Data collection based on phase 1 results and emerging themes; 
• Analysis; 
o Coding (line by line and focused), 
o Memos and notes, 
o Defining the properties of sub-categories and categories, 
o Factor construction; 
• Theoretical sampling (based on the categories and factors); 
• Saturation;  
• Mapping of factors into an explanatory model. 
 
Phase 2 relies upon the collection of qualitative data from face-to-face interviews with 
protesters, non-participant observation by the researcher, still photography and video 
recordings of protest events. The qualitative interviews followed a structure that became more 
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defined as the study progressed. Particularly where specific categories to be probed or 
examined in the latter stages of the research study had been developed and required “filling 
out” as factors of the CDM (Charmaz, 2006, 2014). 
 
Qualitative interviews 
 
The purpose of the interviews and observations in phase 2 was twofold. Firstly, to provide a 
richer, contextual understanding of the findings of phase 1. Specifically, about relationships 
between the aspects of police legitimacy according to PJ. Secondly, to establish and test 
emerging themes that are not covered by PJ measures. In order to do so differing degrees of 
interview structure were required, the initial sampling adopting a more unstructured approach, 
while the focused and theoretical sampling demanded a more structured one. Therefore, I 
relied upon different interview plans depending on the interview situation (an example is shown 
in Appendix 6). The interview plans did not dictate a predefined structure or specific questions. 
Topics and themes were included to help focus the researcher’s attention with the aim of 
developing a rich dataset as the research progressed (Charmaz, 2006). Developing interview 
plans for theoretical sampling is more complex since they focus on defined categories and 
relationships that require examination. Indeed, the expectation in applying GTM is that the 
interview guide should evolve as the study progresses (Birks and Mills, 2011). Consequently, 
I elaborated the guides around the categories and themes that became of interest to the 
explanatory framework. In much the same way the direct observations and analysis of video 
footage relied upon an initial coding process that became more focused and structured around 
the categories and factors as the analysis proceeded. Where I have relied on video footage I 
have transcribed it into the written word. On a practical level, the digital recording of interviews 
in the field was not possible and interviews relied upon note-taking at the time or immediately 
after the event. While there is an acceptance that audio recording is not a necessity, it clearly 
has advantages in providing reliability, validity and security of data. However, in some settings 
the very presence of a recording device can be counterproductive by making participants feel 
uncomfortable or inhibited (Birks and Mills, 2011, Devers and Robinson, 2002). This aspect 
was magnified in the present work. Both the ethical challenge of being a serving police officer 
and of conducting interviews in crowded, noisy, dynamic protest settings made it less desirable 
to audio record interviews.  
 Observations and notations made in the field are important contemporaneous records 
for analysis in a grounded theory method (Birks and Mills, 2011). To that end handwritten 
notes were used to capture observations and verbatim responses by participants that were 
later transposed to the coding matrices (all handwritten notes have been securely retained in 
accordance with the University ethics regulations). 
 
149 
 
Participants and sample size 
The question as to how many interviews or observations are required is a common one in 
qualitative research design (Punch, 2005). In simple terms, perhaps the answer is as many 
as is necessary to find out all you need to know. In the early stages of a study such as this it 
may not be possible to know the full extent of the nature and type of data required, participant 
numbers or how, where and when you will generate them (Birks and Mills, 2011). In adopting 
a process informed by GTM it is clear that a rigid approach cannot be applied in advance and 
that the decision on what constitutes adequacy of the empirical data must relate to the concept 
of theoretical saturation (Charmaz, 2006). However, the decreasing return of gaining new 
insights combined with time restraints do ultimately lead to a point where the researcher can 
confidently terminate data collection. It is not simply a case of numerical frequency of codes 
to establish sufficiency of data collection and generation. According to Morse (1995, p.148) 
researchers “cease data collection when they have enough data to build a comprehensive and 
convincing theory, that is saturation occurs”. 
 The strength in using GTM comes from the comparative method and the iterative 
process that helps saturation and sufficiency of data. This is not to say that the researcher 
need return their findings to participants in order to check understanding and as a means to 
somehow validate it, otherwise known as member checking (Charmaz, 2006). A salient point 
to note in the research context of protest is that participants’ beliefs and understanding about 
the social world are not static entities, but rather as Birks and Mills (2011, p.99) note are 
“…subject to change and influenced by the context of the day, making them inherently 
unreliable as absolute truth”. This implies that research is a snapshot in time and space with 
Iittle point in returning to the field for further validation of what has been recorded. I do not rely 
on member checking for two reasons, one a practical and ethical one and the other 
methodological. In the first, it would not be possible to trace a participant given the guaranteed 
anonymity that they are given. In the second, Charmaz (2006) points out that member 
checking is redundant in GTM as a source of verifying categories and concepts in the analysis. 
 The decision making for selecting participants for the present study is made in light of 
the themes and categories emerging from the data analysis (including that gained from phase 
1). In other words, the researcher finds those that may provide the best understanding of the 
emerging categories (Thomson, 2011). Who better to ask about protest and police legitimacy 
than protesters themselves, because they have experienced the phenomenon being studied. 
Hence, the researcher can increase the quality of data. However, an initial sample is required 
and such was provided in phase 1 in terms of providing the baseline data and findings for 
further investigation. 
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The coding process 
The recording (written or otherwise) of interviews and activity is fundamental to data collection 
and the later analysis if we are to avoid claims of nothing more than anecdotalism. To that end 
throughout the interviews, communications and observations I have sought to record precise 
words and actions that have later been transposed into the coding framework. However, this 
is balanced with an acknowledgement that you cannot report everything because it overlooks 
the theory driven aspect of field work and places an unrealistic burden on the researcher 
(Silverman, 2007; Wolcott, 1990). 
 The first step in the analysis is systematic coding of the interview and observations 
data. I have relied upon an interpretation of coding offered by Charmaz (2006, 2014) as the 
means of categorising segments of data with a descriptive name or label that summarises and 
accounts for each datum. In broad terms the coding is the first step in understanding and 
defining what the data are about and it is what connects data collection with the later 
development of the categories and explanatory factors (Charmaz, 2006). Thus, the coding 
process applied herein has two phases, 1) initial (line-by-line) and 2) focused (Birks and Mills, 
2011; Charmaz, 2014). To enable the reader to visualise how the coding process was applied 
to the original interview or observation notes an illustrative extract for one participant can be 
seen below (see table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1 Illustrative extract from the coding of interview and observation notes. 
 
TUC Demo 17/10/14 Occupy Parliament square 
breakaway group. (OPS) 
Initial coding Focused coding 
Interview OPS 1- Taken from interview notes 
DL-What do you think to the way that the event is 
being policed? 
OPS1- Well let’s face it they [the police] have a job 
to do...but come on over the top? Most people 
here ain’t gonna kick off are they, it’ll be the usual 
nutters and they don’t need an excuse much. The 
majority are here to make a point, we’ve had 
enough...this is the way to get the point across, 
voting don’t work (sic). Real change only comes 
through people doing this I think”  
 
DL- Voting? Why is that? 
OPS1- “Look, I voted. But what was the point, I 
didn’t vote for cuts, for private firms to take over, 
for bedroom tax, for student fees, wrecking the 
country did I. But that’s what we got. It’s little about 
people like me…and it’s a social crisis is what’s 
happened...people can’t carry on struggling with 
things like keeping a roof over the head, feeding 
their families, paying bills and that. And fuel 
poverty. Come on, that’s not democracy. It’s an 
insult. 
 
Accepting the police presence and role 
they play. 
Aligning with some police activity – 
more generally  
Feeling disagreement about policing 
appropriateness. 
Reactions can be over the top. 
Identifies minority groups and 
troublemakers. 
Assessing fellow protesters as different 
from others and here for a reason. 
Finding the system frustrating – Doing 
something to change things. 
 
Being disappointed with the usual 
system of change. 
 
Feeling of frustration and wanting to 
change it. 
Not getting what they wanted, political 
dissatisfaction  
Being let down and disconnected from 
politicians/society. 
Differing version of what democracy 
means to them. 
 
 
Policing roles and responsibilities 
Thinking about policing (ALIGNMENT)  
 
Policing heavy handedness (TACTICS) 
 
Distinguishing protesters and creating 
typologies. Sense of group purpose 
(TYPE OF PROTESTER, RULE SETTING 
and REGULATION, IDENTITY) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the system – voting and protest – 
(CHANGE AGENTS) 
Alignment/dissatisfaction with state processes 
 
 
 
 
A sense of disengagement- 
(DISTANCING/DISENGAGEMENT) 
 
Re-imagining democracy- political basis for 
protest (IDEOLOGY) 
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Initial coding 
The first phase of coding that is applied is initial line-by-line coding. I rely on an interpretation 
of initial coding issued by Charmaz (2014) in that it is the early process of engaging with and 
defining the data with the purpose of defining what is happening and what the data means. To 
avoid imposing any preconceived ideas in the analysis I have coded where possible using 
gerunds, and to use verbatim the words of the respondents. Whenever possible using gerunds 
is aimed at identifying processes in active terms by keeping the researcher as close to the 
participants meanings, actions and perspectives (Charmaz, 2006). The process that I have 
applied uses line-by-line coding of the transcripts and notes. This form of coding works as a 
useful mechanism for catching ideas that might otherwise have escaped attention, had the 
analysis been more thematic in nature or relied on larger data segment size (Charmaz, 2006). 
However, it should be noted that due to the nature of conversations and observations in the 
context of protest events, which often include incomplete sentences or lines without apparent 
meaning, I have chosen to use the segment size as more of a guideline than as a rigid rule to 
be applied. This may be why my initial coding occasionally refers to more than one item in the 
transcript or observation notes. 
Focused coding 
Focused coding is applied after the initial line-by-line coding. I apply the interpretation of 
focused coding as being a process in which the most frequent and/or significant codes are 
identified and related to larger batches of data (Charmaz, 2006, 2014). The aim of using this 
approach is to identify codes with analytic power and use them tentatively to establish 
categories for development. In practical terms I have performed focused coding by being alert 
to recurring words, items and actions in the initial codes, to those which relate to the research 
questions and through the lens of theoretical sensitivity those that made most analytic sense. 
In applying focused coding, I was able to identify gaps in emerging categories that served to 
inform further data collection. 
 In summary, at its simplest level coding means categorising segments of data with 
names or labels that summarise and account for each datum, the initial line by line and focused 
coding provided by GTM connects data collection, category formation and the explanatory 
factors that form the model developed. 
 
Memos and notes 
Writing memos and notes is a recognised step in GTM for the purposes of analysing ideas 
and creatively thinking about codes and categories. Charmaz (2014, p.343) explains that they 
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are a pivotal step, particularly between data collection and drafting the thesis. The main 
purpose of memo-writing is to “prompt the researcher to analyse the data and to develop 
codes into categories early in the research process (emphasis added)”. While I have made it 
clear that I do not claim a grounded theory and arguably have not applied memo-writing in the 
manner that a grounded theorist might understand it to be, I have utilised memos and notes 
to provide a mental space for noting down my thoughts and ideas under development and to 
link categories and sub categories, in this sense some early notes may bear no resemblance 
to the words, ideas and categories presented in the final analysis. 
Defining the properties of sub-categories and categories 
 
The coding process provides a wealth of initial and focused codes, tentative relationships and 
inferences. The focused codes require a greater sense of structure that can be used to elevate 
them and combine them into conceptual constructs. I have relied upon the notion of categories 
and sub-categories to provide this structure and the bases on which the factors and CDM can 
be built. Categories provide the means of developing the analytic framework and comprise the 
key themes of any explanation and can be understood as abstract ‘building blocks’ holding 
together several bodies of data into a cogent entity (Charmaz, 2006). 
According to Charmaz (2014) a category can be defined as: 
The analytic step of selecting certain codes as having over riding significance 
or abstracting themes and patterns into an analytic concept. As the researcher 
categorises he or she raises the conceptual level of the analysis from 
description to a more abstract theoretical level. (Charmaz, 2014, p.341) 
In deciding which focused codes to elevate to categories I have applied certain criteria that 
can be derived from Charmaz (2006, 2014). The criteria are as follows (in no hierarchy):  
• The frequency of code (whether in the same interview or observation or among a body 
of them); 
• The relevance of the code (in terms of the research questions or emerging themes); 
• The significance of the code to the participant (indicated explicitly as well as inferred). 
Ultimately, in congruence with my constructivist approach I acknowledge that the choice of 
categories is not an objective one. The constructivist view of facts and values as being linked 
means a recognition that what I see or do not see may be influenced by values (Charmaz, 
2014). I make no claim that my choices in coding or categorising are the only ones to be made. 
However, I do claim that they are made on an informed basis and on the grounds of a robust 
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interactional process with the empirical data that can be evidenced, guided by theoretical 
sensitivity and on a research strategy that has theoretical provenance. 
 Sub-categories, similar to categories, are compiled codes that together create a 
coherent body of information. However, sub-categories are sub-ordinate to categories and 
thus function more as a related element to a category. Charmaz (2014, p.298) notes that 
“categories do not work well if they are cluttered and many fold, sub-categories help to 
subjugate their content in order to handle the “work” of analysis”. However, they need to be 
used with care if they are not to confuse and distract the reader who cannot readily see the 
relevance or link between sub-categories and categories. I rely on the use of sub-categories 
in those circumstances where a category has properties that are complex and derive from a 
number of related ideas and the sub-categories lend support or related information to the 
category being presented. However, please note that sub-categories are not used in every 
category that I have constructed. 
Constructing the factors of the CDM 
 
Thus far I have described the coding process and how codes are elevated to categories or 
sub-categories. The next step in the analysis is the construction of the factors as distinct 
entities that constitute the explanatory model. The term factor in this context is used to denote 
a collection of information, definable by characteristics and properties that combines with 
others to support an explanation. It is not invoked to imply statistical or other form of 
measurement. The factors are described in detail in chapter six. Within the various 
interpretations and application of GTM, conceptual terminology is at times contested and 
confusing. Charmaz (2006) relies on the notion of theoretical concept, whilst others may refer 
to core categories (Birks and Mills, 2011; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin,1998). In not 
claiming a grounded theory, I will not apply the term theoretical concept as the product of the 
coding process, to avoid methodological controversy beyond the remit of the thesis. What I do 
produce are factors built from sub-categories or categories, upon which the explanatory 
framework in the form of a model sits. 
 A visual representation of the research process from the initial coding, focused coding 
and categorization to explanatory model is provided below (figure 5.1). Please note that whilst 
only two columns are shown for the purpose of illustration, the final analysis identifies and 
constructs four factors in total. 
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Figure 5.1 Visual representation of the coding and categorisation process used to construct the CDM. 
 
Reliability and validity of the phase 2 empirical research  
It may be pertinent to discuss here the reliability and validity of the research process since 
without demonstrable rigour research is “worthless, becomes fiction, and loses its utility” 
(Morse, 2002, p.14). Consequently, a great amount of attention is paid to establishing reliability 
and validity in all research methods. Whether one relies on more traditional interpretations of 
reliability and validity in qualitative research, the argument can be made that the terms apply 
in general to any paradigm as overarching principles. Kvale (1989, p.18) notes that to validate 
is “to investigate, to check, to question, and to theorise”. Further, reliability concerns the 
consistency and trustworthiness of the findings, while validity can be said to be about the 
truthfulness, correctness and relative strength of an argument. In short, whether the methods 
being applied investigate what they purport to do (Kvale, 1989). 
 The notion of trustworthiness was introduced in the 1980s (Guba and Lincoln, 1981, 
1985) and comprises the four main ideas of credibility, transferability, dependability and 
conformability. The means of establishing trustworthiness in qualitative inquiry consists of 
audit trails, the notion of member checking in both coding and confirmation of findings with 
participants, and establishing negative cases (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1982). However, Guba 
and Lincoln (1989) developed further criteria commensurate with constructivist assumptions 
about the world, that can be used to evaluate such research. Notwithstanding their 
tentativeness about the criteria, they have been influential in the development of standards 
used to evaluate the quality of qualitative inquiry. Morse (2002, p.13) notes that “reliability and 
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validity have been subtly replaced by criteria and standards for evaluation of the overall 
significance, relevance, impact, and utility of completed research”. Some evidence suggests 
that the usual orthodoxy of reliability and validity do not fit with the constructivist worldview, it 
being more aligned to objectivist approaches (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008, Kvale, 1989). 
To this end I must substantiate a way to establish the reliability and validity of my research 
that is congruent with the worldview adopted by the thesis.  
 In broad terms verification in any qualitative research comes from applying a process 
of “checking, confirming, making sure, being certain and refers to the mechanisms used during 
the research process to ensuring reliability and validity of the study. These mechanisms are 
woven into every step of the inquiry to construct a solid product” (Morse, 2009, p.9). The 
mechanisms referred to are part of the developing research process, with an effective 
research process moving between design and implementation to ensure congruence between 
the stages and cycles of data collection and analysis (Creswell et al, 2011; Kvale, 1989). This 
sounds very much in the way of GTM. What might these verification strategies look like in the 
context of the present work?  
 By using aspects of GTM, my research process has verification strategies to ensure 
that the reliability and validity of data are provided, ensuring methodological congruence, 
sampling sufficiency, data collection and analysis and model development. Methodological 
congruence is provided by the manner in which the research problem and the method(s) 
applied to it matches the data collection and analysis. I acknowledge that in leveraging GTM 
the research process is not linear, it being an iterative and cyclical one. Charmaz (2006, 2014) 
provides a set of criteria aimed at validating research in the constructivist approach. The 
criteria she sets out are credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness (Charmaz, 2006).  
 Credibility refers to whether there is sufficient evidence from the data to support the 
assertions being made. Originality relates to whether the research contributes insight or new 
rendering of data. Resonance refers to whether the analytic insight is found in participants’ 
reported experiences of the world and usefulness as to whether the research has utility in the 
area being studied and is able to initiate new areas of research and inquiry.  
 My research method shares much in common with Charmaz’s criteria, relying as it 
does on her approach to GTM and constructivism, yet I rely on four additional concepts to 
demonstrate the validity and reliability of the research and relate them to the stages of my 
research process. The criteria are taken from Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) (they adapt 
those of Guba and Lincoln (1989) as outlined above) who elaborate on the concepts of 
dependability, transferability, credibility and conformability. Each are summarised below 
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together with explanation as to how they are specifically applied to my thesis. It will be noted 
that there is some interrelation between the criteria and how they can be demonstrated. 
Dependability 
The notion of dependability of the empirical research relates to demonstrating that the 
research process is logical, auditable and documented so as to provide trustworthiness. Guba 
and Lincoln (1985) have stressed the close ties between credibility and dependability, noting 
that in research practice demonstrating the former goes some way in ensuring the latter 
(Shenton, 2004). It appears that this is achieved by combining methods, and the processes 
used should be reported in detail in order for another researcher to repeat the work (if not 
necessarily to see the same results) (Shenton, 2004). In order to provide dependability, I have 
provided detail about the data collection methods applied. Written records of interviews and 
field notes have been made and retained. Observations recorded by visual media have been 
transcribed and used for the coding and analysis, often in support of the interview content. 
There is a detailed account of the research methodology, the analysis and the iterative 
process. Albeit that GTM per se does not utilise it, I have resorted to a linear structure in the 
way that the phase 2 research process is documented to provide a logical progression and 
readable account. 
Transferability  
The notion of transferability refers to the researcher demonstrating similarity between their 
research and other related research. This is not intended as merely replicating others’ findings 
or studies, but to establish and demonstrate that a similarity is found in similar research 
contexts. I have utilised a mixed method approach in a two-staged design that empirically tests 
the assumptions of PJ and ESIM research, linked it to my research problem and developed 
the findings from phase 1 into the second phase of the study. Whilst I have demonstrated 
similarities in the findings I also identified differences that have informed the phase 2 inquiry. 
The CDM of police legitimacy demonstrates that reference to similar research can be found in 
the categories and factors of my own empirical study. 
Credibility 
The notion of credibility establishes the credentials that the researcher has by being familiar 
with the topic and that the data are “sufficient to merit the claims” of the thesis (Eriksson and 
Kovalainen, 2008, p. 294). It also dictates that there are logical relationships between data 
and the categories, and whether another researcher taking the same evidence might reach 
similar conclusions.  
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 Building and presenting a background knowledge of the area of study is contested 
within earlier grounded theory method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). However, Charmaz (2006, 
2014) disputes this and in principle supports the notion of reviewing and understanding the 
area of research prior to data analysis. In keeping with this principle, I have spent time 
reviewing and analysing the theoretical positions and literature relevant to the study. This has 
defined the theoretical framework surrounding my research problem and further developed 
my theoretical sensitivity. In addition, the professional background, qualifications and 
experience of the researcher is considered by some authors as important in establishing their 
credibility and that of their work (Patton, 1990). Alkin et al (1979) imply that trust in the 
researcher is of equal importance to the adequacy of the research methods. 
 In using the data collection, sampling processes, coding and categorising, and iterative 
features of GTM I have developed the research process in a logical fashion that can be 
demonstrated throughout the analyses. Detailed description of these aspects is a significant 
way of promoting the credibility of the thesis (Van Maanen, 1983). 
Conformability 
Conformability is the idea that the data and findings are linked and can be interpreted easily 
by others. A detailed methodological description assists the reader to evaluate the extent to 
which the data and the concepts from them may be accepted (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2008). In support of this I have provided an audit trail which allows the reader to map the 
course of the study stage-by-stage. In doing so I have provided substantial detail of the 
research process with examples of the coding and analysis, in order to provide an auditable 
process. 
 In summary, I have described how the requirement to demonstrate the reliability and 
validity of my empirical research has been met. After completion of the thesis I reflected on 
the research process and how it might be improved, these reflections concern the use of 
qualitative data analysis tools and ethical challenges. 
Reflections on the use of qualitative data analysis software 
The use of computer-based qualitative data analysis (QDA) packages has invigorated 
qualitative research since the early 1980s (Bryman, 2015; John and Johnson, 2000). Utilising 
an approach informed by GTM, with its defined processes for coding and analysis required 
careful data management and the option to use a computer programme might be considered 
useful. The range of packages available offers effective data management, analysis and 
retention. The power of the software to organise and interrogate data is unquestionable, 
however it remains a tool and cannot replace the critical thinking of a researcher. Researchers 
should be mindful of the shortfalls of commercially driven and sometimes rigid software 
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packages. I was concerned about using deterministic and rigid processes that might have 
framed my ideas in line with the requirements of the programme. The impact of this is that it 
might have predetermined what data and themes came to the fore. Whilst some see this as a 
positive (Brown, 1996) others are less sanguine (Coffey et al, 1996; John and Johnson, 2000).  
 The pitfalls of using QDA packages can be summarised as privileged coding, retrieval 
methods, increased pressure on researchers to focus on volume and breadth rather than on 
depth and meaning, time and effort spent in learning to use complex computer packages, 
increased commercialism (with frequent version releases), and distraction from the real work 
of analysis (John and Johnson, 2000). John and Johnson (2000) recommend that researchers 
pause to consider the capabilities of the package, their own computer literacy and knowledge 
of the package, the time required to gain these skills and the “fit” of the package to their 
research. The decision to use a QDA programme has to be based on the scope of the study 
and the data that you have available.  
 A QDA package such as NVivo was not used for data recording and analysis in phase 
2 and the decision was a deliberate one after I underwent training in NVivo. This was for three 
reasons: 1) I felt that it mediated my contact with the data; 2) data entry would be laborious 
given that I had already invested in making extensive field notes and recordings; and 3) the 
type and amount of data collected was manageable without it. Instead, I relied on manual 
processes to record data and conduct the analysis using my notes, audio and visual 
recordings, post-it notes, indexed logs and annotated diagrams. Given the size of the interview 
sample (n=79) and the way in which GTM requires the researcher to be intimately in touch 
with the data and emerging themes, I found a manual process more appealing. In spite of not 
using a QDA package, I was still able to meet the rigours demanded of robust empirical inquiry.  
 However, the question arises as to whether I would do so again. On reflection, I 
acknowledge the usefulness of a QDA package and in retrospect would consider using one 
for qualitative research. Whilst it is time consuming to learn the package and do the initial data 
entry, it streamlines the management of the data and speeds up the analytic process. 
Reflections on ethical issues and challenges for the researcher 
 
During my PhD candidateship I was a serving police inspector based in London. Clearly, my 
status as both a researcher and serving police officer presented ethical challenges. In addition, 
trust issues were likely to occur with the protesters being interviewed since the interviews 
require informed consent according to the ethics compliance protocol. Furthermore, if I were 
to encounter criminal offences being committed by a participant or they made a disclosure to 
me, my duty to act as a police officer may have interfered with my position as a researcher 
and present a conflict of interest. For this reason, I chose not to collect any personal 
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information from participants other than demographic information in order to ensure their 
anonymity. Any video or still photography occurred in an overt manner, in public where no 
expectation of privacy could have been made and it was not directed at individuals or used to 
identify anyone. 
 The survey questions were so crafted as to avoid any general reference to criminal 
activity by the participant or specific to the protest event itself. This was intentional to mitigate 
any conflict of interest between being a researcher and a police officer. In essence it has been 
necessary to create a virtual “firewall” between myself and the participants in order to 
guarantee their right to anonymity and in an effort to foster a sense of trust and confidence in 
the process. For this reason, it was not possible to follow up any participants in a longitudinal 
study, or via social media or email post-event. Whilst perhaps limiting further research 
opportunities, this approach does guarantee anonymity and protects the participants’ personal 
interests as well as my own professional ones under the Police Code of Ethics. I acknowledge 
the limitation that this has placed on the research. However, it has not prevented sampling 
based on emerging themes that I have taken back into phase 2. It is acknowledged that the 
use of other interview strategies could have been used to survey participants’ perceptions, 
such as the use of third party interviewers and online surveys. However, these are not without 
difficultly. 
 The use of most other means of interviewing rely upon having contact details and some 
means of identifying persons taking part, for example telephone numbers, email addresses, 
physical addresses. Given my unique position as a researcher and police officer, and the need 
for anonymity for the participant these were not appropriate. Furthermore, there are specific 
issues with methods such as online surveys since they carry no guarantee about who is 
completing them and blanket targeting with them can yield low response rates. Similarly, 
telephone surveys carried out later carry the same problems and in present day circumstances 
people are often reluctant to give out telephone numbers because of nuisance calls. The use 
of third party researchers was an option that I considered, however I dismissed it on the 
grounds that: 
• I could not guarantee that the same interview process would be applied in each 
and every case; 
• Considerable briefing and training would be required for the interviewer(s); 
• To do so would likely incur cost for an interviewer’s time; 
• Health and personal safety issues may arise by placing an interviewer in protest 
situations; 
160 
 
• I could not rely on the interpretation and construction of situations and events that 
were mediated through another researcher’s observations. 
 The ethical dimensions of being a police officer and a researcher have been touched 
upon but not how in real terms, protesters can be approached, engaged with and interviewed. 
Interviewing in such circumstances is difficult enough for any researcher yet made harder 
when also a warranted police officer. This is potentially due to the levels of suspicion from 
participants, legal constraints on the officer who is never by definition entirely “off duty” and 
the ramifications of being wrongly identified as an associate of certain extreme groups (such 
as the English Defence League, Britain First, Anti-fascist Action (Antifa) and Black Bloc 
activities). 
 So, how does a serving police officer overcome these and successfully interview 
people at protests? The initial approach to participants in phase 2 was similar to that used in 
phase 1 described above. However, given the less structured interview process and more 
dynamic environment required in phase 2, it is worth additional explanation.  
 After identifying the protest events to attend as outlined above, I spent time physically 
moving amongst protesters. Either alongside them at a march or amongst their midst at a 
static event. On occasions this involved shadowing the police presence where there was one. 
For instance, where a group might break away or divert from the main event. Sometimes, this 
involved protesters focusing their attention on counter-protest groups or iconic premises.  
 The reason for spending time with protesters was to gauge their mood and intent, and 
the likelihood of them being amenable to my approach. I found it helpful to accept leaflets and 
literature about the various protest events and issues that were offered by protesters. This 
served to make it easier to engage people in conversation, raised my own awareness about 
the issues that were important to them and helped to overcome any of their suspicions about 
me. A useful source of information came from vendors of magazines and newspapers such 
as the Socialist Worker and Searchlight. On several occasions I purchased copies and openly 
engaged them in conversation to find out about protest issues and the events of the day. The 
added benefit of this was that other protesters saw me engaging with the vendors and it helped 
to break down any potential barriers when they were approached. 
 Adopting a position alongside protesters enabled me to establish if there were any 
health and safety issues that I needed to take into account, arising from physical threat, 
fireworks, missiles etc. In this sense, I made a dynamic risk assessment whether to continue 
the approach or withdraw. This was effective, since at no time during the field work was I 
subjected to threats or assault or in danger of such. The control measures that I operated were 
to carry a charged mobile phone, inform friends and family where I was and what I was doing, 
visibly display my university ID card, ensure that I didn’t stray too far from public areas and 
that I knew where the police presence was. The latter measure was for two reasons. Firstly, 
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in case I should need assistance in the event of it being unsafe and secondly, in order to gauge 
the police response to the protest. Understandably, my knowledge of police public order tactics 
is such that I could predict whether a cordon, containment or crowd intervention (such as an 
arrest snatch squad) was being prepared for or considered by watching police activity and 
movements. Where I could see this happening, I withdrew from the situation to prevent my 
being caught up in it and moved on elsewhere. Removing myself from these situations also 
protected me from being a witness to criminal offences or being placed in a professional 
dilemma to act against a suspect. As my confidence grew in the field, I developed an approach 
which meant that I could stand away from such situations, particularly where counter-
protesters confronted each other, observe, and wait until people had dispersed before 
approaching them for interview. 
 Once I was satisfied that it was safe to do so, I would approach individuals or small 
groups and engage them in conversation about the protest event and ask if they would mind 
taking part in the research. If they agreed, I then explained that I was a police officer by 
occupation but that I was there as a researcher. I was keen to avoid creating unnecessary 
suspicion and pre-empted concerns about confidentiality by saying that I would not be visually 
or audio recording, would only take written notes at the time if they were agreeable to my doing 
so and that they could see what I had written down if they wished. I utilised a template to 
structure the interview and record the notes (see Appendix 6). The template developed to 
reflect the themes as the fieldwork progressed. Still photography and video recording were 
used during non-participant observation at some protest events to supplement my note-taking. 
This had the benefit of being capable of review post-event.  
 Overall, the approach proved to be successful and I was often surprised at how 
engaging people were. Anecdotally, in one case a visiting protester from Germany told me 
how pleasant he found the UK police and took delight in showing me gaps in his teeth, courtesy 
of the German Federal police. In summary, the fieldwork was both challenging and exciting as 
a researcher. My professional expertise in public order policing together with a thoughtful, 
sensitive approach as a researcher led to some unique and rich data being obtained. 
 In conclusion, this chapter has described in detail the research strategy, methodology 
and processes for the phase 1 quantitative survey and the qualitatively based phase 2. It has 
explained the abductive method of reasoning applied to the thesis and described the research 
process that was adopted for data collection, sampling and saturation, analysis, coding and 
categorising. I have set out the means by which the research meets the requirements of 
reliability and validity. The discussion provided reflections on how the interviews and 
observations were carried out and the challenges and ethical dilemmas of being both a 
researcher and serving police officer at the time. 
162 
 
 The chapter that follows deals with the phase 1 statistical analysis and findings, 
followed by a narrative about the phase 2 analysis. The combination of both analyses 
culminates in the development and presentation of a contextually driven model of police 
legitimacy. 
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Chapter 6 
Analysis, results and discussion 
This chapter provides the analysis, results and discussion of findings for both phases of the 
study. It begins with descriptive analysis of the phase 1 quantitative survey, describing who 
the participants were, followed by the results and discussion of the statistical analyses of 
association between the variables. The chapter highlights the key themes that were taken 
from phase 1 for investigation in phase 2 and provides a narrative from the content of the 
qualitative interviews and observations. It concludes with the construction and presentation of 
a contextually driven model of police legitimacy (CDM). 
Descriptive statistics for the phase 1 sample 
Structured quantitative interviews were conducted with participants at London-based protest 
events between November 2011 and October 2012. The fieldwork was conducted by the 
researcher personally, also attending the protest events as a non-participant observer. The 
phase 1 sample comprises 40 face-to-face interviews carried out at the following events:  
• Occupy London Stock Exchange protest (Occupy LSX) November 2011 (3 interviews 
included from the pilot stage of the survey); 
• The Trades Union Congress (TUC) London rally 2011 (14 interviews); 
• March for Jobs (M4J) 2012 (11 interviews); 
• The Trades Union Congress (TUC) London rally 2012 (12 interviews). 
 The following explains the coding process, analyses and results. Data were collected 
using the survey questionnaire (version 23.0) and responses were coded numerically for entry 
into an IBM SPSS (version 21.0) codebook. Further detail of the coding sheet is shown at 
Appendix 5. The process adopted to manage data involved structuring the codebook, data 
entry, screening for errors, scale testing for reliability, initial data exploration using descriptive 
statistics, variable manipulation and modification using the technique of visual binning and non-
parametric statistical tests for association and correlation.  
 It will be clear from the summary of descriptive statistics below that the sample is not 
taken from a population that is normally (Gaussian) distributed. Therefore, the data are not 
suitable for parametric statistics that relate to correlation and association. Notwithstanding this, 
in any case the ordinal data obtained by Likert scales should not be subjected to parametric 
testing (Field, 2009). 
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 The scale items for the survey questions were subject of reliability testing using 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (α) (Cronbach, 1951). This statistical test measures the internal 
consistency of a scale (Cronbach, 1951; Field, 2009; Pallant, 2012) and the α scores are shown 
under each survey question in the preceding chapter. Following alpha tests, each of the 
question responses were subject of frequency distribution testing using the suite of descriptive 
statistics contained in IBM SPSS (version 21.0). Once the distributions were established and 
any potential errors identified in data entry or processing, new variables were created from the 
individual items and the scores summated for each of the variables using the SPSS technique 
of visual binning. Visual binning is the process of creating groups or categories from the 
variables and is commonly applied in SPSS analyses where several survey items are used to 
capture data for the variables under examination (Field, 2009). New variables created were 
subject of additional frequency distribution testing before being analysed for association and 
correlation (SPSS outputs are shown at Appendix 5). The variables created covered the 
following concepts related to PJ: 
• General trust and confidence in police; 
• Moral alignment with the police; 
• Police legality; 
• Personal values about the law; 
• Event specific trust and confidence including perceptions of treatment by police; 
• Cooperation and compliance with the police. 
 Where appropriate the median (mdn), mode (md) and interquartile range (IQR) are 
reported as the measures of central tendency and dispersion because standard deviation is 
not appropriate where data are not normally distributed (as is the case here). Population 
distributions were established as not normal by applying the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test.  
 Descriptive statistics have been applied to each item within the survey questionnaire 
and for any new variables created for analyses. Each construct under examination was 
represented by summing the scores for specific items measuring the PJ variables. Where 
categories were required for the test to be applied the variables were created utilising the 
technique of visual binning and manipulated into three distinct categories for each variable 
(high, medium and low scores). The IBM SPSS default function provides integer cut off points 
to create these three categories (Field, 2009). The creation of only two categories was 
considered but rejected as it would require a median split. The median split is a means of 
reducing continuous variables to categorical ones for analysis but is considered inappropriate 
or unreliable in these circumstances because it is too “clumsy” in offering sufficient 
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discrimination between the scale item responses (Field, 2009), particularly in the area of 
attitude assessment. Furthermore, it would imply that the data are interval in nature. Any 
additional comments made by participants during the quantitative interviews were recorded 
on the survey questionnaires and treated as qualitative data segments and later coded. 
Subsequently they were used in phase 2 to inform the initial and focused codes and category 
formation according to the iterative process (Birks and Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2006). 
 A summary of descriptive statistics for the sample are provided in the tables below. 
Those for the constructs associated with police legitimacy together with the SPSS outputs are 
shown in the appendices (Appendix 6).  The sample (n=40) comprises 57.5% male (n=23) 
and 42.5% female participants (n=17) with a modal age range of 20-24yrs and mdn of 35-
39yrs (shown in figure 6.1 below). 
 
Figure 6.1 Phase 1 age range histogram. 
Self-defined ethnicity 
The sample is represented by the following self-defined ethnic backgrounds, White British 
72.5% (n=29), white other 15% (n=6), other mixed 2.5% (n=1), Chinese 2.5% (n=1) and other 
7.5% (n=3) see Table 6.1 below. 
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Table 6.1 Distribution of self-defined ethnicity. 
Self-defined ethnicity Frequency Percentage 
White British 29 72.5% 
White other 6 15.0% 
Any other mixed 1 2.5% 
Chinese 1 2.5% 
Other stated 3 7.5% 
Total 40 100% 
Previous Contact with the Police 
Participants who had previous contact with the police (within the past two years) prior to the 
protest events accounted for 62.5% (n=25) of the sample (n=40), see Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Distribution of scores for previous contact with police. 
Protester previous contact 
with police 
Frequency Percentage 
Yes 25 62.5% 
No 15 37.5% 
Total 40 100% 
 
Statistical tests for association 
 In the first instance data were analysed using Pearson’s Chi-squared (  test for 
association (Field, 2009; Pearson, 1900). However, the data were to found to violate the test 
assumptions, therefore more appropriate statistical tests were applied. Due to the small size of 
the sample it was appropriate to apply Fisher’s Exact test (Fisher, 1922) and Spearman’s rho 
(rs) correlation coefficient (Field, 2009: Pallant, 2012, Spearman, 1910). The latter does not rely 
on the same test assumptions as some other tests for association and is usually considered to 
be its non-parametric substitute where data are available as ranked scores (Field, 2009). 
Kendall’s Tau test (1938) is sometimes used as an alternative to rs in cases where the sample 
has a large amount of tied ranks. However, since this is not the case here rs is considered more 
appropriate. The likelihood ratios (LR), levels of variance and degrees of freedom (df) are also 
reported where applicable. 
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 Broadly, two scenarios were tested, firstly the relationships between the independent 
variables with self-reported levels of cooperation and compliance with the police at protest 
events and secondly, the relationship between independent variables and protester 
perceptions of event treatment at the hands of the police. Analyses were conducted using 
non-parametric tests as previously discussed, specifically these were: 
• Pearson’s Chi-squared test of independence (X2); 
• Fisher’s Exact test (p value);  
• Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient (rs).  
 The test assumptions for Pearson’s Chi-squared test require a minimum expected cell 
frequency of five or more or at least 80% of the cells (Pallant, 2012). Due to the small sample 
size and the rigours of the cross tabulation, the test was violated as they relate to the minimum 
cell counts (even after correction). Fisher’s Exact test (p) is particularly relevant where small 
samples are encountered and hence was used in the analysis (Field, 2009; Pallant, 2012). In 
each case the p value is reported together with the likelihood ratio (LR). According to some 
researchers the LR is widely used in tandem with Fisher’s Exact test in analyses of small 
sample sizes because the LR rejects the null hypothesis if the value is too small (Pallant, 
2012). As a general guideline the values are applied and interpreted as follows: 
• ≥ 10 are deemed “large” and often conclusive; 
• 5-≤10 are deemed moderate; 
• 2-≤5 small, ≥1-≤2 minimal;  
• ≤ 1 no change or minimal.  
 As a test for relationships between variables, Spearman’s rho (rs) correlation coefficient 
(Spearman, 1910) can be interpreted by reference to the following values: 
• Where rs is 0.10- 0.29 a small/weak association exists; 
• Where rs is 0.30- 0.49 a medium/moderate association exists; 
• Where rs is 0.50- 01.0 a large/strong association exists. 
The rho value (rs) is often reported in tandem with a measure of the level of variance. The 
level of variance indicates how much one variable accounts for variance in another and will 
be reported herein, in essence the level of variance is represented by the square of the r value 
expressed as a % rating. (Field, 2009; Pallant, 2012). The IBM SPSS (v 21.0) test outputs 
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showing the full range of analytic products are included in Appendix 6. A summary of the test 
results for association and significance are shown at table 6.3 and 6.4 below. 
Table 6.3 Summary of tests for association related to protester perceptions of police treatment at 
events. 
Variable 
 
rs value p 
value 
Variance 
% 
df LR*** 
Previous police contact .241* 3.044 5.8 2 3.103 
Trust and confidence in 
police 
 .451** 13.371 20.3 4 16.202 
Police legality   .086 5.141 -17.2 4 5.487 
Moral alignment with 
police 
.694** 22.838 48.2 4 28.128 
Personal values about 
the law 
.496** 22.553 24.6 4 28.196 
Police legitimacy .563** 10.164 31.7 4 12.678 
*Significant at .140 (2 tailed) 
** Significant at 0.01 (1 tailed) 
*** Higher the LR the greater the significance of the association 
n=40. Unweighted data 
 
Participants’ previous contact with the police prior to a protest event can be seen to have a 
weak, positive, significant association with perceptions of event treatment (p = 3.044). Whilst 
more general trust and confidence in the police has a strong, positive significant association 
with the way that people perceived their treatment by the police at the event (p =13.371). 
The associations between the variables and participants’ views attitudes to compliance and 
cooperation with the police are summarised below in table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4 Summary of tests for association related to protester levels of compliance and cooperation 
at events 
Variable 
 
rs value p 
value 
Variance 
% 
df LR*** 
Previous police contact .284* 2.918 8.0 2 2.908 
Trust and confidence in 
police 
.499** 7.814 24.9 4 8.346 
Perceptions of event 
treatment 
.726** 23.404 52.7 4 27.338 
Moral alignment with 
police 
.582** 21.571 33.8 4 25.502 
Personal values about 
the law 
.673** 10.091 45.2 4 10.997 
Police legality .279 4.298 5.2 4 5.663 
Police legitimacy .709** 12.669 50.2 4 15.466 
*Significant at 0.075 (1 tailed) 
** Significant at 0.01 (2 tailed) 
*** Higher the LR the greater the significance of the association 
n=40. Unweighted data. 
 Previous contact with the police has a weak positive significant association with 
attitudes to compliance and cooperation with police at protest events (p = 2.918). Whilst 
general trust and confidence in the police has a moderate positive significant association with 
levels of compliance and cooperation with police (p = 7.814). 
Discussion of the phase 1 results and implications for phase 2 
 In light of the results reported in tables 6.3 and 6.4 above, the evidence for or against 
the research questions is considered below. However, a cautionary note should be applied to 
the interpretation of the phase 1 results on a number of levels. First, since they describe the 
analyses of data for a small sample population (n=40) in no way can or should a generalisation 
be made to the wider population. Secondly, relationships cannot be assumed to be 
directionally linear. This is due to the inter-relatedness of the concepts from which police 
legitimacy is formed. In common with much PJ research it cannot be stated that any one has 
pre-eminence over another nor that relationships are in any way causal. Thirdly, it can be 
considered that non-parametric statistics are less powerful than parametric (notwithstanding 
that ordinal data are not suitable for parametric testing). However, taking these limitations into 
consideration the results do provide evidence of the relationships covered by the research 
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questions. In considering whether the claims of PJ and its correlates of police legitimacy and 
compliance and cooperation hold in protest situations, the research questions are answered 
below. 
What is the relationship between protester perceptions of police legitimacy and 
cooperation and compliance at protest events?  
The results indicate that there is a strong positive association between protester perceptions 
of police legitimacy with their levels of cooperation and compliance. In terms of a null 
hypothesis that there is no relationship, it can be rejected and support is found for an 
association. 
What association is there between protester moral alignment with the police and 
cooperation and compliance at protest events?  
The results indicate that there is a strong positive association between moral alignment with 
the police and cooperation and compliance levels. In terms of a null hypothesis that there is 
no relationship, it can be rejected and support is found for an association. 
What association is there between protester personal values about the law and 
cooperation and compliance at protest events?  
The results indicate that there is a strong positive association between protester personal 
values about the law and cooperation and compliance levels. In terms of a null hypothesis that 
there is no relationship, it can be rejected and support is found for an association. 
What is the relationship between moral alignment with the police and how protesters 
perceive their treatment at protests?  
The results indicate that there is a strong positive and significant association between moral 
alignment with the police and perceptions of event policing and treatment. In terms of a null 
hypothesis that there is no relationship, it can be rejected and support is found for an 
association. 
What association is there between protester perceptions of treatment by the police and 
attitudes to cooperation and compliance?  
The results indicate that there is a strong positive association between protester perceptions 
of treatment by the police at an event with cooperation and compliance levels. In terms of a 
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null hypothesis that there is no association, it can be rejected and support is found for a 
relationship. 
 Whilst these results echo what we might expect in PJ terms and they broadly support 
the conclusions drawn in similar PJ research, the greater question arises about the extent to 
which additional factors not covered by the PJ variables are associated with the construction 
and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and 
cooperation. The indications from the phase 1 analysis and the previously documented 
contingencies to PJ outcomes are that relationships between the constituents of police 
legitimacy may indeed be moderated in the specific context of protest. This statement is made 
on four bases.  
 Firstly, protesters’ moral alignment with the police and their personal values about the 
law are both strongly associated with assessments about how they are treated by the police. 
This is a key component of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation as its corollary. 
 Secondly, moral alignment and personal values about the law can be antecedent to 
the actual protest event itself or contact with the police. Indeed, the results show that previous 
contact with the police is only weakly associated with perceptions of event treatment and 
compliance levels. This perhaps indicates that moral alignment and personal values do not 
carry equal weight among the constituents of the constructs being applied.  
 Thirdly, it is apparent from the results for perceptions of event treatment (shown in 
table 6.3 above) that 69.2% (n=27) rated the police as doing a ‘good job’ in policing the protest 
event, yet this was not reflected in the compliance and cooperation levels. If we follow the PJ 
thesis concerning fair and respectful treatment then we might have expected to see greater 
expressions of compliance and cooperation as a corollary of benign or positive assessments 
of event policing. However, participants seemed capable of neutral or positive assessments 
about the policing of a protest event but still held negative attitudes to compliance and 
cooperation with the police.  
 Fourthly, support for the latter point can be found in the qualitative statements made 
by participants during the survey which indicate that additional influences may indeed impact 
the perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance and cooperation as commonly measured 
in PJ. Comments were made such as: 
“The police support the system and I want to change it. The police did a good job today 
but it’s not for me to agree with them”. (Interviewee SQ1) 
“The police protect the rich – it’s all about that”. (Interviewee SQ7) 
“[The] police do a bad job they’re consistently disproportionate in their response, 
victimising people, corrupt at worst. The tactics like metal barriers are confrontational, 
the police define what they do as legal and I don’t support them”. (Interviewee SQ18) 
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“Policing at protests is government sanctioned and it’s organised to suppress effective 
direct action”. (Interviewee SQ26) 
“The attitudes of the police are largely disconnected and disinterested to the needs 
and concerns of protesters, why should I do what they say?”. (Interviewee SQ35) 
“It’s not my duty to support the police at protests”. (Interviewee SQ36) 
On the four bases discussed above there is reason to be less sanguine about how and by 
what route attempts to enhance protester perceptions of police legitimacy produce compliance 
and cooperation. The implication is that the route from perceptions of treatment by the police 
to assessments of their legitimacy and compliance and cooperation are somehow moderated 
by attitudes and beliefs that are relevant to the context. These do not appear to be adequately 
covered by the measures that operationalise the constituent constructs of PJ. The qualitative 
comments made by protesters show that there is scope for further examination of the 
influences associated with the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy.  
 In conclusion, the purpose of the phase 1 exploratory survey was twofold, firstly, to 
provide a preliminary exercise to test the applicability of PJ concepts in the context of protest 
and secondly to identify aspects of their constituents for further qualitative, empirical 
investigation. The findings of the phase 1 analyses are broadly supportive of the related PJ 
research findings discussed earlier. The broad claims of PJ relating to assessments of police 
legitimacy and how compliance and cooperation is secured, both through self-regulation and 
normative compliance are consistent with my own findings. Protester perceptions of fair and 
respectful treatment at the hands of the police are associated with greater expressions of 
cooperation and compliance with the police as a felt obligation and positive assessments of 
police legitimacy are linked to self-reported cooperation and compliance levels. However, 
there are a number of contingents to the evaluations being made by protesters and the route 
from event treatment to cooperation and compliance is not clear. Moral alignment and 
personal value systems appear significant in protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy and 
their attitudes to compliance and cooperation with the police and the law. Moreover, additional 
influences appear to be at work in how protesters construct and shape their perceptions of the 
law, the police, their treatment at the hands of the police and in overall assessments of police 
legitimacy prior to and within protest situations. 
 What does this mean for PJ and ESIM as they relate to the policing of protest? 
Potentially, policing strategy and tactics based entirely on the tenets of these approaches have 
limited application and efficacy in the context of protest. While I of course do not rebuff the 
significant weight of theoretical and empirical evidence for PJ and ESIM in policing, I argue 
that they provide insufficient explanation of the full range of influences that are at work in the 
construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to 
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compliance and cooperation. Phase 2 of the investigation now turns to qualitatively 
investigating and explaining these potential influences. 
Phase 2 data analysis and construction of factors 
Phase 2 of the study aims to deal with the research question of what additional factors 
influence the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and 
attitudes to cooperation and compliance? The phase 2 analysis is based on data collected at 
a number of London-based protest events between 2010 and 2015. A total of 13 protest events 
were attended, from which 79 qualitative interviews were carried out and non-participant 
observations were made (see table 6.5 below). Each event has a unique reference number 
shown in brackets. 
Table 6.5. Summary of interviews and observations. 
Event Interviews Note 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson (J4IT) 2010 4 Additional video footage recorded by the 
researcher during the event for analysis and 
notes taken. 
The Democracy rally (DR) 2010 1 Still photographs and notes taken. 
Occupy London Stock Exchange (Occupy 
LSX) 2011 
3 Observation and notes taken. 
March for Jobs rally (M4J) 2011 11 Additional video footage recorded by the 
researcher during the event for analysis and 
notes taken. 
Students against Cuts (SAC) 2011 3 Additional video footage recorded by the 
researcher during the event for analysis and 
notes taken. 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) N30 March 
2011 
11 Still photographs and notes taken. 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) March 2012 15 Still photographs and notes taken. 
Occupy Parliament Square (OPS) 2014  5 Still photographs and notes taken. 
Anti-Abortion protest (Ab) 2015 1 Observation and notes taken. 
Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) 
protest 2015 
2 Observation and notes taken. 
Reimagine Democracy rally (RID) 2015 6 Observation and notes taken. 
The People’s Assembly (TPA) rally 2015 6 Still photographs and notes taken. 
Unite Against Fascism (UAF) rally 2015 11 Still photographs and notes taken. 
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Through the analysis, four factors are identified and developed into the CDM of police 
legitimacy. The factors are as follows: 
1. Protester constructions of policing; 
2. Power and identity relationships; 
3. Levels of protester engagement and distancing; 
4. Pre-existing ideology. 
The reader should note that the order of presentation is not intended to imply any hierarchy or 
pre-eminence of factors. In keeping with the GTM applied to the research the factors consist 
of categories with supporting subcategories (Charmaz, 2006). The narrative that follows draws 
on the content and context of protesters’ experiences, behaviours, comments and responses. 
Where possible these are supported by additional video footage, still photography and notes 
taken by the researcher. In the narrative each participant and protest event can be identified 
by a unique reference (see Appendix 7 for a log of data used).  
 The CDM (see figure 6.2 below) is an attempt to theorize the factors found through the 
empirical research to be influential in the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of 
police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. 
 
Figure 6.2 The contextually driven model (CDM) of police legitimacy: An explanatory model 
of factors associated with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police 
legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. 
  
Protester constructions of 
policing
Power and 
identity 
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Levels of protester 
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Pre-existing 
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Protester constructions of policing 
The first factor identified from the empirical research is protester constructions of policing. 
Protesters made evaluations about what the police represent as an organisation and how the 
police deal with protest events. These evaluations appeared to derive from their personal 
contact with the police, and vicariously mediated through other people or media sources. The 
three main categories that were found to underpin this factor are identified as: types of policing, 
police integrity, and narratives about policing. These are set out below together with comments 
and evidence from the interviews and observations. 
Types of policing 
Protesters expressed an acute sense of the nature and type of policing used at protest events. 
They perceived that a different style of policing was adopted at protests, a range of tactics and 
in some cases a particular type of officer or “unit”, whether or not they were explicitly identified 
as such by clothing or equipment. Furthermore, they identified broader policing roles and that 
there was a distinction between general uniformed police duties and specific public order or 
protest policing duties. Protesters’ assessments of types of policing appeared to be made from 
police tactics, use of equipment, police roles and non-police stewarding at events. Protesters 
identified issues with how well the police communicated with them, for example where a 
participant was asked about levels of tactical communication by the police at protests they 
perceived it as:  
 “Intimidating and with a sense of arrogance and superiority, never explaining their 
 actions or that good at communicating with us”. (Interviewee SQ21) 
 
Yet participants appeared to see communication as the unilateral responsibility of the police 
when asked whether they would engage with the police to ask for information in the following 
examples: 
DL- Would you approach the police for information about what’s happening or why 
 they are doing certain things? 
 
“Why would I? It’s not my responsibility to find out what’s happening from them”. 
(Interviewee UAF1) 
 
Similarly: 
 
DL – No one seems to know what’s planned for the event? 
 
“No, we’ll see what happens”. 
 
DL – Would you approach the police to ask what they know and what’s happening? 
 
“No, I don’t do that, we’ll find out soon enough, they don’t really talk to us much 
 anyway”. (Interviewee J4IT5) 
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A theme emerged of poor tactical communication between the police and crowd members, 
with organisers giving crowd members instructions directly or mediated by the police giving 
information to them for broadcasting to protesters. The police appeared ill equipped at times 
to provide multi-channel and effective communication to ameliorate negative perceptions of 
police activities. This is an enduring problem identified elsewhere from a number of reviews of 
large scale protests and disorders (HMIC, 2009a, 2011a, 2011b). 
 The use of non-police equipment such as metal barriers instead of physical police lines 
or cordons, whilst well intentioned can be perceived as being confrontational or unnecessary. 
A participant reporting the policing of an event as being poor explains: 
DL - What makes you think the police did a bad job of policing the event today? 
“The tactics like the metal barriers are confrontational and unnecessary”. (Interviewee 
SQ18) 
 
While another commented on the use of metal barriers saying: 
“What do they [the police] think this is Beirut?”. (Interviewee SQ8) 
 
It appeared that the mere presence of certain types of otherwise benign equipment for 
managing crowds can be perceived negatively and detract from positive perceptions of police 
performance in managing events. This is noteworthy given HMIC (2011b) recommendations 
to consider the increased use of barrier systems for crowd management. While it certainly 
reduces potential for conflict through physical contact between protesters and the police it can 
be counter-productive. Not least because it reduces face-to-face communication between the 
police and crowd members. 
 Containment or “kettling” of groups has become a much-contested policing tactic even 
when apparently applied to keep factions apart, and in order to facilitate the right to protest. 
Protester perceptions of it can be counter to how its use is intended. An example from a Unite 
against Fascism rally illustrates the point where a police presence in the form of two lines 
(cordons) keeping opposing factions apart was perceived as follows: 
“They have police protection that’s what mate. Who protects a few fascists? The police 
that’s who of course!”.  
 
DL - But maybe the police line is there for you too, perhaps to stop violence happening 
or helping you to protest at the same time against them? 
 
“Yeah I guess. No, we don’t need it, look (points to a large UAF crowd). But they do 
(points to a Britain First group) to stop us getting to them that’s what. Typical of the 
police!”.  
 
DL - So the police, in protecting people, are in the way is that what you mean? 
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“Well they are in a way [...] it’s not like we need protecting, do we? The police won’t 
stay here long, we have all day if we need to”. 
 
DL - But aren’t the police trying to be fair to everyone including your group? 
 
“I don’t want or need that, that’s the point of resistance. The police become 
pointless”. (Interviewee UAF3) 
 
The situations in which police cordons were used but did not obstruct the free movement of 
participants were also perceived negatively or the motives for their use potentially 
misunderstood. Observations at a Students against Cuts rally and an interview with a 
participant illustrate the point thus: 
DL - The police seem to have a line across the road but people can still walk 
between them. What do you think of that? 
 
“Not sure why they are there if they are letting people through anyway, though I’ve 
seen it before, once you’re in there they close up and you’re stuck in”. 
 
At this point missiles were thrown from one side of the crowd towards police lines: 
 
DL – It seems that others are not happy about it either from the things being thrown? 
 
“Yeah but I suppose it won’t help now […] the police line will close up ’cos it was 
open before”. 
 
DL – So in a sense it was more about the presence of the police line there for the 
missiles to be thrown over, is that what you are saying? 
 
“It seems that way to me, unless they thought they had been kettled, it can be hard to 
see when you’re in it [the crowd]. But who else would they be throwing at?”. 
(Interviewee SAC1) 
 
The use of police tactics for the benefit of keeping order or protecting the rights of more than 
one group can be perceived negatively, as more of an encumbrance or illegitimate protection 
of an opposing faction in the eyes of others regardless of any objective police intention.  
 
 There were police tactics used to facilitate crowd safety at planned and spontaneous 
protests that appeared to go entirely unnoticed and failed to attract any positive recognition 
such as the protection of march routes, sites of static protest activity and traffic management. 
Observations of a spontaneous breakaway group in support of the Justice for Ian Tomlinson 
campaign march demonstrated this when the road became congested and protesters were in 
danger from the passing of heavy traffic:  
“Officers approach a group in the road and tell them about the traffic and the lorries 
coming over the bridge, a man in a pig mask stands behind an officer mimicking and 
mocking him in front of the group”. (Observation notes J4IT6) 
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In the same event a series of police interventions aimed at facilitating the progress of the 
march went unnoticed and then suffered a degree of dissent with jeering and whistling by 
protesters at the police officers who were stopping the traffic to let the march progress. 
 
 Thus, it appeared that protesters’ assessments of police tactics were made within a 
frame of reference to the event itself, and their own aims and value systems. There was little 
recognition about the role of police tactics in protecting their safety and ensuring the exercise 
of the right to protest. At times this appeared independent of any intention by the police or 
what by objective standards might be considered as entirely appropriate and desirable policing 
interventions.  
Police roles 
There were perceptions expressed of a distinction between general day-to-day police duties 
and protest specific policing, in some sense the latter was given special attention with an 
indication that it is somehow different from everyday police activity. The role of the police in 
what they should be doing in the minds of protesters was verbalised. Protester perceptions of 
the specific nature of protest policing can be sharply seen in these two examples: 
“I’ve been to a lot of protests and the police are usually bad at the job, it [the police] 
brings out the thugs and provokes people”. (Interviewee SQ17) 
 
“On things like this they get the Met TSG out, thugs, psycho-goon TSG”. (Interviewee 
J4IT5) 
 
The demarcation between perceptions of “normal” and protest policing was made on the basis 
that the latter is somehow disconnected from day-to-day policing activity, and is illustrated in 
the following examples: 
“There’s a distinction between the normal police and the riot police, police took the role 
of protecting premises and property, like Fortnum and Mason3 and the Ritz, the 
stewards dealt with the march”. (Interviewee SQ32) 
DL - Would you say that applies to all policing then – like traffic or local bobbies in your 
area?  
 
“That’s different they’re not the same as this lot are they”. (Interviewee UAF9) 
 
“Incidents isolated from day-to-day policing such as kettling, the Jean Charles de 
Menezes thing and Tomlinson detract from what the police do and are”. (Interviewee 
SQ12) 
 
“It’s the police […] they might be okay one time and then not the next. Like my locals 
are okay, [they] let me off speeding (laughs) but here it’s different”. (Interviewee RID4) 
 
                                                          
3 This refers to another protest event where the Metropolitan Police intervened to eject a sit-in 
demonstration and were perceived to have used police lines to protect property and goods at both 
premises. 
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“The general police do a good job but it depends on which force and the geography 
you’re in”. (Interviewee SQ3) 
 
“The majority of police on a day-to-day basis are satisfactory but they are used 
politically especially at demos”. (Interviewee SQ5) 
These examples demonstrated a cognitive process whereby protesters consciously separated 
isolated incidents of general police activity from protest policing, at times this process was 
informed by assessments of individual police forces and locality. 
 The role of police officers in policing protest insofar as what they are there to do and 
should or should not concern themselves with was highlighted. When asked about the police 
presence, their involvement can be ignored or perceived as unnecessary to protesters. The 
example below taken from an Anti-abortion protest where graphic images were on display 
highlights the point: 
DL - What do you think about the police presence here? 
 
“I didn’t really notice […] yeah there are some (looks across the road), no one spoke 
to us today about what we’re doing, so I didn’t notice them to be honest”.  
 
DL- Would you expect them to get involved at all?  
“No, I don’t see why. It’s not police business is it really? They shouldn’t get involved. 
 We’re just here to get the message across to voters and MPs. You know it’s not a 
 police  issue is it? We’re not doing anything illegal it’s an organised campaign to raise 
 awareness and influence voters”. 
 
DL - What about if the police asked you to stop or change what you are doing? 
 
“The [protest] issue is important and I’d say, just for a short time that we are doing it. 
We are entitled to and no one should stop it. What harm are we doing? This is the only 
way – by lobbying, it’s not for the police to interfere with that, it’s not like we are doing 
something wrong you know”. (Interviewee Ab671) 
Protester perceptions of police interventions in their protest activities were influenced by 
whether they believed that they were doing something illegal or that it was not a police matter. 
 The use of stewards has increased in the management of organised protests and 
indeed it is often encouraged by the police and event organisers themselves. Interestingly, 
their presence and use of tactics similar to those employed by the police were generally well 
received and complied with, as this example taken from observation notes on the use of police-
style cordons illustrates: 
“Stewards began to gather – around 20 plus at the front of a march and create a box 
cordon at the head of the demo ready for the move off. This is a police style tactic. The 
march moves slowly off with stewards at the head in box formation and along the sides 
to stop overspill into the opposite carriageway as it moves through Oxford Circus and 
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into Regent Street to Piccadilly. The police presence is limited to traffic police at the 
front and rear and on junctions to stop traffic and act as safety management for the 
march. Stewards in tabards control the pace and movement of the march with a moving 
box cordon which appears to be adhering to its authority and instructions”. 
(Observation Tac1) 
However, stewards perceived their role as having limitations and boundaries, anticipating that 
there were certain groups or activities that were the sole remit of the police, in the following 
examples from observations of a group of six protesters dressed in black climbing up onto 
road furniture and chanting swear words next to where a steward was standing and directing 
the march: 
DL – I noticed that you didn’t speak to that group, any reasons for that? 
 
“No point (shrugs) they wouldn’t talk to me or do what I said anyway, why would they? 
They do what they want at gigs like this. It’s all a game, if the police were bothered 
they’d do something”. (Interviewee UAF1) 
 
Similarly, another steward observes: 
 
“It’s not my job. I’m here for the march not any of this (points to other protesters 
breaking away from the march), it’s the usual, the cops will sort it out. They wouldn’t 
take any notice of me anyway they’re not like the majority of people today are they?”. 
(Interviewee UAF4) 
 
Those with responsibilities for stewarding protests appeared to distinguish their role from that 
of the police. That certain activities were for the police alone to deal with and they perceived 
that there were types of protester who would not acknowledge the authority of stewards, in 
this sense they were the “property” of the police. 
Police integrity 
Protesters made assessments about the reliability and trustworthiness of the police based on 
perceived lawfulness of police actions, reports of wrongdoing, dishonesty and “scandals”. The 
police use of coercive force and suspicion about police motives also informed views about 
police integrity and the extent to which the police were seen to act proportionately. The 
category of police integrity is linked to two subcategories of police legality which captures 
assessments of officers’ legal knowledge and use of powers, and trust which covers 
perceptions of the police being honest, sincere and “doing the right thing”. Notably, trust did 
not appear to arise in the context of police effectiveness, as in how good or bad they are at 
their job, in solving crime or dealing with anti-social behaviour (which are the more commonly 
applied measures elsewhere by HMIC in PEEL assessment). Protesters’ perceptions of police 
integrity were highlighted in the following comments: 
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“The police are corrupt. They over police rallies and demos”. (Interviewee SQ11) 
 
“The police incite violence, arrest people at random and use disproportionate violence 
against protesters”. (Interviewee SQ22) 
 
“My experience shows that protests of this size and nature tend to turn more violent 
later when media coverage is less on police conduct”. (Interviewee SQ35) 
 
“I have had some bad experience of other demos. But you see cases all the time, the 
police lies, corruption, Plebgate4 and that”. (Interviewee RID2) 
 
Some protesters also commented on the number of integrity issues concerning officers taking 
bribes and being corrupt: 
“I expect that I might be horrified at the results [about bribes] if I really knew”. 
 (Interviewee SQ4) 
 
“The police do a bad job, things like Fortnum and Mason5, deaths in custody, racial 
prejudice, complicity with their notes to perjure themselves and to conquer protesters”. 
(Interviewee SQ23) 
 
These views represented perceptions about policing both generally and within the context of 
protest that considered it corrupt and of provoking violence, with officers willing to lie in their 
evidence. Participants also expressed a suspicion that police corruption may be more 
widespread than known. Notably, reference was made to “scandals” involving individual police 
officers and that officers behaved differently when media attention was upon them. 
 A subcategory was identified about police legality, specifically related to officers’ 
knowledge and application of their legal powers. Observation and interviews following a police 
officer speaking with a group about protesting in Parliament Square, London revealed the 
following: 
“You have no right to stop me, protest is my right. You tell me the law that says why I can’t 
or shouldn’t sit or stand here and just make my point of view? You don’t have the power 
to do that….my address? I don’t need to give you it and I won’t, it’s not my role in life to do 
so for the police. It’s my to challenge you. And people like me (turns to others), there are 
so few of us and they (points to the police) don’t get it. You’ll only concoct something 
against me”. (Interviewee OPS3) 
 The notion that protesters and those acting on their behalf at protest events scrutinised 
police actions and were cognisant of police powers can be seen in an account from legal 
observers (who are often used by protest groups to monitor police activity): 
DL - What do you think about the policing of today’s event? 
                                                          
4 “Plebgate” is a reference to a scandal in the United Kingdom about an altercation between a 
Conservative Party MP and police officers. The officers were alleged to have concocted evidence to 
support an allegation of wrongdoing by the MP. 
5 This refers to a previous protest event where the Metropolitan Police intervened to eject a sit-in 
demonstration and used police lines to protect property and goods at the premises. 
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“It’s been ok so far we just note down movements, officer details, warrant numbers and 
actions, in case clients raise issues later. But no issues so far. People just don’t trust 
them [the police] since G20”. 
 
DL – Why since G20 specifically? 
 
“Well, the warrant number thing officers had no ID and people I speak to are definitely 
more suspicious now, like a heightened awareness to it”. 
 
DL - The police must be aware of what you’re doing and act accordingly maybe? 
 
“Maybe, but you’d be surprised, or maybe not (laughs) some don’t even know the law 
or that they’re under scrutiny. Our legal knowledge is greater than most police these 
days”. (Interviewee LO2) 
 
There is a sense expressed here of anticipated indiscretions by the police that required 
evidence being recorded on protesters’ behalf, and notably that the need arose from occasions 
of police wrongdoing at previous protests. Other participants expressed a belief that 
knowledge of the law is lacking in frontline officers at protests in the following terms: 
 “Like I say we organise and meet beforehand and it’s a static so we don’t need to 
apply for police permission. Not like these [police] here would know anyway...we know 
the law better than they do”. (Interviewee DR1) 
If there is a presumption that the police do not understand the law as well as some protesters 
do, its corollary appeared to be that the police do not follow their own rules either through 
ignorance or design:  
 “The police are a law unto themselves”. (Interviewee J4ITS1) 
 Issues of trust in the police were also identified. While we might anticipate a significant 
category of trust in its own right, certainly from the theorising on trust and confidence within 
PJ, it appeared more in the context of perceptions of police dishonesty, and often expressed 
in the following terms: 
“We’ll remember the 100s if not 1000s, that’s what we’re fighting for. For Justice! You 
[the police] cannot be trusted […] fuck the police state and what it stands for. They all 
tell lies and you can’t be trusted”. (Interviewee J4ITS1) 
“People rely on us because they don’t trust the police versions of these protest events”. 
(Interviewee RID3) 
 
Narratives 
The category of narratives concerns protesters’ accounts of policing and comes from a number 
of sources that are distal and proximal in nature, ranging from previous contact with the police, 
experience at protest events, media publicity and folklore. A theme of previous police 
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wrongdoing emerged in the narratives that were either personally constructed, vicariously 
obtained or both. Take the following examples from a march organised to protest against the 
decision by the Crown Prosecution Service not to charge a police officer over the death of Ian 
Tomlinson at the G20, 2009 and a speech delivered at a Unite against Fascism rally: 
“We set up the campaign immediately after Ian’s death, we didn’t think we’d get far. 
Statistically, you are more likely to die at the hands of the police more than in the 
general population. Since 1969 there have been more murderers in the police force 
than in any other section of the population. We want people to know about the extent 
of organised police violence in the country”. (Interviewee J4ITS1) 
“Remember, if you’re on the street and you’re black or dark you know. You know what 
the police are in this country. You’re badly treated and treated differently at the hands 
of the police. We applaud police protection of mosques and for minorities, but they 
must do more than that”. (Interviewee UAFS1) 
These illustrate the way that narratives about policing are created and communicated and the 
place that they occupy in constructing and shaping protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy. 
Participants sensed that information abounds and is available from a number of sources 
regarding the “truth” about policing past, present and future: 
DL – What do you think about that comment the [UAF] speaker just made? 
 
“I think he has got a point, the police do pick on kids and that”.  
 
DL-  He said that they protect people too? 
 
“It’s not enough is it, people are suspicious when they hear such things about the 
police”. 
 
DL – What’s the alternative then or the more than that he referred to? 
 
“Well people should refuse to buy into their [the police] lies. The myths that are 
peddled, the stories are true it’s all out there. The students, police deaths, spies, it’s all 
there. The main news avoids it, but if you look you can find it”. (Interviewee UAF10) 
 
And again: 
 
DL - You say the police are tied up in the system, how do you know that? 
 
“Look around you…history tells us that. Cable Street, Brixton, poll tax and all those 
it’s a pattern in policing, people aren’t blind”.  
 
DL – You seem young enough not to have been at those events though? 
 
“Ha ha, yeah of course. But it’s well known about the police in this country if you read 
 accounts”. (Interviewee TPA3) 
 
These sentiments resonate with Braithwaite’s idea (2009, 2011) about the casting of authority 
in a “villainous” role in order to create justification for social distance and motivational postures. 
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 Protesters’ perceptions of previous contact with the police derived from personal and 
vicarious experiences, and appeared to influence the construction of narratives about the 
policing of protest: 
“I’ve had no personal experience, but I am aware that friends growing up in London 
had different experiences with the police. I’ve been to a lot of protests and they [the 
police] are usually bad at doing their jobs, they usually bring out their thugs and 
provoke people”. (Interviewee SQ17) 
 “Listen, I was at G20 and Climate camp and I seen (sic) what the police do and people 
should know about police brutality. It’s state endorsed violence aimed at destroying 
protest”. (Interviewee SQ6) 
” I have no experience at rallies like this, but I’m sure bad things happen, don’t they? 
By the law of averages there must be something in what you hear”. (Interviewee TPA5) 
Narratives such as these often appeared to be informed by historical accounts of the police, 
related not just to protest policing but wider police activity and reports of alleged wrongdoing. 
Rationally, some participants identified that they had no personal experience upon which to 
base the narratives, but the perception endured that there must at least be something in the 
accounts that were being reported by sources that they trusted. That there is “no smoke 
without fire”. 
 In summary the factor of protester constructions of policing is constructed from three 
main areas. Firstly, from types of policing incorporating perceptions of police tactics and police 
roles both generally and specific to protest events. Secondly, from protesters’ views of police 
integrity with regard to the lawfulness of police activity and of perceived police wrongdoing. 
The notion of trust in the police appears tied up with assessments of how honest and sincere 
the police are perceived to be, not how well they perform their duties and functions. Protesters 
anticipate indiscretions by the police based on perceptions of previous contact with the police. 
Thirdly, from narratives that are created and communicated about police actions. These 
narratives come from historic accounts and personal or vicarious reports of police contact. 
Narratives that have been constructed are communicated through a number of media such as 
web-based material, written leaflets and flyers, social media applications and speeches. 
 Evaluations are made of police tactics wherein benign or well-intentioned police activity 
or use of equipment can be seen as unnecessary and provocative to protesters. There is a 
sense that benign police interventions go unnoticed until they are interpreted within a frame of 
reference that sees them negatively. Police actions to control traffic or maintain crowd safety 
may be seen negatively, even where it appears to keep warring factions in a crowd apart or 
protect the rights of opposing groups. Policing at protests can be singled out and perceived 
as a distinctly different type of policing from the general day-to-day police functions. The use 
of stewards to manage protest appears well accepted by protesters, yet stewards have clear 
boundaries about their remit and the type of protester and behaviour that they would deal with. 
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 In short, protesters create representations of the police and how they operate in the 
context of the policing of protests. 
 
Power and identity relationships 
The second factor identified by the empirical research is power and identity relationships. 
Protesters expressed a feeling of power and identity both individually and for their group. The 
power and identity relationships factor was concerned with the means of them delivering 
change, in being able to influence someone or something, and it carried a strong sense of 
making a difference. This required something of a value-based position for the participant, 
positioning them and the protest relative to the police or state authority in a perceived power 
dynamic. The factor identified social and group identities that were often formed prior to protest 
events and that appeared to be required for meaningful collective action. The main categories 
that underpin the factor are: change agents, identities, and empowerment. These are set out 
below using comments and evidence from the interviews and observations. 
 
Change agents 
Protesters identified the role that they play in raising awareness about the issues pertinent to 
the protest and perceived being a force for change. The role appeared to be one fuelled by a 
sense of grievance, of not being satisfied with a democracy seen as different to their own 
interpretation, and a desire for an alternative vision of society. Protesters saw themselves and 
the act of protest as the means of bringing about change, sometimes feeling a sense of duty 
or responsibility to do so.  
The following example from the Occupy Parliament Square protest illustrates these points: 
“Look, I voted. But what was the point, I didn’t vote for cuts, for private firms to take 
over, for bedroom tax, for student fees, wrecking the country did I? But that’s what we 
got. It’s little about people like me and it’s a social crisis is what’s happened. People 
can’t carry on struggling with things like keeping a roof over the head, feeding their 
families, paying bills and fuel poverty. Come on, that’s not democracy. It’s an insult. 
We want an alternative to all that. You know there is one, it takes people getting 
together, standing up and saying this ain’t right. The system its wrong and we’ll change 
it. People see in the papers, fights and all that but forget the real point is about the 
cuts, the politicians. We are doing something to change the system. Imagine if 
everyone did that. It’s my place to challenge the police, authority and people like me 
(turns to others present) like there are so few of us and they (points to the Palace of 
Westminster) don’t get it but the only way to change it to make them listen”. 
(Interviewee OPS1) 
The notion that the system is broken and in need of an alternative was echoed by others: 
“The political system is broken. An election won’t fix it. The mainstream all feed racism 
and islamophobia. This is about launching a national campaign with people joining 
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together to build real democracy by uniting and fighting for it and being a movement 
for change”. (Interviewee RID1) 
 
“You have to challenge authority to change things, this is the way to a better system, 
we the few doing it for the many. Resist. Rebel. Revolt. That’s it”. (Interviewee TPA3) 
 
Protesters expressed a vision of a different type of system. They expressed the notion that 
they and their group or campaign was the agent of change, by making a stand against the 
authorities, including the police. The ways of doing so ranging from legitimate peaceful protest 
to direct action and acts of violence. They depicted their role as being the challenger(s) with a 
sense of social or political duty and responsibility for protesting on behalf of others. A 
patchwork of issues such as racism, social crises and failed democracy were sometimes 
conflated to provide a foundation upon which these change agents stood, positioning the 
protest in political terms relative to the state and the police.  
Identities 
Protesters described a sense of identification with or against other protesters and protest 
causes. They recognised that others may not share their real or imagined motives and 
standards of behaviour. The perception was that there may be minority elements within the 
group(s) who do not follow or share agreed or acceptable levels of behaviour. These standards 
of behaviour in some cases were made explicit by way of stated rules and preferred ways of 
being, to some degree they were “policed” by members of the group. There was a sense that 
behaviour falling outside of these established or expected norms detracted from the main 
purpose of the protest and a level of group leadership or hierarchy was reported in some 
instances. These examples from the Occupy Parliament Square event illustrate the points: 
“Let’s face it they [the police] have a job to do, but come on this is over the top? Most 
people here ain’t gonna kick off are they, it’ll be the usual nutters and they don’t need 
an excuse much. The majority are here to make a point, we’ve had enough. This is the 
way to get the point across, voting don’t (sic) work. Real change only comes through 
people doing this I think”. (Interviewee OPS1) 
 
DL - When you say there’s no violence here today, what’s your take on using violent 
protest then? 
 
“Doing it? No, not for me, it takes away from what the message is and gives them 
(points to police) an excuse to blame us. People see in the paper, fights and that but 
forget the real point is about the cuts, politicians, changing the system. I know you get 
people who come for it [violence] but most want to get the point across”. 
 
DL - But you don’t? 
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“No, I said, It’s a personal choice. The people here look, they choose to do what’s 
going on. This about setting the camp up, nothing else. It’s a shared vision, we have 
agreements right, at least we stick by what we say. (Points to a placard placed on 
grass). We have a code, if you want, based on non-violent behaviour, no 
discrimination, sobriety, shared responsibility and respect”.  
 
DL - That seems a tall order to comply with? 
 
“Maybe, but don’t forget, it’s a stated intent, we all signed up to that when we decided 
to be part of this action didn’t we? It’s like they are values and we’ll stick to it, if people 
wanna (sic) be part of the camp then that’s that or they can leave. We have no place 
for violence and intimidation here”. 
 
DL - Does that apply to contact with the police? 
 
“I’m not saying that there aren’t some who might lose it, that’s a personal thing isn’t it? 
But the theory is, we make a stand for what we believe in and we make our choices, 
we might be flouting some law that says we can’t camp here, but that’s different from 
bashing the cops when they tell us to leave isn’t it? But some can’t see that”.  
 
DL – How would you get them to leave the group? 
 
“Physically, we can’t I guess […] but I would ask them to leave. Tell them they aren’t 
welcome in the group but it’s a free country, I suppose people could just ignore it”. 
(Interviewee OPS2) 
 
In another example from the Occupy London Stock Exchange protest, a protester 
distinguishes between who they see as “genuine” protesters and those not part of their group:  
 
“It’s peaceful, the usual suspects are here [...] but it’s nothing to do with the camp. 
They know it, they turn up unannounced, [they are] nothing to do with us”. (Interviewee 
SQ3) 
 
Empowerment 
Protesters reported a sense of empowerment and conveyed a notion of strength and solidarity 
in numbers. The sense of power enabled them to act in ways in which they might not otherwise 
have done as an individual in opposition to the police. Further, that they could engage in 
activity within the protest setting that they could or would not do in everyday life. Paradoxically, 
some protesters reported a sense of gaining the moral high ground by refraining from using 
or supporting levels of force. They described an acute awareness of the capacity and 
capability of their group to act. This was seen in the following exchanges at the Occupy 
Parliament Square and The Peoples’ Assembly protest events: 
“Look at it, if all these people don’t like what they were doing [the police] they couldn’t 
do a thing about it. The people will decide, not the police. You know it, he knows that, 
it’s always a choice, but with all these people here, we could do what we want right 
now. The police can’t stop this can they?”. (Interviewee OPS4) 
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DL - There are plenty of police around the square by the look of it? 
“They haven’t done anything have they, either they haven’t been needed or they can’t 
anyway, there’s too many of us. The people decide don’t they. I don’t think they (the 
police) want to be here. It’s all politics and what it looks like, that’s why they get 
involved”. 
DL - What do you feel about cooperating with the police then, if they asked you to do 
something or stop? 
“We want to occupy the square for a while, they couldn’t stop it. It’s a public right, like 
a duty to stand up for something...that’s why the rally was set up and there’s too many 
of us and it makes no difference what the Met do. We have a code see (points to a 
banner) …non-violence, [violence] it gets in the way. There are some (points to some 
protesters with face masks on and in black clothing) but they don’t represent us. 
Playing up isn’t the point of the protest”. (Interviewee TPA1) 
DL - With all these people here what should happen do you think? 
“Direct action. Voting does nothing. Direct action does. Protest has to be more than 
just standing around”. (Interviewee TPA2) 
DL - But the police might not let that happen? 
“No, not with so many of us we could, if people wanted it, flood the green [the 
square]. The police couldn’t stop it”. (Interviewee TPA2) 
These comments highlight protesters’ recognition that by weight of numbers they could 
overcome police efforts to limit their actions. Significantly, personal choice and value-based 
judgements appeared to inform their decisions whether to cooperate or resist. They also 
identified that within a group setting they may be able to engage in activity that individually 
would be riskier and potentially lead to arrest. The following example from the Justice for Ian 
Tomlinson march where a protester is shouting insults and swear words at the police highlights 
this: 
 DL-Would you do that if you were walking alone? 
 
“No obviously not, they would arrest me, right? But they can’t here with all of us. Would 
they arrest all of us?”. 
DL - So, in numbers you think the police are less likely to take action against 
 individuals? 
“At the time […] I suppose it depends on what you did, like they probably have photos 
and that but for shouting they either can’t or wouldn’t risk it. There’s masses of us and 
we’d look after each other”.  
DL - What does that mean? That you would intervene? 
“Yeah, I like to think that we’d protect each other, we the people, it’s where the real 
power lies”. (Interviewee J4IT2) 
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The sense was conveyed that the police were less likely, able or willing to act given the weight 
of numbers of participants and the likelihood that it would cause other protesters to intervene. 
Protesters’ decisions to resist the police or not were made as part of their personal value 
systems. An expectation of involvement by other protesters was inferred and this was linked 
to the notion of “people power” described as ‘we the people’ and a feeling of solidarity through 
the act of resistance. 
 In summary, power and identity relationships accounted for the capacity and capability 
that protesters felt they had in achieving the protest aims. Protesters appeared to describe 
themselves as change agents in opposition to the status quo, as the means to bring about 
change and the establishment of an alternative situation or system. Change agents saw 
themselves as having a role defined as a sense of duty or responsibility to use protest to 
further their causes(s) and sometimes of acting on behalf of others. There was a recognition 
of certain types of protester and forms of protest that may be viewed as acceptable or 
unacceptable depending on group or personal value-systems, rules or expected standards of 
behaviour. Feelings of empowerment derived from a sense of being part of something, of 
having greater strength and power in numbers and having the ability and opportunity to act in 
concert to advance the protest aims. This may or may not involve opposing the police yet is 
often expressed as being regulated through a personal or group-based value system. 
Commonly, people expressed making decisions according to an individualised sense of right 
and wrong, one that might not always correspond to the law.  
 
Levels of protester engagement and distancing 
The third factor developed from the empirical data concerns levels of protester engagement 
and distancing. Protesters reported various levels of engagement and distancing with the 
police, the law and the state. The factor is built upon protester expressions of alignment with 
the police, the law and authority. It is related to PJ with regard to moral alignment with the 
police, personal values about the law and attitudes to cooperation and compliance. All of 
which are constituents of police legitimacy according to PJ theory. The main categories that 
underpin the factor are 1) police alignment, 2) personal values, and 3) compliance. These 
are set out below using comments and evidence from the interviews and observations. 
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Police alignment 
Protesters expressed different levels of alignment with the police. They were described in 
terms of the level of identification that participants felt with the police and how the police were 
or were not representative of them and their values. Protesters reported that in exercising their 
rights and freedoms the police may be in opposition and misaligned with protesters’ values. 
Evidence for police alignment can be found in the following examples from the Occupy 
Parliament Square protest: 
DL - If the police have a job to do, what do you think about cooperating with them?  
“Mm (laughs), I’m not new to this, I’ve been on a few protests now. I say this, first it’s 
a right in a free democracy, it’s a right to protest. Second, they will do what the 
government tells them. I am not here to do what the government says, that’s why I’m 
protesting and I’m not here to agree with the police”. (Interviewee OPS1) 
A police officer approached a female protester to engage with her and the following exchange 
occurred: 
“I’m not listening to you (walks off from police officer talking to her), because you can’t 
tell me what to do”. (Interviewee OPS3) 
A physical display of dismissive defiance is shown in the latter example by the protester 
walking away and choosing not to engage with the police officer. The sense of the police being 
an irrelevance and unrepresentative to some protesters was demonstrated in the following 
example at a Unite against Fascism rally: 
DL - Aren’t the police trying to be fair to everyone, including your group? 
“I don’t want or need that, that’s the point of resistance. The police become pointless”. 
(Interviewee UAF3) 
 
In another example from the Justice for Ian Tomlinson campaign march, the police are seen 
as being utterly unrepresentative of the people:  
 
“We’re about to start a riot and why not? I have no respect for any of you now. None 
of you! Effectively we live in a police state. We have lost the freedoms which over the 
generations we won in this country. So, what have we now is just blindingly obvious. 
We have an upside-down police force. We have a police force that kills you. Arrests 
you if you’re innocent and if you’re guilty let you go free. They don’t represent us. I 
don’t recognise what they stand for”. (Interviewee J4ITS1) 
The examples above illustrate the various levels of social distancing, resistance and defiance 
according to Braithwaite (2009, 2010, 2011), both in physical terms as the case of the protester 
walking away ignoring police officers and psychologically by expressions of a loss of respect 
for the police. Indeed, the police can be perceived as being altogether opposed to the act of 
protest itself as a democratic right: 
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“They seem to be against protest, it’s not like we are doing something wrong when this 
is our right”. (Interviewee SQ30) 
DL - From what you were saying you don’t seem to think the police facilitate protest? 
 
“No. I don’t think that’s their role, well it should be, but I don’t think most see it that 
way”. (Interviewee UAF9) 
Protesters in these cases framed the police as being opposed to protest and whilst their role 
should be to facilitate it, that the police do not see it as such. 
Personal values 
The category of personal values depicts protesters’ attitudes about the law and the legal 
system. They appeared to carry the locus of right and wrong in their own personal value 
systems and of what the law should or should not represent. There was a strong sense that 
cooperation with the law was a personal matter and what was perceived by participants as 
“minor” offending (based on their own values and opinion) was permissible relative to the 
weight of the issues that the protest was about. Personal values incorporated a degree of legal 
recognition, that is to say how valid they believed the law to be and if they recognised its 
validity. 
The following exchange occurred at the Occupy Parliament Square event and highlights the 
point about recognition of the law: 
“We aren’t doing anything wrong, there’s no violence, I’m here to do what I need to 
and not what they think I should be doing”. 
DL - Why is that? 
“Well, standing on a green [the square] compared to standing up for cuts and 
everything that is going on, it’s nothing in comparison. It’s their laws not mine”.  
DL - Their? 
“Yeah, the police, the government you know. It’s all the same”. (Interviewee OPS2) 
The extent to which other protesters’ behaviour was viewed as acceptable or not was 
described in the following terms: 
DL - So are you saying that for you it’s a personal choice whether to use violence to 
get what you want? 
“Yeah, there’s levels though I think. Trespass or whatever they call it is one thing, but 
for me fighting or throwing things that’s something else”.  
DL - Would you recognize the police as having the rule of law? 
“Not really. It’s our law not theirs but the police don’t uphold our rights I think”.  
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DL - When you say there’s no violence – why do you think that is? 
“If people wanted to they would, but they obviously don’t, it’s a personal choice thing”. 
(Interviewee OPS4) 
An element of calculation by protesters of the potential costs associated with engaging in 
criminal acts was also identified: 
DL - So the reason you wouldn’t get involved in criminal acts is more to do with what 
you might lose? 
“Yes, really it’s not worth it for me is it? I guess if you have nothing to lose then you 
might, but personally I couldn’t do that”. (Interviewee RID4) 
 
Another protester highlights the personal choices to be made: 
 
DL - Are you saying then here today, it’s like you have your own rules to follow and not 
that of the law? 
“Pretty much [...] the legal system is wrong anyway and criminalises people for the 
wrong things. For rip off bankers it’s ok. Don’t pay taxes and they’ll lock you up. What 
kind of law is that? It’s a personal assessment, a country needs laws or it would be 
barbaric, people would run amok […] so there has to be something like that in place. 
Some don’t like it but that’s the way it is”.  
DL - So would you follow those laws yourself? 
“Well yeah, I would, but then that’s because I think it’s the right thing to do. But others 
don’t, it’s got to come down to your own standards hasn’t it?”. (Interviewee TPA2) 
Here in these examples protesters articulated that compliance with the law was very much a 
personal choice. A choice informed by a number of factors that needed to be taken into 
account such as their personal value systems, the consequences to the individual and wider 
society. However, a strong sense of the law being unfairly applied by authority and of the 
powerful in society not being held to account was expressed and used to rationalise protesters’ 
decisions. 
Compliance 
The category of compliance is concerned with participants’ willingness to comply with police 
requests and directions at protest events. According to PJ and the ESIM compliance and 
cooperation is a corollary of perceived police legitimacy which is produced by fair, respectful 
and proportionate treatment by the police. However, protesters reported a distinctly different 
explanation of the relationship between how they perceived their treatment by the police and 
their readiness to cooperate. Examples from The Peoples’ Assembly march and Occupy 
London Stock Exchange event highlight the relationship as follows: 
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 DL –How was the event policed today do you think? 
 “Okay, not much happened today, the police went along with it”.  
DL – So, how would you feel about cooperating with them, say if they stopped you 
going where you wanted to? 
“No, no way. That’s the whole idea, to revolt. Not to do what they want us to”. 
(Interviewee TPA6) 
And again, on complying with the police: 
DL - How would you feel about doing what they told you, like leaving the camp or 
moving on? 
“No, we’re staying. They [the police] support the system and this about changing it”. 
(Interviewee SQ2) 
Even after recognising that the police had acted benignly, another protester makes 
clear his position on compliance: 
DL – What do you think of the way the police have handled the event today? 
“They followed us around a bit but I can’t say I’ve had any issues with them”.  
DL – So you’ve had no problems with them today? 
“Not really, no”.  
DL – If they asked you to join the main march or disperse, what would you do about 
that? 
“It’s not happening. I didn’t come here to follow their instructions”. (Interviewee TPA2) 
In these examples, protesters reported experiencing benign or positive encounters with police 
activity. However, there was no corresponding expressions of compliance or cooperation with 
police requests. Compliance as a stated intention appeared to be linked to personal value 
systems and unrelated to the positive qualities of police contact. In short, fair and respectful 
treatment by the police did not necessarily correspond with greater expressions of compliance 
and cooperation. 
 In summary, levels of protester engagement and distancing identified the alignment 
that protesters felt with the police and what they represent. The notion conveyed is one shared 
with PJ in the use of the term “alignment”, in that it includes the extent to which the police are 
perceived as representative of protesters’ values and facilitative of their aims. Of course, whilst 
desirable there are occasions when the police cannot align to these consensual values.  
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 Significantly, personal value systems about the law appeared to influence protesters’ 
motivational postures towards the police and the rule of law. This component of the CDM 
resonates with the theoretical perspective of motivational posturing and social distancing 
identified as a contingency to PJ (Braithwaite, 2003, 2009, 2011). Within the CDM, levels of 
engagement and distancing can be seen to range from full cooperation with the police and the 
law based on a personally felt obligation to comply, to extreme dismissive resistance or 
defiance in the form of complete disengagement from the police. Between these positions a 
number might be found whereby protesters engage with and utilise the democratic processes 
to lobby and protest within the law, expressing resistance yet complying through fear of 
sanction. 
Pre-existing ideology 
The fourth factor developed from the empirical data is pre-existing ideology. It concerns the 
presence and influence of political and issue-based agendas on the protest. Ideology 
appeared as the means of positioning protesters within a political context and related to the 
expression and presence of a set of personal or group inspired beliefs. These beliefs 
influenced protesters’ actions and/or evaluations of the police as agents of the state. Protester 
perceptions of the police as therefore political in nature were identified. Pre-existing ideology 
also impacted ways in which protest groups defined and supported each other. The main 
categories that underpin this factor are, 1) political bases, 2) issue bases and 3) state agents. 
Political bases 
The category of political bases identified the presence and expression of political standpoints 
and beliefs about the existence and nature of policing and the state. Protesters often framed 
their protest in political terms and cast the police as part of the political system that they 
perceived as being aligned to the government and the powerful (often expressed as the “rich” 
in their accounts). This served to position the protest and protesters in degrees of opposition 
to the police and state authority. During the Justice for Ian Tomlinson campaign march, 
Occupy Parliament Square and Unite against Fascism rallies, this position was voiced in the 
following terms: 
“That’s the point, protest is meant to smash the capitalist state and their police”.  
DL – You think that the police support Capitalism in some way? 
“This protest represents a political struggle for many of us today and the police are a 
product of capitalism. If we had the kind of country that we wanted then there wouldn’t 
be a police (sic)”. (Interviewee J4IT1) 
And on the perceived partisan nature of protest policing: 
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DL – You didn’t seem too happy about what the police were asking you to do? 
“No way, they have no right, it’s disgusting how they behave. They should be over in 
there (points to the Houses of Parliament). The Met chief, he’ll probably be a Lord or 
Sir something, sick, they’re all in some big club together behind closed doors. People 
are not stupid”. (Interviewee OPS5) 
Another protester shouted – “Austerity breeds fascism smash the fascist police” and is 
then interviewed: 
DL - You were talking about the fascist police, what makes you think the police are 
fascist in this country? 
“It’s all political isn’t it. The boys in blue. The government, it’s blue. They even wear 
the same colour. The police are the face of right wing politics as far as I’m concerned”. 
(Interviewee UAF2) 
 
The notion of the police as being allies of the rich and powerful and not guardians of the poor 
and less privileged was also expressed: 
“The police are puppets. The people will do what the people do, that’s the working 
class struggle regardless its always been. The police aren’t there to facilitate that 
struggle, are they?”.  
 
DL - What are they there to facilitate then? 
 
“It’s about their political masters, the legal system, powers, laws, the rich, take the war 
on terror as an example. It’s just an excuse to shift the blame onto the oppressed and 
the police use their powers to do that here”.  
DL - Ok but where would you see the police in a “new world”? 
“Personally, I don’t. I’m not a police fan. But politically, I admit, you need one, a police 
force. But a new socialism would mean real change for the police in this country. No 
racism, no scapegoating anymore. More accountability for what the police do. They 
will not be allowed to continue as part of the rich imperialist agenda”. (Interviewee 
UAF9). 
 
The views expressed above highlight how the police can be painted as protecting the rich and 
powerful and being part of the state machinery. Some protesters saw the role of protest as 
being to break up the existing political structure and replacing it with one in which the police 
did not exist or were markedly different. Take this other example from The Peoples’ Assembly 
march: 
“We’re not starting a class war – we’re ending it and the police are part of it”.  
DL - Part of what? 
“The structure […] the war’s not about kicking the Tories out, it’s the whole thing and 
yes the police are wrapped up in the structure”. (Interviewee TPA5) 
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Protesters positioned themselves and their protest as engaged in a class struggle or “war” in 
which the police were viewed as partisan and inextricably linked to the authorities and system 
of government.  
Issue bases 
Issue bases related to the dogmatic positions taken by protesters, often related to racial, 
religious or specific campaign issues. They were ideological in the sense that they were based 
on or related to a set of ideas and ideals. These concerned the protest causes, where they 
were couched in terms that were not explicitly political or made on the basis of political 
ideology. These may be single protest issues or multiple ones with protest occurring in a 
focused or coalition arrangement. Multiple issues were sometimes conflated within one protest 
event. Protesters described being opportunistic and utilised protest events that were not their 
primary concern for the purposes of promoting their own. Evidence for these issue bases can 
be found in the following examples from a Unite against Fascism rally where banners identified 
a multitude of groups and affiliations. The issues ranged from racism, anti-austerity, Save the 
NHS and Ban the UKIP party. A protester hands out “Against Racism” leaflets and is 
interviewed: 
DL – What’s the leaflet about? 
“Racism and hatred, it’s about why islamophobia is wrong. Islam is peaceful and its 
people”.  
 
DL - Oh I see. I didn’t realise that the event was about that as an issue? 
 
“Well yeah, but it’s like everyone’s together. There’s lots of different people handing 
out things at these events, we support each other”.  
 
DL - So your main reason for attending isn’t about austerity and the other protest 
issues, it’s more to promote this issue for you? 
 
“Yeah [...] when people come out like this they pick up lots of information on others’ 
campaigns”. (Interviewee UAF2) 
 
Further interviews with a UAF supporter at a rally in support of victims of police violence 
highlighted the dominance of a single issue for some participants, often based on race: 
“They [UKIP supporters] have no rights. I don’t believe in a democracy like that. It lets 
people spread lies and filthy views. I don’t want to live in a country like that, that’s gotta 
(sic) change you know”. 
 
DL - Is that a reason you came out today – to change things? 
 
“Yeah, I’m incensed about it, it must change. Austerity breeds fascism like that lot. We 
need to get the message out that we won’t tolerate it. Any coverage, any way is a win”. 
(Interviewee UAF6) 
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An additional example of the conflation of issues at an organised event can be seen from the 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson campaign march where a protester in the road was carrying a sign 
saying “Fuck the law. Not the poor”: 
DL - What brought you to today’s event? 
“I wanted to show some support for the [Tomlinson] family”.  
DL - I noticed that your banner talks about the banks and the poor though, and not Ian 
Tomlinson? 
“Well, the bankers profit while people starve, it’s wrong. So that’s why I’m raising it”. 
(Interviewee J4IT3) 
 
However, protesters made assumptions about their peer groups and identified with them on 
the basis that there must at least be some common ideological link between them: 
DL - There seems to be a lot of different banners and supporters for diverse issues 
today, not necessarily for the Occupy group, does that happen a lot? 
“I wouldn’t say they were that different, they all have some link […] you’re not gonna 
see a young tory flag are you (laughs)?”.  
DL - So you see them as linked in some way? 
“Well, it just wouldn’t mix well would it if groups had competing agendas. I mean not 
like fascists or that, but to work together you need similar ideas as a starting point”.  
DL - So groups that are against each other, you think won’t work together in a protest 
setting? 
“That’s a bit obvious”.  
DL –But to some degree, people use the same opportunity to protest about their 
specific issues? 
“Yeah they do, sometimes it’s difficult to separate them, but to some extent we must 
all be on the same side I guess”. (Interviewee OPS4) 
These examples demonstrate that even in the face of what appeared to be different protest 
agendas, protesters felt an affinity for each other and their causes. However, this clearly has 
limitations. Some protesters reported that the protest issues or groups representing them 
might be perceived so disparate as to be antagonistic to each other. In the following account 
by a Searchlight magazine seller at a Unite against Fascism rally the point is highlighted: 
DL - So are the majority well behaved? 
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“Yeah, you can see that can’t you (looks surprised). There’s always a few, like 
extremists. Like back there earlier, the black and reds6. But that’s on both sides. Some 
of them hate us too”.  
 
DL - You? 
 
“Searchlight. Certain groups don’t think we’re extreme enough. There’s always a few, 
they like a scrap with the fascists. See all these (pointing to other small groups) they 
don’t want that either. To get mixed up with that lot”.  
 
DL – So are you saying that although you share a cause, opposed to what you see as 
fascism, you don’t always agree and support each other on the way to protest? 
 
“In the main yeah. We are non-violent, but they don’t agree and like Antifa or whatever, 
they will use very direct action and violence. It’s part of their ethos”. (Interviewee UAF8) 
 
A further example relating to an Anti-abortion protest highlighted the negative impact of 
competing ideals on protesters working in coalition together: 
DL - I wondered if you joined other protest events to get the point across and gain 
wider support? 
“This is a specific campaign group. I haven’t heard of that, it’s difficult because not 
everyone supports what we do”.  
DL- In what sense? 
“The pro-choice lobby, women’s rights and that, they wouldn’t agree with us on this 
campaign”. (Interviewee Ab671) 
Groups may have shared a platform in the physical context of a protest event, yet protesters 
discerned that whilst they agreed on a broader level, there may be deeper, ideological issue- 
based ones that served to divide them, and in some cases, they were irreconcilable. 
State agents 
The category of state agents appeared as a significant one for protesters. Many expressed a 
strong sense of the police as the face and operational arm of the state. On one level the police 
were perceived to be partisan, not representative of the people and serving the needs of the 
state usually characterised as the government or “the system”. A perception was voiced that 
the police had a bias towards protecting property and the interests of the “rich”. This was 
highlighted at The Peoples’ Assembly march when a protester was interviewed about the use 
of Bitcoin (a virtual currency) and expressed how the police were viewed as part of the 
“system”:  
                                                          
6 Clothing and flags with these colours displayed are often used to denote anarchist affiliated 
individuals and groups. 
199 
 
“The government and their puppets, the banks, the police. Bitcoin is about freedom 
and they can’t control it”. 
DL - You see the police as tied up with them? 
“Maybe not each cop [...] But as a whole the police are part of the machinery”. 
(Interviewee TPA3) 
And again, at the Re-imagining Democracy gathering: 
“The whole system is broken down [...] the police are part of it and they prop it up. They 
are too close to it”.  
 
DL - When you say it what does that mean? 
 
“The government, the status quo. The police are part of the problem, not the solution 
if you ask me”. (Interviewee RID5) 
 
During another observation and interview a protester commented on the researcher’s own role 
as a police officer in a system that is perceived to imprison people unfairly: 
“The police you say? The police put our families in there [prison], not you personally, 
but you know what I mean. You’re one of them, it’s [the police] all part of the state 
system”. (Interviewee IPP1) 
 
The police are also characterised as being part of a broken structure and as participating in 
maintaining that system. There was a sense that the police are an integral part of it. However, 
what this system is appears to be a conflation of the many derided targets of the protest. The 
perception that the police are used politically as state agents is revealed in the following 
examples: 
“The police are used politically especially in demos like the student demos”. 
 (Interviewee SQ5) 
 
“Policing of protests is government sanctioned and organised to suppress effective 
direct action”. (Interviewee SQ26) 
 
“The police are part of the state. Nothing but the puppets of the coalition in this country, 
used to support the cuts and the banks. They exist to undermine the proletariat, you 
know that”. (Interviewee UAF9) 
 
A categorisation of the police as being in support of undermining the poor and working class 
was made at several protest events in the following terms: 
“The police protect the interests of the rich not the poor”. (Interviewee SQ6) 
“They protect the rich it’s all about that”. (Interviewee SQ7) 
“I feel threatened not protected by them. They are more about property than people”. 
(Interviewee SQ19) 
“Fuck the law, not the poor I say. We live in a police state, smash it and their police”. 
(Interviewee J4IT1) 
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 In summary, the factor of pre-existing ideology comprises a variety of personal and 
group ideas and ideals that influence the framing of protest and the police. It demonstrates 
competing agendas even within a single protest event. Some groups, although sharing 
broader political bases appear not to work closely together and recognise boundaries between 
how they operate. These boundaries influence the lengths to which they are prepared to go in 
protest or in support of each other. Protesters expressed what might be known as a free rider 
approach (Opp, 2009) and “piggy backed” events for their own ends, this involved using the 
opportunities of affiliation between groups and their physical size to further their own protest. 
 In conclusion, the four factors of protester constructions of policing, power and identity 
relationships, levels of protester engagement and distancing and pre-existing ideology (see 
figure 6.2 above) capture the range of influences that can be associated with the construction 
and shaping of protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance 
and cooperation. The CDM synthesises aspects of PJ and the ESIM, also drawing on the 
contingencies of motivational posturing, social distancing (Braithwaite, 2009, 2011) and the 
asymmetry of policing (Skogan, 2006, 2012). The content of the four factors can be seen to 
emanate at and inform three levels, 1) the personal (individual), 2) the social (group) and 3) 
the causal (protest issue). While the factors have no pre-eminence or hierarchy we can see 
from their content that they are inter-related at these three levels. The CDM of police legitimacy 
can be viewed as representing the attitudes, behaviours and “signs and symptoms” associated 
with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and compliance 
and cooperation with the police and the law. 
  
201 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The chapter that follows summarises the main points of the thesis and the empirical research. 
It highlights the limitations of the research and sets out theoretical and professional practice 
implications and recommendations. The theoretical and empirical focus of this thesis has been 
on police legitimacy. It has argued that police legitimacy, defined empirically, needs to be 
understood with regard to the policing context. The thesis claims an original contribution to the 
field by identifying contextually based influences represented by the CDM7 that are associated 
with the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and their 
attitudes to compliance and cooperation. This contribution is significant for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is the first time that research of this type has been conducted in this way by using the 
PJ theoretical framework in the specific context of protest policing. Secondly, the findings 
challenge existing thinking about the development of perceptions of police legitimacy and 
compliance and cooperation with the police at protests. The pre-eminence of PJ and the ESIM 
approaches to policing is called into question by the theoretical analysis and empirical aspects 
of the thesis. 
  The introduction to the thesis set out its theoretical base and it discussed various ways 
in which the legitimacy of the police can be viewed. Whilst PJ and the ESIM utilise an 
interpretation that is empirically-based, one that sees legitimacy as coming from peoples’ 
perceptions of fair and respectful treatment and processes at the hands of authority, other 
interpretations exist. Legitimacy can also be established objectively through moral argument. 
Human rights, and the obligation of the state to protect peoples’ rights, highlight this point8. 
However, the introduction also highlighted that legitimacy can be construed as sharing 
elements from both interpretations in something of a hybrid model. Beetham (1991) identifies 
that legitimacy is multi-dimensional by combining distinct levels relating to conformity to set 
rules, rule justification through shared beliefs, and consensual support. Thus, when discussing 
police legitimacy, we need to be clear which interpretation is being applied and its limitations. 
The thesis began by using PJ’s empirical interpretation of legitimacy, that is through protesters’ 
perceptions of police legitimacy. The following research questions were addressed: 
                                                          
7 The term “model” is used to denote an explanatory framework that is constructed from the empirical 
data and informed by related theories. The coding and analysis of the data was informed by grounded 
theory method, but the thesis does not claim a grounded theory. 
8 Irrespective of whether we believe human rights can be established objectively, it is beyond question 
that their efficacy and meaning can only be established if they are accepted and assumed to be 
objective moral criteria. In this respect, human rights are distinct from, and more than legal rights. 
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• To what extent do the broad claims of PJ and the correlates of police legitimacy and 
compliance and cooperation hold in protest situations? 
• What additional factors can be associated with the construction and shaping of 
perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation? 
These have been examined theoretically through critical analysis and empirically by a mixed 
method sequential research study. 
 In order to demonstrate the influence of PJ chapter one critically documented the rise 
from its US origins to become orthodoxy in UK policing. The discussion highlighted how PJ 
has become common parlance and pervades many aspects of policing such as police reform, 
policing models, internal assessments of police legitimacy and integrity, crime control and 
protest and public order policing. Critically, antecedents and contingencies to the claims made 
by PJ and the ESIM about police legitimacy and compliance were examined and presented. 
These came from three main sources: the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between 
the police and public (Skogan, 2006, 2012); the dialogic nature of police legitimacy that is not 
reflected in PJ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Cherney and Murphy, 2011; Tankebe, 2013); 
and the phenomena of motivational posturing and social distancing (Braithwaite, 2009). 
Additional support for these was found in the empirical data that underpin the factors of the 
CDM of police legitimacy (see chapter 6). 
 In an attempt to highlight the distinct and special nature of the policing context, chapter 
two examined the foundations and trends of the policing of protest and public order. The 
historical background to policing in England and Wales under the old watch arrangements to 
the birth of the new police in 1829 was discussed. It documented some pivotal moments in 
the policing of protest and public order that led to reform with a shift from the use of the military 
to the civil police. It also detailed the ways in which crowds have been understood from 
classical psychological reductionism, that is the idea of the “mob”, to modern day social 
psychological models of crowd dynamics. The key points of the debate about the 
paramilitarisation of policing were examined together with the observation by some authors of 
a return to repressive regimes in the policing of protest. 
 In chapter three the focus shifted from the policing of protest and public order to the 
act of protest itself. The chapter covered four main topics. Firstly, what constitutes protest and 
social movements and how peoples’ intentions and actions are framed, organised and acted 
upon. The analysis explored types of protest activity and levels of organisation and 
coordination. From the academic literature some defining criteria for protest were provided 
that informed the contextual framework of the empirical research. Secondly, chapter three 
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examined the role that social media play in framing protest events, establishing 
communication networks and a means of sharing and mobilising resources. Thirdly, it critically 
discussed theories and models of public disorder, specifically those broadly called “tinder and 
spark” explanations of riot and disorder (Waddington, 2007). The origin and development of 
the ESIM was examined with a critical look at its claim about the influence of emerging 
perceptions of police illegitimacy in the escalation of collective violence (Reicher, 2011; Stott, 
2009, Stott, 2011). The chapter concluded by identifying a link between protester attitudes and 
their behaviour, highlighting the importance of the context and conditions under which attitudes 
influence behaviour. 
 Having critically analysed the policing of protest and public order and dimensions of 
the act of protest, chapter four sought to examine attempts in the UK to legitimize the policing 
of it since London G20, 2009. The critique drew on academic and “grey” literature sources in 
an examination of specific recommendations and changes to police training and policy, 
intelligence gathering, tactical flexibility and the police use of force. It demonstrated that these 
are not free of controversy, having contributed to confusion and contradiction in resolving 
many of the issues facing the legitimacy of the policing of protest and public order in the UK. 
 Chapters five and six concentrated on the empirical research content of the thesis in 
setting out the research strategy, methodology and processes that were employed for the two 
stages of research and the construction of the CDM of police legitimacy. It described the mixed 
method design that employed an exploratory structured, quantitative survey followed by a 
detailed qualitative exploration of the findings and investigation of factors associated with the 
construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to 
cooperation and compliance. Chapter six provided the statistical analysis of the quantitative 
data and a narrative concerning the development of the four factors: 1) protester constructions 
of policing, 2) power and identity relationships, 3) levels of engagement and distancing, and 
4) pre-existing ideology, that underpin the CDM of police legitimacy. 
 The broad claims of PJ relating to assessments of police legitimacy and how 
compliance and cooperation is secured through self-regulation and normative compliance are 
consistent with my own initial findings. Protester perceptions of fair and respectful treatment 
at the hands of the police are associated with greater expressions of cooperation and 
compliance with the police and positive assessments of police legitimacy are linked to self-
reported cooperation and compliance levels. However, there are a number of contingents to 
the evaluations made by protesters and the route from assessments of treatment to 
cooperation and compliance is not as clear as PJ posits. The CDM of police legitimacy 
(presented in chapter 6) maps the additional influences that appear to be at work in how 
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protesters construct and shape their perceptions of the law, the police, their treatment at the 
hands of the police and in overall assessments of police legitimacy prior to and during protest 
situations.  
 Why develop a contextually-based model at all, since PJ and the ESIM appear to 
provide longstanding, influential, empirically based explanations for the presence and 
development of perceptions of police legitimacy? The reason is that neither approach wholly 
accounts for the array of contextual influences that are at work in the construction and shaping 
of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. PJ 
and ESIM are general models that are psychologically-based. Moreover, neither approach 
provides the police in practice with a heuristic tool to identify and manage the nuances of 
protest policing. Particularly, this relates to information and intelligence gathering by the police, 
the bases upon which to engage and communicate with protesters and police decision-
making. Therefore, the CDM of police legitimacy adds a new dimension to these aspects of 
protest policing. It is clear from the critical analysis that PJ and the ESIM are theoretically 
linked on the premise that compliance with the law emanates from perceptions of legitimacy 
“created” by police activity (Hoggett and Stott, 2010; Stott, 2009; Stott and Drury, 2000; Stott 
and Reicher, 1998b). However, with the vast body of empirical research in PJ there is a 
scarcity that applies it specifically to protest and public order policing and the more qualitative 
aspects remain largely under investigated (Mazerolle et al, 2013). 
 While the ESIM has been the vade mecum for the training and practice of protest 
policing its efficacy in dealing with every protest and public order scenario has been called 
into question since the August 2011 English riots. Moreover, problems arise with the ESIM on 
three fronts. Firstly, it lacks recognition of the influence of antecedent attitudes towards the 
police and the law. Secondly, protesters’ pre-existing attitudes appear exaggerated in protest 
and public order situations. Thirdly, its over reliance on the notion of “self-policing” as a 
regulating mechanism of behaviour in crowds. Arguably, the empirical basis for the ESIM’s 
dominance in the policing of crowds and sporting events has gone unchallenged for a number 
of years until events questioned its general efficacy and application to all protest and public 
order situations (HMIC, 2011a, 2011b). In short, the ESIM approach might work in some 
situations where there is no disorder, but not so where it has already broken out. That situation 
requires a more nuanced approach. 
 The factors of the CDM indicate that the PJ and ESIM accounts of the construction 
and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy provide insufficient, contextually-based 
explanatory power for their presence and development. According to Stott’s (Stott, 2009) 
underlying analysis, the ESIM works on the basis that preventing perceptions of police 
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illegitimacy being formed through the actions of the police rests solely on identities being 
contemporaneously formed within a crowd: an identity formed in response to perceived 
indiscriminate policing. In short, his argument is that if we prevent perceptions of police 
illegitimacy forming then we can stop conflict arising. However, this fails to recognise the 
diversity and impact of distal and proximal influences that are identified by the CDM. Negative 
perceptions of police legitimacy may be pre-conceived and endure above and beyond fair and 
respectful policing interventions at protest events. Similarly, PJ’s emphasis is on fair and 
respectful treatment by the police as the key process and driver of perceived police legitimacy. 
PJ rests on a version of legitimacy that is empirically based and theoretically limited, i.e. by 
perceptions of fairness not by any objective standards or those that can be argued by other 
interpretations of legitimacy. Notably, PJ’s emphasis appears to be on the individual (personal) 
level, whilst ESIM’s is on the group (interactive) level. Therefore, in providing contextual 
explanations of the influences associated with the construction and shaping of protester 
perceptions of police legitimacy neither PJ or the ESIM go far enough in recognising a 
combination of the personal, interactive and causal dimensions at work.  
 As I have demonstrated through the empirical data the police can be perceived as 
dealing with an event fairly yet accrue no expressions of compliance and cooperation, this 
undermines one of the key claims of PJ theory. In addition, with its emphasis on facilitating 
the “legitimate aims” of the group, and in treating members in a non-homogenous manner the 
ESIM fails to account for why in the face of fair and accommodating policing and benign police 
activity, resistance and expressions of hostility still arise and fulminate. It is accepted that the 
mechanism for this in the ESIM appears to be that of shared social identity between group 
members in opposition to the police, but it still fails to acknowledge underlying antecedents 
and contingencies to police legitimacy. In contrast, the CDM of police legitimacy is concerned 
with what lies beneath and beyond to provide a more nuanced and contextually-based 
understanding. 
 The critical analysis of “tinder and spark” inspired theories of disorder such as the 
Flashpoints model (Waddington et al, 1989) (see chapter 3) specifically demonstrates that the 
CDM of police legitimacy is not synonymous with it. Unsurprisingly, given the similar context 
of the research the CDM shares some similarity in its empirical data with Flashpoints. This 
similarity is no different from the way in which Flashpoints might share similarities with the 
“tinder and spark” theories that preceded it and upon which it is based. The CDM differs 
significantly from the Flashpoints model of disorder in both its focus and explanatory power. 
Moreover, the Flashpoints model is primarily concerned with explaining the initiation of public 
disorder (or its absence) whilst the CDM is concerned with police legitimacy. Flashpoints is a 
sociologically-based model, the CDM rests on a social psychological and philosophical base. 
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The levels in the Flashpoints model provide little if any explanation of the factors associated 
with the construction and shaping of perceptions of police legitimacy. Legitimacy in the 
Flashpoints model is a term reserved for “the ways in which the group’s declared ends and 
the means proposed are subject to ideological processes” (Waddington et al, 1989, p.161). 
Indeed, in the original publication of the Flashpoints model Waddington et al (1989, p.157) 
make clear that in so doing they are attempting to theorize the factors found to be “the crucial 
determinants of order and disorder”. Furthermore, the use of the term “contextual” in the CDM 
is entirely different from that intended by Flashpoints, since it uses the term to depict the 
policing situation in which protesters’ perceptions are constructed and shaped, whilst 
Flashpoints uses it to denote “a set of existing relations (emphasis added) between the police 
and dissenting groups” (Waddington et al, 1989, p.163). The Flashpoints model of disorder 
does not tackle police legitimacy in the same way to that of my thesis. 
Limitations of the research 
The thesis has certain limitations and its findings would require further development before 
claims of wider generalisation might be made. The four main limitations arise from, 1) the 
sample size for phase 1, 2) specificity of the field work, 3) ethical considerations and 4) 
delineation of the factors. Each is discussed in turn below. 
 There is a small sample size in the phase 1 exploratory survey (n=40) and it is 
acknowledged that participants came from particular types of protest events that were all 
based in London. To that end the findings may relate specifically to these, but not necessarily 
beyond those events. The matter of sample size has been addressed in chapter 5 and 
attention is drawn to the point that the phase 1 survey was intended to serve as a preliminary 
exercise to test the concepts of PJ with no expectation of any statistical significance or in 
establishing a claim to generalisation beyond the events investigated. The overtly political 
elements of the data obtained in phase 2 may have been informed by the emphasis on certain 
types of protest events (such as those against austerity measures and TUC demonstrations). 
To this end the thesis may be specific to a particular form or forms of protest activity. That said 
the thesis raises valid theoretical, policy and professional practice considerations of utility. 
 The empirical research does not relate to any one police force, however given that 
London is served by four police organisations and some of the protests took place in areas 
within their jurisdiction (Metropolitan Police Service, City of London Police, British Transport 
Police and Ministry of Defence Police) it may relate directly to policing by these organisations 
only. Large scale protest in London is often policed through a partnership arrangement 
involving these police forces, which was the case during the period of the empirical research. 
Future research might involve empirical study in other police jurisdictions in the UK and 
beyond with a view to establishing if the claims hold elsewhere. Certainly, in order to challenge 
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the claims of PJ as a generalised approach to developing police legitimacy and public 
compliance and cooperation, the research requires application to other policing contexts 
beyond that of protest and public order. However, what the CDM does highlight are the 
limitations of PJ and the ESIM in the most volatile of protest situations. Whilst they make an 
important contribution in ensuring that the police do not cause disorder by their actions, there 
will be times when it occurs irrespective of what the police do. In these situations, policing 
needs to make an appeal to objective legitimacy for its actions, and not one based on 
consensus. 
 Due to the ethical considerations and limitations arising from the author being a serving 
police officer at the time of the research certain protest groups could not be engaged with or 
interviewed, such as those openly identified as English Defence League, Britain First, Antifa 
and those involved in Black Bloc actions. It is acknowledged that others have previously 
carried out research with members of such groups regarding attitudes to racism, hate crime 
and harassment (Gadd and Dixon, 2011; Winlow et al, 2017). This limitation has meant that 
so-called extreme left and right-wing groups or those applying violent direct action could not 
be represented by my data and analysis. Further, to guarantee participant anonymity and to 
guard against the researcher being embroiled in later criminal proceedings as a witness, a 
more longitudinal approach could not be used. The latter would have provided opportunity to 
gauge if and to what extent participants’ perceptions changed over time and from event to 
event. Future research might employ a strategy that follows participants’ journeys and 
experiences across several protest events over a prolonged period. This would be in order to 
ascertain the extent to which perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and 
cooperation vary and whether or not these hold across differing policing contexts. 
 The CDM of police legitimacy comprises factors derived from a number of categories 
developed from the empirical data and it is accepted that further research and delineation 
would be required for any claim of these as theoretical concepts underpinning a generalised 
theory. However, I maintain that the four factors are sufficiently and substantially populated 
with empirical data to provide them with characteristics that give weight to the claims of the 
thesis. Whilst the data described the relationships, associations and influences for the sample 
alone it is intended that the CDM be applied in future empirical research aimed at establishing 
its theoretical utility and as a heuristic tool in professional policing practice. 
 There are theoretical, policy and professional practice implications of the thesis and 
each is discussed below. 
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Theoretical implications. 
There are four theoretical implications of the thesis that can be identified as follows, 1) the 
dimensions of empirical legitimacy (as applied by PJ and the ESIM), 2) the operationalisation 
of concepts used in PJ research, 3) the role of antecedents and contingencies and 4) the 
concept of “self-policing” in groups. 
Dimensions of empirical legitimacy. 
The first implication concerns the concept of legitimacy that is applied in the PJ and ESIM 
approaches to policing. PJ identifies at length and emphatically with empirical legitimacy, that 
is views about police legitimacy based on consensus. The ESIM appears less overtly 
concerned with philosophical aspects to the notion of legitimacy yet by association it clearly 
adopts a similar position. However, empirical legitimacy is but one variant of the concept. 
There are theoretical and practical limitations in carrying out policing activities completely on 
the basis of empirical legitimacy. This is not least because policing is a highly contentious 
venture at times, often being conducted outwith consensus. There are occasions and 
situations in which the police must act without consensual agreement in order to protect and 
secure the rights of others or wider society. Pursuing legitimacy exclusively through empirical 
means renders policing and its outcomes highly context specific and therein lies the problem 
for both PJ and the ESIM. Police legitimacy reliant on establishing consensus with the policed 
may indeed fail when their expectations are not or cannot be met. Much PJ research has been 
conducted in specific policing initiatives from which it has then become generalised to every 
policing context (Mazerolle et al, 2013; Myhill and Quinton, 2010). Arguably, PJ’s utility in 
delivering widespread and generalised perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation and 
compliance is questionable. The policing of protest is highly context specific and raises the 
question as to whether the PJ and ESIM approaches to policing can or should be applied all 
of the time in every circumstance with any expectation of efficacy. As Reiner (2010) highlights:  
Policing is an inherently conflict-ridden enterprise…the essential function 
and distinctive resource of the police is the potential use of legitimate force 
[and] if there was universal consensus about norms, values and appropriate 
modes of social behaviour there would be no need for a police force. In most 
situations there is somebody being policed against whose assent to policing 
is brittle. (Reiner, 2010, p.69). 
Therefore, whilst it may be desirable to strive to achieve consensus in policing protests, an 
over reliance on empirical legitimacy as the means to do so might leave both the police and 
the policed bewildered and disappointed. 
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The operationalisation of concepts used in PJ research 
The second theoretical implication of the thesis relates to the way concepts are 
operationalised as variables in PJ research. On the one hand the general claim of PJ that 
perceptions of police legitimacy are associated with expressions of compliance and 
cooperation, holds in the protest events studied here. However, the thesis identifies theoretical 
and empirical antecedents and contingents arising from the asymmetry of policing (Skogan, 
2006, 2012), motivational posturing and social distancing (Braithwaite, 2009, 2010), and the 
four factors of the CDM. These challenge the constituents of the concepts currently 
operationalised in PJ research. In short, they do not capture the full range of variables 
sometimes found in protest and public order policing. It is noteworthy from the empirical data 
in this respect that protesters held benign or positive assessments of contact with the police 
at protest events but did not express any desire to cooperate or comply. In PJ terms, this 
suggests moral alignment between the police and protesters’ values, does not guarantee 
perceptions of police legitimacy as predicted by PJ theory. This is not surprising given that PJ 
recognises the competition that variables such as individual perceptions of previous police 
contact, personal values about the law and personal morality can bring. There is some clarity 
in the operationalised variables used by PJ, but they do not sufficiently capture all available 
data and relationships that are relevant in protest. 
 Problems also arise in the way that the idea of a public “duty” to cooperate with 
authority is operationalised and the idea of alignment between peoples’ personal values and 
the law. These problems are recognised by authors who highlight a potential for discrepant 
understandings of what constitutes a public “duty” to comply with the law and the police, and 
on what basis such judgements are made (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Murphy and Cherney, 
2012). Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) highlight a misplaced reliance in PJ on the notion that 
the law arises from societal values and that the peoples’ values mirror the value-worth of the 
law. Whilst this might be the case it is not universally so. 
 Perhaps the time has come to acknowledge that the empirical findings through PJ 
research have exceeded its theoretical framework. This is because most PJ research still uses 
Tyler’s (1990) original theory that was developed to explain why people comply with the law, 
and research has abounded into areas beyond his original theoretical framework. Moreover, 
as a general theory of compliance PJ might not have utility in every policing context, 
particularly in those such as protest where the police are so often seen as agents of the state 
and in which people more readily challenge the law and authority. Whilst obvious, protest 
scenarios are ones in which people often feel aggrieved about something that the state has 
done or is doing and wish to bring about change. These can only serve to magnify the 
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significance of context and intensify antecedents and contingencies to perceptions of police 
legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. Political demonstrations are a 
legitimate part of liberal democratic society but are not a “normal” everyday feature. Therefore, 
those engaged in protest are either doing something unusual and extraordinary, or if engaged 
routinely in protest, they are extraordinary individuals. This observation is a challenge for PJ 
theory which assumes a background of stability and order in society. 
The role of antecedents and contingents. 
The third theoretical implication of the thesis arises for both the ESIM and PJ. The ESIM’s 
theoretical claims have been examined alongside those of PJ since it currently appears to 
have pre-eminence as the means of understanding crowd dynamics, the development of 
collective conflict and (dis)order and for informing policing strategies based on facilitation and 
dialogue. Indeed, the two are increasingly linked in cognate literature about police legitimacy. 
However, while there is sometimes reference to the impact of historic grievances and social 
influences on social identities in crowds, the weight of antecedent notions of police 
(il)legitimacy appear downplayed as a precursory or predisposed mechanism operating at the 
personal, social and causal levels. In the ESIM, as we have seen there is a reliance on the 
emergent nature of notions of police illegitimacy at the time as a result of contact with the 
police.  
 In answering the research question of what additional factors can be associated with 
the construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to 
cooperation and compliance, a number are identified in the empirical data underpinning the 
CDM. The data demonstrate a wider range of contingents and antecedents than both PJ and 
the ESIM allow. Elsewhere, it has been a noted criticism of PJ research that antecedent beliefs 
about police legitimacy have a stronger impact than it suggests on interpretations of police 
activity and public perceptions of them (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Smith, 2007). The 
present work resonates with this observation and contributes further empirical evidence for it.  
 Social identity-based approaches to protest and public order policing in the form of the 
ESIM rely upon a somewhat unilateral approach that police tactics shape protesters’ social 
identity and determine the nature of group behaviour (Stott, 2009). I have argued that such a 
narrow focus does not provide sufficient explanatory power without due regard to the 
antecedents of protester attitudes to policing and preconceived notions of police legitimacy. I 
contend that any model reliant upon the agency of protesters’ perceptions must by necessity 
acknowledge and account for the presence and impact of these. In modelling a range of 
contextual influences in the CDM, it provides a tool for managing the policing of protest and 
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public order. The CDM enhances our understanding about why social identity-based 
approaches do or do not work every time in every circumstance. 
The concept of self-policing in groups 
The fourth theoretical implication relates to the notion of “self-policing” in crowd dynamics and 
adherence to group values. It is a contestable concept that might better be verbalised as 
protesters “controlling themselves” (Waddington, 1994b, p.195). The CDM highlights that 
people regulate themselves based on their personal values and assessments of right and 
wrong. Further, that whilst they may share moral alignment to a set of group rules, this is a 
personal choice and others may not share the same commitment.  
 Arguably, the use of the term “policing” implies that there is resort to or risk of sanction 
for non-compliance. Therefore, we might ask on what basis would strangers “police” each 
other in a group context? If we are to reject the classical reductionist notion of group think and 
the mob mentality then we must accept that individuals in crowds retain a personal, individual 
responsibility for their actions. Thus “self-policing” in the form of self-regulation may be a more 
accurate description of what occurs in protest crowds, understood on the basis of a personal 
value system rather than adherence to the requests or demands of other group members. 
Whilst the ESIM uses “self-policing” to denote a crowd regulating its behaviour in a positive 
way, that is to reduce conflict and disorder, it does not necessarily mean compliance with the 
law or those in authority. Understanding the moral parameters of protesters is useful for the 
police, even where they are in opposition to the law and policing. The CDM is an approach 
that gives a nuanced understanding of these parameters and opens opportunities for 
legitimate police responses. 
 The concept of “self-policing” used in the ESIM needs further clarity for its presence 
and utility to be thoroughly examined and tested empirically. Specifically, by addressing the 
questions of how it is conducted, by whom and on what basis, when it occurs in relation to 
points of contact with the police, how and why crowd members engage in it and on what basis 
they respond or not. Presently, it lacks definition and substance for its operationalisation by 
which it can be tested.  
Policy and professional practice implications 
Policy makers and those charged with the strategic implementation of policy might consider 
whether and to what extent PJ and the ESIM approaches to policing continue to be fit for 
purpose in light of what the CDM offers and the theoretical implications outlined above. 
Panaceas for policing and crime control seldom deliver what they promise with any longevity. 
From a professional practice perspective, a criticism levelled at academia is that for all the 
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research and theorising, sometimes little translates to policing practice (notwithstanding the 
clamour for “evidence-based policing”). As both an early career academic and a former 
practitioner I have sought to translate the theoretical and empirical content of the thesis into 
something of tangible use in the “real world” of policing. On balance, I would argue that caution 
be applied before PJ and the ESIM in their present forms become the mainstay for policy 
making and the practice of policing focusing on police legitimacy and crime control. 
Specifically, I identify three main implications of the thesis for policy and professional practice 
relating to: internal assessments of police legitimacy (under PEEL); training relating to protest 
and public order policing; police intelligence and information gathering for protest and public 
order events. These are set out below. 
Internal assessments of police legitimacy. 
In light of the critical analysis provided in chapter one, HMICFRS might reconsider the criteria 
used for assessing police legitimacy in PEEL inspections. It is clear that the present agenda 
is based on a conflation of procedural and organisational justice that is reliant on the notion of 
police legitimacy that suffers the problems already discussed. Specifically, this relates to the 
PEEL inspection criteria that a police force is legitimate where it has public consent, staff 
operating fairly, reasonably, effectively and lawfully and the trust and cooperation of the public 
(HMIC, 2016). However, as we have seen the police can behave entirely to the letter of the 
law yet garner little or no public support. Apart from limiting itself to a reliance on the same 
theoretical basis for police legitimacy that PJ and the ESIM do, PEEL is also an assessment 
made on conditions over which the police themselves have little if any control. No recognition 
of the antecedents and contingencies to police legitimacy are to be found in the PEEL 
inspection criteria. This is an anomaly that should be addressed if it is to more meaningfully 
describe and report on the state of policing.  
Training relating to protest and public order policing. 
HMICFRS and police forces might reconsider the content and conduct of police training and 
tactical guidance for protest and public order policing. It has an over reliance on the ESIM and 
PJ. Policing is political, highly context specific and not entirely consensual at the tactical and 
operational levels. That is not to say that pursuing fair and respectful treatment and aspiring 
to consensual legitimacy is not in some way a public good, but this is an altogether different 
proposition from one that sees it as the exclusive route to police legitimacy and cooperation 
and compliance in each and every policing circumstance. Thus, training and guidance in the 
area of protest and public order policing cannot hinge on such a general approach without 
significant, context specific empirical support. We have seen evidence of a potential reversal 
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relating to the use of the ESIM for the policing of public disorder in the wake of the August 
2011 riots. However, PJ continues to gain broad appeal across policing in the UK, without the 
accompanying context specific empirical support. 
 Whilst I have argued that there are limitations to the ESIM approach to establishing 
police legitimacy and questioned the notion of “self-policing” in crowds, it may not be 
appropriate to dismiss it entirely. Instead, it is better to seek ways in which some of the 
underlying features of the ESIM can be enhanced by it embracing the presence and impact of 
contextually- based influences and the antecedents and contingents to legitimacy as the CDM 
does. By placing less reliance on the idea of emerging social identities and by clarifying the 
concept of “self-policing” this is achievable. “Self-policing” is not necessarily synonymous with 
compliance and cooperation with the law and authority.  
 In the final analysis, PJ and the ESIM assume that violence and disorder is a failure of 
policing to create perceptions of police legitimacy. However, this is problematic for the policing 
of protest and public order for three reasons. Firstly, it may not be the case of a failure of 
policing at all because there are occasions when violence occurs despite the police use of PJ 
and the ESIM approaches. Secondly, making this assumption may serve to demoralise the 
police and undermines their trust in using PJ and the ESIM. Thirdly, an insistence on the police 
use of them denies the legitimacy of other ways of dealing with such violence and disorder, in 
a considered and informed way. The CDM gives us a better understanding of the motivations 
behind perceptions of police legitimacy and attitudes to compliance and cooperation. 
 An acceptance that in specific policing contexts attitudes do beget behaviour might 
reconcile the scenario of when ESIM-based policing does not work in reducing conflict and 
disorder: rather than seeing it as merely behaviour emanating from a reaction to police tactics. 
The CDM acknowledges the ESIM’s use of social identity and group norms within its 
constituent factors, while drawing upon a greater pool of contextual influences. It provides an 
enhanced heuristic tool for the policing of protest and public order. As such, the content and 
future development of training and policy in this area of policing should be revised. 
Intelligence and information gathering for policing protest and public order events. 
Enhancing the way that intelligence and information relating to protest is gathered will better 
inform its management and police decision-making. Strategically, in terms of the quality and 
standardisation of national and force-wide threat assessments for both pre-planned and 
spontaneous protest and public order situations. Tactically, in terms of enhancing dialogue-
based approaches with protesters and crowds. At both levels I would argue that introducing 
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the CDM as a template is likely to yield a more detailed and structured intelligence product 
than the current that is aimed at the “usual suspects and crime problems” associated with 
protest and public order events (HMIC, 2014b). 
 The dialogue-based approach to policing protest and public order that is advocated by 
the ESIM involves mediation (gaining mutual understanding), suggestion (providing and 
communicating options and solutions) and monitoring (of crowd mood, intentions and effects 
of police actions). A framework based on identifying and engaging with: protester 
constructions of policing; levels of engagement and distancing; power and identity 
relationships; and pre-existing ideology offers two benefits. Firstly, it would complement the 
mediation and monitoring aspects of dialogue by demonstrating that the police are cognisant 
of and interested in understanding protesters’ motivations, intentions and grievances. 
Secondly, it would improve the quantity and quality of the intelligence and information gathered 
which will assist in focusing police interventions with protesters. The CDM of police legitimacy 
provides a new framework by which information and intelligence can be gathered in a 
structured, usable and standardised format. I would encourage its extended application in 
dialogue-based policing approaches to protest and public order. This perhaps represents a 
future area of research. 
Context is everything 
Few would argue against attempts to enhance police legitimacy through fair and respectful 
treatment and processes. Certainly, I do not in this thesis. There is little doubt that focusing 
on improving these is a wholly desirable aim for the police and public. However, PJ and the 
ESIM do provide a soft explanation that does not withstand collision with the weight of 
theoretical and empirical evidence concerning the influences at work in the construction and 
shaping of protesters’ perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and 
cooperation. Therefore, a contextually driven model of police legitimacy is required. One that 
accounts for the diversity of antecedents and contingencies to police legitimacy and 
recognises the relevance of the policing context. The thesis has argued that police legitimacy, 
defined empirically, needs to be understood with regard to the policing context 
 The policing of protest and public order is at times a fraught venture and if the content 
and arguments of the thesis teach us anything the message is threefold. Firstly, that protester 
perceptions of police legitimacy and their attitudes to compliance and cooperation are not 
always synchronous with contemporaneous contact with the police. However well intended or 
delivered that contact is or is perceived to be, there are many contextually driven influences 
behind them. Secondly, that our conceptualising of police legitimacy cannot necessarily be 
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based on consensus, that is to say, through subjectivity and what people view as acceptable 
to them, whether or not it serves the rest of civil society. Whilst there are demonstrable factors 
that impact on the construction and shaping of empirical legitimacy and its correlates, this 
does not negate the argument that the law, its authority and that of its agents are justifiably 
legitimate by objective criteria. Thirdly, that in the context of protest, at times the best policing 
can do is engage in a contextually focused manner, act legitimately in the face of opposition 
or apathy and remain cognisant of the limitations inherent in the PJ and ESIM approaches. 
 Ultimately, basing the policing of protest and public order on the agency of empirical 
legitimacy without acknowledging its antecedents and contingencies, and the significance of 
context risks failing the police and public alike. Where perceptions of police legitimacy and 
attitudes to compliance and cooperation are concerned, context is everything. 
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Mr David Lydon  
c/o Department of Law and Criminal Justice Studies  
Faculty of Social and Applied Sciences 
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Confirmation of ethics compliance for your study “The impact of police and protester 
contact during protest events on protester perceptions of police legitimacy.” 
 
I have received a completed and countersigned Ethics Review Checklist dated 11 July 2010 
for the above project. Because you have answered “No” to all of the questions in Section B of 
the form, no further ethical review will be required under the terms of this University’s Research 
Ethics and Governance Procedures.  
In confirming compliance for your study, I must remind you that it is your responsibility to 
follow, as appropriate, the policies and procedures set out in the Research Governance 
Handbook (http://www.canterbury.ac.uk/research/governance/index.asp) and any relevant 
academic or professional guidelines. This includes providing, if appropriate, information 
sheets and consent forms, and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data. Any 
significant change in the question, design or conduct of the study over its course should be 
notified to the Research Office, and may require a new application for ethics approval. You 
are also required to inform me once this research study has been completed. Wishing you 
every success with your research. 
 
Yours sincerely  
Roger Bone  
Research Governance Manager  
Tel: +44 (0)1227 782940 ext 3272 (enter at prompt)  
Email: roger.bone@canterbury.ac.uk  
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Appendix 2 Study information sheet. 
 
 
Police legitimacy and the policing of protest: An investigation of the construction and shaping 
of protester perceptions of police legitimacy 
INFORMATION SHEET 
The Department of Law and Criminal Justice Studies at Canterbury Christ Church University (CCCU) is 
conducting research into perceptions of police legitimacy. The research seeks to examine the impact of 
contact with the police during protest events on views of trust and confidence and attitudes to cooperation 
and compliance. The research aims to identify whether people’s experiences during protest influence 
their perceptions of trust and confidence in the police and to determine the impact of this on attitudes to 
comply and cooperate with the law.  
The research is being conducted by field-based survey interviews and researcher observation 
supported by video and still photography. 
It consists of structured and semi structured interviews with people attending protest events. The 
interviews consist of a structured survey questionnaire with opportunity to comment on specific answers 
and in situ interviews with people at protest events. 
The principal researcher for the study is David Lydon who is a post graduate student at Canterbury 
Christ Church University and a serving Police officer. The research is unconnected to the researcher’s 
employment status or role as a police officer. 
Background 
Public confidence and trust in the police is vital to a successful relationship between the police and 
public. The research is aimed at investigating perceptions of police legitimacy at protest events and 
attitudes to cooperation with the police. The information generated by this research will be used as the 
basis for a post-graduate thesis. It is anticipated that the findings will influence the policing of protest 
and demonstrations in England and Wales and enhance the way that the police engage with the public 
during protest events. 
What will you be required to do? 
You will be invited to take part in an interview using a questionnaire whilst participating in a protest event 
or be willing to participate in answering questions by the researcher. The questionnaire will be 
administered by the researcher and you will have opportunity to comment on some questions to clarify 
the answers given. 
To participate in this research, you must: 
Have opportunity to sign the consent form. 
Participate by completing a questionnaire at the protest event or answer questions asked by the 
researcher before, during or after the event. 
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Procedures 
After participating in the protest event you may be asked to complete a questionnaire or interview.  The 
questionnaire/interview will ask you questions about: 
Your previous experience of the police; 
Your experience of attending protest events in the past; 
Your views on the contact with the police during the specific event 
The level of satisfaction that you felt in terms of: 
Quality of police contact;  
Fair and just treatment;  
Treated with respect and dignity;  
How well the police did their job; 
Your general perceptions as a result of the contact on trust and confidence in the police after the event 
and willingness to comply with police requests and the law. 
Confidentiality 
All data and any personal information will be stored securely and in accordance with the Data Protection 
Act 1998. Please note that the questionnaire itself does not require any personal details that 
could be used to establish your name, address or identity in any way. 
The data collected will only be accessed by David Lydon. All electronic data will be stored on the 
researcher’s computer in password protected files, paper documents will be stored in a secure cabinet 
which only the researcher has access to.  
After completion of the study, all data anonymised (i.e. all personal information associated with the data 
will be removed). Please note that you under no obligation to provide any personal, identifying 
information. 
The retention period for material has been set at 12 months after completion of the thesis submission.  
After this period all confidential material will be destroyed. To guarantee anonymity the researcher will 
not ask you for personal contact details or specifically about any behaviour that may constitute a criminal 
offence. 
Deciding Whether to Participate 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study, procedures or requirements for participation in 
the study do not hesitate to contact me or the University. 
Should you decide to participate, involvement is voluntary and you will be free to withdraw at any time 
from the interview processes. 
Do you have any Questions?  
Please contact David Lydon at: 
The Department of Law and Criminal Justice Studies, 
Canterbury Christ Church University, 
North Holmes Road, Canterbury, KENT.CT1 1QU.or email: dpl10@canterbury.ac.uk 
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Appendix 3 Consent form. 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Research Project: Police legitimacy and the policing of protest: An investigation of the 
construction and shaping of protester perceptions of police legitimacy. 
Name of Researcher: David LYDON 
Contact details:   
Address:  
School of Law, Criminal Justice and Computing 
Canterbury Christ Church University 
North Holmes Road 
Canterbury 
   
   
   
Tel:  07894603304 
   
Email:  dpl10@canterbury.ac.uk 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions. 
  
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without 
giving any reason and that I have the right to be anonymous. 
  
3. I understand that any personal information that I may provide to the researcher(s) will be kept strictly 
confidential 
  
4. I agree to take part in the above study.   
 
________________________ ________________            ____________________ 
Name of Participant (if given) Date Signature 
_________________________ ________________            ____________________ 
Name of Person taking consent Date Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
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Appendix 4 Phase 1 Survey questionnaire. 
 
Survey Questionnaire 
I would like to ask some questions about you and your general views about the U.K. 
police before you took part in the event. Please answer ALL of the questions in the 
survey. 
Q1 Please circle below to indicate your age range. 
16-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+ 
 
Q2 Gender (Please tick to indicate) 
Male- Female- 
 
 
Q3 To which of these ethnic groups do you consider you belong? 
(Please tick only ONE in the box below). 
1 White – British  9 Asian or Asian British – 
Pakistani 
 
2 White – Irish  10 Asian or Asian British – 
Bangladeshi 
 
3 White – Other White Background  11 Asian or Asian British – Other 
Asian Background 
 
4 Mixed – White and Black Caribbean  12 Black or Black British – 
Caribbean 
 
5 Mixed – White and Black African  13 Black or Black British – 
African 
 
6 Mixed – White and Asian  14 Black or Black British – Other 
Black Background 
 
7 Mixed – Any Other Mixed Background  15 Chinese  
8 Asian or Asian British – Indian  16 Other  
 
Interview URN DL- 
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Q4 In the past two years did the police approach you, stop you or make contact with you 
for any reason? If Yes, go to Q5. If No (or Don’t know), go to Q6. 
Yes- No- (Don’t Know) 
 
 
Q5 How dissatisfied or satisfied were you with the way the police treated you the last time 
that this happened? 
 
Very dissatisfied Dissatisfied Neither satisfied 
or dissatisfied 
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
     
 
Q6 Taking everything you know about the police into account do they do a good job or a 
bad job? 
 
Very good job Good job Neither good or 
bad job 
Bad job Very bad job 
     
 
Q6 Cont. - Why do you say that? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……… 
The following are statements about the U.K. police in general. Please indicate your 
views on the statements below using the scale provided.  
Q7 Taking everything I know about the police into account I have confidence in the police. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
     
Q8 The police generally treat people fairly9. 
                                                          
9Fairly in the sense of Unbiased and without prejudice. 
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Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
     
 
Q9 I generally support how the police usually act. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
     
 
Q10 The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong10 as I do. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
     
 
Q11 The police stand11 for values that are important to me. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
     
 
Please answer the following questions below using the scale provided where 0 is never 
and 4 is always. 
Q12 How often would you say that the police take bribes12? 
Never    Always (Don’t Know) 
0 1 2 3 4  
                                                          
Treated in the sense of how the police responded  to and deal with people. 
10Sense of right and wrong’ in terms of ‘feeling of morally right or wrong from a personal point of view’. 
 
‘Stand’ as in the sense of ‘defend/uphold/promote’ 
12 Bribe as in money or any other inducement to influence them. 
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Q13 How often would you say that the police deliberately give false evidence13 to the 
courts? 
Never    Always (Don’t Know) 
0 1 2 3 4  
 
Q14 How often would you say the police use more force than is legally allowed when 
making arrests? 
Never    Always (Don’t Know) 
0 1 2 3 4  
 
The following questions concern your personal beliefs about following the law in 
general. Please indicate your views to the statements below using the scale provided. 
 
Q15 I always try to follow the law even if I think it is wrong. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
or disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
     
 
Q16 Disobeying the law is hardly ever justified. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree  
or disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
     
 
Q17 It is hard to blame someone for breaking the law if they can get away with it. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
or disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
     
 
                                                          
13 Evidence as in witness testimony or other materials provided to a court as part of the prosecution case 
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Below are specific questions about the policing of the event itself. Based on your 
personal experience of the event please consider the statements and indicate your views 
using the scale provided. 
Q18 Overall, did the police do a bad job or a good job in policing the event? 
Very bad job Bad job Neither good 
or bad job 
Good job Very good job 
     
Why do you say that? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……… 
Q19 I had confidence in the way that the police dealt with the event. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
or disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
     
 
Q20 How dissatisfied or satisfied were you with the way that you were treated14 by the 
police during the event? 
Extremely 
dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied  
or dissatisfied 
Satisfied Extremely 
satisfied 
     
 
Q21 The police treated people fairly15 at the event. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
or disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
     
 
                                                          
14Treated in the sense of how the police responded  to and deal with people. 
15 Unbiased and  without prejudice. 
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Q22 I would support16 how the police acted during the event. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
or disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
     
 
The following questions are about what you see as your public duty17towards the police 
during your participation in the event. Please indicate your views where 0 is not at all 
your duty and 4is completely your duty.  
 Q23 To what extent is it your duty to support the decisions made by the police 
even if you disagree with them? 
Not at all my duty    Completely my 
duty 
 
0 1 2 3 4  
Q24 To what extent is it your duty to do what the police tell you even if you didn’t 
understand or agree with the reason(s)? 
Not at all my 
duty 
   Completely my 
duty 
 
0 1 2 3 4  
 
Q25 To what extent is it your duty to do what the police tell you to do even if you didn’t 
like how they were treating you? 
Not at all my 
duty 
   Completely my 
duty 
 
0 1 2 3 4  
 
Any other comment(s) about the issues raised by this questionnaire that you would like 
to add? 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Support as in ‘back’ their actions 
17‘Duty’ in the sense of your public, moral duty to the state as a citizen. 
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Appendix 5 SPSS outputs and distributions 
Demographics 
Statistics 
Age range 
N 
Valid 65 
Missing 0 
Age range 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
 25 38.5 38.5 38.5 
16-19 years 6 9.2 9.2 47.7 
20-24 years 18 27.7 27.7 75.4 
25-29 years 3 4.6 4.6 80.0 
30-34 years 2 3.1 3.1 83.1 
35-39 years 4 6.2 6.2 89.2 
40-44 years 1 1.5 1.5 90.8 
45-49 years 2 3.1 3.1 93.8 
50-54 years 3 4.6 4.6 98.5 
55-59 years 1 1.5 1.5 100.0 
Total 65 100.0 100.0 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Ethnicity 40 1 16 2.93 4.480 
Valid N (listwise) 40 
    
 
  
254 
 
(General Trust and Confidence/Everything into account) 
 
 
 
255 
 
 
 
 
 
256 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Q9 (Moral Alignment/Support for police 
actions generally) 
.312 40 .000 .838 40 .000 
Q10 (Moral Alignment/Same sense of right 
and wrong) 
.240 40 .000 .798 40 .000 
Q11 (Moral Alignment/Stand for Values) .245 40 .000 .819 40 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
257 
 
 
 
 
 
258 
 
 
 
 
259 
 
 
 
 
260 
 
 
 
 
261 
 
 
 
 
262 
 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Q15 (I Try to follow the Law) .189 40 .001 .873 40 .000 
Q16 (Justification to disobey the Law) .284 40 .000 .768 40 .000 
Q17 (Hard to blame Law breakers) .295 40 .000 .845 40 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Visual binned variables for analysis 
Notes 
Output Created 29-JAN-2014 21:49:24 
Comments  
Input 
Data C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 65 
Missing Value 
Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used All non-missing data are used. 
Syntax 
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=TotalGenTrust 
TotalEventTreatment TotalCompliance 
TotalMoralAlign TotalPolLegal 
TotalPersValues 
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX 
KURTOSIS SKEWNESS. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.00 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.00 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Std. 
Error 
TotalGeneralTrust 40 3.00 11.00 7.0250 2.52665 -.009 .374 -.932 .733 
TotalEventTreat 39 4.00 16.00 12.3077 2.98376 -.553 .378 -.188 .741 
TotalCompandCoop 40 3.00 9.00 5.5750 2.36304 .466 .374 -1.436 .733 
TotalMoralAlignment 40 3.00 12.00 6.0500 2.34193 .681 .374 -.177 .733 
TotalPoliceLegality 24 5.00 13.00 8.2083 2.04257 .160 .472 -.010 .918 
TotalPersonalValues 40 2.00 9.00 4.4000 1.91887 .585 .374 -.161 .733 
Valid N (listwise) 24         
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Notes 
Output Created 29-JAN-2014 21:56:11 
Comments  
Input 
Data C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 65 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User defined missing values are treated 
as missing. 
Cases Used All non-missing data are used. 
Syntax 
DESCRIPTIVES 
VARIABLES=TotalLegitimacy 
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX 
KURTOSIS SKEWNESS. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.00 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.00 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Std. 
Error 
Total Police 
Legitimacy 
24 14.00 41.00 25.9583 7.74304 .293 .472 -.661 .918 
Valid N (listwise) 24         
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Notes 
Output Created 29-JAN-2014 22:01:51 
Comments  
Input 
Data C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 65 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values for 
dependent variables are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no 
missing values for the dependent variable 
or factor(s) being analyzed. 
Syntax 
EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalGenTrust 
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT 
/COMPARE GROUPS 
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES 
EXTREME 
/CINTERVAL 95 
/MISSING PAIRWISE 
/NOTOTAL. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:02.28 
Elapsed Time 00:00:01.54 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Total General Trust and Confidence 40 61.5% 25 38.5% 65 100.0% 
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Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Total General Trust and 
Confidence 
Mean 7.0250 .39950 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound 6.2169  
Upper Bound 7.8331  
5% Trimmed Mean 7.0278  
Median 7.0000  
Variance 6.384  
Std. Deviation 2.52665  
Minimum 3.00  
Maximum 11.00  
Range 8.00  
Interquartile Range 3.75  
Skewness -.009 .374 
Kurtosis -.932 .733 
 
Extreme Values 
 Case Number Value 
TotalGeneralTrustandConfidence 
Highest 
1 2 11.00 
2 3 11.00 
3 16 11.00 
4 24 11.00 
5 40 11.00 
Lowest 
1 36 3.00 
2 35 3.00 
3 33 3.00 
4 22 3.00 
5 21 3.00 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TotalGeneralTrustandConfidence .104 40 .200* .939 40 .032 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Variable: Total General Trust and Confidence 
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Notes 
Output Created 29-JAN-2014 22:09:13 
Comments  
Input 
Data C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 65 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values for 
dependent variables are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no 
missing values for the dependent variable 
or factor(s) being analyzed. 
Syntax 
EXAMINE 
VARIABLES=TotalEventTreatment 
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT 
/COMPARE GROUPS 
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES 
EXTREME 
/CINTERVAL 95 
/MISSING PAIRWISE 
/NOTOTAL. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.75 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.72 
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Case Processing Summary  
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
TotalEventTreat 39 60.0% 26 40.0% 65 100.0% 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
TotalEventTreat 
Mean 12.3077 .47778 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound 11.3405  
Upper Bound 13.2749  
5% Trimmed Mean 12.4558  
Median 13.0000  
Variance 8.903  
Std. Deviation 2.98376  
Minimum 4.00  
Maximum 16.00  
Range 12.00  
Interquartile Range 5.00  
Skewness -.553 .378 
Kurtosis -.188 .741 
 
Extreme Values 
 Case Number Value 
TotalEventTreat 
Highest 
1 5 16.00 
2 6 16.00 
3 7 16.00 
4 9 16.00 
5 11 16.00a 
Lowest 
1 33 4.00 
2 39 8.00 
3 36 8.00 
4 30 8.00 
5 37 9.00b 
a. Only a partial list of cases with the value 16.00 are shown in the table of upper extremes. 
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Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TotalEventTreat .176 39 .004 .923 39 .010 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Variable: Total Event Treatment 
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Notes 
Output Created 29-JAN-2014 22:11:35 
Comments  
Input 
Data C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 65 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values for 
dependent variables are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no 
missing values for the dependent variable 
or factor(s) being analyzed. 
Syntax 
EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalCompliance 
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT 
/COMPARE GROUPS 
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES 
EXTREME 
/CINTERVAL 95 
/MISSING PAIRWISE 
/NOTOTAL. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.70 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.72 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
TotalCompandCooperation 40 61.5% 25 38.5% 65 100.0% 
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Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
TotalCompandCooperation 
Mean 5.5750 .37363 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound 4.8193  
Upper Bound 6.3307  
5% Trimmed Mean 5.5278  
Median 4.5000  
Variance 5.584  
Std. Deviation 2.36304  
Minimum 3.00  
Maximum 9.00  
Range 6.00  
Interquartile Range 4.75  
Skewness .466 .374 
Kurtosis -1.436 .733 
 
Extreme Values 
 Case Number Value 
TotalCompandCooperation 
Highest 
1 2 9.00 
2 3 9.00 
3 5 9.00 
4 6 9.00 
5 8 9.00a 
Lowest 
1 37 3.00 
2 36 3.00 
3 34 3.00 
4 33 3.00 
5 32 3.00b 
a. Only a partial list of cases with the value 9.00 are shown in the table of upper extremes. 
b. Only a partial list of cases with the value 3.00 are shown in the table of lower extremes. 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TotalCompandCooperation .247 40 .000 .821 40 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Variable: Total Compliance and Cooperation 
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Notes 
Output Created 29-JAN-2014 22:13:39 
Comments  
Input 
Data C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 65 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values for 
dependent variables are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no 
missing values for the dependent variable 
or factor(s) being analyzed. 
Syntax 
EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalMoralAlign 
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT 
/COMPARE GROUPS 
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES 
EXTREME 
/CINTERVAL 95 
/MISSING PAIRWISE 
/NOTOTAL. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.86 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.83 
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Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
TotalMoralAlignment 40 61.5% 25 38.5% 65 100.0% 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
TotalMoralAlignment 
Mean 6.0500 .37029 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound 5.3010  
Upper Bound 6.7990  
5% Trimmed Mean 5.9167  
Median 6.0000  
Variance 5.485  
Std. Deviation 2.34193  
Minimum 3.00  
Maximum 12.00  
Range 9.00  
Interquartile Range 3.00  
Skewness .681 .374 
Kurtosis -.177 .733 
Extreme Values 
 Case Number Value 
TotalMoralAlignment 
Highest 
1 24 12.00 
2 16 11.00 
3 3 10.00 
4 5 10.00 
5 2 9.00a 
Lowest 
1 36 3.00 
2 33 3.00 
3 22 3.00 
4 18 3.00 
5 39 4.00b 
a. Only a partial list of cases with the value 9.00 are shown in the table of upper extremes. 
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Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TotalMoralAlignment .184 40 .001 .920 40 .008 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Variable: Total Moral Alignment 
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Notes 
Output Created 29-JAN-2014 22:15:18 
Comments  
Input 
Data C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 65 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values for 
dependent variables are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no 
missing values for the dependent variable 
or factor(s) being analyzed. 
Syntax 
EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalPolLegal 
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT 
/COMPARE GROUPS 
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES 
EXTREME 
/CINTERVAL 95 
/MISSING PAIRWISE 
/NOTOTAL. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.70 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.72 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
TotalPoliceLegality 24 36.9% 41 63.1% 65 100.0% 
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Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
TotalPoliceLegality 
Mean 8.2083 .41694 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound 7.3458  
Upper Bound 9.0708  
5% Trimmed Mean 8.1389  
Median 9.0000  
Variance 4.172  
Std. Deviation 2.04257  
Minimum 5.00  
Maximum 13.00  
Range 8.00  
Interquartile Range 2.75  
Skewness .160 .472 
Kurtosis -.010 .918 
Extreme Values 
 Case Number Value 
TotalPoliceLegality 
Highest 
1 3 13.00 
2 23 11.00 
3 24 11.00 
4 26 10.00 
5 5 9.00a 
Lowest 
1 35 5.00 
2 21 5.00 
3 11 5.00 
4 40 6.00 
5 22 6.00b 
a. Only a partial list of cases with the value 9.00 are shown in the table of upper extremes. 
b. Only a partial list of cases with the value 6.00 are shown in the table of lower extremes. 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TotalPoliceLegality .193 24 .022 .931 24 .102 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Variable: Total Police Legality 
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Notes 
Output Created 29-JAN-2014 22:16:35 
Comments  
Input 
Data C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 65 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values for 
dependent variables are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no 
missing values for the dependent variable 
or factor(s) being analyzed. 
Syntax 
EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalPersValues 
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT 
/COMPARE GROUPS 
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES 
EXTREME 
/CINTERVAL 95 
/MISSING PAIRWISE 
/NOTOTAL. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.76 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.83 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
TotalPersonalValues 40 61.5% 25 38.5% 65 100.0% 
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Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
TotalPersonalValues 
Mean 4.4000 .30340 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound 3.7863  
Upper Bound 5.0137  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.2778  
Median 4.0000  
Variance 3.682  
Std. Deviation 1.91887  
Minimum 2.00  
Maximum 9.00  
Range 7.00  
Interquartile Range 2.75  
Skewness .585 .374 
Kurtosis -.161 .733 
Extreme Values 
 Case Number Value 
TotalPersonalValues 
Highest 
1 2 9.00 
2 40 9.00 
3 3 7.00 
4 10 7.00 
5 15 7.00a 
Lowest 
1 36 2.00 
2 34 2.00 
3 33 2.00 
4 25 2.00 
5 23 2.00b 
a. Only a partial list of cases with the value 7.00 are shown in the table of upper extremes. 
b. Only a partial list of cases with the value 2.00 are shown in the table of lower extremes. 
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  Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TotalPersonalValues .142 40 .041 .921 40 .008 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Variable: Total Personal Values 
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Notes 
Output Created 29-JAN-2014 22:18:37 
Comments  
Input 
Data C:\Users\Dave\Documents\DatasetV5.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 65 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values for 
dependent variables are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no 
missing values for the dependent variable 
or factor(s) being analyzed. 
Syntax 
EXAMINE VARIABLES=TotalLegitimacy 
/PLOT BOXPLOT HISTOGRAM NPPLOT 
/COMPARE GROUPS 
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES 
EXTREME 
/CINTERVAL 95 
/MISSING PAIRWISE 
/NOTOTAL. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00.76 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.84 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
TotalPoliceLegitimacy 24 36.9% 41 63.1% 65 100.0% 
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Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
TotalPoliceLegitimacy 
Mean 25.9583 1.58054 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound 22.6887  
Upper Bound 29.2279  
5% Trimmed Mean 25.8056  
Median 24.5000  
Variance 59.955  
Std. Deviation 7.74304  
Minimum 14.00  
Maximum 41.00  
Range 27.00  
Interquartile Range 11.00  
Skewness .293 .472 
Kurtosis -.661 .918 
Extreme Values 
 Case Number Value 
TotalPoliceLegitimacy 
Highest 
1 3 41.00 
2 24 39.00 
3 16 37.00 
4 2 35.00 
5 40 35.00 
Lowest 
1 22 14.00 
2 21 14.00 
3 35 15.00 
4 1 17.00 
5 11 19.00 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TotalPoliceLegitimacy .133 24 .200* .959 24 .414 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Variable: Total Police Legitimacy 
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Phase 1 trust and confidence histogram. 
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Frequency distributions for the binned variables 
General trust and confidence 
in the police score values 
Frequency Percentages 
3.00 5 12.5% 
4.00 3 7.5% 
5.00 2 5.0% 
6.00 7 17.5% 
7.00 7 17.5% 
8.00 4 10.0% 
9.00 4 10.0% 
10.00 3 7.5% 
11.00 5 12.5% 
Total 40 100% 
 
Distribution of scores for general trust and confidence in the police. 
 
Phase 1 moral alignment with police histogram. 
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Protester moral alignment 
with the police score values 
Frequency Percentage 
3.00 4 10.0% 
4.00 11 27.5% 
5.00 3 7.5% 
6.00 5 12.5% 
7.00 8 20.0% 
8.00 3 7.5% 
9.00 2 5.0% 
10.00 2 5.0% 
11.00 1 2.5% 
12.00 1 2.5% 
Total 40 100% 
N.B. The higher value the more favourable assessments by participants                                                    
 
 
Phase 1 police legality histogram. 
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Protester perceptions of 
police legality score values 
Frequency Percentage 
5.00 3 12.5% 
6.00 3 12.5% 
7.00 2 8.3% 
8.00 3 12.5% 
9.00 9 37.5% 
10.00 1 4.2% 
11.00 2 8.3% 
13.00 1 4.2% 
Total 24* 100% 
*n=24 due to the Don’t Know option for scale items which effects the overall scoring of the variable. N.B. The higher value the 
more favourable assessments by participants                                                                                                
Distribution of scores for perceptions of police legality. 
 
Phase 1 personal values about the law histogram. 
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Protester personal values 
about the law 
Score values 
Frequency Percentage 
2.00 8 20% 
3.00 7 17.5% 
4.00 6 15.0% 
5.00 9 22.5% 
6.00 4 10.0% 
7.00 4 10.0% 
9.00 2 5.0% 
Total 40 100% 
N.B. The higher value the more favourable assessments by participants                                                                
Distribution of scores for personal values about the law. 
 
 
Phase 1 perceptions of event treatment histogram. 
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Phase 1 perceptions of confidence histogram. 
 
Phase 1 satisfaction level histogram. 
 
Phase 1 perceptions of fair treatment histogram. 
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Phase 1 personal support histogram. 
 
Phase 1 total event treatment histogram. 
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Protester perceptions of 
event treatment by the police 
Score values 
Frequency Percentage 
4.00 1 2.6% 
8.00 3 7.7% 
9.00 3 7.7% 
10.00 5 12.8% 
11.00 5 12.8% 
12.00 2 5.1% 
13.00 2 5.1% 
14.00 7 17.9% 
15.00 4 10.3% 
16.00 7 17.9% 
Total 39* 100% 
*1 missing entry on a respondents survey entry N.B. The higher value the more favourable assessments by participants                       
Distribution of scores for protester perceptions of event treatment. 
 
Phase 1 total police legitimacy histogram. 
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Protester perceptions of 
police legitimacy 
Score values 
Frequency Percentage 
14.00 2 8.3% 
15.00 1 4.2% 
17.00 1 4.2% 
19.00 1 4.2% 
21.00 1 4.2% 
22.00 1 4.2% 
23.00 3 12.5% 
24.00 2 8.3% 
25.00 2 8.3% 
26.00 1 4.2% 
28.00 1 4.2% 
30.00 2 8.3% 
33.00 1 4.2% 
35.00 2 8.3% 
37.00 1 4.2% 
39.00 1 4.2% 
41.00 1 4.2% 
Total 24 100% 
N.B. The higher the  value the more favourable assessments by participants                                                                
Distribution of scores for protester perceptions of police legitimacy. 
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Phase 1 total compliance and cooperation histogram. 
 
Protester levels of 
compliance and cooperation 
with the police 
Score values 
Frequency Percentage 
3 9 22.5% 
4 11 27.5% 
5 3 7.5% 
6 3 7.5% 
7 3 7.5% 
8 1 2.5% 
9 10 25.0% 
Total 40 100% 
N.B. The higher the value the more favourable assessments by participants                                                                
Distribution of scores for protester levels of compliance and cooperation. 
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Phase 1 scatterplot for general trust and confidence. 
 
Phase 1 scatterplot for event treatment. 
 
Phase 1 scatterplot for moral alignment. 
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Phase 1 scatterplot for personal values. 
 
Phase 1 scatterplot for police legality. 
 
Phase 1 scatterplot for police legitimacy. 
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Appendix 6 Interview plan template. 
 
Phase 2 Interview/Observation template 
Date- 
 
Event- 
 
Location- 
 
Time commenced- 
Time concluded- 
 
Interview/Focus group/Observation/Notes (Select) 
Constructions of policing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Engagement and distancing 
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Power and identity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideology 
 
Addt. Notes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any emerging/repeating themes 
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Observation Notes (any supporting video/photographic?) 
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Appendix 7 Phase 2 factors data index. 
Factor – Constructions of policing 
Event URN Category/sub 
category 
TUC N30 March 2011 SQ21 Tactics and 
functionality 
Unite against Fascism rally 2015 UAF1 Tactics and 
functionality 
TUC N30 March 2011 SQ18 Tactics and 
functionality 
March 4 Jobs 2011 SQ8 Tactics and 
functionality 
Unite against Fascism rally 2015 UAF3 Tactics and 
functionality 
Students against Cuts 2011 SAC1 Tactics and 
functionality 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson march 
2009 
J4IT5 Tactics and 
functionality 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson march 
(Photo media) 2009 
SDV09 Tactics and 
functionality 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson march 
(Photo media) 2009 
SDV10 Tactics and 
functionality 
TUC N30 March 2011 SQ17 Police roles 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson march 
2009 
J4IT5 Police roles 
TUC March 2012 SQ32 Police roles 
 
Unite against Fascism rally 2015 UAF9 Police roles 
 
March 4 Jobs 2011 SQ12 Police roles 
 
Re Imagine Democracy rally 2015 RID4 Police roles 
 
Occupy London Stock Exchange 
2011 
SQ3 Police roles 
March 4 Jobs 2011 SQ5 Police roles 
 
Anti- Abortion static protest 2015 Ab671 Police roles 
 
Imprisonment for Public protection 
rally 2015 
IPP2 Police roles 
Unite against Fascism rally 2015 Tac1 Police roles 
 
Unite against Fascism rally 2015 UAF1 Police roles 
 
Unite against Fascism rally 2015 UAF4 Police roles 
 
Democracy rally 2010 DR1 Police roles 
 
March 4 Jobs 2011 SQ11 Police Integrity 
 
TUC N30 March 2011 SQ22 Police Integrity 
 
TUC March 2012 SQ35 Police Integrity 
 
Re Imagine Democracy rally 2015 RID2 Police Integrity 
 
TUC N30 2011 SQ23 Police Integrity 
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Justice for Ian Tomlinson march 
(Speaker) 2009 
J4ITS1 Police Integrity 
Re Imagine Democracy rally 2015 RID3 Police Integrity 
 
Occupy Parliament square 2014 OPS3 Police legality and 
trust 
Re Imagine Democracy rally 2015 
(legal observer) 
LO2 Police legality and 
trust 
Democracy rally 2010 DR1 Police legality and 
trust 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson march 
2009 
J4IT5 Police legality and 
trust 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson march 
(Speaker) 2009 
J4ITS1 Narratives 
Unite against Fascism rally 2015 UAF10 Narratives 
 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA3 Narratives 
 
TUC N30 2011 SQ17 Narratives 
 
March 4 Jobs 2011 SQ6 Narratives 
 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA5 Narratives 
 
 
Factor– Power and Identity 
Event URN Category/sub 
category 
Occupy Parliament square 2014  OPS1 Change agents 
 
Re Imagine Democracy rally 2015 RID1 Change agents 
 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA3 Change agents 
 
Occupy Parliament square 2014  OPS1 Identity/Type of 
protester/rule setting 
Occupy Parliament square 2014 OPS2 Identity/Type of 
protester/rule setting 
Occupy London Stock Exchange 
2011 
SQ3 Identity/Type of 
protester/rule setting 
Unite against Fascism rally 2015 UAF1 Identity/Type of 
protester/rule setting 
Occupy Parliament square 2014  OPS4 Empowerment 
 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA1 Empowerment 
 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA2 Empowerment 
 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson march 
2009 
J4IT2 Empowerment 
Students against Cuts 2011 SAC4 Empowerment 
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Factor – Engagement and distancing 
Event URN Category/sub 
category 
Occupy Parliament square 2014  OPS1 Police alignment 
 
Occupy Parliament square 2014  OPS3 Police alignment 
 
Unite against Fascism rally 2015 UAF3 Police alignment 
 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson march 
(speaker) 2009 
J4ITS1 Police alignment 
TUC March 2012 SQ30 Police alignment 
 
Unite against Fascism rally 2015 UAF9 Police alignment 
 
Occupy Parliament square 2014 OPS2 Personal values/Legal 
recognition 
Occupy Parliament square 2014  OPS4 Personal values/Legal 
recognition 
Re Imagine Democracy rally 2015 RID4 Personal values/Legal 
recognition 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA1 Personal values/Legal 
recognition 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA2 Personal values/Legal 
recognition 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA6 Personal values/Legal 
recognition 
Occupy London Stock Exchange 
2011 
SQ2 Personal values/Legal 
recognition 
TUC March Feeder demo 2012 TFD2 Personal values/Legal 
recognition 
TUC March Feeder demo 2012 
(video media) 
SDVSFM Personal values/Legal 
recognition 
Students against Cuts 2011 SAC2 Personal values/Legal 
recognition 
Unite against Fascism rally 2015 
(Magazine seller) 
BSBF1 Compliance 
Students against Cuts 2011 SAC2 Compliance 
 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA1 Compliance 
 
Re Imagine Democracy rally 2015 RID6 Compliance 
 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA6 Compliance 
 
Occupy London Stock exchange SQ2 Compliance 
 
TUC March Feeder demo 2012 TFD2 Compliance 
 
March 4 Jobs 2011 SQ4 Compliance 
 
March 4 Jobs 2011 SQ7 Compliance 
 
TUC N30 2011 SQ16 Compliance 
 
TUC N30 2011 SQ17 Compliance 
 
TUC March 2012 SQ27 Compliance 
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TUC March 2012 SQ31 Compliance 
 
 
Factor- Ideology 
Event URN Category/sub category 
Occupy Parliament square 
2014  
OPS5 Political bases 
 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson 
march 2009 
J4IT1 Political bases 
Unite against Fascism rally 
2015 
UAF9 Political bases 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA5 Political bases 
Unite against Fascism rally 
2015 
UAF8 Political bases 
Anti- Abortion static protest 
2015 
Ab671 Political bases 
Unite against Fascism rally 
2015 
UAF2 Issue bases 
Unite against Fascism rally 
2015 
UAF6 Issue bases 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson 
march 2009 
J4IT3 Issue bases 
Occupy Parliament square 
2014 
OPS4 Issue bases 
 
The People’s Assembly 2015 TPA3 State agents 
 
Re Imagine Democracy rally 
2015 
RID5 State agents 
Occupy London Stock 
Exchange 2011 
SQ1 State agents 
Imprisonment for Public 
protection rally 2015 
IPP1 State agents 
March 4 Jobs 2011 SQ5 State agents 
 
March 4 Jobs 2011 SQ6 State agents 
 
TUC March 2012 SQ26 State agents 
 
March 4 Jobs 2011 SQ7 State agents 
 
TUC N30 2011 SQ19 State agents 
 
Justice for Ian Tomlinson 
march 2009 
J4IT1 State agents 
 
 
 
 
 
